Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County v. R.C., 2025 ONCJ 396

Warning

This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87 (8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142 (3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Ontario Court of Justice

DATE: 2025-07-25
COURT FILE No.: Woodstock C49/25

Between:

Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County
Applicant

— AND —

R.C.
T.D.
J.L.
Respondents

Before Justice S. E. J. Paull
TCCH held on July 15, 2025
Reasons for Judgement Released on July 25, 2025

Counsel:
Danielle Lapare — counsel for the applicant
Sandra Carnegie — counsel for the respondent, R.C.
T.D. — on his own behalf
Susan Gordon — OCL counsel for the child, L.L.

PAULL J.:

[1] Before the court are 3 motions to address the temporary care and custody of the respondents’ children.

[2] R.C. is the mother of D.D. born […], 2019 (female) and L.L. born […], 2010 (female). R.C. also has another child, Le.L. (16 years old) who is not the subject of this proceeding and remains in her care. T.D. is the father of D.D. T.D. has another child Da.D. (age 11) from a prior relationship, who is not the subject of this proceeding, and who resides with him on a part-time basis. J.L. is the father of L.L. and had service dispensed on him on April 29, 2025. J.L. has had no recent involvement.

[3] The Society has two motions before the court. Following the apprehension of the children with a warrant from R.C.’s care on April 9, 2025, the first motion sought to place D.D. with T.D. under terms of supervision with access to R.C. at the discretion of the Society, with L.L. placed with the maternal grandparents, K.C. and S.C. under terms of supervision with a similar access term. This order was made on a temporary without-prejudice basis on April 14, 2025.

[4] The Society continues to seek this relief as it relates to L.L., but has brought a further motion dated July 20, 2025 seeking to place D.D. in the temporary care and custody of both T.D. and S.F., a kin placement, on a specified schedule. It submits that this is necessary as a result of its ongoing concerns with T.D.’s refusal to cooperate with access between R.C. and D.D., and by his continuing to expose the child to negative messaging about her mother.

[5] T.D. disputes these allegations and has brought his own motion which seeks to maintain D.D.’s temporary care and custody solely with him.

[6] R.C. seeks a return of L.L. to her care under terms of supervision, and supports the Society’s position with respect to D.D., which will permit her to have meaningful access with D.D. in the home of S.F.

[7] OCL counsel on behalf of L.L. supports her return to the care of her mother, on the basis of her strongly held views and preferences.

[8] In addition to the submissions of the parties, I have reviewed and considered the affidavits of the family service worker, Tyra Riach dated April 10, 2025 and June 20, 2025, the affidavits of R.C. and S.F. sworn June 13, 2025 and the affidavits of T.D. dated April 13, 2025 and July 4, 2025.

[9] Following submissions on the issue, the court determined that it would permit the affidavit of T.D. dated July 4, 2025 to be filed for consideration on the motions. The applicant and R.C. declined the opportunity to respond and wished to proceed with the hearing.

The Law

[10] The legal test to be applied on this motion is set out in subsections 94 (2), (4) and (5) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the Act) that read as follows:

94 (2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child,
(a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part;
(b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the Society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate;
(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the Society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; or
(d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of the Society, but not be placed in a place of temporary detention, of open or of secure custody.

Criteria

(4) The court shall not make an order under clause (2) (c) or (d) unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order under clause (2) (a) or (b).

Placement with relative, etc.

(5) Before making a temporary order for care and custody under clause (2) (d), the court shall consider whether it is in the child’s best interests to make an order under clause (2) (c) to place the child in the care and custody of a person who is a relative of the child or a member of the child’s extended family or community.

[11] Subsection 94 (11) of the Act states that before making an order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained. L.L. gave clear and consistent views and preferences to her counsel, which the court has seriously considered. D.D. just turned six years old and does not have OCL counsel. Her views will be discussed further below.

[12] At a temporary care and custody hearing, the onus is on the Society to establish, on credible and trustworthy evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if a child is returned to the respondent(s), it is more probable than not that he or she will suffer harm. Further, the onus is on the Society to establish that the child cannot be adequately protected by terms and conditions of an interim supervision order. See Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. T., [2000] O.J. No. 2273 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). Simply stated, this is a two-part test that the Society has to meet.

