Administrative Law - ONCJ

An application under section 74 of the Firearms Act to review the Chief Firearms Officer's decision to revoke the applicant's firearms licence.

The applicant, a retired military officer with PTSD and a history of alcohol abuse, had his licence revoked following several incidents involving mental health crises and impaired driving between October 2017 and September 2018.

The applicant sought to overturn the revocation, presenting new medical evidence from specialized treatment providers indicating significant improvement in his condition, abstinence from alcohol, and minimal risk regarding firearm possession.

The court found the original decision reasonable but determined that the new medical evidence was substantial enough to undermine the factual assumptions underlying the revocation decision and granted the application.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with a Property Standards Order issued by the City of Pickering under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The order required the defendant to remedy violations on his residential property, including removing inoperative vehicles, garbage, and debris from the yard by May 17, 2018.

When the defendant failed to comply, the municipality attended the property with contractors and removed items from the yard.

The defendant challenged the conviction on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected both Charter applications and convicted the defendant.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection on grounds of risk of physical harm and risk of emotional harm, a disposition order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised access to the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had not established a genuine issue requiring trial on either ground for finding.

The court noted that while the father exhibited difficult behaviour, there was no credible evidence of a mental health disorder causally connected to risk of physical harm, and no evidence of emotional harm to the children.

The court also expressed concerns about the disposition sought and the practical feasibility of the proposed access arrangement.

The Crown brought an application to vacate the preliminary inquiry date and remand the accused to Superior Court following amendments to the Criminal Code effective September 19, 2019, which restricted preliminary inquiries to offences carrying a maximum sentence of fourteen years or more.

The accused had elected for trial by judge and jury with a preliminary inquiry prior to the amendments coming into force.

The court considered whether the amendments applied retrospectively to cases already in the system.

The court found that a Superior Court decision on a prerogative writ application (R. v. R.S., 2019 ONSC 5497) was binding authority establishing that the amendments applied retrospectively as procedural changes affecting court jurisdiction.

The Crown's application was allowed, the preliminary inquiry was vacated, and the accused was given the opportunity to re-elect pursuant to section 536(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed her conviction under the Building Code Act and brought two motions: (1) to bifurcate the appeal into separate hearings on different grounds, and (2) to perfect the appeal without filing all trial transcripts due to financial constraints.

The trial lasted 8 days over 15 months.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the appeal grounds were factually and legally interrelated and that permitting severance would not be fair or expeditious.

The court also rejected the request to proceed without transcripts, holding that the appeal must be perfected in the usual course with all transcripts filed.

The Electrical Safety Authority sought a pre-sentencing order compelling the defendant to produce personal and business financial documents to assist in determining an appropriate fine.

The defendant had been convicted of operating an electrical contracting business without a valid license under the Electricity Act, 1998.

The court held that while a sentencing court has implied jurisdiction under s. 57(3) of the Provincial Offences Act to compel production of financial documents in exceptional circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish such exceptional circumstances in this case.

The application was dismissed as premature.

A Toronto Police Service officer pleaded guilty to obstructing justice by destroying or converting evidence to his own use.

During the execution of a search warrant at a marijuana dispensary, the officer stole three cannabis-infused chocolate bars that had been overlooked during the search.

He later consumed one of the bars while on duty and armed with a firearm, resulting in severe intoxication.

His impaired state led him to make a false officer-in-need-of-assistance call, which caused responding officers to rush to the scene.

One officer was seriously injured in the response.

The evidence tampering resulted in the withdrawal of criminal charges against seven persons.

The court rejected a conditional discharge despite the officer's otherwise exemplary 13-year career, finding that a conviction and conditional sentence of imprisonment was necessary to protect the rule of law and denounce the egregious breach of public trust.

The defendant was charged with prohibited use of the left lane on King's Highway (Highway 401) while operating a commercial dump truck exceeding 6.5 meters in length, contrary to section 1(1) of Ontario Regulation 608.

The central legal issues were whether the prosecution must prove the defendant's knowledge of the prohibition, whether traffic signs are legally required on provincial highways, and whether the defendant established a due diligence defence.

The court found that the offence is one of strict liability, that no traffic sign is legally required on provincial highways, and that the defendant failed to establish due diligence.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant corporation was charged with using a property zoned for residential use as a commercial business in violation of the City of Hamilton Zoning By-law.

The court found that the defendant established a legal non-conforming use defense based on continuous commercial use since the property's original construction in the late 1940s.

The court also found ambiguity in the applicable zoning by-law as of the alleged offense date and determined the defendant acted with due diligence in responding to prior enforcement notices.

The charge was dismissed.

This decision addresses a motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma to transfer carriage of a child protection proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The case involves a non-Indian child (C.C.2) whose mother is a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, which contains complex geographical and personal jurisdictional criteria, including conditions restricting certain services pending consultation with other communities.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS has jurisdiction to provide services on First Nation reserves under paragraph 1 of its designation, as the bulk of child protection services were being provided on a reserve.

The transfer was granted, though the court expressed concerns about the superficial evidence presented and the lack of information from respondents.

