ONTARIO YOUTH COURT OF JUSTICE

WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

This is a case under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and is subject to subsections 110(1) and 111(1) and section 129 of the Act. These provisions read as follows:

110. IDENTITY OF OFFENDER NOT TO BE PUBLISHED -- (1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.

111. IDENTITY OF VICTIM OR WITNESS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED -- (1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.

129. NO SUBSEQUENT DISCLOSURE -- No person who is given access to a record or to whom information is disclosed under this Act shall disclose that information to any person unless the disclosure is authorized under this Act.

Subsection 138(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply with these provisions, states as follows:

138. OFFENCES -- Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published) . . . or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) . . .

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

DATE: 2025 12 12

COURT FILE No.: Toronto #24-Y4811743-00

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

-- AND --

T.P. (A Young Person)

Sentencing Judgment

Before Justice Brock Jones

Heard on September 16 and November 27, 2025

Written Reasons released on December 12, 2025

S. Park — counsel for the Crown

M. Malott — counsel for T.P.

Jones J.:

I. Introduction

[1] T.P., a young person, as defined in the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1., pleaded guilty to one count of failing to stop his motor vehicle and remain at the scene of an accident to offer assistance, despite knowing that he had been involved in an accident that resulted in bodily harm to another person, contrary to Criminal Code section 320.16(2).

[2] The Crown proceeded summarily.

[3] This is a case about the tragic consequences that accompanied the impulsive, reckless and dangerous decisions of a teenage driver, and what constitutes an appropriate response from a youth justice court.

II. Admitted Facts

[4] On Monday, November 25, 2024, at approximately 10:29 p.m., T.P. was operating a stolen silver 2017 Honda CR-V northbound on Brimley Road in the city of Toronto. He was 16 years old. He had his G1 driver's licence. There were three other teenage occupants of the motor vehicle: R.H., D.G, A.R. and B.G. [^1]

[5] T.P. was speeding. PCs King and Ellis were positioned in their squad car on Brimley Road near Lombardy Crescent. They captured the speed of T.P.'s vehicle at 96 km/hr. The posted speed limit was 50 km/hr.

[6] The officer activated their vehicle's emergency equipment to signal the suspect vehicle to stop. The officers learned that the car T.P. was driving had been reported stolen. They briefly pursued the vehicle, but T.P. was travelling at such a high speed that they turned off their emergency equipment and ended the pursuit. They reported their observations over the radio.

[7] A short time later, the officers were informed that the stolen vehicle had been involved in a collision further north on Brimley Road.

[8] T.P. struck a white 2021 Audi Q7 that had been travelling near Eglinton Avenue East. The collision caused both vehicles to spin out of control. Once his car came to a stop, T.P. exited the driver's side. R.H. exited from the front passenger seat. D.G. escaped through the rear driver's side door. All three fled the scene.

[9] A.R. and B.G. were seriously injured and bleeding profusely. Emergency responders extracted A.R. and B.G. from the vehicle, and they were transported to a nearby hospital. A.R.'s injuries were life-threatening, and she required immediate surgery.

[10] A police officer located T.P. and R.H. in a nearby store. They were both injured and covered in blood. They were placed under arrest and transported to a hospital for medical treatment.

III. Background of T.P.

[11] A pre-sentence report ("PSR") was prepared for the court. I will summarize its contents in this judgment to best protect T.P.'s privacy rights.

[12] T.P. was born in Toronto. His parents separated when his mother, Ms. P. was pregnant with him. Their relationship was unhealthy and caused Ms. P considerable stress. Despite the efforts of his parents to co-parent and share responsibility for his care, T.P.'s relationship with his father largely fell apart after he turned six years old. Despite some sporadic contact over the years since then, T.P. has not been able to maintain a meaningful relationship with his biological father.

[13] Otherwise, T.P. reported having a happy childhood. He has a very positive view of his mother, whom he considers to be loving and caring. He has siblings and enjoys a good relationship with them.

