Administrative Law - ONCJ

The appellant was charged with operating a taxicab without a valid licence contrary to the City of Oshawa Taxicab Licensing By-law.

The appellant was detected through an undercover operation where a municipal officer used the Uber app to request a ride.

The appellant accepted the ride request and arrived at the pickup location but was detained before any passenger entered the vehicle.

At trial, the appellant argued that no completed trip occurred and therefore no "operation" of an illegal taxicab had been proven.

The trial justice convicted based on findings that the appellant accepted the Uber ride request, arrived at the pickup location, and paid a cancellation fee, constituting evidence of hiring himself out for conveyance.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the interpretation of "conveyance" and "for hire" under the by-law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered under default proceedings for improperly using a blue flashing light contrary to section 62(32) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The certificate of offence listed an incorrect set fine of $85.00 when the correct fine for a commercial motor vehicle should have been $200.00.

The court found that the certificate was not complete and regular on its face and therefore could not support a conviction under the default proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion was dismissed because Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction over the children in question.

The court found that while two of the children had First Nations heritage through their father, the other two children and their mother did not qualify under any paragraph of Nogdawindamin's ministerial designation.

Additionally, Nogdawindamin was prohibited from exercising certain functions under conditions imposed by the Minister that had not yet been lifted.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought access to youth criminal justice records of A.C., now an adult, for use in child protection proceedings regarding A.C.'s infant son.

The records were created when A.C. was a young person and are protected under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court was required to balance the society's interest in protecting the child against A.C.'s privacy rights under the Act.

The court granted limited access to two records within the statutory access period (robbery and breach of recognizance charges) but denied access to all other records that fell outside the access periods.

The court imposed strict conditions on the use and distribution of the records granted.

An employer operating a sawmill was convicted of violating Section 75(b) of Ontario Regulation 851 under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to ensure that side cantors of an industrial saw machine were blocked as prescribed.

A worker suffered crushing injuries when side-heads moved during maintenance because hydraulic power was not shut off.

The trial Justice found that "blocked" requires a physical blocking mechanism, not merely shutting off hydraulic power.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Justice erred in interpreting "blocked" and that the sentence of $48,000 was excessive.

The appeal court upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no palpable error in the trial Justice's interpretation of the legislation in the context of worker safety.

A status review application brought by the Children's Aid Society concerning an 11-year-old child placed in the care of the maternal aunt under an order dated January 20, 2016.

The Society failed to comply with statutory and procedural requirements for service of the status review application.

The application was issued before the order's expiry but served significantly late, and the maternal aunt was not served prior to the first return date despite being entitled to service.

The court dismissed the application for non-compliance with Section 64(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act and Rule 33(6.1) of the Family Law Rules, finding that jurisdiction for status review had been lost.

A mother sought costs against a Children's Aid Society following the withdrawal of a child protection application.

The Society had commenced proceedings seeking supervision of the child, who had Crohn's disease, after the mother sought alternative naturopathic treatment and refused to cooperate with the Society's investigation.

The court dismissed the costs motion, finding that while the mother was a strong advocate for her child, the Society acted reasonably in investigating concerns raised by medical professionals and in seeking a minimally intrusive court order to compel cooperation.

The Society reassessed its position once information was provided and withdrew the application at the third court appearance.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual touching of a person under 16 years contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred in January 2013.

The trial proceeded over multiple court appearances spanning 17 months.

The accused was found not guilty on both counts.

The court further found that the accused's rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated due to abuse of process resulting from the Crown's breach of undertakings given at the judicial pre-trial and the failures of Legal Aid Ontario.

The court also found a violation of section 11(b) Charter rights due to unreasonable delay caused by the actions of the prosecuting Crown and Legal Aid Ontario.

The appellant appealed convictions for drive under suspension and drive with a licence issued in another jurisdiction while under suspension in Ontario.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the originating process was defective or that there was no power to amend the tickets; and second, that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court dismissed both grounds, finding that the appellant had been properly arraigned on a Part III information after attorning to jurisdiction, and that the Justice of the Peace's findings were reasonable based on the evidence.

The appellant had been previously convicted of impaired driving, failed to pay the fine, and subsequently drove while suspended, claiming he had been misled by a Ministry of Transportation counter clerk.

The accused, a pharmacist, pleaded guilty to defrauding the Ontario Drug Benefit Plan of $2.5 million over three years by knowingly overbilling for pharmaceuticals not purchased or dispensed.

The accused had repaid $2 million in restitution but $500,000 remained outstanding.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less one day in custody, rejecting the defence submission for a conditional sentence despite evidence of the accused's depression, drug addiction, and rehabilitation prospects.

The court emphasized that general deterrence is the paramount sentencing principle in large-scale fraud cases involving breach of trust.

This is a mid-trial evidentiary ruling in a family law matter concerning access to a child.

The respondent sought to introduce a decision from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board dated August 8, 2008, which had awarded compensation to the respondent for abuse allegedly perpetrated by the applicant.

The applicant opposed admission on hearsay grounds and argued that any probative value was outweighed by prejudicial impact.