The defendant pleaded guilty to stunt driving contrary to s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after being detected driving 212 kph in a posted 90 kph zone on Highway 17.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a $3,000 fine and 30-day licence suspension.

The court rejected the joint submission as markedly out of line with public expectations and contrary to the public interest, finding the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court imposed a $7,000 fine and a maximum two-year driving suspension, emphasizing the egregious nature of the speeding (122 kph over the limit) on a dangerous two-lane highway and the need for general and specific deterrence.

The defendant corporation appealed its conviction under section 121 of the Highway Traffic Act for operating a commercial motor vehicle in excess of its registered gross weight.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty based on weigh scale evidence showing the vehicle weighed 31,510 kg against an authorized gross weight of 8,043 kg.

The defendant challenged the reliability of the weigh scale, arguing it required calibration.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, holding that weigh scales constitute prima facie evidence of accuracy under the principle established in R. v. Bland, and that merely raising the issue of calibration without evidence of actual inaccuracy does not create reasonable doubt.

The court dismissed the appeal but allowed the defendant to present sentencing submissions before pronouncing sentence anew, as the trial judge had imposed sentence without hearing from the defence.

The defendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown sought to rely on three prior pardoned convictions for drinking and driving spanning 1982, 1989, and 1996 in sentencing.

The central issue was whether pardoned convictions, disclosed with ministerial consent, could be considered at sentencing.

The court held that pardoned convictions should not be considered as aggravating factors at sentencing, treating the defendant as a first offender.

The court imposed the minimum fine with a one-year payment period and a 12-month driving prohibition under the Criminal Code, with a concurrent two-year licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act subject to the Interlock Program.

The appellant municipality appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace who reduced a statutory minimum fine of $200 for failing to stop at a red light to $100.

The Justice of the Peace had announced in advance that she would never impose the statutory minimum fine and made comments suggesting bias against the prosecution.

The appellate court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by disregarding the statutory minimum penalty without evidence of exceptional circumstances or undue hardship justifying relief under section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to the statutory minimum of $200 plus costs.

An appeal against conviction for failing to yield to traffic on a highway.

The appellant was charged under section 136(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The sole ground of appeal was whether the Justice of the Peace erred in refusing the appellant's adjournment request at the completion of the Crown case.

The adjournment was sought to allow the appellant to consult with counsel regarding undisclosed evidence that emerged during cross-examination of the investigating officer.

The trial judge denied the adjournment twice and proceeded to conviction.

The appellate court found that the adjournment application was not properly adjudicated, that relevant factors were not considered, and that the denial resulted in a miscarriage of justice by preventing the appellant from calling a defence in a strict liability offence.

The defendant was charged with two counts under the Building Code Act: constructing a basement entrance without a permit and failing to comply with an Order to Comply.

She was convicted and fined $5,000 total.

On appeal, the defendant raised numerous arguments including issues regarding service of the summons, necessity, officially induced error, applicability of the Building Code, new legislation, and claims of an unfair trial.

The appellate court dismissed all arguments as lacking merit and upheld the conviction.

The sentence appeal was adjourned pending the outcome of a new permit application or Committee of Adjustment application.

An employer in a farming operation was convicted of failing to take every precaution reasonable in the circumstances for the protection of a worker under section 25(2)(h) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

An employee fell and broke her leg while descending from a transport storage trailer using portable steps that left a 24-inch gap between the top step and the trailer floor.

The employer appealed, arguing that the concept of "adequacy" did not apply to farming operations and that the steps had been used safely for months without incident.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the employer failed to provide adequate access and egress to the trailer and that the gap between the steps and trailer floor was self-evidently unsafe.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to yield to traffic on a through highway under Section 136(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge had classified the offence as one of absolute liability, rejecting the appellant's due diligence defence.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that the offence is one of strict liability to which a due diligence defence applies.

The court applied the four-factor test from R. v. Sault Ste.

Marie, examining the regulatory pattern, subject matter, penalty, and precision of language.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

The defendant pleaded guilty to six counts of contravening the Travel Industry Act, 2002 by acting as a travel agent without being registered.

Over a period from October 2009 to May 2010, the defendant engaged in a scheme involving unauthorized use of credit cards, misrepresentation of bookings, and diversion of client payments.

The scheme caused significant financial losses to multiple victims including a children's charity, a travel agency, and individual consumers.

The defendant was sentenced to 90 days in custody served intermittently on weekends, two years probation, and a free-standing restitution order totaling $173,832.23.

The appellant, a holder of an Ontario commercial fishing license, was convicted after trial of two counts of unlawfully failing to comply with a condition of the license by overfishing.

He was sentenced to fines totalling $4,000 and a ten-year prohibition from participating in commercial fishing activities.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on multiple grounds, including that he was not the operating mind of the business, that there was a breach of section 7 of the Charter and an abuse of process, that the trial court conducted the trial unfairly and with bias, and that crown counsel behaved improperly.

The appellant also appealed the sentence as harsh and excessive.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the convictions and the sentence.