[14] T.P.'s experience in school has been disappointing. He is not currently enrolled in school, having decided to discontinue his attendance. He dropped out of grade 9 after experiencing some negative events at a high school. He was transferred to another school and skipped class. He was removed from the school due to poor attendance. After attempts at other forms of educational programming, he was returned to the second school in 2023. He had another negative experience, this time with the school principal, and then stopped attending altogether. T.P. expressed a general dislike of school to the PSR author. He may enroll in an education program to help him earn his Ontario High School Diploma, as this will be necessary to achieve some of his career ambitions.

[15] For now, T.P. has pursued some occupational opportunities, such as at a construction business. He enjoys that job and has built positive relationships with his co-workers. His primary focus in the future will be to expand further in the construction business. He enjoys hands-on learning and activities and would like to become a crane operator. T.P.'s mother has concerns about his peer group. Many of them have been involved with the youth criminal justice system, and she believes they may have a negative influence on him. T.P. disputes this characterization and believes others do not easily influence him.

[16] In 2020, T.P. attended Anishnawbe Health Toronto. He engaged with a therapist and a psychiatrist over several months. T.P. reported that he did not find the therapy helpful. He initially attended due to suicidal thoughts, which he believes he no longer experiences. In July 2025, T.P. participated in the Manifesting Amazing Dreams (MAD) program offered by the Canadian Training Institute. This program focuses on developing essential skills, promoting personal growth, and fostering resilience among justice-involved youth. He completed the program on August 29, 2025. He enjoyed this program and found it helpful for his choices and future goals.

[17] Regarding the incident that brought him before the youth justice court, T.P. expressed remorse and regret. He holds a "sense of guilt" for the injuries that everyone sustained. He describes the accident as traumatic.

IV. Gladue Letter

[18] A letter was provided to the court by Desirée Duplessis, Senior Manager, Gladue Caseworker Program, Aboriginal Legal Services. Ms. Duplessis assigned a caseworker to interview T.P. and his family to prepare a possible Gladue report.

[19] Ms. P. believed that she was "Cree from Alberta", and that T.P.'s father is Jamaican. Ms. P. first learned of her Indigenous ancestry following her grandfather's death in March 2008. She did not know the name of his First Nation. The caseworker was unable to determine if there was meaningful evidence of Indigenous heritage in T.P.'s lineage.

[20] However, T.P. stated that he learned about his Indigenous ancestry and began identifying as Indigenous around the age of 10. Ms. P. works for an Indigenous organization and reported that her son has participated in fasts, sweats, and fire keeping in the community.

[21] T.P. shared information about his lived experiences, including exposure to community violence, and a family history of mental health and substance use issues. He experienced discrimination for being a person of mixed ancestry, but not specifically for being Indigenous.

[22] After research into what was known about T.P.'s family history, the caseworker was unable to prepare a formal Gladue report or letter. Ms. Duplessis wrote that T.P.'s "ancestral connection is tenuous at best" and that even if there was some means by which to confirm the claims of Indigenous ancestry, a caseworker could not address how being an Indigenous Canadian has affected his life circumstances.

V. Positions of the Parties

[23] Both parties submitted that a four-month custodial disposition followed by a one-year driving prohibition order was appropriate. They initially differed on the form that the custodial portion of the sentence should take.

[24] Ms. Park submitted that it should be an open custody and supervision order. Mr. Malott submitted that a deferred custody and supervision order was both lawfully available and more appropriate. [^2]

[25] After the conclusion of submissions on November 27, Mr. Malott informed the court via written correspondence that his client's position had changed and that the parties would now be jointly recommending a four-month open custody and supervision order.

VI. Law and Analysis

[26] Young persons are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral culpability for their actions: YCJA section 3(1)(b). That presumption was established by the Supreme Court of Canada as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter in *R. v. D.B.*, 2008 SCC 25. The significance of this principle cannot be overstated. Young persons are, simply put, "constitutionally different" from adults for sentencing purposes: see *R. v. I.M.*, 2025 SCC 23, at para. 89.

[27] There are important differences between the principles of sentencing that apply under the Criminal Code and those that take prominence under the YCJA. In I.M., the Supreme Court explained that the Canadian youth criminal justice system recognizes the "diminished moral responsibility" of young persons and their "unique developmental circumstances." These, in turn, will often justify a "different societal response and approach to their culpability and sanction": see para. 97.

