Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 3111-998-24-31103237-00 (Peel Region) Date: September 22, 2025 Ontario Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King — and — Prabhjot Mann

Before: Justice S. Robichaud

Heard on: August 19, 21, September 22, 2025

Reasons for Sentence released on: September 22, 2025

Counsel:

• J. White, counsel for the Crown
• L. Sandhu, counsel for the accused Prabhjot Mann

Reasons for Sentence

i. Overview

[1] The history of proceedings and reasons for sentence are as follows:

[2] On September 4, 2025, I found Mr. Mann guilty of all offences he was facing relating to a loaded, restricted firearm found inside a duffel bag inside his home while on a court order not to possess any weapons. My reasons for judgment were set out in R. v. Mann, 2025 ONCJ 457. I do not intend to reiterate my findings here, except as may be required; however, I do rely on them in my considerations in determining an appropriate sentence and in reaching facts on any aggravating factors.

[3] On the day judgment was delivered, defence declined an opportunity to have a pre-sentence report prepared for Mr. Mann. Crown and Defence counsel were encouraged in court and via email to file submissions, supporting case law, and any other relevant materials in advance by responding in a "reply-all".

[4] The matter was adjourned to September 22, 2025, for further submissions and sentencing. I confirmed on this date that all materials were now filed and that there was not a change in position of seeking a pre-sentence report.

[5] The Crown filed sentencing materials and a draft 491 forfeiture order on September 12, 2025. The sentencing materials spanned 183 pages and included an affidavit entitled "Affidavit of Lisa Smith - June 27, 2025" (Smith Affidavit). Ms. Smith is a criminal intelligence analyst with Peel Regional police and was tasked with setting out relevant and detailed statistical information on illegal firearm possession, their use, and consequences in Peel Region since 2014 to 2025.

[6] On September 16, 2025, the defence filed three cases for my review.

[7] On September 18, 2025, I responded to all parties via email advising them that the entire day was tentatively set aside by the trial-coordinator for Mr. Mann's sentencing hearing. As such, I encouraged all parties to ensure filings are complete, that arrangements should be made for any potential witnesses on disputed evidence be ready to proceed either in person or via Zoom, and that I am made aware of any further aggravating or mitigating factors as soon as possible. However, I made it clear that I would entertain further adjournments for incomplete materials if so required.

[8] While there was no 11(b) application filed, and Mr. Mann's trial and judgment occurred just under the 18 month Jordan ceiling, I am nonetheless mindful of the need to proceed promptly. The date for sentencing, September 2, 2025, would be 18 months and 6 days from the swearing of the information.

[9] On September 22, 2025, all exhibits received to date were filed including:

(1) Email correspondence between the Court and counsel.

(2) The Smith Affidavit

(3) Mr. Mann's institutional records

(4) Letters of support from Mr. Mann's wife Amarjeet Kaur, and his uncle Jagraj Singh,

(5) Mr. Mann's Work Permit issued by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)

(6) An immigration opinion letter, while not specific to Mr. Mann, highlights the consequences of a conviction of any offence of 10 years or more resulting in a finding of "serious criminality" and therefore deemed inadmissibility to Canada.

ii. Further Findings of Fact on Sentence

[10] At the outset of sentencing, I invited counsel to make submissions on whether I could conclude that Mr. Mann was in possession of the loaded firearm, ammunition, and prohibited device:

(1) While in a public place.

(2) While travelling to Quebec; and

(3) While in a motor vehicle.

[11] Although evidence was led at trial that could support findings on these issues, no specific conclusions were made at that time, as they did not form part of the essential elements of the offences charged.

[12] At sentencing, I invited counsel to make submissions or call evidence on any remaining disputed matters before determining whether these circumstances should be treated as aggravating factors. I remain bound by the principle that any aggravating factor must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

[13] Counsel for the Crown did not seek to call any evidence on any of these aggravating factors but agreed that based upon the evidentiary record I could make findings provided they are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

[14] Defence counsel urges the Court not to draw aggravating inferences about possession at GoodLife or interprovincial transport, noting that no witness saw the weapon in the blue bag and that Ms. Kaur testified she did not see it.

[15] In assessing the evidence at trial and applying these findings of fact to the sentencing proceedings, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mann was in possession of the firearm, ammunition, and prohibited magazine outside the residence and took them with him on his work-related trip to Quebec.

[16] This finding gives rise to additional aggravating factors, which I address below. My conclusion is based on the following facts and inferences that flow naturally from the trial record:

• Although the firearm was not observed until police discovered it during the search, the evidence supports only one reasonable conclusion: the firearm was inside the blue duffel bag during Mr. Mann's trip to Quebec.

• Ms. Kaur testified that the blue duffel bag was brought with them to Quebec. While I do not accept her evidence that she was unaware of the firearm, her testimony regarding the presence of the bag during the trip is uncontroversial and corroborated by police observations before and after the trip.

