WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication.

Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order:

(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.

87.— (8) Prohibition re identifying child.

No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

87.— (9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.

The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.— (3) Offences re publication.

A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: September 3, 2025

Court File No.: Timmins FO-24-92-00

Between:

North Eastern Ontario Family and Children's Services (NEOFACS) Applicant

— AND —

M.R. and A.R. Respondents

Before: Justice G. Jenner

Heard on: August 12, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on: September 3, 2025

Counsel

• Sonia Migneault — counsel for the applicant society
• Marco Frangione — counsel for the respondent mother, M.R.
• Kim Guillemette — counsel for the respondent father, A.R.
• Lisa Barazzutti — for the Office of the Children's Lawyer, legal representative for the child A.A.

JENNER J.:

REASONS RE: MOTION FOR ACCESS

I. Introduction

[1] On August 12, 2025, I heard a motion concerning the respondent parents' access, on a temporary basis only, to their children who are subject to the society's protection application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sch. 1 (CYFSA). The five subject children are AA (age 12), BB (age 4), CC (age 3), DD (age 2), and EE (age 1). MR, who I will refer to as the mother, is biological mother to all five. AR, who I will refer to as the father, is biological father to the youngest four children and has stood in the place of a parent to AA. AA's biological father has not been a part of AA's life and was previously removed as a named party.

II. Context and Positions of the Parties

[2] The applicant society removed the children to a place of safety and commenced the underlying application in September 2024 following the disclosure of extremely serious child abuse allegations. At the first court appearance on September 18, 2024, Justice Dwyer made an order placing the children in the temporary care and custody of the society. The order provided for supervised access for both parents a minimum of three times per week. Location, duration, level of supervision, and frequency of access above the minimum were to be at the discretion of the society.

[3] Access pursuant to the order of Justice Dwyer was short-lived. The respondent parents were charged criminally in relation to the abuse allegations in November 2024 and were each incarcerated for several months before separately securing interim judicial release. The interaction of the parents' release orders with Justice Dwyer's order regarding access has been the source of debate and acrimony amongst the parties. I will address this interaction as a threshold matter before proceeding to my assessment of the appropriate access order.

[4] Under their release orders, the parents are now living apart. The father resides in Monteith, Ontario, while the mother resides in Timmins, Ontario. Both seek supervised in-person access with the younger four of the five children. They propose several community members who have offered to support access as supervisors. Each parent sees merit in postponing their efforts to have access with AA.

[5] The society is opposed to any access to any child for either parent, though their opposition to the father having access is voiced louder than their opposition to the mother.

III. Issues

[6] The issues to be determined on this motion are:

1. How do the parents' current criminal court release orders bear on the question of access under the CYFSA?

2. What access, if any, is appropriate, in respect of each parent and child?

IV. Analysis

4.1 The bearing of the criminal court release orders

[7] The parents framed their motion for temporary access in part as a motion to enforce the order of Justice Dwyer dated September 18, 2025. They claim that once the parents were released from custody the society was obligated to commence or resume access as per that initial order, which has never been revoked or replaced. They claim that by continuing to refuse to facilitate access the society is in contempt of that order.

[8] I reject this framing. Under the constitutional doctrine of paramountcy, to the extent there is a conflict between a criminal court order and a child protection order, the criminal court order prevails and conflicting components of the child protection order are of no force and effect: M.Q. v. R., 2024 NBCA 69, at para. 65. For example, conditions imposed on an accused in a criminal proceeding restricting contact with a child will override any conflicting conditions allowing for or requiring access that are made by a child protection court. It matters not whether the child protection order was made before or after the criminal court order. It matters not the level of court or judicial official who made the order. For example, a criminal release order issued by a justice of the peace would prevail over a protection order made by a judge.

[9] The parents' release orders are different, so I will address each in turn.