[28] But while the YCJA is premised on the presumption of diminished moral culpability, it is also founded on the key notion of accountability. Section 38 of the YCJA states that the purpose of sentencing is to "hold a young person accountable for an offence through the imposition of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences for the young person and that promote his or her rehabilitation and reintegration into society, thereby contributing to the long-term protection of the public."

[29] A sentence must be "proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence": section 38(2)(c). When arriving at an appropriate sentence, a youth justice court shall take into account the following pursuant to YCJA s. 38(3):

(a) The degree of participation of the young person in the commission of the offence;

(b) The harm done to victims and whether it was intentional or reasonably foreseeable;

(c) Any reparation made by the young person to the victim or the community;

(d) The time spent in detention by the young person as a result of the offence;

(e) The previous findings of guilt of the young person; and

(f) Any other aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to the young person or the offence that are relevant to the purpose and principles set out in [section 38].

[30] The offence committed by T.P. was extraordinarily serious, characterized by several significant aggravating factors. He knowingly chose to drive a stolen motor vehicle, with four passengers, nearly double the speed limit along a busy roadway in Scarborough. When located by the police, he did not stop and pull over as required. Instead, he made the inherently risky decision to try to escape capture, only to collide with another car. He, and he alone, was responsible for the horrible accident that followed. The accident and the resulting bodily harm to his passengers constitute entirely reasonably foreseeable consequences of the decision to drive dangerously on a busy city street, even for a teenager of T.P.'s age and maturity.

[31] In I.M., the Supreme Court explained that the accountability inquiry mandated under the YCJA permits the sentencing court to consider the normative consequences of the offence, the impact of the offence on any victims or the community, and the availability of rehabilitative and reintegrative supports within the youth system: see para. 173. The last factor is vital to remember. Accountability, a "cornerstone of youth sentencing", encompasses sanctions that must be proportionate and "promote meaningful consequences and societal reintegration": see para. 170 (my emphasis added.)

[32] T.P. pleaded guilty, which is an important mitigating factor. A trial would have required several other young persons to testify, which would have been emotionally difficult for them. However, in my view, the evidence for the Crown at trial would have been overwhelming.

VII. Gladue Principles

[33] Even in a case such as this one, where extensive and serious bodily harm resulted from the commission of the offence, a youth justice court must always consider "all available sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances", with "particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal young persons": YCJA section 38(2)(d). The sentence imposed must furthermore be the "least restrictive sentence that is capable" of achieving the sentencing principles mandated by the Act, and that is the one "most likely to rehabilitate the young person and reintegrate him or her into society", and also "promote a sense of responsibility in the young person, and an acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and the community": YCJA section 38(2)(e).

[34] While there is no requirement for a direct causal connection between a young person's Aboriginal identity and the offences committed, there must be some means by which to assess how "the systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal people in Canadian society must have impacted the offender's life in a way that (1) bears on moral blameworthiness, or (2) indicates which types of sentencing objectives should be prioritized in the offender's case": see *R. v. F.H.L.*, 2018 ONCA 83, at paras. 31-2.

[35] There is little to no evidence presented in this case that would explain how T.P.'s self-identification as an Indigenous Canadian can draw a connection, even a tenuous one, with the systemic and background factors relevant to the application of YCJA section 38(2)(d). His belief in his heritage may be sincere. But more is required for Gladue principles to affect a youth court's sentencing decision, as the court must be able to assess how a young person's life experiences in this regard bear on his moral blameworthiness.

VIII. Prior Sentencing Authorities -- Dangerous Driving

[36] Reported sentencing decisions for young persons who have been found guilty of dangerous driving causing death or bodily harm have often come to very different conclusions, reflecting the highly individualized nature of youth sentencing. These cases all accept that such an offence qualifies as a "violent offence" and thus the requirements of YCJA section 39(1)(a) have been met. Mr. Mallot did not dispute this during oral submissions.