• Ms. Kaur further testified that upon returning from Quebec, she and Mr. Mann placed their bags in the kitchen and immediately went upstairs, as Mr. Mann was feeling unwell. According to her, she gave him medication and he went to sleep. Although I have serious concerns about Ms. Kaur's overall credibility, I accept this specific account as accurate, as there is no evidence of Mr. Mann interacting with the bag after returning home. Accordingly, there is no equally competing inference that the firearm was placed in the bag after the trip. This supports the aggravating factors of possession in a public place, possession in a commercial motor vehicle, and interprovincial transport.

[17] However, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mann had the firearm with him while at the GoodLife gym. The temporal gap and change in purpose between his possession of the duffel bag at the gym and his departure for Quebec leave uncertainty as to when the firearm was placed in the bag. While there is a high probability that he had the firearm and prohibited items with him at all material times led in evidence at trial, I cannot find the additional aggravating factor that he possessed them in a highly public setting such as a gym, where they could have been easily accessed or stolen.

iii. Counts Where the Principle in Kienapple Applies

[18] One of the first matters addressed at the sentencing hearing was what counts, if any, should be stayed pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in R. v. Kienapple.

[19] As noted above, Mr. Mann was found guilty of the following Criminal Code of Canada offences:

(1) Possession of a firearm, to wit; a handgun, knowing that he was not a holder of a licence contrary to section 92(1)

(2) Possession of a restricted firearm with accessible ammunition capable of being discharged in said firearm without authorization contrary to Section 95(1)

(3) Careless storage of a firearm, to wit: a handgun, contrary to Section 86(1)

(4) Possession of a prohibited device and ammunition without a licence, to wit: rounds of 9mm ammunition, knowing that he was not the holder of a licence under which he may possess it contrary to Section 92(2); and,

(5) Disobeying a lawful court order, to wit: do not possess any weapon(s) as defined by the Criminal Code, contrary to Section 127.

[20] It is agreed that count 1, the section 92(1) count, should be stayed pursuant to this principle on the basis that this charge arose out of the same factual and legal circumstances as the more serious offence of 95(1), or count 2 of the information.

[21] Count 4 will remain as the prohibited device does not relate to the possession of the firearm in counts 1 and 2; rather, it relates to a prohibited over-capacity magazine used with the restricted handgun. Counts 3 and 5 are separate and distinct offences and will also remain.

iv. Position of the Parties

[22] The Crown seeks a total sentence of 3.5 years for the cumulative sentence that may be considered as a total sentence, or as a breakdown of offences where consecutive sentences apply. In this case, the breakdown would therefore be 3 years concurrent on the firearm offences, and 6 months consecutive on the breach of court order (consecutive). I advised the Crown that I was inclined to treat the breach of a court order under s.127 as consecutive sentence. With that, the Crown's view is that the total sentences should therefore be three years for the firearm offences and six months for the breach of court order.

[23] Relying on R. v. Burke-Whittaker (Whittaker), 2025 ONCA 142, R. v. Fernandes, 2025 ONSC 4412, and R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, Defence submits the operative range for s. 95 "true crime" possession commonly spans two to five years but argues this case sits at the low end given the absence of use to facilitate other criminality and Mr. Mann's circumstances as a first-time offender. Defence stresses that the s. 127 common law peace bond breach should attract less weight than a s. 117 prohibition breach and highlights the severe immigration consequences (serious criminality and resulting inadmissibility) as collateral consequences.

[24] On credit, the Defence submits 256 days of real pre-sentence custody attracts Summers at 1.5:1, and seeks significant Duncan mitigation for triple-bunking and lockdowns, plus additional credit for 9 months 20 days of strict house arrest, proposing an overall mitigation in the range of 6–6.5 months (plus recognition of house-arrest conditions). The Defence ultimately seeks a 30-month global sentence (28 months on the firearms, 2 months consecutive for the s. 127), once Summers and Duncan credits are applied.

[25] Both counsel agree that Summers and Duncan credit should apply to Mr. Mann.

v. The Background of Mr. Mann

[26] Through submissions of counsel and the exhibits on sentencing, I have come to learn the following about Mr. Mann:

• Mr. Mann is 26 years old. He is in Canada on a work permit; he is not a Canadian citizen or permanent resident.

• He is married to Amarjeet Kaur. Prior to these charges, Ms. Kaur and Mr. Mann looked forward to a life "full of hope" but that shifted quickly when they lost their baby, presumably a miscarriage, followed by Mr. Mann's arrest shortly thereafter. Both have faced immense stress and trauma over the past couple of years and they now look to the future with anxiety and pessimism. They faced significant financial challenges while Mr. Mann was on bail as he was unable to work. Ms. Kaur has been residing in British Columbia in an effort to pursue immigration options more favourable to her circumstances. Ms. Kaur speaks highly of his character and advises he is "not a bad person". She hopes that upon his release, they can rebuild their lives together.

