WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: October 9, 2025

Court File No.: Sault Ste. Marie 998-24-13301136

Between:

His Majesty the King

— and —

T.J.L.

Before: Justice Michael Perlin

Heard on: August 13 and 14, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on: October 9, 2025

Counsel:

Marie-Eve Talbot — counsel for the Crown

Kenneth Walker — counsel for the defendant

Reasons for Judgment

PERLIN J.:

A. The Charges and Narrative

[1] T.J.L. is charged with sexual assault, assault, and uttering death threats, all allegedly committed against the complainant, Z.S. The complainant testified for the Crown. T.J.L. testified in his own defence. The case turns on their credibility and reliability, and the application of the burden of proof through the framework in R. v. W. (D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742.

[2] There is no dispute that T.J.L. and complainant began a relationship in January 2024. She was 16. He was 21. The evidence conflicted on the seriousness of this relationship and its dynamics. It is consistent that between January and June 2024, the two spent a great deal of time together at T.J.L.'s house in Sault Ste. Marie, where he lived with his brother, his mother and her boyfriend.

[3] The complainant described three incidents that are the subject of the charges.

[4] First, she testified that on February 29, 2024, she and T.J.L. were at his house doing Xanax and cocaine together. She was extremely intoxicated; unable to move or speak. While she was in this state, T.J.L. began touching her sexually, culminating in sexual intercourse to which she did not consent.

[5] T.J.L. denies this occurred.

[6] Second, the complainant testified that on April 23, 2024, she was at T.J.L.'s house. She was pregnant at the time. He became violent and squeezed her belly forcefully. They both fell onto a couch. He placed his hands on her neck and squeezed. During these events, he told her he was "squeezing the baby out of her" to kill the baby and said, "you and this baby are going to die".

[7] T.J.L. recalled an incident in April 2024. He described the complainant as the aggressor. She was upset, and intent on destroying his property. They both testified that on this date police and an ambulance attended. She testified she went to the hospital.

[8] Third, the complainant testified that on June 3, 2024, she went to T.J.L.'s house at his request. He was drunk. They both ended up lying in his bed. He was behind her and started grinding his pelvis against her. She pushed him off and said no. He persisted. She said no again. He continued persisting and eventually forced intercourse on her. The next morning, she was upset. She told him what had happened. He said he had no recollection of it.

[9] T.J.L. agrees he had intercourse with the complainant that day. He agrees she left in anger in the morning. But he says she initiated consensual intercourse. He understood she was angry about a list of girls' names she had found on his phone that morning. The theory of the defence is that this anger prompted her to fabricate all the allegations and provide a video statement to police on June 5, 2024.

B. Issues and Applicable Legal Principles

[10] T.J.L. and complainant offer conflicting accounts of the events at issue. While this case turns on their credibility and reliability, I must not approach it as a contest between them – comparing their evidence and deciding which version I prefer. T.J.L. enjoys the presumption of innocence, which will be displaced, resulting in a finding of guilt for an offence, only if the Crown proves each essential element of that offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

[11] To determine whether the Crown discharged its burden, I will analyze the evidence using the Supreme Court's framework from W.(D.), at p. 758, which instructs as follows:

First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.

Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.

Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.

[12] I note that evidence was introduced without objection regarding the allegedly abusive dynamics of the relationship. I understood the evidence was intended to complete the narrative and contextualize the relationship, the allegations, and the manner in which the allegations were reported. Defence counsel also commented on how some evidence spoke poorly to T.J.L.'s character. I remind myself I must not use this evidence to reason that T.J.L. is of bad character or the kind of person who would likely commit the offences alleged: see e.g., R. v. D.S.F. (1999), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.).

[13] There are three counts before the court, and four allegations. There was no similar-fact evidence application. As such, I have assessed each allegation independently without reference to the substantive testimony given in relation to each other allegation. I have assessed credibility based on the evidence as a whole: R. v. MRS, 2020 ONCA 667, at paras. 63-64.

C. Positions of the Parties

[14] The defence argues T.J.L.'s evidence should be believed. The intercourse on June 3 was consensual and the other allegations are untrue. The complainant had a strong motive to fabricate the allegations, which calls all her evidence into question. There is a reasonable possibility that the allegations are not true. Defence counsel urges me to keep in mind T.J.L.'s learning disability when assessing his evidence.