[13] A court must choose the order that is the least disruptive placement consistent with adequate protection of the child (subsection 1 (2) of the Act): Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. B.D. and F.T.M., 2012 ONSC 2448.

[14] The degree of intrusiveness of the Society's intervention and the interim protection ordered by the court should be proportional to the degree of risk. See CCAS of Toronto v. J.O., 2012 ONCJ 269.

[15] Subsection 94 (10) of the Act permits the court to admit and act on evidence that the court considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstance. In determining what evidence is credible and trustworthy, the evidence in its entirety must be viewed together. Evidence that may not be credible and trustworthy when viewed in isolation might reach that threshold when examined in the context of other evidence. See Jewish Child and Family Services of Toronto v. A.K., 2014 ONCJ 227 at paragraph 18; CAS of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. S.S.H., 2019 ONSC 5365.

[16] The Act gives priority to the person who had charge of the children prior to Society intervention under Part III of the Act. There can be more than one person in charge of the children. See Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. A.(S.) and R. (M.), 2008 ONCJ 348.

[17] L.L. was in the sole care of R.C., and D.D. was in the joint care of her parents before Society intervention under Part V of the Act. This means the court cannot make an order under clause 94 (2) (c) of the Act (placing D.D. solely with her father or L.L. with her grandparents), unless the Society meets the legal test set out in subsection 94 (4) of the Act.

[18] The Divisional Court has held that a Society seeking an order for temporary Society care at this early stage of a case has only to demonstrate that it has reasonable grounds to believe that there is a protection risk for the child that justifies Society intervention. See L.D. v. Durham Children’s Aid Society and R.L. and M.L., [2005] O.J. No. 5050 (Ont. Div. Ct.). The burden on the Society at this stage does not go as high as showing that on the balance of probabilities there is an actual risk to the child in the parent’s care. See also CCAS of Toronto v. M.L.R., 2011 ONCJ 652; The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. S.G., 2021 ONSC 2260.

[19] Subsection 94 (6) applies to an order being made in accordance with clause 94 (2) (b) for a temporary supervision order. See Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. P. (C.R.), 2011 ONSC 2056.

[20] The onus of proof or criteria are the same when the Society is requesting a non-removal order pursuant to clause 94 (2) (b) of the Act or a removal order pursuant to clauses 94 (2) (c) and (d) of the Act - the issue to be determined in making the non-removal order under clause 94 (2) (b) is whether or not the Society has reasonable grounds to believe that there is a probable risk that the child will suffer harm if reasonable terms and conditions of a supervision order are not imposed. See Children's Aid Society of Halton Region v. Z. (T.A.), 2012 ONCJ 231, par. 20.

[21] Subsection 94 (8) of the Act provides that where an order is made under clause (c) or (d) of subsection 94 (2), the court may order access on any terms that it considers appropriate. In determining what order is appropriate, the court should consider the paramount purpose of the Act, being the best interests, protection and well-being of children and the secondary purposes of maintaining the integrity of the family unit, assisting families in caring for their children and recognizing the least disruptive action consistent with the best interests of the children (subsections 1 (1) and (2) of the Act). In assessing best interests, the court should consider the relevant factors set out in subsection 74 (3) of the Act. See JFCS v. H.B.S. [2012], O.J. No. 5055 (OCJ).

[22] The party seeking to impose restrictions on a parent’s contact or access to a child must demonstrate that it is necessary and the limit is proportionate to the risk. Any such terms should be child and harm specific and be supported on the evidence. See Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. A.C., 2020 ONCJ 505.

[23] In C.A.S. v. C.F., 2020 ONSC 3755, Justice Heather McGee discussed supervised access in the child protection context at paragraphs 32 to 34 as follows:

[32] Access is the right of a child. As stated by Justice Blishen in V.S.J. v. L.J.G., “there is a presumption that regular access by a non-custodial parent is in the best interests of children. The right of a child to visit with a non-custodial parent, to know and maintain or form an attachment to a non-custodial parent is a fundamental right and should only be forfeited in the most extreme and unusual circumstances.”
[33] A child’s right to access with a parent invites a further layer of complexity in a child protection proceeding. Court must engage in a careful balancing of the benefit of a parent’s care, the specific risk of harm to the child while in that parent’s care, and the measures in place for risk reduction.
[34] Supervised access is a critical tool in that engagement. Supervision provides a safer bridging period during which parental deficits can be assessed and whenever possible: repaired. Supervised access is clearly indicated when parenting judgement is impaired, there is a history of violence and other harmful behaviour directed toward the primary caregiver and/or evidence of abuse or neglect of the child.

