Trial Judgement
DATE: July 17, 2025
COURT FILE No.: 1260-999-24-20270198
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
Between:
The Region of Halton (Prosecution)
— and —
614128 Ontario Ltd. (o/a Trisan Construction) (Defendant)
Trial Judgement
Before Justice of the Peace T.J. Howard
Trial heard May 5, 2025 in Burlington, Ontario
Judgement released July 17, 2025 in Burlington, Ontario
Ms. P. Chislett ..................................................................................... for the Prosecution
Ms. K. McKenzie ...................................................................................... for the Defendant
Justice of the Peace T.J. Howard
Introduction
[1] The defendant, 614128 Ontario Ltd. (operating as Trisan Construction) is charged with one count of failing to stop at a red-light (red-light camera system), contrary to s. 144(18.1) and pursuant to s. 207 (as the vehicle owner) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, as amended. It is alleged that the defendant committed the offence on February 25, 2024, at James Snow Parkway and Main Street in the Town of Milton. Proceedings were commenced via a certificate of offence under part I of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, as amended. That certificate made out that the vehicle bearing Ontario number plate “BE22966” was owned by the defendant.
[2] The trial took place on May 5, 2025, in Burlington. The prosecution tendered a series of certified documents (see exhibits 1 to 8) to prove their case. The defendant did not present any evidence. In closing submissions, the defendant argued that the prosecution failed to prove ownership of the vehicle, a required element of the offence when charged pursuant to s. 207 of the HTA. I directed that both parties provide written submissions on the issue. The date of July 17th, 2025, was selected for judgement.
[3] In written submissions, the defendant makes the following arguments: i) the prosecution has failed to provide any authority that allows evidence of number plate ownership to be accepted as evidence of vehicle ownership, and thus, has not proven ownership of the vehicle, ii) the prosecution has failed to show that the red-light camera system was operating correctly on the date of the offence, and iii) the prosecution has failed to show, using expert evidence if required, the time it takes for a vehicle to come to a full stop and make a right hand turn at the speed the defendant’s vehicle is said to have been travelling. I will discuss each of these arguments, before turning to the ultimate issue of whether the prosecution has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Analysis
a. Has the prosecution established ownership of the vehicle?
[4] It is helpful here to recreate the entirety of section 207 of the HTA with some emphases:
Vehicle owner may be convicted
207 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the owner of a vehicle may be charged with and convicted of an offence under this Act or the regulations or any municipal by-law regulating traffic for which the driver of the vehicle is subject to be charged unless, at the time of the offence, the vehicle was in the possession of some person other than the owner without the owner’s consent and on conviction the owner is liable to the penalty prescribed for the offence. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 207 (1).
When owner not liable
(2) The owner of a vehicle shall not be convicted as an owner for a contravention of any of the following provisions, but where the owner is also the driver, he or she may be convicted as a driver:
- Section 78 or 78.1.
- Subsection 106 (2) or (4).
- Sections 129 to 143, subsections 144 (1) to (17), subsections 144 (19) to (32), sections 145 to 165, sections 167 to 168, section 172, subsections 175 (1) to (10), subsections 175 (12.2) to (18) or section 176, 182 or 199.
- A regulation or by-law made or passed under section 106 or under any section or subsection that is referred to in paragraph 1, 2 or 3.
- Any by-law passed under any Act regulating or prohibiting turns on a highway. 2017, c. 26, Sched. 4, s. 24 (1, 2); 2021, c. 26, Sched. 1, s. 21 (1).
Permit holder deemed owner
(3) For the purposes of this Act or any municipal by-law regulating or prohibiting parking, standing or stopping, the holder of a permit as defined in section 6 shall be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle referred to in the permit if a number plate bearing a number that corresponds to the permit was displayed on the vehicle at the time an offence was committed unless the number plate was displayed thereon without the holder’s consent, the burden of proof of which shall be on the holder. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 207 (3).
Exposing number plate
(4) For the purposes of this Act or any municipal by-law regulating or prohibiting parking, standing or stopping, where a number plate issued under section 7 is exposed on a motor vehicle, the holder of the permit corresponding thereto shall be deemed to be the owner of that vehicle unless the number plate was exposed thereon without the permit holder’s consent, the burden of proof of which is on the permit holder. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 207 (4).
No imprisonment or probation
(5) Any person convicted of an offence pursuant to subsection (1) is not liable to imprisonment or to a probation order under subsection 72 (1) of the Provincial Offences Act as a result of the conviction or as a result of default in payment of the fine resulting from the conviction. 2005, c. 26, Sched. A, s. 31 (1).
(6) Repealed: 2017, c. 9, s. 9 (1).
Limitation
(7) An owner of a motor vehicle convicted of an offence under section 128 on the basis of evidence acquired through the use of an automated speed enforcement system or under subsection 175 (19), (19.1), (20) or (20.1) is not liable to imprisonment, a probation order under subsection 72 (1) of the Provincial Offences Act or a driver’s licence suspension as a result of that conviction or as a result of default in payment of a fine resulting from that conviction. 2004, c. 22, s. 6 (2); 2017, c. 9, s. 9 (2); 2017, c. 26, Sched. 4, s. 24 (3).