[15] The Crown argues that the complainant was an honest witness who provided a reliable account of what happened to her. I should accept her evidence. T.J.L.'s evidence was highly problematic. I should reject it and find it does not raise a reasonable doubt.

D. Do I Believe T.J.L.'s Evidence? If Not, Does It Raise a Reasonable Doubt?

[16] The Crown submits there are serious issues with T.J.L.'s credibility.

[17] In some respects, I disagree. The Crown points to T.J.L.'s failure to agree with the Crown's assertion that he wanted the complainant to end her pregnancy. I disagree that this harms his credibility. He agreed that he asked her to have an abortion and that he thought a baby would be too much responsibility for them. He essentially agreed with the Crown's suggestion; he was clearly uncomfortable with adopting it in the terms used by the Crown. This does not strike me as an unusual response from a parent discussing a pregnancy that led to the birth of a child.

[18] The Crown says T.J.L. was impeached by prior statements showing that he was much more invested in his relationship with the complainant than his trial evidence suggested. In some instances, T.J.L. did not admit to having made the prior statements the Crown alleged. The Crown did not lead evidence to prove the prior statements. The unadopted, unproven prior statements have no evidentiary value.

[19] There were exceptions, however. First, T.J.L. was asked to confirm his earlier testimony that he "never told [the complainant] you love her". He agreed: "I've never said 'I love you'". It was put to him that he had sent her a message on Instagram in December 2024 saying, "I did love you". He accepted he might have done so. In re-examination, he testified that whatever the message said, he had never told her, "I love you". Notwithstanding that the Instagram message was framed in the past tense, I agree with the Crown that this message was inconsistent with his earlier evidence that he would not tell her he loved her and does not really use those words. When asked earlier if he had ever loved her, he said "not really".

[20] Second, T.J.L. acknowledged, or at least accepted it was possible, he had sent other Instagram messages in December 2024 like "you were my world", "I always hoped it would work out", "I was going to be that guy […] who [would] always hug you, cuddle you, make you laugh". T.J.L. explained that he was probably emotional because he was going back to jail for breaching his release order by contacting her. I accept that these statements speak to an emotional disposition toward the relationship at times that was quite different than his evidence in chief and at the beginning of cross-examination that they "were just friends" or "friends with benefits". His apparent emotional state in December 2024—lamenting the loss of the relationship—also appears inconsistent with his evidence that he only considered the prospect of a serious relationship at its very beginning and that he did not have an interest in her after the charges were laid in mid-2024.

[21] More generally, I agree with the Crown that T.J.L.'s evidence regarding his feelings toward the complainant shifted throughout his testimony. He testified in chief "we were just friends". In addition to the evidence I have just discussed, he testified in cross-examination that

• he was not committed; they were just friends with benefits,
• they were more than friends,
• he had romantic interest in her, but only at the beginning of the relationship,
• he did not know how he felt at the beginning of the relationship,
• he cared for her and liked her, but that was it.

Although it is possible that some of T.J.L.'s inconsistent responses reflect his feelings at different points in the relationship, I am satisfied that his evidence regarding his feelings toward the relationship was inconsistent. This harms T.J.L.'s credibility.

[22] I agree with the Crown that T.J.L.'s evidence regarding his drug and alcohol use was concerning. I do not believe his claim that he never took drugs or drank when the complainant was present. He testified he was addicted to alcohol and cocaine. As defence counsel acknowledged, addiction suggests relatively persistent consumption. For much of the relevant period, T.J.L. and complainant were also together persistently: he agreed she was at his home several days a week, sometimes for days at a time. If they were together persistently and he was persistently consuming drugs and alcohol, it is not plausible that he was not consuming drugs and alcohol in her presence. In cross-examination on this issue, T.J.L. walked back his evidence that he was addicted to drugs and alcohol, in part by noting that there were hours or days when he would not use drugs or drink. None of this reflected well on his credibility.

[23] I am also troubled by the way T.J.L.'s evidence on this issue morphed with respect to the June 3 allegation:

• On whether he was intoxicated, he accepted he had been intoxicated. He also testified, "Not really, I wasn't drunk". He also agreed he was intoxicated in the complainant's presence, and testified, "[t]his is why she got mad. I wouldn't drink like that ever." Later, when asked about the impact of intoxication on his memory, he testified that he was just "just buzzed", which he does "not consider" to be "intoxication".