[24] Supervised access is not intended to be a long-term arrangement for a child. It is beneficial for children who require gradual reintroduction to a parent, or whose safety requires it until such time as the parent is sufficiently rehabilitated and a child is no longer in danger of physical or emotional harm. See Najjardizaji v. Mehrjerdi, 2004 ONCJ 374, [2004] O.J. No. 5472 (OCJ).

Background and Evidence

[25] The Society has a long protection history with R.C. as a caregiver dating back to 2012, with 52 openings, 17 of which were investigated and 2 transferred to ongoing services. The protection concerns centred primarily on intimate partner violence, post separation conflict and alcohol use in a caregiving role.

[26] Starting in 2012, the Society began receiving multiple reports from police regarding R.C. and J.L. concerning adult conflict in the presence of the children. The police also reported that R.C. showed signs of intoxication at times. Both R.C. and J.L. faced domestic related criminal charges at different times, although the result of these charges was not noted. The Society verified a risk of emotional harm to Le.L. and L.L. as a result of exposure to adult conflict between R.C. and J.L.

[27] T.D.’s child protection history began in 2020 with his relationship with R.C. The Society began receiving police reports regarding domestic conflict between T.D. and R.C.

[28] In early 2020 the Society verified a concern for the children’s exposure to adult conflict causing a risk of harm. Within a few months more police reports were received by the Society regarding domestic conflict between R.C. and T.D. which involved both parties consuming alcohol. The Society once again verified risk of harm to the children from the exposure to adult conflict.

[29] The pattern of continued reports from police led to further verifications of a risk to the children due to adult conflict and resulted in the Society cautioning R.C. and T.D.

[30] In August 2024 a further report from police was received that confirmed that R.C. was charged in Grand Bend after allegedly driving intoxicated with two 13-year-old girls in the car. This criminal charge remains outstanding.

[31] Both R.C. and T.D. contacted police at various times regarding concerns with the others alcohol use or that the child, D.D. was not returned when required.

[32] In September 2024, during one such incident, police noted that R.C. appeared intoxicated and presented with a strong odour of alcohol. The Society received additional referrals concerning R.C.’s alcohol consumption and its impact on her ability to safely parent. The Society verified a concern of caregiver with the problem related to R.C.’s alcohol consumption. The family was referred to ongoing services in October 2024 with that file remaining open until the protection application was commenced.

[33] During this time T.D. continued to express concerns for the children’s safety in R.C.’s care as a result of her alcohol use, mental health, and dysregulated behaviour.

[34] As a result of the ongoing reports and referrals, the worker met regularly with R.C. and the children. Initially Le.L. and L.L. reported no concerns. D.D. expressed concerns about conflict between her mother and sisters and that her mother drinks wine, although was unable to provide any other particulars. The Society became increasingly concerned with D.D.’s exposure to post separation conflict between R.C. and T.D., and R.C. and D.D.’s older sisters.

[35] T.D. made repeated referrals which the Society investigated. In December 2024 T.D. attended the Society unannounced with D.D. and insisted that D.D. be interviewed immediately. The Society worker advised that he had already reported these concerns and the investigation would occur, but an interview would not occur at that time. T.D. was dissatisfied with that decision and took D.D. to the police, who also declined to interview the child at that time.

[36] On December 17, 2024 the Society received a further police report because T.D. refused to return D.D. to R.C.’s care as arranged. The police reported that R.C. presented with slurred speech during the initial call, and later that day during a further police interaction they noted that she was intoxicated and in no condition to provide care for D.D.

[37] By early 2025 the Society’s concerns continued to be the risk of emotional harm as a result of exposure to post separation conflict and from R.C.’s alcohol use.

[38] On March 30, 2025 the Society received a further police referral as T.D.’s partner had taken a video of a conflict between the parties during an access exchange with the children present.