• Mr. Jagraj Singh, the uncle of Mr. Mann, and a Canadian citizen, wrote a letter to the Court expressing strong family support for Mr. Mann. He describes Mr. Mann as a kind, respectful, and caring individual who values family and community, and states that this conviction is entirely out of character. Mr. Singh emphasizes the emotional hardship the process has caused, particularly for Mr. Mann's wife, who has experienced significant stress and depression during his incarceration. He assures the Court that, upon release, the family will provide full support to help Mr. Mann reintegrate, secure meaningful work, and move forward positively. The letter concludes with a plea for mercy and compassion in sentencing, asserting that Mr. Mann is a good young man who can rebuild his life with family support.

• Prior to remand, Mr. Mann spent 9 months and 20 days on strict house arrest with a surety. He was not permitted to work during that period and was required to reside with his surety. If he was outside of this residence, he would need to be in the presence of that surety.

• He has no criminal record.

• As a result of this conviction, he will most certainly face deportation. I base this on the immigration opinion filed.

• Mr. Mann was afforded the opportunity to address the Court at the completion of sentencing but declined.

vi. Principles of Sentencing

[27] In determining the appropriate sentence, I look to the guiding principles set out s.718.1 of the Criminal Code. I have also evaluated the case law submitted by Defence and Crown.

[28] The Court has a duty not only to sentence individual offenders, but to speak clearly to the community about how illegal firearm offences are treated.

[29] In reaching a proportionate sentence, I am mindful to take into account the mitigating and aggravating factors, and any collateral consequences that may affect the offender. I am also mindful of the emphasis that denunciation and deterrence are paramount considerations in offences of this nature. Both trial and appellate courts have repeatedly stressed the harm that gun crime creates in our community. As a few notable examples:

• "Gun-related crime poses grave danger to Canadians."

• "Gun crimes involving the possession of loaded, concealed firearms in public places pose a real and immediate danger to the public, especially anyone who interacts with the gun holder. When the person with the gun is confronted by the police, who are engaged in the lawful execution of their duties, the risk increases dramatically. It increases yet again when the gun holder flees, and still again when the gun holder discards the weapon in a public place. A person who carries a concealed, loaded handgun in public undermines the community's sense of safety and security. Carrying a concealed, loaded handgun in a public place in Canada is antithetical to the Canadian concept of a free and ordered society."

• "Firearms offences, involving violence, have been decried by all levels of courts in Canada as a scourge on our society. Crimes involving firearms are far too common. Firearms are used to seriously injure, maim, or kill people. The result is that courts have repeatedly emphasized the need for exemplary sentences."

• "Gun crime is a matter of grave and growing public concern. Guns are designed to cause serious injury and death. Guns such as the one seized in this case are inherently dangerous and present an ultimate threat of death to those in their presence. A sawed-off shotgun serves no legitimate purpose. This is a "true crime" offence. In R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that illegal firearms are primarily found in the hands of criminals who use them to intimidate, wound, maim and kill."

• "Gun crime has become a cancer in Toronto. Despite several years of case law condemning the offence, the possession of firearms remains a blight on the city and its residents. Guns are made and used to maim, threaten and kill. Their impact goes well beyond the victims of such crime: spouses, romantic partners, parents and children suffer the trauma of a loved one lost to the mindless violence wrought by the use of firearms. Witnesses to gun violence may suffer traumatic effects that linger for their lifetime. Courts have sought to send an unambiguous message to those involved in gun crime that convictions will inevitably bear severe consequences."

[30] A valuable curation of similar comments by highly respected jurists and appellate authority was set out by Justice Goldstein in R. v. Sampogna, [2020] O.J. No. 692 at para 12.

[31] Despite these ever-escalating denunciatory messages sent by the court, the Smith Affidavit makes it clear that this has had little effect on the willingness of some individuals to possess illegal firearms and lethal accoutrement in our communities. Mr. Mann is one of those people.

[32] While prevalent in Peel Region, this problem is not exclusive to it. In the recent Toronto decision of R. v. Hinds, [2025] O.J. No. 463, Justice J. Callaghan pointed out that "The rate of police-reported violent crime involving a firearm increased in 2022 by 8.9%. The 2022 rate of firearm-related violent crime is at its highest level since comparable data was first compiled in 2009."

[33] Illegal firearms, and the horrific violence that routinely flows from their use, remains a persistent and deeply troubling threat to public safety and in Peel and across Canada. Courts at all levels have consistently recognized the gravity of these offences and the urgent need to respond with sentences that reflect the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public.

[34] It is hard to know whether this is driven by a sense of indifference, a feeling of impunity, confidence in concealment, or a sentiment that gun crime is not treated severely enough to sufficiently deter individuals from possessing them. I doubt the courts will ever come to sufficiently understand or deter some individuals' willingness to commit these crimes despite the most severe of sentences or while on court orders not to do so.