• After he accepted in cross-examination that he had been intoxicated at 9 pm, it was put to him that he testified earlier that he would never get intoxicated with alcohol with her in the house. He disagreed, "[w]ell no. I think I just – I wasn't intoxicated at the time is what I'm saying". He later accepted that he had been intoxicated with her in the home. He denied his initial evidence about never being intoxicated with her had been a lie, but agreed it had been a mistake.

[24] T.J.L.'s evidence regarding the relationship, substance use with the complainant, and addiction varied significantly throughout his testimony.

[25] T.J.L. also gave inconsistent evidence on a key aspect of his defence: i.e. the claim that the complainant became angry at him on June 3 after finding a list of girls in a social-media account on T.J.L.'s phone. T.J.L. testified that after they had had sex on June 3, he woke up and caught the complainant using his phone. Asked if he knew why she was angry in the morning, he testified that he assumed it was about his phone, but he did not know why. His counsel then prompted him with a leading question: "there was a suggestion made to her [in cross-examination] about girls" being the reason for her anger. T.J.L. then adopted this central pillar of his defence. A few minutes later, he testified that he had "caught a glimpse" of what she had been looking at on his phone. His initial inability to recall this key aspect of his defence went unexplained.

[26] After considering these factors, I do not accept T.J.L.'s evidence denying his culpability. Nor does it raise a reasonable doubt in my mind. His evidence was too improbable and inconsistent for me to have any faith that he was testifying truthfully when denying the core allegations before the court.

[27] I highlight two factors that I have not considered in this analysis. First, evidence was led of a criminal finding of guilt with an offence date post-dating the events at issue in this trial. I have not considered that finding of guilt in assessing T.J.L.'s credibility.

[28] Second, I note that T.J.L., in testifying, sometimes took long pauses and expressed his responses tentatively, with uncertainty. In assessing his credibility, I do not rely on this testimonial demeanour. I cannot be sure whether his pauses or uncertainty can be explained by his learning disability, which I accept makes it difficult for him to understand or respond to questions. I have excluded this from my analysis.

E. Does the Evidence That I Do Accept Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt That T.J.L. Is Guilty of Any of the Offences Charged?

[29] This question turns primarily on the credibility of the complainant. The defence contends she had a motive to fabricate the allegations. The defence also points to parts of her evidence that counsel submits should cause me to find her incredible.

1. Alleged Motive to Fabricate

[30] While T.J.L. has no burden to demonstrate why the complainant would fabricate her evidence, if a motive to do so is shown, this factor may bear significantly on credibility: R. v. Ignacio, 2021 ONCA 69, at paras. 52, 59, leave to appeal ref'd; R. v. J.H., 2020 ONCA 165, at para. 148; R. v. Batte, at para. 120. However, motive to fabricate is just one factor to be considered in a credibility assessment: Batte, at para. 121. Where a motive to fabricate is alleged, it is for the trier of fact to conclude whether the motive existed and what weight to give it in the credibility assessment: see e.g. R. v. McKenzie, 2020 ONCA 646, at para. 34; J.H., at para. 146; R. v. Swain, 2021 BCCA 207, at para. 32.

[31] The defence alleges that the complainant's motive to fabricate materialized on June 3, 2024, when, in the morning after they had consensual sex, she accessed T.J.L.'s cellphone and found a list of girls in his social-media account. She was upset. The relationship, which had been fine until June, suddenly changed. She was pregnant and vulnerable, and had been, in defence counsel Mr. Walker's words, "tossed away".

[32] The defence contends that the complainant lashed out in anger by fabricating the allegations and reporting them to a Children's Aid Society worker almost immediately. This led to the complainant providing a video statement to police on June 5, 2024. The defence adds that the complainant, by her own admission, had many interactions with CAS workers and police in the preceding months during which she could have reported what she later described as regular physical and sexual abuse. The defence submits she only complained once she had a motive to fabricate on June 3.