[37] In *R. v. T.M*, 2024 ONCJ 257, a 16-year-old young person of Indigenous and Black Canadian heritage pleaded guilty to a count of dangerous driving causing death. He drove a motor vehicle at 232 km/hr when his vehicle collided with the victim's car. The victim suffered life-threatening injuries and died two days later. T.M. did not have a prior youth court record.

[38] T.M. brought an application challenging the constitutionality of the provisions of the YCJA, which placed restrictions on the availability of a deferred custody and supervision order ("DCSO"). YCJA section 42(5)(a) provides that if a young person causes serious bodily harm through the commission of an offence, a DCSO is unavailable. YCJA section 42(2)(p) limits the length of a DCSO to six months. Justice Camara found these provisions of the YCJA unconstitutional and imposed a DCSO of two years less a day.

[39] The Crown appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeal granted the appeal. The Court held that the restrictions on the availability of a DCSO in the YCJA were constitutional: *R. v. T.M*, 2025 ONCA 436. The sentence imposed by the trial judge was therefore illegal. The Court of Appeal deemed 11 months of the prior DSCO to have been served, and imposed 18 months' probation, and a requirement that the young person complete 100 hours of community service: see para. 10.

[40] Many decisions have held that a form of custody is required for offences of this magnitude. For example, in R. v. C.S., [2024] O.J. No. 3301, the young person drove a motor vehicle at speeds of 122-140 km/hr in an effort to pull off a driving trick (to wit: to "catch air.") He had four passengers with him at the time, and in the dark, drove the vehicle intentionally in a dangerous manner through an intersection at an "extremely excessive speed": see para. 72. He killed a friend who was a passenger.

[41] While he did not have a prior youth court record, and Justice Morneau held that the young person's rehabilitation and reintegration had to be given prominence, the objective severity of the offence demanded a custodial sentence. Her Honour imposed a nine-month open custody and supervision order, one year of probation, 100 hours of community service, and a three-year driving prohibition order.

[42] In *R. v. C.Z.*, 2022 ONCJ 152, the young person pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death and one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. He drove his parents' Mercedes at 102 km/hr in a residential area. He lost control of the vehicle and struck three people standing in a driveway. Two of them were children. He was 16 at the time of the offences, expressed genuine remorse, and did not have a prior youth court record.

[43] Justice Rose held that the offences required consideration of the sentencing principle of denunciation, even if that sentencing principle is not mandatory and is not commonly applied in youth courts: see para. 22. While C.Z. was a young person, the harm that resulted from his driving was entirely foreseeable: see para. 36. Justice Rose imposed a one-year open custody and supervision order, one year of probation, and a six-year driving prohibition order.

[44] Another decision that concluded a custody and supervision order is required in cases of this nature is *R. v. R.R.*, 2016 ONCJ 307. The 16-year-old young person was street racing, driving at approximately 130 km/hr in a 60 km/hr designated zone. He struck and killed an 18-year-old man who was riding his bicycle.

[45] Justice Crewe also determined that the sentencing principle of denunciation had to be factored into his decision. His Honour imposed a 10.5-month open custody and supervision order, one year of probation, 100 hours of community service, and a five-year driving prohibition order. As noted in the decision, "every street racer is a potential killer": see para. 64.

[46] Other youth justice courts have imposed non-custodial sentences despite the often terrible harm that was caused by a young person's dangerous driving. In *R. v. A.H.*, 2017 ONCJ 521, a 17-year-old young person was found guilty after a trial of dangerous driving causing death. He drove a rental car in a parking lot when he struck and killed a pedestrian. A.H. had a supportive family, had complied with his bail conditions, and demonstrated good rehabilitative prospects. He was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD") as a child and had a very difficult upbringing, with multiple surgeries. He struggled to meet standard developmental goals and had difficulty with social interactions.

[47] Justice Copeland (as she then was) found that A.H.'s ASD diagnosis was a significant mitigating factor that impacted A.H.'s moral culpability: see para. 66. He could be held accountable for his actions without resort to a custodial sentence, through a two-year probation order, 100 hours of community service, counselling, treatment, and a five-year driving prohibition order.