Limitation
(7.1) An owner of a motor vehicle convicted of an offence under section 166 on the basis of evidence acquired through the use of an automated street car enforcement system is not liable to imprisonment, a probation order under subsection 72 (1) of the Provincial Offences Act or a driver’s licence suspension as a result of that conviction or as a result of default in payment of a fine resulting from that conviction. 2021, c. 26, Sched. 1, s. 21 (2).
Owner liability, red-light camera system evidence
(8) The owner of a motor vehicle shall not be charged as an owner with an offence under subsection 144 (18) unless the evidence of the offence is obtained through the use of a red-light camera system. 1998, c. 38, s. 5 (2); 2017, c. 9, s. 9 (3).
Definition
(9) In this section, “owner” includes an operator as defined in section 16 or as deemed in section 19. 2005, c. 26, Sched. A, s. 31 (2). [emphasis added]
[5] The term “holder” of a permit used in ss. 207(3) and (4) is defined in s. 6 of the HTA as: “…the person in whose name the plate portion of a permit is issued.”
[6] It is clear, from s. 207(4) in particular, that a person (or in this case a business) who is the holder of the plate portion of a permit for a number plate displayed on a vehicle at the time of an alleged offence is deemed to be the owner of the vehicle.
[7] In the case before me, exhibit 5 is a certified copy of a Ministry of Transportation document titled “certificate of ownership” making out that Ontario number plate “BE22966” was issued to “614128 Ontario Ltd.” and “that this is the person who is the holder of the plate portion of the permit…and in whose name the plate portion of the permit is recorded in the records of the Ministry on: 2024/02/25”.
[8] Further, the photographs in evidence (exhibits 2 and 4) show number plate “BE22966” affixed to the rear of a Ford F-150 pickup truck, the vehicle alleged to have failed to stop for a red-light.
[9] This certified evidence is both credible and reliable, and the defendant takes no issue with it. Therefore, in my view, the prosecution has established the defendant’s ownership of the vehicle in this case. I turn now to the second issue.
b. Has the prosecution established that the red-light camera system was functioning correctly on the date of the alleged offence?
[10] Section 205.21 of the HTA deals with “certificate evidence” and reads as follows:
(1) The certified statements in a certificate of offence are admissible in evidence as proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, of the facts stated in it.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the statements setting out the evidence of an officer referred to in subsection 205.20 (1) in respect of whom a summons has been issued.
[11] In this case, exhibit 1 is the certificate of offence, which states therein:
I Jeffrey Moore…further certify and believe that the red-light camera system used was (make) Robot (model) Traffistar SR 590-ONT, a prescribed system pursuant to Ontario Regulation 277/99, as amended, and that the red-light camera system and the traffic control signal were in operation and functioning properly at the time the photographs referred to herein were taken …” [emphasis added]
As no evidence to the contrary was presented in this case, the certified statement of Jeffrey Moore is evidence that the system was working correctly. Again, the certified evidence before me is both credible and reliable and I accept it.
c. Does the prosecution need to lead evidence of the ability or lack thereof of a vehicle to come to a full stop and turn right in the timeframe captured?
[12] In essence, the defence submits that the defendant’s vehicle may have come to a full stop at the stop line and then proceeded to turn right, despite that it was captured at a speed of 30 km/h and the time difference between the two photographs was 1.8 seconds.
[13] I do not accept this submission. This submission raises a question regarding the circumstantial evidence in this case and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. The case of R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, at paras. 35 to 37 sets out the test for circumstantial evidence: if there are reasonable inferences other than guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
[14] In this case, the only reasonable inference to be drawn, based on the prosecution’s evidence, is that the defendant’s vehicle failed to stop at the red-light. First, the recorded speed of the defendant’s vehicle approaching the intersection was 30 km/h at the time the red-light was active for 0.9 second (see exhibit 1). Second, the defendant’s vehicle moves mostly through the intersection (following a right turn) at the time the red-light was active for 2.7 seconds (see exhibit 2). In my view, it is not reasonable to infer that the defendant’s vehicle reduced its speed to a full stop and then nearly completed a right turn in the span of 1.8 seconds.
[15] The issue of reasonable inferences to be drawn from the speed reading of a red-light camera system was addressed in R. v. Hardey, [2008] O.J. No. 559. The Court noted that two reasonable inferences can be drawn from such a speed reading: i) it set[s] off the camera, and ii) it gives rise to an inference that the vehicle was travelling too fast to stop for the red-light: see Hardey, supra, paras. 4-5. I am persuaded by this reasoning.
Conclusion
[16] The only evidence presented in this case was that of the prosecution. I find that the only reasonable inference available to me based on all the evidence is that the defendant’s vehicle failed to stop at the red-light before making a right turn. The prosecution has proven the case beyond any reasonable doubt and the defendant is guilty of the offence.
Howard, T.J., Justice of the Peace