[33] The alleged motive was advanced in part through T.J.L.'s testimony. He testified that in the morning after they had had sex on June 3, the complainant was "throwing a fit". He had seen her accessing his phone. He assumed, but did not really know, that what she had seen had made her upset. In response to a leading question from defence counsel, T.J.L. agreed that he believed she had been upset about the list of girls. He later explained that this was a list of female friends on social-media app Snapchat. In cross-examination, he testified that something had clicked in her brain that caused her to lash out and hate him suddenly.

[34] I accept the defence submission that the complainant had negative feelings toward T.J.L., at least in part arising from his social-media activity involving other women. The complainant gave the following evidence in her video statement and in court:

• the relationship was good until she found out he was talking to his ex-girlfriends;
• at one point, she did not remember when, she accessed his phone and saw a list of girls;
• the list of girls upset her;
• with respect to June 3, she did not recall whether she was going through T.J.L.'s phone when she woke up after the alleged incident;
• she agreed that she was upset that morning. She denied it was because of having seen a list. She testified she was upset because she had been sexually assaulted;
• she agreed that she had regretted reporting to her CAS worker what had happened to her. She did not want her report to "come this far" (i.e., to a trial). She told T.J.L. that she was going to tell the police that the allegations were a mistake and a lie.

[35] While I accept that the complainant was—and remains—angry at T.J.L., in part based on his list of girls, I am satisfied that the motive alleged by the defence should have little bearing on my credibility assessment of the complainant. I reject the suggestion that it was a factor that suddenly caused her to lash out in anger and allege sexual and physical abuse.

[36] As noted before, the theory, tying the complainant's anger on June 3 to the list of girls, was only introduced into T.J.L.'s evidence when prompted by a leading question from his counsel. I find this prompting makes T.J.L.'s evidence on this point less worthy of belief: see R. v. Parkes, 2005 CarswellOnt 925 (S.C.), at para. 44. I accept T.J.L.'s initial response, which was not prompted: he did not know what had angered her but had assumed it was something she saw on his phone.

[37] Further, the evidence is unclear on when the complainant became aware of the list of girls. Regardless of when it occurred, there are significant logical difficulties with the defence argument that the list was a sudden breaking point on June 3 that led her to fabricate the allegations.

[38] If, on the one hand, she discovered the list on some other day, there was no apparent innocent trigger on June 3 for the sudden change in the complainant that T.J.L. described.

[39] If, on the other hand, she discovered the list on June 3, two factors demonstrate that this discovery did not prompt a sudden change in the complainant's conduct that the defence alleges. First, I accept that the complainant had already reported T.J.L. to police before June 3 when the alleged motive to fabricate arose. The parties agreed that police became involved during the April 23 incident. She says she reported an assault (not a sexual assault). T.J.L. testified that he had shown his hands to police that day to demonstrate that there were no marks on his hands. She understood that police decided not to charge T.J.L. that day because she had also assaulted him by throwing a box of Kraft Dinner at him. She also testified that she had told the nurse at the hospital about the assault and that police had been present in the room at the time. I accept she reported abuse to police in April 2024.

[40] Second, if the list was discovered on June 3, it did not prompt her to take the action the defence alleges shows she was intent on harming him: reporting to police. Rather, she told her CAS worker, who chose independently to notify the police. The complainant agreed in cross-examination that she did not want her CAS worker to report the allegations to police and did not know that the worker was going to do so. The complainant was 16 at the time and is only 17 now. I do not believe she was so sophisticated that she would share allegations with her CAS worker in an effort to get the information to police indirectly. She confided in someone close to her. Her regret in telling her CAS worker speaks to the fact that she never intended to bring the sexual-assault allegation to police. This weakens the defence argument.

[41] The defence emphasizes one passage of the complainant's video statement as evidence that she felt betrayed and reported the allegations as a result. The complainant said, "[T.J.L.] says he wants to be a part of the baby's life, so I make him a part of the baby's life, not my life, the baby's life". Defence counsel points to the words "I make him a part of the baby's life, not my life" as indicating that she felt like she had been tossed away and was upset T.J.L. did not want to be a part of her life. I disagree. I understood her statement that T.J.L. would "not" be in "my life" not as an expression of remorse over his disinterest, but as an assertion of her disinterest in him at the time she gave her statement.