[10] The father's release order is in direct conflict with Justice Dwyer's access order. On March 12, 2025, following a bail review, the father was ordered released from custody. Presently, his conditions of release preclude contact with the five children. His conditions also preclude contact with the mother except in the presence of legal counsel and preclude contact with anyone under the age of 16 except in public places and in the presence of one of his sureties. The court stipulated, however, at para. 41 of its decision, that:

[the father]'s access to the [children] shall be deferred to the discretion of the child protection court. If an order for access is made, the applicant may return to this court to seek a revision of his bail conditions.

[11] While the court's reasons offer a path to revisit the father's release conditions in light of developments in the child protection matter, there is no built-in exception for contact with the children pursuant to a child protection court order. In fact, the criminal court's expectation is clearly communicated: the father would need to return to criminal court to revise his conditions.

[12] The mother's release order is less clear. Initially, her release order dated April 30, 2025, included a condition that she not contact the children, but further indicated "this release order is made without prejudice to [the mother]'s position in any child protection proceedings, and her ability to seek a bail review depending on the outcome of such proceedings." The mother's release order was then amended on consent on June 17, 2025 to alter the language to read "[t]hese release conditions are without prejudice to the Ontario Court of Justice's ability to adjudicate and determine parenting time to the Applicant as part of any Child Youth and Family Services Act and/or Ontario Family Law Act Proceedings."

[13] No doubt, in varying the release order on consent, the approving justice of the peace sought to give effect to the express intentions of the parties to preserve this court's ability to assess appropriate access. Unfortunately, however, the language was imprecise. There remained in the order a condition of no contact with the children. There was no express exception to that condition, for example, 'pursuant to a family court order made after today's date.' The 'without prejudice' language that was used and amended can reasonably be read as simply reinforcing this court's jurisdiction to assess appropriate parenting time under the CYFSA, without the parents being prejudiced by the criminal court's own determination. It does not follow that the criminal court order intended for the protection court's determination to automatically prevail over or become an exception to the release order terms.

[14] This is not the only available interpretation of the release order. But the ambiguity left the society with no realistic option but to err on the side of caution, and to assume a conflict displacing Justice Dwyer's order.

[15] In light of the father's release order, the access provisions in Justice Dwyer's order as they related to him were and continue to be, at least temporarily, of no force and effect. With respect to the mother's release order, the question is muddled, but given the difficult position the society was in, I conclude there is no reasonable basis for enforcement proceedings relating to those access provisions.

[16] It does not follow that the issue of access in the child protection proceedings is moot or should be deferred. As the reasons for decision in releasing the father observe, future developments in this child protection proceeding may offer a basis for either parent to seek to revise their release conditions. Moreover, the course of criminal proceedings is not always predictable. The criminal proceedings may conclude, with or without advance warning, at any number of stages. That would remove the conflict and revive whatever child protection order remains in place. It is in my view, wholly appropriate, and indeed necessary for this court to consider what degree of access, if any, is appropriate, applying the provisions of the CYFSA. An appropriate protection order should always be in place, even if it is of no force and effect. Indeed, if the society was opposed to access as a result of new developments in the criminal matters it ought to have taken steps earlier to vary Justice Dwyer's order.

[17] While a new order respecting access may be similarly of no force and effect to the extent of any conflict with criminal release conditions, the respondent parents can then seek to revise the applicable criminal court order. It will, of course, be for the criminal court of competent jurisdiction to determine if a change is justified, applying a different set of statutory parameters to what could be a different evidentiary record. Moreover, in the event the criminal proceedings conclude abruptly, an appropriate order for access will be in place.

[18] I recognize this means that, if successful in this motion, the parents would be required to return to criminal court before access could begin in earnest. I do not wish to contribute to the impression of the legal system as labyrinthine or Kafkaesque. But parents in facing both criminal prosecution and child protection proceedings encounter a simple, if challenging reality: their ability to see their children might be restricted in criminal court by terms of judicial interim release as well as in family court by protection orders. Each court applies a different statute and considers overlapping but distinct issues. Ultimately, a parent must be clear of both types of restriction before access can occur.

4.2 Appropriate access

Legal Framework

[19] The remaining issue is what form of parental access, if any, should be ordered on a temporary basis.