[39] The worker later reviewed this video in which she observed that R.C. appeared intoxicated. T.D. and his partner were in front of R.C.’s home with T.D. holding D.D. to prevent R.C. from taking her. R.C. is seen pushing Le.L. and L.L. and grabbing and pulling D.D. from T.D.’s arms. Le.L. can be heard stating that R.C. is going to lose her children, and Le.L. and L.L. are heard yelling at their mother to stop and stated that she was going to regret this. D.D. could be heard crying.

[40] The worker observed in the video that R.C., T.D., and his partner are engaged with each other verbally. An arm is observed coming towards the camera and T.D.’s partner is then heard stating that she is going to charge R.C. with assault. Le.L., L.L. and D.D. were all exposed to this altercation. The worker cautioned T.D. about recording D.D. and access exchanges.

[41] Following this incident, the Society commenced a further investigation. The worker arranged with the parents to put in place a temporary safety plan for the children during the investigation. Le.L. and L.L. went to stay with the maternal grandparents, and D.D. remained in T.D.’s care.

[42] On March 31, 2025 the worker interviewed D.D. privately at T.D.’s home. D.D. was reluctant to speak about what had occurred the day prior but expressed that she was fearful of her mother and does not want to go back to her mother’s home. D.D. stated that her mother pulled on her and was yelling.

[43] On April 1, 2025 the worker interviewed Le.L. and L.L. separately and privately at their school. Despite their earlier statements to the worker that there were no concerns they both reported that their mother’s alcohol use was a problem. They acknowledged that they had not been truthful regarding their concerns in the past.

[44] On April 7, 2025 T.D. provided an audio recording to the worker which was just under three minutes long of T.D. questioning D.D. about issues in mother’s home including questions about yelling and fighting in the home. D.D. stated that she and L.L. hide from her mother in a bedroom and locked themselves in the room. The worker once again cautioned T.D. about recording D.D.

[45] On the same date R.C. revoked her consent for Le.L. and L.L. to remain in the care of her parents and for D.D. to remain in the care of T.D. As a result, the Society applied for a Warrant.

[46] On April 9, 2025, before the warrant was granted, R.C. picked up D.D. early from school. Police and the worker attended the home during which the worker interviewed D.D. privately and she stated that she wanted to go to her dad’s home. The warrant was issued later in the day on April 9, 2025 and L.L. and D.D. were apprehended from R.C.’s care.

[47] The Society takes the position that L.L. and D.D. are at risk of physical and emotional harm in the care of R.C. due to her alcohol use, mental health, and volatile behaviour while in a caregiving role. The Society is also concerned that R.C.’s alcohol use is leading to conflict between her and her older children which D.D. is being exposed to. The Society is also concerned that L.L. and D.D. are at risk of physical and emotional harm due to their exposure to verbal and physical post separation conflict between R.C. and T.D. during access exchanges.

[48] The Society is also concerned about T.D. exposing D.D. to negative messages and criticisms regarding her mother, insisting that D.D. be interviewed repeatedly by the Society or police regarding protection concerns, and taking audio and video recordings of D.D. The Society is concerned that these actions will cause emotional harm to D.D. and damage D.D.’s relationship with her mother.

[49] Prior to the Society commencing its application, the status quo with respect to the child L.L., was that she was in the sole care of R.C. The status quo for D.D. was pursuant to a final consent order dated March 17, 2025 where the parties agreed to joint decision-making with regular parenting time to T.D. Commencing July 1, 2025 the parties were to implement a shared parenting plan with set-off child support.

[50] Following the apprehension, on the first return date of the Society’s motion, a temporary without-prejudice order dated April 14, 2025 was granted which placed L.L. with the grandparents and D.D. with T.D., with access to R.C. at the discretion of the Society.

[51] The worker deposes that despite ongoing efforts, she has been unable to implement an access schedule, including regular phone calls, as a result of T.D.’s ongoing refusal to cooperate.