[42] For these reasons, I reject the defence theory that the allegations were fabricated in anger. I do not find that the complainant reported just after the June 3 incident out of anger about discovering a list of girls on T.J.L.'s phone that day. If she found the list on June 3, it was not the dramatic breaking point that the defence contends prompted her to report false allegations to police: she had already complained to police in April; and she did not report the June allegations to police; she reported them to her worker. If she found the list at some other time, there was no apparent innocent trigger that day to prompt a false complaint.

[43] I accept that the complainant was unhappy with the relationship and was angry with T.J.L. based on her perception of how he acted during the relationship. While this factor weighs somewhat against her credibility, I do not see it as doing so significantly. It does not explain the timing of her decision to speak to her CAS worker just after June 3, when she says she was sexually assaulted, and before she provided a statement to police on June 5.

3. Other Issues Bearing on Credibility

[44] The defence submits the complainant's evidence was calculated to paint T.J.L. in a negative light. I reject this argument. Her evidence shows she was trying to be fair and accurate. She readily acknowledged facts that would paint her unfavourably: e.g., her drug addiction, her history of self-harm, her assault on T.J.L. by throwing a box at him on April 23, her apparent concession that she sometimes stayed at T.J.L.'s residence longer than she should have when his mother wanted her to leave (i.e., she agreed she always left, eventually). She was firm in cross-examination but did not reflexively deny every point put to her. She was willing to accept defence counsel's assertions when she agreed with them, even if they would make her look bad. This speaks favourably to her honesty.

[45] She was also fair to T.J.L. For example, she had said in her video statement that T.J.L. struck her in the face on April 23. When asked about this at trial, she said she could not remember if it was T.J.L. or his mother who had struck her. Similarly, in her video statement, she told police that she could not remember if T.J.L. or his mother had punched her in the stomach. If she was intent on maligning T.J.L., I would expect she would not make these concessions in his favour. These facts also suggest she was an honest witness.

[46] The defence made several other arguments.

[47] First, the defence submits the complainant's evidence that she had contracted an STD from T.J.L. was fabricated to attack his character. T.J.L. testified that he never had the STD, so she could not have gotten it from him. I reject the argument that the complainant concocted this story to malign T.J.L. The evidence does not allow me conclude whether T.J.L. gave the complainant an STD. I accept that she genuinely believed he did. (I note that whether or not he did is irrelevant to the issues before the court.)

[48] Second, the defence says the complainant exaggerated when she estimated that T.J.L. had been intoxicated in her presence and aggressive with her 40 or more times during the relationship. The Crown submits that it is not inherently implausible: spread out over a relationship between January and early August, during which they saw each other frequently and sometimes for days on end, her estimate works out to just five or six times per month. I agree. The complainant's estimate is consistent with her overarching narrative of the relationship. Both parties admitted to having addiction issues and that they would see each other several times per week. She testified he would pretty much only call her to come over if he was intoxicated. She testified there was aggression "like […] every time I'm there". I reject the argument that her estimate harms her credibility.

[49] Third, the defence submits that the complainant's description of the June 3 allegation of sexual assault is inherently unbelievable. She testified that T.J.L. had put his penis "right in between [her] thighs" while his pants were still on. Defence counsel contends T.J.L.'s penis could not be both between her legs and still within his pants. I disagree. The complainant explained that T.J.L. was wearing "joggers" (i.e., sweatpants) and that they were being stretched by his erect penis. This does not strike me as implausible.

[50] Fourth, the defence points to the complainant's admission that she had self-harmed. I do not see how this admission suggests she was being untruthful with the court.

[51] Fifth, counsel submits that I should be concerned that the complainant was looking at notes while giving her video statement to police. She had dictated the notes to her CAS worker. The complainant has difficulty reading due to dyslexia. I asked counsel to elaborate on why her use of notes was concerning. He submitted it was a bit "weird". I rewatched the video. I found nothing concerning in her use of notes or demeanour. It appeared to me that she was referring to notes just to refresh her memory on dates, not to assist in recalling the allegations.

[52] Sixth, and finally, counsel says I should be concerned by the lack of corroborative medical records to support the complainant's claim that she overdosed on the night of the February sexual-assault allegation. Counsel submits it would have been possible for the Crown to obtain and produce medical records if they existed, and I should infer from their absence at trial that they do not exist and she is lying about an overdose.