[20] The authority for an order for temporary parental access when a child is removed from the parent or parents in charge is set out in s. 94(8) of the CYFSA. That subsection provides that where an order is made under s. 94(2)(c) or (d), temporarily placing the child with another person or in society care, that order "may contain provisions regarding any person's right of access to the child on such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate."

[21] The court also has jurisdiction to vary a temporary provision for access by virtue s. 104 of the CYFSA. Section 104 is broader than s. 94(8), insofar as it permits non-parents to apply for, vary, or terminate access terms, and permits access orders to be made whenever the court is making an order under Part V of the CYFSA. Resort to s. 104 is, however, unnecessary in this instance. Section 94(8) stipulates that the access provisions are contained within the temporary care and custody order made under s. 94(2). Section 94(9) provides that the court may vary or terminate a temporary care and custody order made under s. 94(2) at any time. That access terms in a s. 94(2) order may also be varied appears clear.

[22] In certain contexts, a party seeking to vary an access order must demonstrate a change in circumstances: see Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2017 ONCJ 784, at para. 55. In this case, however, the order of Justice Dwyer was made on a without prejudice basis before the parents were able to retain counsel and before the Office of the Children's Lawyer became involved. I approach the question of the appropriate order afresh. There is no need for any party to demonstrate a change in circumstances, material or otherwise.

[23] Section 94(8) of the CYFSA says only that the order for access should be "appropriate," but further guidance is provided elsewhere in the Act, and within the jurisprudence. For one, s. 94(11) requires that, before making an access order for a parent, "the court shall take into consideration the child's views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child's age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained." More broadly, courts have held that in determining what order is appropriate, the judge should consider the paramount purpose of the Act, being the best interests, protection and well-being of children, and the secondary purposes of maintaining the integrity of the family unit, assisting families in caring for their children and recognizing the least disruptive action consistent with the best interests of the children (ss. 1(1) and (2) of the Act). In assessing best interests, the court should consider the relevant factors set out in subsection 74(3) of the CYFSA: JFCS v. H.B.S., 2012 O.J. No. 5055; Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. Z.Y.J., 2017 ONCJ 353, at para. 15.

[24] In determining what order is appropriate I may admit and act on evidence that I consider credible and trustworthy in the circumstances: CYFSA, s. 94(10).

[25] Of course, I am applying s. 94 to two different parents in respect of four different children. The appropriate order might be different for each parent and might not make identical provision as between the four children.

The society's evidence

[26] On this motion the society relies on the affidavit of Child Protection Worker Brittany Dodd, dated July 15, 2025, and the affidavit of Legal Services Supervisor Angel Ferron, dated July 8, 2025.

[27] Ms. Dodd's evidence includes the following:

Disclosures from the children:

• On November 1, 2024, AA told Child Care Supervisor Christine Miller that he suffered abuse at the hands of his parents. In a forensic interview conducted jointly by the society and the Timmins Police Service, AA disclosed:

  • Being hit with objects, open hands, and being punched, showing a number of scars and bruising caused by his parents;
  • Having to put his hands on a hot stove and being required to sit in a hot oven;
  • Ingesting full bars of soap, cayenne pepper, and hot sauce when he lied;
  • Being forced to have a mouthful of sawdust;
  • Being deprived of food;
  • Being threatened;
  • Being hosed down and forced to shower in freezing water; and
  • His siblings being repeatedly hit with wooden or plastic spoons which would last approximately 10 minutes.

• On November 5, 2024, AA disclosed the same incidents in an interview with the Ontario Provincial Police, but further disclosed:

  • Being whipped to the extent that a muscle popped out of his body;
  • Being stitched with a needle and a string that had been boiled in water;
  • Being hit so hard he fell unconscious;
  • Being made to clean the floors on his hands and knees;
  • That his sibling BB was brought "downstairs" by the father to hurt him;
  • That BB would be hit with a belt, spoons, and a ruler; and
  • That he saw the father hit the mother in the head with a bible.

• On November 21, 2024, during a forensic interview, CC disclosed to Ms. Dodd that she, DD, BB, and AA would be spanked by the mother and the father.