[35] While it appears the courts have exhausted efforts of denunciation through strong and repeated messages, we have not exhausted the tools available to us in protecting the public from individuals who brazenly carry them in public; and, in the case of Mr. Mann, while on court orders prohibited them from doing so.

[36] While "denunciation and deterrence" under section 718(a) and (b) are paramount objectives in sentencing gun cases, it does not prevent courts from adding the same paramountcy towards protecting the public as stated the immediate outset of s.718 of the Criminal Code: "The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society…" in addressing illegal firearms.

[37] Similarly, s.718(c) states "to separate offenders from society, where necessary;" This is another valuable tool as courts seek to quell the scourge of gun crime in Canada, and more particularly, in the Greater Toronto Area.

[38] The increase in gun violence and gun possession over the past decade has not gone unnoticed by the public. Canadian media has routinely covered the harm of illegal gun crime and how it has impacted our communities. Those that it impacts most are often the most vulnerable and impoverished.

[39] While media reports and news stories on these crimes must be evaluated through a lens of skepticism that are at times motivated to generate traffic or subscriptions, it would be obtuse to ignore an overall sentiment that there is an erosion of public confidence in the sentences that people who are willing to carry illegal firearms receive.

[40] Variances of sentences in similar cases range from conditional sentence orders, to upper reformatory, to penitentiary terms. While all these cases aim to achieve a proportionate sentence for the offender, it is undoubtedly difficult for the public to understand how there is such deviance from the stated baseline:

Gun crimes involving the unlawful possession of loaded handguns in public places fall squarely within that category. McLachlin C.J., in Nur (SCC), at para. 82, observed that a three-year sentence may be appropriate "for the vast majority of offences" under s. 95: see also Nur (ONCA), at para. 206; R. v. Mansingh, 2017 ONCA 68, at para. 24; R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692, at paras. 47-49; and R. v. Danvers (2005), 199 C.C.C. (3d) 490, at para. 77. (Emphasis added)

[41] Where the Supreme Court of Canada and appellate courts have made it clear that the "vast majority of cases" involving illegal firearms require significant custodial sentences, courts should strive to apply this binding authority consistently. Doing so reinforces public confidence in the justice system. Similarly, those who possess illegal firearms should understand that such conduct will almost certainly result in a substantial custodial sentence, likely in a penitentiary. Regardless of whether these sentences deter or denounce offenders, they unquestionably protect the public during the period of incarceration.

vii. Pre-Sentence Custody: Summers and Duncan Credit

[42] Mr. Mann was first admitted to the Maplehurst Correctional Centre on March 21, 2024, and remained in custody until March 28, 2024, at which point he was released, presumably on bail. He was subsequently readmitted on January 19, 2025, and has remained in custody since that date.

[43] As of September 22, 2025, defence and the Crown agree he has accrued a total of 256 days of pre-sentence custody. Applying the standard Summers credit ratio of 1.5:1, this results in an effective sentence of 384 days, or just over 1 year.

[44] Counsel for Mr. Mann submitted institutional records detailing the conditions under which Mr. Mann served this time. These records are relevant to the question of whether additional credit, commonly referred to as Duncan credit, should be applied considering the conditions he endured.

[45] In addition to the filed records, and the submissions of counsel, I also rely on my local knowledge as a presiding Justice in Peel where MCC serves. To strengthen that awareness, I am also aware of recent decisions that describe the ongoing unacceptable conditions within Maplehurst.

[46] In one such recent decision dated September 16, 2025, Justice Mirza of the Superior Court of Justice here in Peel Region stated:

[70] […] In R v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that the appropriate circumstances, particularly harsh presentence incarceration conditions, can provide mitigation apart from and beyond the one point five credit referred to in section 719(3.1) of the Code. In considering whether any enhanced credit should be given, the court will consider both the conditions of the pre-sentence incarceration and the impact of those conditions on the accused.

[71] I can reasonably infer how hard it has been to be in Maplehurst for him over the almost three years. Every judge and justice of the peace in this Court routinely hears about the hardships from frequent lockdowns, triple-bunking, violence and health concerns at Maplehurst.

[72] There is no doubt that it is an institution that is punishing, at times cruel, and it is not a suitable setting for any person long-term.

[47] While I bound to consider harsh conditions, how that affects the ultimate sentence is a matter of discretion with no fixed formula of what credit I should apply. In the decision of R. v. Abraham, 2023 ONSC 4592, R.S.J. Ellies points out the difficulty in trying to reach a specific ratio in trying to calculate an appropriate amount of Duncan credit when evaluating all factors holistically. This is complicated further when considering a mixed "partial" and "full" lockdown experience, and therefore "assess[ed] the effect of the lockdown on him qualitatively and to mitigate the sentence based on that assessment." That is the same approach I intend to take in Mr. Mann's case by factoring in the entirety of the records and further amplified by counsel in submissions.