[52] In support of the Society’s position that D.D. be placed in the care of both T.D. and a kin placement, the worker deposed to a number of concerns following the granting of the temporary without-prejudice order on April 14, 2025. These include the following:

1. The Society approved an access plan for R.C. including regular phone calls. Concerns arose immediately of T.D. not facilitating the calls as directed which required ongoing intervention by the worker.
2. T.D. made it clear in repeated phone calls and emails to various workers and managers at the Society that he did not agree with the phone calls or the access plan.
3. T.D. stated the calls were not emotionally healthy for D.D. and wrote in one email dated May 1, 2025 that, “forcing her to have those conversations daily would be like making a woman at a shelter speak to her abuser”.
4. The worker supervised several access visits herself and approved S.F. to be an access supervisor.
5. T.D. was once again cautioned about recording interactions based on a concern that his partner was now videotaping S.F. at exchanges.
6. The worker was required to intervene continually as a result of T.D.’s refusal to facilitate the phone calls and access visits pursuant to the schedule she provided.
7. T.D. maintained the position that the access plan, including phone calls, required his consent, and he was not in agreement with the Society’s plan.
8. T.D. took the position in his email correspondence that access should not be forced. In an email dated June 4, 2025, he stated that D.D.’s relationship with R.C. should only be maintained, “when R.C. is in a healthier and more stable place with proper mental health supports”.
9. Despite arrangements being made, including a volunteer driver, for D.D. to have an overnight visit on June 13, 2025 with R.C. in the home of S.F., T.D. refused to facilitate the visit.
10. T.D. sent an email dated June 12, 2025 refusing to acknowledge that there was an order under the CYFSA regarding access and stated that, “… I cannot comply with an order that does not legally exist”.
11. The worker responded by email on the same date that a supervision and access order was made on April 11, 2025. T.D. was provided with the endorsement and the issued order for April 11, 2025.
12. Despite this T.D. continued to deny that the Society had the authority to make access arrangements for R.C. and D.D. without his consent.
13. The Society supports S.F. as a kin placement and as a supervisor for R.C.’s access with D.D.
14. The paternal grandparents, who have care of L.L., are not willing to supervise R.C.’s access with D.D. as a result of their strained relationship with R.C.
15. The worker personally supervised many of D.D. and R.C.’s weekday evening visits as a short-term plan prior to other family and community options for supervision being arranged. The worker observed that R.C. sometimes used access visits to complain about T.D. rather than interact with D.D. and support her if she was struggling with the transition.
16. Despite no significant concerns noted during access, the worker observed that D.D. appeared less connected with R.C. over time which raised a concern for her about potential negative influence by T.D.

[53] As a result of the ongoing concerns with T.D. and his refusal to facilitate access, the Society submits that an order placing D.D. in the care of both T.D. and S.F. is necessary. It seeks a fixed schedule over the summer holidays in a manner which mirrors the parties’ arrangements in the CLRA order. The applicant submits that this would permit R.C. to have her access appropriately supervised and address the issue of T.D.’s ongoing interference and noncompliance with the supervision order.

[54] Alternatively, the Society seeks a fixed access schedule for R.C. and D.D. in the home of S.F.

[55] R.C. did not dispute the history or protection concerns outlined by the Society. She deposed that she has not consumed alcohol since April 2025. She states that she has made arrangements to engage in the Family Violence Counselling Program, continues to have virtual sessions with her therapist, has started attending AA meetings, and she has completed an intake with CMHA Thames Valley Addiction Services. She provided no independent confirmation of any engagement with these supports.

[56] R.C. seeks the immediate return of L.L. and opposes the placement with her parents. Initially she had supervised visits which have progressed to unsupervised. However, L.L. is not permitted to have overnights in her home.

[57] R.C. opposes the placement of D.D. with T.D. and seeks the return of D.D. to her care. However, during submissions R.C. conceded that D.D. could not be returned to her care at this time and was in support of the Society’s position of a joint placement between T.D. and S.F.

[58] She deposed that T.D. continues to interfere with her access including the telephone calls. When she tries to communicate with D.D. in the manner and at times as directed by the Society, T.D. refuses to cooperate and has threatened to “file a harassment report” if she keeps calling.

[59] S.F. filed an affidavit in support of R.C. She deposed that she and her husband are D.D.’s godparents and that they are ready and willing to assist. They both work as elementary school teachers and are available over the summer. They reside in London.