• On November 21, 2024, BB disclosed to Ms. Dodd the following:

  • That he, AA, CC, and DD would be spanked, and that the father hit him, CC and DD with his hands and with spoons on their bums;
  • That AA would be locked in his room for long periods of time; and
  • That his own hands, fingers, feet and toes would be hurt with a belt.

• On January 14, 2025, AA disclosed the following to Ms. Dodd:

  • That DD and EE, who was three months old at the time of removal, would also be physically disciplined;
  • That the children would be deprived of food as a form of discipline;
  • That all children were made to spend long periods in their bedrooms;
  • That he was whipped in his penis by extension cords; and
  • That the father would clean AA's privates with his own hands in a rough manner.

• On April 8, 2025, AA completed a sworn statement to the OPP and indicated the following:

  • That the father would watch him shower and the father would have his hand down his own pants; and
  • The father would grab AA by the testicles.

• On June 19, 2025, AA provided further sworn evidence to the OPP indicating the following:

  • The father would get on top of him and "hump him" with clothes on; and
  • On one occasion the father got in the shower with AA while naked, and AA could feel the father's penis near his own bum.

Corroborative Evidence:

• On August 9, 2022, a dentist disclosed to the society that the day prior, while treating AA, she noticed two lesions on the sides of his throat. When she asked AA about it, he said he disobeyed his parents and that his father put a wooden spoon into his mouth and held it to the back of his throat. A colleague asked the father about it. He denied it and indicated the son did it to himself. When the appointment finished, AA asked if it was time for a punishment again.

• On November 4, 2024, AA was examined by a pediatrician, who documented injuries to his ear, mouth and throat, genitalia and buttocks, mid-back, fingers, and toes.

• On November 9, 2024, the OPP executed a search warrant at the family residence. Police found:

  • A heavily damaged grey pipe.
  • Damaged curtain rods in a closet.
  • Bungee cords with carabiner clips on the ends. The ends of the clips were worn.
  • Various extension cords and belts.
  • A hose valve in the basement.
  • Significant damage to one end of AA's bed, where the metal is scratched, scraped, and dented, consistent, Ms. Dodd indicates, with AA's description of being tied to his bed with bungee cords.
  • Bars of soap.
  • Sawdust in the basement.
  • A dented and marked wooden post in the basement.

Admissions from the parents:

• On August 9, 2022, the father told a society worker that he pushed a wooden spoon into AA's mouth for lying.

• The same date, the father "admitted to the extension cord incident" noting it was because of AA's biting, kicking, and punching.

• On September 27, 2022, the father told a society worker that he spanked AA for refusing to do chores, and placed AA on a timeout on a chair for an afternoon.

• On September 11, 2024, the mother told Ms. Dodd that she had spanked BB and CC for not listening to her when she had not given them permission to stop colouring. She further advised that every time the children are placed on a time out, they first receive a spanking as punishment. When questioned about whether this was excessive, she responded "no we are following what God wants and children are to be punished if they disobey their parents."

• On October 2, 2024, the mother admitted to providing AA with Trazodone, an anti-depressant prescribed to the father that is not approved for children.

Concerns with Exercised Access:

• AA often sits very close to the father. The father questions AA until he cries.

• When the father is present, the mother will generally repeat the father's comments.

• DD cries during most visits. The mother can eventually soothe her, but if the mother leaves the room, DD cries when left alone with the father.

• The father accused AA of lying.

• The father would quickly get frustrated when the children cried.

Health of children:

• In the fall of 2024, while in society care, all five children presented with untreated hand, foot and mouth disease.

Non-compliance:

• On October 29, 2024, the father attended the school of the two older children, without authorization, resulting in the issues of a trespass notice.

[28] Ms. Ferron's affidavit repeats much of what is contained in Ms. Dodd's affidavit but includes the following additional salient information:

• On August 30, 2024, during a safety assessment at the parents' residence, Ms. Dodd observed a chain lock outside AA's door, which AA and the father confirmed was used for timeouts. AA reported that redness and bruising on his knuckles and nailbeds of his fingernails was from a bicycle accident.