[48] In making such a consideration, I have considered the records of Mr. Mann that demonstrate:

(1) A total of 109 lockdown days. 48 of those days were full lockdown and 61 were partial lockdowns. Combined, Mr. Mann served a total of just under 45% of his time in custody in some form of lock down.

(2) Mr. Mann was triple-bunked for a total of 177 days, or 69% of his time in custody.

(3) There are no reports of institutional misconduct on file. He was therefore eligible for full access to privileges. However, that access was significantly frustrated or negated on lockdown days.

(4) A list of programming that would have been available to Mr. Mann on days he was able to attend but this was presumably seriously undermined or negated by lockdowns.

(5) His dietary needs were met. His entitled privileges were still accessible on "partial" lockdown days. Regardless of lockdowns, inmates were still entitled to shower daily or as operationally feasible.

[49] The Crown agrees to applying Duncan credit appropriately to reflect the conditions Mr. Mann spent his time in custody, but did not take a firm position on what that means in effect.

[50] Defence counsel pointed out the case of R. v. Beals, 2023 ONSC 555, that provides a helpful reference on how similar conditions were treated by other judges in this jurisdiction. Justice Durno in R. v. Andrew, [2021] O.J. No.2911 attributed approximately 0.5 days credit for every day spent in lockdown. I accept this as sensible credit for lockdown days for Mr. Mann and therefore credit him 60 days for the prolonged lockdowns at Maplehurst.

[51] In the same case, Justice Durno gave 9 months of mitigation for 458 days of triple-bunking. Applying the approximate ratio to Mr. Mann, he is therefore entitled to an additional 100 days of pre-trial custody under Duncan principles of mitigation.

[52] Lastly, I am asked to consider applying further Duncan credit for his strict conditions while on bail awaiting trial. While these conditions pale in comparison to the mitigation he deserves for his time spent at Maplehurst, he is entitled to some degree of additional mitigation when considering he was unable to work, had to live away from his spouse, and was not allowed outside the residence except while in the presence of his surety. Therefore, I will credit Mr. Mann an additional 1 month for his time spent on house arrest as further Duncan credit.

[53] The total effective pre-sentence custody Mr. Mann has served is:

(1) 256 days of actual custody × 1.5 Summers credit = 384 days

(2) + 60 days credit for lockdown

(3) + 100 days credit for triple-bunking

(4) + 30 days credit for strict bail conditions

[54] Total: 384 + 60 + 100 + 30 = 574 days of enhanced credit.

viii. The Appropriate Range

[55] In R. v. Williams, 2022 ONCJ 57, Justice West provided a helpful analysis of determining an appropriate range for firearm possession offences by drawing on Supreme Court and appellate authority. The judgment identifies several factors relevant to this case that I will reiterate and adopt here:

(1) The distinction between "true crime" and regulatory possession under s. 95(1), with the former attracting exemplary custodial sentences, even for youthful first offenders.

(2) The paramount importance of denunciation and general deterrence in sentencing for loaded firearm offences, particularly where the firearm is possessed in public.

(3) The starting point for sentencing in "true crime" cases is typically at or near the maximum reformatory sentence, and often in the penitentiary range, even for first offenders.

(4) The range of sentences is informed by appellate decisions such as R. v. Nur, R. v. Smickle, 2013 ONCA 678, R. v. Mansingh, 2017 ONCA 68, and R. v. Beals, 2023 ONSC 555, which consistently affirm custodial sentences of two to three and a half years for possession of prohibited or restricted firearms in "true crime" scenarios.

(5) The presence of aggravating factors, including possession in a public place, concealment, proximity to others, and risk to police and community, significantly increases the seriousness of the offence.

(6) The absence of a connection to other criminal activity (e.g., trafficking or gang involvement) may mitigate the sentence, but does not remove the offence from the "true crime" category.

(7) Sentencing must remain individualized but must also reflect consistency and proportionality.

(8) The impact of systemic racism may be relevant to moral culpability but does not diminish the gravity of the offence.

(9) The harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody may be considered as a mitigating factor, but must not render the sentence disproportionate (R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754 and R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344).

[56] In R. v. Gorgievski, [2024] O.J. No. 4752, Justice Schreck affirmed that the well-established sentencing range for first-time firearm possession offences is between two and five years. The offender's level of moral culpability determines where within that range a sentence should fall. Where the firearm is possessed in public as a tool of criminal trade, the culpability is high and sentences tend toward the upper end of the range. Conversely, where the firearm is possessed in private and not for the purpose of facilitating other criminal activity, a sentence at the lower end may be appropriate. Regardless of context, the moral culpability associated with possessing a firearm remains significant.

