WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
DATE: July 22, 2025
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE Toronto
BETWEEN: HIS MAJESTY THE KING — AND — A.C.
For the Crown P. Rutherford
For the Defendant R. Mohan
Heard: August 13, 2024 and June 4, 2025
SENTENCING JUDGMENT
RUSSELL SILVERSTEIN, J.:
A. INTRODUCTION
[1] On August 13, 2024, A.C. pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual interference against his niece, K.J., contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code of Canada.
[2] Although A.C. pleaded to only two counts on the seven-count information before the court, he admitted to further criminal behaviour against K.J. and the parties agree that he is to be sentenced for the entirety of the admitted criminal behaviour.
B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCES
[3] An agreed statement of fact was filed. It sets out the following admissions.
[4] A.C. is K.J.’s maternal uncle. K.J. has known the accused for her entire life and would often attend his residence to be babysat while her mother attended work. K.J. was born in 2008. A.C. was born on December 9, 1966. At all material times, A.C. lived with his wife and did not have any children.
[5] The offences all took place between January 2015, and December 2020.
[6] On the first occasion, K.J. remembers being approximately seven years old. She was at A.C.’s house in the living room taking a nap on the couch. She woke up to her underwear pulled down to her knees and A.C. on top of her touching her vagina with his hands. He then put his finger in her vagina for several seconds. When he stopped, he told her not to tell anyone what he had done. She sustained soreness to her vagina.
[7] On the second occasion, K.J. remembers being approximately eight years old. She was at A.C.’s house for a family party. K.J. and her cousin were in the guest room when A.C. entered and signalled K.J. to come behind the bedroom door. She complied. He put his hand down her pants and inserted his finger into her vagina for approximately 25 seconds.
[8] On the third occasion, K.J. remembers being approximately nine years old. She was sitting on the living room floor carpet of A.C.’s house. He approached K.J. and laid her down on the floor. She was wearing a dress at the time. He lifted her dress and touched her vagina. He inserted his fingers into her vagina and rubbed her clitoris. He stopped when he noticed her brother drive up the driveway in his car.
[9] On the fourth occasion, she remembers being approximately ten years old. She was on the living room couch in A.C.’s house watching television. He approached her and sat next to her on the couch. He put his hand up under her shirt and rubbed her breasts. He asked her to go to the washroom and take a shower so that he could see her naked, but she refused.
[10] On the fifth occasion, K.J. remembers being approximately ten or eleven years old. She was sitting in the guest room of A.C.’s house playing on her tablet. A.C. took off the covers that were on top of K.J. and began touching her. He pulled her underwear down to her knees and inserted his fingers into her vagina. He put his mouth on her vagina and inserted his tongue for several seconds. He told her not to tell anyone what he had done to her.
[11] On the sixth occasion, K.J. remembers being approximately eleven years old. She was in the guest bedroom of A.C.’s house. He came into the room and asked K.J. if he could touch her, to which she replied “no”. The accused pried her legs apart with his hands and inserted one finger into her vagina.
[12] On the seventh occasion, K.J. was approximately twelve years old. She was in the guest bedroom at A.C.’s house when A.C. came in and complimented her. He kissed her on the forehead telling her that she was beautiful. He kissed her on the mouth and inserted his tongue. He pulled down K.J.’s leggings and inserted one of his fingers into her vagina. She tried to squeeze her legs together to prevent him from touching her, but he was stronger than she and he was able to pry her legs apart.
C. THE IMPACT OF THE OFFENCES ON THE VICTIM AND HER FAMILY
[13] Three Victim Impact Statements prepared by members of K.J.’s immediate family were filed and read aloud by Mr. Rutherford at the sentencing hearing.
[14] A.C.’s abuse of K.J. has left a trail of emotional, psychological, and social destruction for her and her entire family. She is afraid of men, afraid of the dark and chronically sleep-deprived. She has written suicide notes that her parents have discovered. The entire extended family is fractured and K.J.’s parents feel tremendous guilt to the point of sometimes feeling suicidal themselves.
[15] The Supreme Court in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 explains the immense and far-reaching harm typically caused by the sexual exploitation of a child. I have no doubt that, even beyond what is expressed in the Victim Impact Statements, the defendant’s criminal behaviour has had, and will continue to have the sort of impact described in Friesen.
D. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
[16] A.C. did not testify. Nor did he choose to say anything on his own behalf when given the opportunity at the sentencing hearing.
[17] What the court knows about A.C. comes from counsel’s submissions and from what A.C. reported to Dr. Giovana de Amorim Levin, a forensic psychiatrist who prepared a report for the defendant.
[18] A.C. is now 58 years old, originally from the Philippines, having come to Canada in 2001 after completing a civil engineering degree in the Philippines. He is now a Canadian Citizen. He has a strong employment history, albeit not as an engineer. He has been married to his first wife for 21 years and has no children.