• The society has received several reports from the children's foster parents relating to the children asking not to be hit, and of the children being rigid and extremely compliant, for example by not taking steps like eating or moving unless told to.

The father's Evidence

[29] The father swore an affidavit dated July 10, 2025. He indicates he began his relationship with the mother in October 2018 and in April 2019 they married. The mother and AA moved in with him. They relocated to Val Gagné, Ontario in October 2021.

[30] The father takes issue with the society's mention of earlier referrals of the family to the society, indicating he has not received disclosure of such referrals, despite requests. The father does admit to one incident of sticking a wooden spoon into AA's throat. He says he expressed deep remorse, and that it has not happened since. He further admits that in the past in the Ottawa area he did use an extension cord while spanking AA. He says they learned this was not appropriate and no longer use items to spank the children. The father denies ever tying AA's hands to a bed or hitting him until he cried. He says only that when AA's behaviours became violent they would hold his hands to his side until he calmed down. The father admits to one instance of placing a bar of soap in AA's mouth due to repeated lying. AA was required to hold the bar of soap in his mouth for two minutes. Of the lock on AA's door, the father admits that in the past when AA would become violent, they would lock him in his room until he calmed down, to protect the other children.

[31] The father stresses that apart from AA, none of the other children have shown signs of injury. The father denies that the children are spanked every time before a time out. The father denies that during an access visit, he said anything inappropriate to AA. He states he was advising AA of his Charter right to freedom of religion.

The mother's evidence

[32] The mother relies on her affidavit sworn July 7, 2025. She denies the allegations against her and the father. She indicates neither she nor the father, to her knowledge, has ever abused any of the children. The mother alleges that her children's needs are not being met in society care. She indicates that in November 2024, EE, five months old at the time, had a large unexplained bruise at the back of her head. She has further concerns about EE and DD's diaper rashes. She also accuses the society of disregarding the children's religious needs. She indicates additionally that AA has reported that a former foster parent hit DD.

[33] With respect to the access visits that were able to occur, the mother describes them as overwhelmingly positive. The mother expresses concern that the lack of any contact for over eight months is detrimental to the children's development. She further expresses concern over the children's division between multiple homes over vast geographic areas.

[34] The mother complains that the society has given her no indication of what is expected of her to mitigate the protection concerns. She says she has, of her own initiative, begun counseling and parenting courses.

Is access appropriate?

[35] All parties agree that the alleged abuse, and in particular that disclosed by AA, is horrific. It is, to be blunt, torture. The seriousness with which all parties approach the allegations is demonstrated by their positions: no party is suggesting that any form of unsupervised parenting time is appropriate, at least at this juncture. Moreover, no party is seeking access be ordered with respect to AA, who is the subject of the most extreme forms of alleged abuse. I am being asked to determine only whether some form of supervised parenting time may be appropriate for the younger four children.

[36] In considering this issue, I make the following initial observations about the evidence:

• The most heinous of the allegations—the whipping, sexual assault, forced ingestion of substances, placement in an oven, etc.—arise in respect of AA only. In respect of the remaining children, the allegations, while still concerning, are in the nature of excessive spanking, striking with objects like wooden spoons, and inappropriate confinement.

• While both parents are implicated in alleged abuse, they are not implicated equally. The father is singled out more frequently, and for more serious allegations. Only the father is implicated in inappropriate sexual behaviour. The mother has admitted only to spanking the children and on one occasion improper administration of medication. The father has admitted to two serious assaults with a weapon.

• In respect of some of the more extreme allegations, there is some circumstantial corroborating evidence, for example the items found during the search of the residence and the evidence from AA's dentist. There is also some direct corroboration: the admission of the father in respect of the use of a wooden spoon on AA's throat, and the use of an electric cord to whip AA.

• In respect of some of the most extreme allegations, such as the placement of AA in an oven, and the alleged sexual assaults, there is no evidence beyond AA's disclosure. I am not suggesting that children's evidence cannot be accepted absent corroboration. I am simply providing an overview of the strength of the society's case, which has not yet been tested by processes such as cross-examination.