[57] In this case, the evidentiary record does not clearly establish why Mr. Mann possessed the firearm, nor does it show a connection to other criminal activity. However, this does not diminish the seriousness of the offence. Mr. Mann was in possession of a carelessly stored, loaded, restricted firearm, equipped with a prohibited over-capacity magazine, inside motor vehicles—including one used for commercial purposes—and transported it across provincial borders.

[58] These circumstances are highly aggravating. Based on the authorities cited and the facts of this case, I find that the appropriate starting point for Mr. Mann's sentence on the firearm-related offences is between three and four years. This range does not include the breach of the court order, which I address separately below as a consecutive sentence.

ix. The Evidence of Firearm Offences in Peel Region

[59] The Smith Affidavit provides a comprehensive statistical and contextual overview of firearm-related violence in Peel Region from 2011 to 2025. It documents a sustained and troubling increase in the unlawful possession and use of handguns, particularly in urban centers such as Brampton and Mississauga. The data reveals that most firearm-related homicides in Peel involve illegally possessed handguns, often loaded and concealed, and frequently found in residential settings. These weapons are not only used in targeted violence but also contribute to accidental shootings, intimidation, and the destabilization of communities.

[60] The affidavit highlights a pattern of increasing accessibility to prohibited firearms and devices, including over-capacity magazines, which amplify the lethality of these weapons. It further notes that many of these firearms are stored or transported in ways that make them readily available for use—often in bags, vehicles, or shared dwellings—without any lawful purpose. The cumulative effect of these practices has been a measurable erosion of public safety, with law enforcement and emergency services reporting a marked rise in firearm-related incidents, injuries, and fatalities over the past decade.

[61] These findings underscore the urgent need for courts to respond with clarity and resolve. The possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm in Peel Region is not a neutral act—it is a direct contribution to a documented crisis. The Smith Affidavit supports the conclusion that denunciation and deterrence must be prioritized in sentencing, not only to hold individual offenders accountable but to affirm the Court's role in protecting the community from the predictable and often tragic consequences of illegal firearm possession.

[62] The affidavit provides concrete data to support these conclusions. Between 2020 and 2024, Peel Regional Police responded to over 1,200 firearm-related incidents, with unlawfully possessed handguns comprising more than 85% of all firearms seized. In 2024 alone, there were 47 shooting-related injuries and 19 confirmed firearm-related homicides in the region. Notably, over-capacity magazines—such as the one found in Mr. Mann's possession—were recovered in 31% of handgun seizures that year, underscoring their increasing prevalence and the heightened risk they pose to public safety.

[63] The affidavit also highlights a troubling rise in residential firearm recoveries, which have nearly doubled since 2018. These recoveries frequently involve unsecured, loaded handguns found in shared dwellings, often accessible to others and stored in bags, closets, or vehicles. The data confirms that such storage practices are not only unlawful but statistically correlated with both intentional violence and accidental discharge. These patterns are not isolated—they reflect a broader and worsening trend in Peel Region that demands a sentencing response calibrated to the gravity of the risk and the need for community protection.

[64] I am aware that the Smith Affidavit relates to firearm possession and crime in Peel Region, and not Waterloo where the firearm was seized, it makes no difference in any of my assessments of the appropriate range. The investigation commenced with Peel Regional Police and the firearm was seized by them. As the Crown pointed out, Mr. Mann is part of the data that is relied upon. The escalating issue of gun crime, whether viewed from a national, provincial, or local level, all speaks to the same level of concern and sentencing principles.

x. The Need for Denunciation and General Deterrence in Peel Region

[65] The sentencing in this matter must be situated within the broader context of firearm-related violence in Peel Region. The statistical and analytical data contained in the Smith Affidavit, examined above, paints a stark and troubling picture. Over the past decade, Peel Region has experienced a sustained and alarming increase in the possession and use of illegal firearms. The affidavit documents not only the frequency of such offences, but also their devastating consequences—fatal shootings, injuries, and the erosion of public safety in communities across Brampton and Mississauga.

[66] This Court cannot view Mr. Mann's conduct in isolation. The possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm, with an over-capacity magazine, in a shared residence where there was a history of volatility, is not merely a regulatory infraction. It is a direct affront to public safety and a manifestation of the very crisis described in the Smith Affidavit. The firearm was not locked away, nor was it stored in a manner that minimized risk. It was accessible, mobile, and ready for use—one trigger pull away from grievous harm or death.

In this context, the principles of denunciation and general deterrence must be given primacy.

[67] The presence of an over-capacity magazine not only increases the potential lethality of a firearm—it fundamentally alters the risk calculus for law enforcement officers tasked with confronting individuals who possess such weapons unlawfully. Police officers are trained and equipped to respond to threats based on expected levels of force and engagement. When confronted with a prohibited device capable of discharging significantly more rounds than a standard magazine, officers are effectively "outpowered" in terms of their own protective gear and tactical options. This imbalance escalates the danger of any encounter, increasing the likelihood of reactive force, injury, or death. The proliferation of such devices contributes to what can only be described as an arms race between those who unlawfully possess firearms and the officers sworn to protect the public. Courts must recognize this dynamic and respond with sentences that reflect the heightened risk posed to law enforcement and the community at large.