[60] T.D.’s position is that D.D. is safe, secure, and thriving in his care and that this placement should be maintained. He disputes that there are any child protection concerns related to him, and that the sole reason for the Society’s involvement is R.C.

[61] T.D. felt strongly that the Society has not taken his concerns seriously about R.C.’s alcohol use and abusive behaviour. He does not dispute recording R.C. or D.D. but states that he did not manipulate the circumstances and did it out of genuine concern for D.D.’s safety.

[62] T.D. has provided confirmation that he successfully completed the Circle of Security Program and engaged counselling for D.D. through Welkin Child and Youth Mental Wellness.

[63] T.D. attached a series of letters of support from family members and other individuals offering various opinions and conclusions about D.D. and his and R.C.’s parenting abilities. These are unsworn and not an affidavit form, and are not admissible. See Robinson v. Kilby, 1996 O.J. No. 423 (SCJ); Lisanti v. Lisanti, 1990 O.J. No. 3092 (SCJ). The unqualified opinions expressed by family and friends would not be admissible in any event.

[64] T.D. also attached 2 emails to his most recent affidavit from Sara Emptage dated June 25 and July 2, 2025 which purport to be summaries of counselling sessions she provided to D.D. Ms. Emptage indicates various opinions and concerns reported by D.D. about her mother which make her feel scared and sad, but that she feels safe, loved, and cared for by her father.

[65] Section 94(10) of the CYFSA states that:

(10) Evidence on Adjournments-- For the purposes of this section the Court may admit and act on evidence that the Court considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstances.

[66] It must be noted, however, that the relaxed evidentiary standard in s.94(10) does not otherwise change the rules of evidence.

[67] As child protection cases must be brought before the court within five days of the child’s removal to a place of safety, it is often necessary for the court to consider information learned from third parties, such as doctors or teachers, as there is not sufficient time to obtain direct affidavits from those persons. However, the longer the case goes on, the more important it becomes to produce direct evidence from third parties.

[68] Further, judges must act as gatekeepers by taking a vigilant and rigorous approach to examining the reliability of expert evidence. This approach must be taken at all stages of a protection case, and not just at the trial stage. A preliminary finding against the parent at an early stage is likely to follow that parent throughout the protection proceeding. It has the potential to significantly impact the direction of the case and as such it is crucial that such a finding be based on reliable evidence. See Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2017 ONCJ 661.

[69] With respect to Ms. Emptage, there is no evidence of her qualifications or experience in order to evaluate her ability to provide opinion evidence. There is no information outlining the nature of the counselling services she is providing. There is no indication of who was present for the sessions, the context and questions surrounding D.D.’s purported disclosures or the specifics of D.D.’s disclosures. The emails do not appear to be the counsellor’s notes and records of the sessions but rather summaries she has compiled at the request of T.D. It is unclear what background information she may have received from T.D. or whether D.D. was present when this information was provided. In the circumstances, no weight can be placed on these email summaries for the purposes of this hearing.

[70] OCL counsel on behalf of L.L. supports her immediate return to R.C.’s care. She indicates that L.L. has expressed consistent and strong views and preferences to return to her mother’s care despite the concerns she acknowledged to the worker. Ms. Gordon takes the position that as L.L. is older than D.D., the level of risk to her is manageable, and she would be able to remove herself if any concerns arise.

Analysis

[71] I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if L.L. and D.D. are returned to R.C.’s care, it is more probable than not that they will suffer harm.

[72] For the same reasons which will be outlined below I am further satisfied that the children cannot be adequately protected by terms of supervision returning either of them to R.C.’s care.

[73] R.C. did not dispute the Society’s evidence that she has a long history of alcohol misuse and dysregulated behaviour. There have been similar concerns and frequent police involvement over many years during which R.C. has been noted as intoxicated. It is clear that the children have all been placed at risk from their mother’s alcohol use and the resulting volatile behaviour over an extended period of time.

[74] While I have not accepted the evidence of D.D.’s counsellor for the reasons outlined, I accept the disclosures made to the worker by all the children during her private interviews with them the day following the March 30, 2025 altercation at the access exchange as credible and trustworthy. The statements were received by the worker shortly after the event, and she is a professional with a duty to record them accurately. The video viewed by the worker also corroborated the children’s statements.