[48] In R. v. M.W., [2013] O.J. No. 6256, the young person drove at a high rate of speed on Eglinton Avenue in Toronto, while weaving through traffic. He collided with a vehicle and killed the 73-year-old driver. M.W. remained at the scene and cooperated with the authorities. He was 17 at the time and had no prior youth court record. He completed 150 hours of community service prior to his sentencing hearing.

[49] Justice Kelly described the young person as "a young man of exemplary background and character" with "an unblemished past and likely a very promising future": see para. 35. The Youth Justice Court accepted a joint submission for a 12-month probation order.

IX. Conclusion -- The Joint Position Is Appropriate

[50] In *R. v. C.D.* and *R. v. C.D.K.*, 2005 SCC 78, the Supreme Court held that Parliament's intent by introducing the YCJA was to reduce the rate of incarceration for young persons. This is a foundational principle of our youth criminal justice system, and one that must be respected. But there are some offences, particularly those that cause serious bodily harm to their victims, that cry out for a high degree of accountability from the young persons who commit them. The magnitude of accountability demanded cannot always be met by a non-custodial sentence. Each case will turn on both the nature of the offence and the offender's personal characteristics.

[51] The dangerous driving in this case was done with wanton disregard for the safety of T.P.'s own passengers, other drivers and innocent members of the public. The risk that someone might have had their life taken in the accident was plain and obvious. In *R. v. Rawn*, 2012 ONCA 487, at paras. 48-9, the Ontario Court of Appeal held "[a] motor vehicle can, in a moment of recklessness, be transformed into an object capable of destroying lives" and, accordingly, the licence to drive is a privilege that comes with immense responsibility. There can be no doubt that T.P. grossly abused that privilege by his actions. His dangerous behaviour endangered the safety of every member of the public in his path. He nearly killed A.R., who was herself just a teenager and completely at his mercy as a passenger in the backseat of the stolen car.

[52] I am mindful not to place undue weight on the gravity of the offence when determining the appropriate sentence for T.P. The Supreme Court of Canada explained in I.M. that any crime, "however serious in character, tragic in consequence or troubling in execution, is not inherently indicative of a young person with the developmental age of an adult": see para. 143. T.P. was only 16 years old when he made the terrible series of decisions that culminated in him colliding with another car, and he cannot be held to an adult standard of moral responsibility, regardless of the consequences of his actions. Nor can certain adult sentencing principles, such as general deterrence, play any role in my decision.

[53] That being said, T.P., while a young person, was old enough to understand that what he was doing was both wrong and inherently dangerous. Furthermore, I may consider the underlying factual circumstances of his crimes to the extent they offer insight into his thinking and level of sophistication: I.M. at para. 145. T.P. may have been a newly licensed driver, but he was aware of the rules and responsibilities that accompany operating a motor vehicle. The tragic consequences of his decision to drive so dangerously were entirely foreseeable to him, even as a 16-year-old. The normative aspects of his conduct are deeply concerning.

[54] His moral culpability is further informed by his decision to evade the police and flee the scene of the accident, where two of his friends were seriously wounded, in an attempt to evade capture. His behaviour after the offence may be lawfully considered in this regard: see I.M. at paras. 148 and 151. He was lawfully obligated to stop for the officers and then to remain at the scene of the accident and secure help for the injured parties: see Criminal Code section 320.17; Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, section 200(1). Instead, he chose to leave them there, bleeding, while hiding in a nearby location. That demonstrates both callousness and an enhanced level of moral culpability, warranting an appropriate response. This conduct also justifies some weight being attached to the sentencing principle of denunciation, which may be optionally applied in youth sentencing cases: see YCJA section 38(2)(f)(i).