• Concerns identified during the few access visits that have occurred were largely centred on the father, rather than the mother. DD, for example, responds poorly to being left alone with the father. The mother, on the other hand, is able to soothe the children. One observation has been made that the mother may behave differently when in the father's presence, taking cues from him repeating his comments.

• The father's decision to attend two of the children's school in October, while not in technical breach of the court's access terms, is cause for concern about his respect for boundaries in the context of this litigation.

[37] If the risks flowing from the alleged physical abuse were the only risks presenting for these children, and if the only consideration was the minimization of that risk, then an order for no access whatsoever for either parent might be justified. But those two premises are flawed. The risk of harm from the alleged abuse is not the only potential harm that must be considered, and many factors must be considered. The harm flowing from the abrupt and complete separation of these children from the only parents they have ever known must also be weighed and balanced by the court: Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. G.S., 2012 ONCA 783, at paras. 25-30; CAS v. Hamilton v. C.(K.), 2016 ONSC 2751, at para. 220; Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.I., 2022 ONCJ 612, at paras. 57-58.

[38] This balancing goes hand in hand with the purposes of the Act, which in pursuit of the protection and well-being of children, emphasize the importance of supporting the integrity of the family unit, using the least disruptive courses of action that are appropriate, and respecting a child's need for continuity of care and stable relationships within a family: s. 1(1) and (2) of the CYFSA. The principles are also reflected in several of the best interest factors set out in s. 74(3) of the Act, which stress, among other things, the importance of a child developing positive relationships with parents (s. 74(3)(c)(v)), a child's emotional ties to a parent or family member (s. 74(3)(c)(vi)), continuity of care and effects of disruption (s. 74(3)(c)(vii)), and the risk a child may suffer harm through being removed from a parent (s. 74(3)(c)(x)). These principles also explain why severing a child's relationship with a parent by denying any and all contact with that parent is an extreme measure reserved for the most exceptional circumstances: Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. C.D., 2024 ONCJ 167, at para. 20.

[39] No order that I make with respect to access can simultaneously entirely eliminate both the risk of harm flowing from the abuse allegations, and the risk of harm in severing the children's relationships from their parents. The appropriate order must seek to balance these competing concerns.

[40] Achieving an appropriate balance is a significant challenge. The court would benefit from more detailed information about the children's development, which could greatly assist in assessing and understanding the children's attachment to each parent and the emotional risks involved in access. It is unhelpful that the society has either not gathered or not seen fit to share any meaningful information about the children's emotional well-being in the 11 months since their removal. A development assessment, for example, for these four children, as well as for AA, would help the court to more carefully tailor terms to meet the children's needs. I will return to this issue in discussing next steps in this litigation.

[41] Ultimately, however, I am reluctant to delay a decision on access. I am mindful that delay might exacerbate the harm associated with separation of these very young children from both of their parents. I must also be mindful that a sustained period of little to no access can have significant consequences on the final outcome of the protection application, and can place the trial judge in the difficult position of deciding whether they can safely return children to parents who have had a diminished or non-existent opportunities to demonstrate their progress with respect to the society's concerns and their current parenting capacity: CCAS of Toronto v. R.M., 2017 ONCJ 784, at para. 78.

[42] With respect to the mother, I am of the view that supervised daytime parenting time, commenced gradually, is appropriate. Appropriate supervision will reduce to a tolerably low level the physical risk to the children. I think it highly unlikely that the mother would, in the circumstances, risk resort to physical discipline of the children in any form in the presence of other responsible adults. I am cognizant that if the children have been victim to the abuse alleged, access with the mother might present emotional challenges. But I must weigh that against the trauma of the children's sudden separation from her. Incrementalism and supervision have a role to play here as well. The society has a duty to continually assess their position on access and make necessary adjustments. The children's emotional well-being as access resumes is something that can be monitored, mitigated with services, and if need be, revisited by the court.