[75] The older children, Le.L. and L.L. were directly involved in the incident. They both acknowledged to the worker that there are concerns with their mother’s alcohol use, and that they were not truthful about it in the earlier interviews.

[76] R.C. was intoxicated at the exchange with all the children present. She was physical with Le.L. and L.L., and they were yelling at her. D.D. was crying as R.C. tried to pull her from T.D.’s arms.

[77] It is not surprising that D.D. would have expressed to the worker being fearful and not wanting to return to her mother’s home. This is the latest incident in a long history of the children’s exposure to their mother’s alcohol use and dysregulated behaviour.

[78] R.C.’s continuing behaviours, over an extended period of time, illustrate a lack of insight into how her actions, decisions, alcohol use and the resultant emotional dysregulation negatively impacts her children and puts them at risk of harm.

[79] D.D. is at further risk from being exposed to conflict between her mother and sisters. D.D. herself reported conflict between them to the worker. Further, both children are at risk of harm from the high level of conflict between R.C. and T.D. While the parties disagree on who is to blame, they did not dispute that there has been significant parental conflict at access exchanges which has repeatedly required police intervention.

[80] Further, T.D.’s choice to record interactions at exchanges rather than remove himself and D.D. if he felt R.C. was intoxicated has only contributed to the conflict, and he likely did it knowing it would provoke conflict. His choice to question and record D.D. about her mother is also problematic.

[81] Courts have been consistent that the recording of interactions between litigants in family law matters should be strongly discouraged. There is already enough conflict and mistrust without the parties worrying about whether the other is recording them. These types of recordings also often show that the parent doing the recording is putting their own need to win in the litigation ahead of the child’s needs. See R.E. v. D.C., 2021 ONCJ 8.

[82] Electronic recording of parenting exchanges is a growing trend which should be strongly discouraged. It puts the child in the middle. It exacerbates tensions and creates a heightened sense of potential or imminent conflict. It clearly demonstrates that the parent holding the camera is focussing more on the litigation than the emotional well-being of the child. See Guadalaxara v. Viau, 2014 ONSC 545 (SCJ); Luke v. Luke, 2014 ONSC 422 (OCJ).

[83] This standard might even be higher when dealing with the taping of children. See Webster v. Seteu, 2015 ONCJ 538, where the court wrote:

The photographing and videoing of children for court purposes is troublesome. What message does a child receive when after each visit with the other parent he is examined and photographed? What message does a child receive when instead of comforting him, his parent videos him crying or having a tantrum? The mother in this case was cautioned about taking photographs of the child by SCAN and continued to take such photographs on many occasions. I find that this evidence is not helpful for the purpose tendered by the mother but does reflect on the mother’s inability to put the child’s needs ahead of her own need to discredit the father.

[84] Overt recording of a child for strategic purposes is a theft of innocence. It complicates the child’s life immeasurably; heightens anxiety about parental conflict; tests the child’s loyalties; and imposes unbearable responsibility for the child to try to fix adult problems. See K.M. v. R.J., 2022 ONSC 111.

[85] Despite being cautioned by the worker, T.D. continued to record D.D. and others and has insisted that D.D. be interviewed by CAS and the police. This illustrates a lack of insight on his part in addition to an inability or unwillingness to follow reasonable directions from the Society. In the circumstances, I place no weight on the views expressed by D.D. in the recording made by T.D.

[86] T.D.’s lack of insight goes beyond this. It is clear that he has refused to fully cooperate to implement the terms of the supervision order, particularly related to D.D.’s access to R.C. He continued to take the position that his consent for R.C.’s access was required. He denied the existence of the supervision order even after the issued order was provided to him.

[87] His position as communicated to the workers and other employees of the Society in various emails makes it clear he places little importance on the child’s relationship with her mother. The Society made its expectations and the access schedule clear to him, which it had the authority to do, and he has wilfully refused at times to follow it.

[88] A parent’s willingness to facilitate, and not just accommodate the other parent’s access is an important best interests factor. See Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. C.P.I., 2021 ONCJ 575.

[89] For a supervision order to be an effective instrument of risk management, a parent must meet a minimum threshold of cooperation and reliability, and there needs to be demonstrable evidence that the parent will be compliant with the terms. See Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.R., 2020 ONCJ 22.