[55] Youth justice courts have long recognized that where serious offences resulting in bodily harm or death have been committed, "the concepts of proportionality, meaningful consequences and retribution may take precedence over rehabilitation": see *R. v. A.A.Z*, 2013 MBCA 33, at para. 65; *R. v. S.N.J.S.*, 2013 BCCA 379, at para. 29. I find the least restrictive sentence capable of holding T.P. accountable for his actions and promoting a sense of responsibility in him for his actions and the harm he caused is a four-month open custody and supervision order, followed by 12 months of probation. An open custody sentence will simultaneously make T.P. aware of the nature and consequences of his conduct, while also permitting him to successfully reintegrate into the community. [^3] A probation order, by itself, would fail to hold him accountable for his actions and would not be proportionate to his degree of moral culpability for his actions. Such a sentence would fail to bring home to T.P. to severity of his crime and the devastating consequences he caused to his multiple victims.

[56] There are more aggravating factors and fewer mitigating factors in this case than in the reported decisions where youth justice courts have declined to impose a custodial sentence. It must not be forgotten that he could have easily killed one of the passengers in his car, and that A.R. required emergency surgery. He left her there after the crash, gravely injured, while trying to protect himself from capture. Had one of his victims died, the length of time required in open custody would have been much higher.

[57] The YCJA requires that provinces provide at least two levels of custody for young persons who are sentenced to a custody and supervision order. Open custody is qualitatively very different from secure custody. In Toronto, these facilities are smaller residences scattered across the city where youth live under supervision. However, young persons are permitted to enter the surrounding community, escorted, and to attend educational programming outside the open custody facility. [^4] Other privileges can be earned with good behaviour. It places fewer restrictions on an individual's liberty than a secure custody facility, such as the Roy McMurtry Youth Centre.

[58] Time spent in an open custody facility will communicate to the young person that they have committed an offence, or a series of offences, serious enough to justify a custodial sentence, thereby holding them accountable through a meaningful consequence. Yet the sentence will provide an opportunity for the young person's supervised and controlled release back into the community. Where a custody and supervision order is required for a low-risk youth who is unlikely to re-offend violently, open custody will typically better reflect the sentencing goals of the YCJA and promote the young person's successful rehabilitation and reintegration into society than the use of secure custody.

[59] T.P. is at a very low risk of reoffending, and no evidence was presented to suggest that he poses a threat to the community. He has successfully complied with the terms of his release order for over a year. An open custody sentence will also ensure he remains close to his family and can have contact with them. The four-month term will be broken down into a sentence of two-thirds custody and one-third community supervision, as required: see YCJA section 42(2)(n). This means T.P. will serve 80 days in open custody, followed by 40 days under community supervision, subject to terms set by the provincial director: see YCJA s. 97.

[60] In order to ensure the least amount of interference to T.P.'s plans for his future goals, I had considered delaying the implementation of the custodial portion of this sentence for several months: see YCJA section 42(12). Mr. Malott informed the court that, after reflection, his client decided he would prefer to begin serving the sentence on December 12. T.P. believed, for reasons I will not expand upon, that this would cause his mother the least amount of personal difficulty. I commend T.P. for putting his mother's needs first. That speaks very well of his developing character.

[61] I also impose a 12-month probation order. On that order, T.P. is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle. He must also complete 80 hours of community service. The probation order commences at the conclusion of his custody and community supervision order.

[62] I impose a driving prohibition order for one year, as recommended jointly by the parties: YCJA section 42(2)(j); Criminal Code section 320.24(1). [^5]

Released: December 12, 2025

Signed: Justice Brock Jones

[^1]: I was informed during the proceedings that each of the young persons had been charged by the police initially and therefore all of their identities are subject to YCJA s. 110 publication ban.

[^2]: The Crown disputed that a deferred custody and supervision order was lawfully available due to YCJA s. 42(5)(a). I need not decide this question given the new, joint position presented to the court.

[^3]: When deciding on the level of custody, a youth sentencing court must follow the criteria referenced in sections 24.1 to 24.3 of the Young Offenders Act, which are incorporated by reference into the YCJA: see YCJA section 88. Ms. Park, very fairly, did not argue for a secure custody placement for T.P. The presumption is for an open custody placement, which I find is entirely appropriate in this case regardless.

[^4]: When a youth is found guilty in court, the Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services publishes the information. Updated April 15, 2025. Available online: https://www.ontario.ca/page/when-youth-found-guilty-court

[^5]: A longer driving prohibition order could have been easily justified.