[43] With respect to the father, I am likewise of the view that some degree of access is appropriate. His access, however, ought to be more restricted, given the differences I outline above, and in particular because he is more prominently featured in the most serious abuse allegations. While I consider the risk he would engage in physical abuse towards the children while supervised to be negligible, I have a heightened concern about the emotional impact that access may have on the children. With respect to the father, greater caution is called for. Access for the father will commence on a more limited basis.

Particulars of access

[44] Several important variables require consideration: (i) whether the parents should be permitted to have access together, (ii) the identity of the supervisors, (iii) frequency, and (iv) whether the children shall attend access together.

[45] On the first issue, I am not prepared to permit the parents to have shared access with the children at this time. While I think it important for the children to maintain connection to both their parents, it is not, in my view, a critical priority for the children to spend time with both parents at once. And, cutting against mutual access, is the concern that the mother is a victim of intimate partner violence and potentially influenced negatively by the father. The order for temporary access is not meant to experiment with the family and children. Access is, however, something to be constantly re-evaluated, and it is in the best interests of the children for the court to have some basis to assess the parents' parenting independent of one another: CCAS of Toronto v. R.M., 2017 ONCJ 784, at para. 79. Mutual access visits may warrant re-evaluation at a later date, but at this time the parents shall exercise access independently of one another.

[46] Who should supervise the parents? The parents proffer several community members as potential supervisors, including the mother's surety, who is her former family law counsel, and that surety's spouse. While no party devoted oral submissions toward the proposed supervisors, in written materials concerns were raised that the proposed supervisors are biased towards the parents. The mother's surety, in particular, was criticized, given her past role as counsel to the mother and her strong views about the merits of this matter. The OCL, in its written submissions with respect to access for AA, suggested that I apply the standard applicable to judges and decision-makers.

[47] Respectfully, I disagree. The role of an access supervisor is fundamentally different than a judicial decision-maker. If bias or perceived bias was disqualifying for access supervisors, it would eliminate whole swathes of extended family members and society employees who regularly perform critical roles in child protection matters. A person's having an existing relationship with a parent or having strong views about the facts giving rise to the proceeding do not, standing alone, render a person ineligible to provide support and assistance to the family, including through supervision. The question is rather whether the access, with all its constituent conditions and aspects, is appropriate. A supervisor's suitability is part of that inquiry and will be context-driven. Here, the suitability of the supervisors centers around whether they can be counted on to perform the function assigned to them; whether they will be present, watchful, truthful in reporting, and intervene as appropriate.

[48] I am satisfied that the proposed supervisors may be suitable at a later stage in this proceeding. The affidavit evidence filed in respect of these proposed supervisors satisfies me that they have familiarity with the family, the serious allegations, and the issues, and that they would take their role seriously. I am not persuaded that their personal views of the matter would cause them to disregard the court's expectations or the children's safety. There is, further, the advantage that at an appropriate juncture, certain of the supervisors can provide round-the-clock in-home supervision for the mother. As explained, however, I favour an incremental approach in this matter. Great caution is called for given the potential emotional trauma that access may trigger in the children. At this time, access shall commence under the full supervision of society workers.

[49] How often should access occur? Again, a gradual approach is warranted. The mother shall commence with access a minimum of once weekly, for a period of three hours. Further supervised access, which may include virtual access, may occur at the society's discretion. With respect to the father, I have greater concern about his ability to engage in child-focused visits without inappropriate conflict. The father's access visits will also be supervised by society workers but will be limited to a period of once weekly, for no more than 90 minutes. I am unprepared to fix a minimum duration for the father given the issues with his past access, and the young age of the children. The court's expectation for the father's access is that, absent compelling reasons, the society will support meaningful visits up to the maximum time commensurate with each child's stage of development.

[50] As to whether the children should attend for access together, I will leave that, at this time, in the discretion of the society. A parent's time with all four siblings together has its obvious benefits. The children are, however, very young. It may be impractical to facilitate uninterrupted access for all children together on any given day. The youngest child, for example, may require focused attention that would frustrate the value and goals of the access for the other children, if held all at once.