[68] While Mr. Mann's firearm was discovered by police in his residence, the evidence supports the conclusion that he transported it across provincial borders and kept it in a bag he routinely carried in public. This aggravates the risk and underscores the need for a sentence that sends a clear and unequivocal message: the unlawful possession of firearms in Peel Region will be met with firm and proportionate custodial sentences.

[69] The Court must not only hold Mr. Mann accountable, but also contribute to the broader effort to stem the tide of gun violence in this jurisdiction. Anything less would fail to reflect the gravity of the offence and the Court's responsibility to protect the community.

xi. The Mitigating Factors Relating to Mr. Mann

[70] As set out in greater detail above at under the background of Mr. Mann, mitigating factors include:

• The Duncan factors already considered.

• He has a loving spouse who is supportive of him and wishes to continue their relationship and presumably continue to attempt to raise a family together upon his release.

• At the time of the offence, he was employed and a contributing member of society while in Canada on a work permit.

• Ms. Kaur and uncle speak to his otherwise good character.

• He has no criminal record.

• Mr. Mann and his wife have faced significant stress since his arrest.

• He and his wife recently lost a child.

xii. The Aggravating Factors Relating to Mr. Mann

[71] To repeat what is stated above, the breach of the Court order (count 5) will be addressed as separate, consecutive sentence and not considered as an aggravating factor.

[72] The aggravating factors are as follows:

• The firearm was loaded and immediately operable. It was capable of causing grievous bodily harm or death with a single trigger pull.

• The firearm was stored in a volatile household, which was occupied by other individuals and had a documented history of violence, as described by Ms. Kaur during her testimony.

• The firearm was equipped with an extended magazine, which is a prohibited device. This increases the potential for lethal harm. While a single bullet may be sufficient to cause death, the presence of an extended magazine serves no lawful purpose and instead increases the capacity for intimidation and further violence.

• For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had this firearm and prohibited device with him during his work trip to Quebec. I consider this interprovincial transport an aggravating factor. I also consider the firearm being present in a motor vehicle an aggravating factor.

xiii. Collateral Consequences

[73] The Court of Appeal of Ontario recently reminded trial judges the mandatory requirement to consider collateral consequences a sentence may have upon the offender, their family, and potentially other unintended consequences. "[C]ollateral consequences humanize and individualize sentencing by accounting for its effects other than the criminal sanction itself".

[74] In addition, a court must ask is whether a sentence may unintentionally undermine some of the objectives of 718.1 such as reintegration into society, rehabilitation, and therefore reduce the need for denunciation and deterrence. This issue is often raised in the context of cases where immigration consequences of deportation may be triggered over relatively small or arbitrary durations of a sentence. There is no rigid rule in how collateral consequences are considered as each offender is unique.

[75] In examining collateral consequences, the court sentencing judge can craft a proportionate sentence by taking into account all of the relevant circumstances related to the offence and the offender.

[76] The fundamental principle is captured well by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34:

48 The question is not whether collateral consequences diminish the offender's moral blameworthiness or render the offence itself less serious, but whether the effect of those consequences means that a particular sentence would have a more significant impact on the offender because of his or her circumstances. Like offenders should be treated alike, and collateral consequences may mean that an offender is no longer "like" the others, rendering a given sentence unfit.

[77] However, in cases where an appropriate sentence places an offender well outside those potential immigration (or other) thresholds, a collateral issue cannot be used to override the sentence to one that is entirely unfit. While the court must strive to reach a proportionate sentence by considering collateral consequences, it must not sacrifice a fit sentence in the process. The Supreme Court made this clear in stating:

[T]he fundamental principle of proportionality must prevail in every case - collateral consequences cannot be used to reduce a sentence to a point where the sentence becomes disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

[78] Similarly, when consequences can be expected as a result of the commission of the offence (as opposed the particular circumstances of the offender), the weight given to collateral consequences may be reduced. In assessing collateral consequences, it is important not to conflate consequences per se (such as incarceration or weapons prohibitions) that is directly linked to the offence, into an collateral consequence that is unusually or disproportionally harsh upon the offender before the court. Where such inevitable consequences would flow, a "collateral" consequence as a mitigating factor is greatly diminished.

[79] I approach this exercise generously and in alignment with what the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34 and emphasized again by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. D.B., 2025 ONCA 577.

[80] The collateral consequences in this case relate primarily to the effects this conviction will have upon his immigration. As noted, it seems certain Mr. Mann will be deported upon serving his sentence. While I might be inclined to consider reducing his sentence if there was an insignificant amount of variance that could change these inevitable immigration consequences, that is not the case here. Any fit and proportionate sentence will result in the same collateral consequences for Mr. Mann – namely, deportation.