[90] To be clear, there are serious protection concerns related to R.C. which appear to be long-standing. Some level of frustration on T.D.’s part is justifiable. The Society would have been justified to take more intrusive measures sooner than it did. R.C.’s alcohol use and volatile behaviour are the primary source of the protection concerns. However, T.D.’s denial that his actions have contributed to the level of conflict is simply not reflective of the evidence. His approach at times has not been reasonable and has necessitated that more intrusive measures be considered.

[91] Despite this, I am not satisfied that placing D.D. with T.D. and the kin placement is the least intrusive measure to address these circumstances at present. Such a response would be disproportionate.

[92] At the hearing, T.D. indicated that he would cooperate going forward, and supported the need for a fixed access schedule. However, some of his actions to date reflect otherwise. If he continues to obstruct the Society in exercising its authority under the supervision order, then the court will reconsider more intrusive measures.

[93] Overall, the evidence when taken together is compelling that R.C.’s alcohol use and volatile behaviour is the primary protection concern and puts the children at risk of harm. The children are at further risk by their continued exposure to adult conflict between both R.C. and T.D., including at access exchanges. The events of March 30, 2025 illustrate that both parties, particularly R.C., lack insight and have contributed to the level of conflict and the risk of harm.

[94] The least intrusive order sufficient to address the risk is that D.D. be placed in the temporary care of T.D. under the terms of supervision proposed by the applicant, with structured access to R.C.

[95] R.C. has begun to seek support for her substance use and mental health. However, there is no evidence of what, if any, progress she has made in addressing these long standing issues.

[96] Given the level of risk and the lack of demonstrable progress by R.C., the evidence supports that supervised access for D.D. continue. This will provide a safer bridging period during which parental deficits can be assessed and, if possible, repaired.

[97] D.D. has a right to have access with her mother which is safe and free from interference from her father. I am satisfied that S.F., who is one of D.D.’s godparents, can provide valuable support for access to occur on the schedule proposed by the applicant. It reflects in part the schedule that the parties agreed was in D.D.’s best interests when they consented to the final CLRA order on March 17, 2025. It will maintain an appropriate level of supervision and provides the parties with clarity on the schedule. The Society shall also maintain discretion to modify access as circumstances warrant.

[98] With respect to L.L., she is older, and I agree that the risk analysis is different for her. However, her age and her views alone are not sufficient to support her immediate return home.

[99] L.L.’s lived experience has been exposure over an extended period of time to her mother’s alcohol use and volatile behaviour, and exposure to the conflict between her mother and T.D., and with J.L. before that. She acknowledged to the worker that her mother's alcohol use is a concern. It led to her exposure to both physical and verbal conflict during the unfortunate incident on March 30, 2025.

[100] R.C. has only begun to take the first steps at addressing these issues and there is no evidence of progress. This is likely to be a long road for R.C., and it is not in L.L.’s best interest to return home in the absence of evidence which establishes progress by R.C., despite her strongly held views and preferences.

[101] The least intrusive order sufficient to address the risk is that L.L. be placed in the temporary care of the grandparents on the terms as proposed, with structured access to R.C.

[102] However, it is appropriate that L.L. have unsupervised access with her mother, and it would be appropriate to expand to overnights in the home when there is evidence of R.C.’s continued abstinence and independent evidence of engagement and progress in working with her supports.

[103] The access arrangements made for L.L. to date have been appropriate and reflect the level of risk and her differing circumstances from D.D. The Society shall maintain its discretion over R.C.’s access with L.L.

[104] On the basis of all the considerations outlined herein, a temporary order shall issue as follows:

1. Per the motion dated April 11, 2025 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10.
2. Per the motion dated June 20, 2025 paragraphs 6, 7, and 9. With a further term that the applicant shall also maintain discretion to modify R.C.’s access to D.D. as circumstances warrant including the frequency, duration, and supervision.
3. The remaining relief in the motions dated April 11, 2025 and June 20, 2025 is dismissed.
4. The motion dated July 15, 2025 is dismissed.

Released: July 25, 2025
Signed: “Justice S. E. J. Paull”