Next steps

[51] The parties are reminded that appropriate access should be the subject of continuous reassessment. Access should be gradually increased providing it is safe to do so. The converse is true, behaviours on the part of the parents which reinforce the protection concerns may justify a reduction in access. Clear expectations should be communicated to the parents, such that they understand the work required to optimize their chances of family reunification. The court will be receptive to motions to vary terms of access based on the parents' progress or based on heightened protection concerns. Though access with respect to AA was not sought in this motion, the question of access for AA should also be evaluated on an ongoing basis. He may, as the only sibling not having access, develop a sense of exclusion. Depending on his communicated views and preferences, supervised access with respect to AA may become appropriate for one or both of the parents. To support this ongoing work, I am directing the parties to discuss and arrange for development assessments of the children.

[52] The parties are also reminded that the order flowing from this decision will have no immediate effect. Both parents must take active steps to seek variation of their criminal release terms. My assessment is made applying the CYFSA. A court of competent criminal jurisdiction might, applying the Criminal Code, preclude or reduce the access I have ordered, and may impose additional restrictions. I am directing all parties to advise this court immediately of any change to the parents' release conditions by contacting the trial coordinator by email. I am directing the trial coordinator to advise me of any such update, such that I can consider whether a date should then be fixed to revisit the question of access after an appropriate period. It would be premature to fix that period now, without knowing whether or when access will commence.

[53] Finally, there are compelling reasons to fix a trial in this matter on the issue of whether the children are in need of protection without delay (the "finding"). The basis for the protection concerns are extremely serious allegations which are yet untested and are largely denied by the parents. While this decision has been on reserve, the underlying protection application has been conferenced before another judge, who recognized the matter is approaching its first anniversary, and seems to be "in drift". The court directed the parties to bring any motions with respect to outstanding disclosure. The court further suggested the society prepare a summary of evidence they rely on to support a finding, such that the respondents can respond in writing detailing the facts that are disputed or agreed. The next court appearance is currently scheduled for October 27, 2025. Absent unexpected issue with respect to disclosure, there should be no obstacle to fixing a date for trial on the finding at that time.

V. Conclusion and Order

[54] The temporary care and custody order of Justice Dwyer dated September 18, 2024 is vacated. A new order shall issue with the following terms:

(1) The subject children shall remain in the temporary care and custody of the society.

(2) On a without prejudice basis, neither parent shall have access with respect to AA, until further order of this court.

(3) In respect of the younger four children, the mother shall have supervised access on the following terms:

a) The access shall be daytime access only.

b) The access shall be a minimum of once weekly, for a minimum period of three hours.

c) Whether the access is concurrent as between the mother and all four children shall be in the discretion of the society, with consideration to the benefits of mutual access, but also the ages and needs of the children.

d) The access shall be fully supervised by the society.

e) The society may, in their discretion, facilitate additional access, including virtual access.

(4) In respect of the four younger children, the father shall have supervised access on the following terms:

a) The access shall be daytime access only.

b) The access shall be a minimum of once per week. The duration of access shall be for a maximum of 90 minutes.

c) The access shall be fully supervised by the society.

d) Whether the access occurs as between the father and all four children shall be at the discretion of the society, with consideration to the benefits of mutual access, but also the ages and needs of the children.

(5) The parents shall not exercise their access together, and the access shall occur on separate days.

(6) Neither parent shall employ any form of physical discipline.

(7) The siblings, including AA, shall have generous access with respect to one another, and at a minimum once per week.

(8) The parties shall discuss and arrange for developmental assessments of the children.

(9) To the extent these terms conflict with a valid criminal court order, these terms are of no force and effect, but only to the extent of the conflict.

(10) In the event of a variation of the terms of one or both parents' release orders, the parties shall immediately advise the trial coordinator and include a copy of the amended order(s) and any decision(s) pertaining thereto. The trial coordinator shall immediately forward such material to my attention.

[55] The matter remains returnable in court on October 27, 2025, for a case conference.

Released: September 3, 2025

Signed: Justice G. Jenner