[19] He reports having had a happy childhood with loving parents who worked as farmers.
[20] He has the sort of infirmities one often finds in men his age: hypertension, high cholesterol, and type 2 diabetes, but he is relatively healthy. Neither drug nor alcohol use pose a problem for him, nor did they play a role in his offending behaviour.
[21] It is clear from the offending behaviour and what the defendant told Dr. Levin that he is a pedophile. Yet, up to the date of sentencing he has taken no steps to address his pedophilia – no counselling or further medical assessment of any kind.
E. THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
[22] Mr. Mohan seeks a sentence of two years followed by three years of probation and other ancillary orders.
[23] Mr. Rutherford argues for a global sentence of seven years and the same ancillary orders suggested by Mr. Mohan.
F. THE PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING
[24] The principles of sentencing are set out in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code.
[25] According to s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the "fundamental purpose" of sentencing is to contribute to "respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society" by imposing "just sanctions" that have one or more of the following objectives, namely: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and others from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and the community.
[26] Further, according to s. 718.1 of the Code, the "fundamental principle" of sentencing is that a sentence "must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender."
[27] Section 718.2 of the Code also dictates that, in imposing sentence, the court must also apply a number of principles including the following:
- A sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender;
- A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
- Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;
- An offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and,
- All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.
[28] Section 718.01 dictates that the objectives of denunciation and deterrence are the primary considerations in sentencing offenders who abuse children.
[29] The overriding fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality. The sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility. Proportionality "ensures a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence and is closely tied to the objective of denunciation, promoting justice for victims and ensuring public confidence in the justice system" while also ensuring "that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender, serving a limiting or restraining function, ensuring justice for the offender. In our criminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other" (R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 at para 37).
G. THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
[30] Referring to s. 718.2, there are several statutory aggravating factors in this case.
- The defendant abused a member of his family.
- The victim was under the age of eighteen years.
- The defendant abused a position of trust.
- The offence has had and continues to have a significant impact on the victim.
[31] This is not a single event. The defendant abused his niece over an extended period.
[32] The abuse included the use of physical force to overcome resistance as well as “requests” that she not tell anyone. Such a “request” from a person in a position of trust and authority must have seemed ominous and frightening to K.J.
H. THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
[33] Mr. Mohan says that A.C. is remorseful. A.C. told Dr. Levin that if he were allowed to speak to K.J. he would apologize to her. Yet, he admitted to the doctor that he would not have stopped abusing K.J. had he not been caught. He told the doctor that when he abused her, he was under the impression that K.J. enjoyed the abuse and that he planned to ask her to marry him when she turned 18.
[34] Whatever mitigation A.C.’s purported remorse might merit, that mitigation is significantly undermined by his lack of engagement with his pedophilia.
[35] There is no evidence of any family or community support for A.C.
I. DR. LEVIN’S REPORT
[36] Dr. Levin applied two standard risk assessment tools and opines that A.C. falls into the low-risk category for recidivism. While the report is not without its procedural inaccuracies, I accept Dr. Levin’s opinion in this regard.
J. THE RELEVANT PRECEDENTS
[37] It is a well settled principle of criminal law that similar sentences should be imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances. Criminal Code, s. 718.2 (b); R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para 2.
[38] There is a wealth of relevant jurisprudence in Ontario. The parties submitted several decided cases for my consideration. None of the cases is entirely on point but taken together they help define a range of sentence for the offences committed by A.C.
[39] Mr. Mohan relies on the following cases: R. v. C.H., 2017 ONSC 71, and R. v. B.N., 2024 ONCJ 687.
[40] Mr. Rutherford relies principally on the following cases: R. v. Friesen, supra; R. v. M.M., 2021 ONCA 890; R. v. N.K., 2024 ONSC 2761; and R. v. A.S., 2023 ONSC 983.
K. DISCUSSION
[50] As the Supreme Court has made clear in R. v. Friesen, supra, at paragraph 114, mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are the norm. Upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances.
[51] Friesen, at paragraph 5, also dictates that prior precedents should be departed from to increase sentences for those who abuse children.
[52] There can be little doubt that the sentencing principles of paramount consideration in cases of this kind are deterrence, general and specific, and denunciation. For that reason, the fact that A.C. presents a low risk of reoffending impacts my sentencing decision only slightly.
[53] Considering the factors set out above, the relevant precedents as well as the characteristics of the offence and the offender, A.C., I see this as a case that lies at the more serious end of the spectrum. A sentence of 6 years or 2,190 days on each count concurrent is appropriate:
[54] The parties agree that the following ancillary orders should be made:
- A primary DNA order;
- A s.161 (a-c) order for 20 years;
- A s.109 order for 10 years;
- A SOIRA order for life.
Released on July 22, 2025
Justice Russell Silverstein