The court ruled the Board's decision inadmissible on multiple grounds: it did not qualify as a public document, its content could not be used to buttress credibility under prior consistent statement principles, it was not necessary under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value given that it was based on an ex parte hearing where the applicant had no opportunity to challenge the evidence.

The Crown appealed acquittals on charges of acting as livestock dealers without a licence contrary to the Livestock and Livestock Products Act.

The accused purchased and sold approximately 2,156 cattle for $1,367,000 and sold 2,811 cattle for approximately $1,619,000 over an 11-week period in 2007.

The trial judge found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused were engaged in the business of buying or selling livestock, as opposed to operating as livestock producers.

The appellate court upheld the acquittals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The accused was charged with two offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: (1) returning to Canada without authorization after a removal order was enforced, contrary to section 52(1); and (2) failing to appear for examination at a port of entry, contrary to section 18(1).

The accused had been issued an Exclusion Order on June 18, 2012, and deported to the United States.

He subsequently re-entered Canada in September 2012 without presenting himself for examination at a port of entry.

The Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused admitted knowledge of the Exclusion Order and his inadmissibility but chose to return to Canada anyway.

The court found guilt on both counts.

The appellant appealed her conviction for careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The conviction was entered in her absence after she failed to appear for trial on February 3, 2013.

The appellant challenged the Certificate of Offence on the ground that it was deficient in failing to specify the municipality where the offence occurred, stating only "Wyecroft Rd., E. of Burloak Drive." The court held that under section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act, a certificate must be complete and regular on its face for a conviction to be entered in the defendant's absence.

The omission of the municipality constituted a fatal defect, and the conviction was quashed.

A private prosecution appeal under the Provincial Offences Act concerning a charge of driving a motorized vehicle on a beach in violation of a municipal bylaw.

The appellant (informant and prosecutor) failed to appear on the trial date due to a genuine mistake regarding the date.

The justice of the peace dismissed the charge and awarded substantial costs against the appellant without notice or hearing.

The appeal court found that while the justice had discretion to dismiss, the circumstances—including unnecessary court-initiated adjournments, confusion about withdrawal versus dismissal authority, and an unjustified costs award—warranted intervention in the interests of justice.

The court set aside the dismissal and costs order, ordering a new trial before a different justice.

The defendant, an unlicensed taxicab driver, was charged with trespassing at Toronto Pearson International Airport contrary to section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Trespass to Property Act after entering the airport on September 30, 2009, despite having been served with a written non-entry notice on September 19, 2009.

The central legal issue was whether the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not fall within the traveller or employment exemptions to the non-entry ban, or whether the burden rests on the defendant to prove on a balance of probabilities that he fell within such exemptions.

The court held that section 47(3) of the Provincial Offences Act places the burden on the defendant to prove the exemptions apply.

The defendant failed to produce evidence of travel documents or compliance with employment requirements, and was convicted.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority appealed the sentencing decision imposed on the respondents for contravening the Conservation Authorities Act by undertaking unauthorized development in a designated erosion hazard zone.

The respondents had applied for permission to construct a lakeside addition to their property in Burlington, which was denied.

Despite the denial and subsequent stop work orders, they proceeded with construction and completed the addition.

The trial judge imposed fines of $5,000 each and a probation order requiring seawall reconstruction, but did not order removal of the unauthorized structure.

The appellate court found the sentence demonstrably unfit and allowed the appeal, setting aside the fines and imposing an order for removal of the lakeside addition at the respondents' expense.

The appellant, Rassaun Steel & Mfg.

Co. Ltd., appealed its conviction under section 25(2)(h) of the Occupational Health & Safety Act for failing to ensure that an overhead duct system was adequately supported while it was being demolished or dismantled.

During equipment removal work at a foundry, a large section of ductwork fell onto a worker, causing serious injuries.

The trial court convicted the appellant, but the appellate court found that the conviction was based on findings unsupported by evidence, including that the ductwork was being dismantled or demolished, that the accident was foreseeable, and that lack of training contributed to the incident.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered.

A police officer charged the defendant with careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act by filing a Certificate of Offence.

However, the officer had deliberately struck out the title "Certificate of Offence / Proces-verbal d'infraction" and other portions of the prescribed form, intending to convert it into a Summons.

The court examined whether these alterations invalidated the document under section 84 of the Legislation Act.

While the striking out of the Fine Boxes and modifications to the Certification Box were found not to invalidate the document, the deliberate removal of the title was found to fundamentally alter the substance of the prescribed form and render it no longer a valid Certificate of Offence.

The defendant was charged with failing to surrender evidence of insurance for an off-road vehicle within seventy-two hours of a peace officer's request, contrary to section 15(4) of the Off-Road Vehicle Act.

The defendant claimed he was an occupier of Crown land under a 21-day free use permit and therefore exempt from the requirement.

He also raised Charter issues regarding unlawful detention, breach of the right to remain silent, and unlawful search.

The court found that the defendant was not a legal occupier of the Crown land, that his arrest was lawful, and that while a search of his saddle-bag breached his Charter rights, no evidence was seized.

The court found the defendant guilty of the included offence under section 15(3) of the Off-Road Vehicle Act as the element of ownership could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.