[53] I disagree with defence counsel that the records, if they existed, would have necessarily found their way to Crown and, in turn, defence counsel. Assuming the proper procedures were followed by counsel, the records could only have been provided to the defence through a third-party records application: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 278.2. If the Crown had them, it should not have disclosed the records but should have given the defence notice of their existence: s. 278.2(3). If the Crown did not have them, the defence could still have sought their production; the claim of an overdose was disclosed in the video statement.

[54] I do not know why the records are not before the court: perhaps they do not exist; or perhaps they exist and are not before the court due to decisions made by the Crown, the defence, or police. I make no findings on this point. I cannot draw any conclusions from the records' absence. Doing so would be speculative. I do not see the absence of medical records as a reason to question the honesty or accuracy of the complainant's evidence.

[55] I did not identify any significant inconsistencies in my review of the complainant's evidence. To be clear, the absence of inconsistencies does not enhance her credibility. It means factors that could have harmed her credibility were absent.

[56] Ultimately, notwithstanding the complainant's admitted negative feelings towards T.J.L., I find she was a compelling witness who testified honestly. In spite of her young age, she was a poised and confident witness who was fair to both herself and T.J.L. She was firm in cross-examination, but not reflexively so, and answered candidly regardless whether the answer would portray her negatively.

F. Conclusions With Respect to Each of the Allegations

[57] There is a single charge of sexual assault with a timeframe covering both the February and June incidents. T.J.L. will be found guilty if either alleged sexual assault is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

[58] Although I have found the complainant credible, I have concerns about the reliability of her account of the February 29 allegation of sexual assault. On her evidence, she was extremely intoxicated on Xanax and cocaine. In her video statement and at trial, her evidence of this incident was far less fleshed out than her evidence in respect of the other allegations. She did not recall if anything was said by T.J.L. She did not recall many mechanics of the incident. In the following days, she had a stinging pain in her vagina. But there could have been reasons for that pain other than just non-consensual intercourse.

[59] I am satisfied that the evidence with respect to this incident is insufficiently reliable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this sexual assault occurred. Due to her professed high degree of intoxication, I cannot be satisfied that her recollection of events is accurate. I cannot be sure of what was said or what each party did. I accept the complainant believes she was sexually assaulted. The evidence does not allow me to conclude her belief is accurate.

[60] I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that T.J.L. should be found guilty in relation to the June 3 sexual assault. They agreed there was intercourse that day. I accept the complainant's evidence that she did not consent and expressed her lack of consent, and that he persisted in forcing sexual intercourse on her over her objections. On these facts, he could not have believed that she communicated consent.

[61] I am also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that T.J.L. assaulted the complainant on April 23 in the manner she described. The alleged assault, in the context of a fight, involved T.J.L. squeezing the complainant's belly and expressing his desire to "squeeze the baby out of" her before placing his hands on her throat and squeezing. I note that T.J.L. agreed in cross-examination that he had asked the complainant to end the pregnancy. In his mind, they were not ready for the responsibility of a baby. He also testified that she had said no, and that he had been fine with this. Nonetheless, he effectively agreed he had the motive that apparently animated his actions that day.

[62] I note that I do not rely on the fact that both witnesses agreed that police and EMS attended on that date as confirmatory. This fact simply suggests a complaint was made; it is not evidence that the complaint was true.

[63] Finally, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that T.J.L. said, "you and this baby are gonna die", or words to that effect, during the April 23 assault. Those words satisfy the essential elements of threatening death. They were uttered in the context of a fight in which T.J.L. was using force in an apparent effort to make good on a threat to "squeeze the baby out of you". A reasonable person would clearly understand those words to convey a threat to cause death. The only reasonable inference is that they were intended to be taken seriously. As such, the act and fault requirements of s. 264.1(1) are satisfied: see R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68, at paras. 10-23.

G. Conclusion

[64] I am satisfied that T.J.L. is guilty of all three counts. I reject T.J.L.'s denials. They do not leave me with reasonable doubt. The complainant's evidence proves the essential elements of all three charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

[65] There will be findings of guilt for sexual assault, assault and uttering death threats.

Released: October 9, 2025

Signed: Justice Michael Perlin