[81] I am aware that there are additional collateral consequences such as the separation of his wife should she remain in Canada. However, I do not accept that as rendering the sentence disproportionate to the moral culpability of Mr. Mann. This is not a case like R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15 where a otherwise fit sentence creates unintentional or unintended consequences that are disproportionate to an appropriate punishment. This is a conviction of serious offence that immigration automatically classifies as one deserving of removal from Canada.

[82] These are not a collateral consequences; they were inevitable consequences.

xiv. The Breach of Court Order and to be Served Consecutively

[83] In sentencing on the breach of the court order (count 5), am cognizant that I can consider this as an aggravating factor; or I can treat this as a separate offence for which I can sentence on a consecutive basis. I cannot do both. I have already stated I intend to do the latter.

[84] Following the reasoning in the case of R. v. McCue, 2012 ONCA 773, I consider the breach of the court order to require a consecutive sentence to properly reflect the gravity of the offence of breaching a court order in such a brazen, and serious manner:

20 The mischief conviction warranted a consecutive sentence. That offence was entirely distinct from the weapons offences. It should have been treated as a separate and distinct matter for the purposes of sentencing. A concurrent sentence denigrates the significance of the mischief charge and suggests that it is not in and of itself worthy of punishment. Of course, in fixing the appropriate length of a consecutive sentence, a trial judge must have regard to the totality of the sentences to be imposed. Totality concerns can, however, be adequately addressed by adjusting the length of the various consecutive sentences, if necessary.

[85] This rationale is supported further by Paciocco J.A. in R. v. Claros, 2019 ONCA 626 at para 51:

51 More importantly, the fact that two offences relating to the breach of a prohibition order occur in close succession, or even at the same time, is not a basis for imposing concurrent sentences. The principle that such offences should be served consecutively is intended to ensure that disregard of firearm prohibition orders, imposed in the interest of public safety, does not go unpunished. This principle also recognizes the fact that the breach of a prohibition order is different behaviour than the associated offences, engaging different social interests: R. v. McCue, 2012 ONCA 773, at paras. 21-22; R. v. Addow, 2014 ONSC 3225, at paras. 29-35; R. v. Callaghan, 2017 ONSC 1853, at para. 80, aff'd on different grounds, 2018 ONCA 969 (Ont. C.A.); and by analogy, R. v. Clouthier, 2016 ONCA 197, at paras. 55, 60.

[86] While the offence Mr. Mann was found guilty of was not a s.117 prohibition order, I see little, if any, difference in the circumstances.

[87] Defence submits that the Court should recognize the significant difference in maximum sentences between a breach of a s.117 prohibition order and a breach of a common law peace bond under s.127, and that this distinction should guide sentencing. I do not agree. Sentencing is an individualized process, contingent on the facts of the case.

[88] While s. 117 orders often accompany an underlying criminal record and a specific firearm prohibition, the starting point for breaches involving firearms is typically six months. In this case, the facts mirror those scenarios: the breach involved possession not merely of a weapon, but of a loaded firearm with ammunition and an over-capacity magazine. Put simply, the seriousness of this breach is such that an appropriate sentence, standing alone, begins at six months even under s.127 of the Criminal Code.

[89] A court made it clear to Mr. Mann that he was not to possess any weapons, and he not only violated that, but in a manner with layers of intentionality and seriousness – acquiring the firearm, acquiring a prohibited device to extend its firing power, loading the firearm, possessing it in a public place, in a motor vehicle, and without any authorization to do so. I list these factors not to replicate the aggravating factors I have already considered; rather, to point out that this was not a "technical" or careless breach of a court order and sentencing him upon this must reflect that.

[90] The appropriate range for breaches of firearm prohibition orders is between 6-12 months, consecutive. While my inclination would be to treat this offence in the middle of the range, I will impose a total of six months to reflect proportionality and align with the Crown's position.

[91] The argument about maximum penalties is therefore academic; in either case, a fit sentence is six months.

xv. Conclusion and Total Sentence

[92] I therefore impose the following sentence:

• On counts 2, 3, and 4 (firearm-related offences), a sentence of three (3) years imprisonment, to be served concurrently.

• On count 5 (breach of court order), a sentence of six (6) months imprisonment, to be served consecutively.

• Pursuant to s. 109(3) of the Criminal Code, Mr. Mann is prohibited for life from possessing any firearm, ammunition, restricted weapon, or explosive substance.

• DNA will be ordered (secondary designated offence)

• A forfeiture order is granted in respect of the firearm, ammunition, and prohibited device.

[93] Accordingly, Mr. Mann is sentenced to a total of three years and six months imprisonment, less 574 days of enhanced pre-sentence credit, resulting in a remaining custodial term of one year, eleven months, and eight days.

Released: September 22, 2025

Justice S. Robichaud