ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2025-05-16
COURT FILE No.: 22-70006831; 22-70006832
BETWEEN:
His Majesty the King
— AND —
Ashley Gallie
Sentencing Judgment
Before Justice Brock Jones
Heard on May 9, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on May 16, 2025
I. Erdei — counsel for the Crown
C. O’Connor — counsel for A. Gallie
Jones J.:
Introduction
[1] Ashley Gallie pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a prohibited firearm knowing that possession was unlawful (Criminal Code section 92(1)); one count of careless storage of the firearm and ammunition (Criminal Code section 86(1)); one count each of possession of a schedule I substance (cocaine and fentanyl) for the purpose of trafficking (CDSA section 5(2)); and one count of possession of proceeds of crime over $5000 (Criminal Code section 354(1)). The Crown proceeded by indictment.
[2] Ms. Gallie was a wholly productive member of society until an accident plunged her life into a tragic spiral of addiction, desperation, and ultimately criminal activity.
[3] These are my reasons for imposing a sentence tailored to the unique circumstances of Ms. Gallie’s life.
Facts In Support of the Guilty Pleas
[4] On October 15, 2022, Toronto Police Service officers executed a search warrant at a motel room where Ms. Gallie was staying. They arrested her and searched her purse, wherein they located crack cocaine, fentanyl, oxycontin, a digital scale, and plastic baggies.
[5] In the motel room, the officers located an unloaded .357 handgun in a black handbag inside a shelf next to the bed. Within that same handbag were six rounds of ammunition for the handgun, alongside one round of .35 magnum ammunition and a round of 7.62 x 39mm ammunition.
[6] As they searched the rest of the room, the police officers located 124.92 g of crack cocaine, 16.92 g of fentanyl, and $10,180 in Canadian currency.
Outstanding Charges and Subsequent Finding of Guilt
[7] On November 24, 2020, Ms. Gallie was arrested for a variety of offences relating to her abusing her position as an employee at two pharmacies. She was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, possession of OxyContin for the purpose of trafficking, and theft over $5000, concerning what occurred at one pharmacy. She was found guilty of theft over $5000 and simple possession of OxyContin for what happened at the second pharmacy.
[8] On November 21, 2023, she was formally convicted of these offences. On November 19, 2024, she began serving a global 4.5-year sentence imposed by Brown J. of the Ontario Court of Justice.
[9] Ms. Gallie was subject to a house-arrest bail for the current charges before the court after her October 15, 2022, arrest. She remained on that release order, without any allegation of breaching it, until she had to step into custody to serve Justice Brown’s sentence.
Background of the Offender
[10] Ms. Gallie was born on […], 1985. She has two adult children, aged 22 and 20. She also has a very young daughter, approximately two years old.
[11] Her upbringing was difficult. She witnessed terrible domestic abuse by her father towards her mother. There was also a history of alcoholism within her extended family. Her father, tragically, committed suicide when she was only 14.
[12] At 15, she had her first child. Once her baby was born, her mother kicked Ms. Gallie and her child out of the home. The father of this child did not remain to help her, and she was placed on social assistance and began living in community housing.
[13] At 18, she met her current partner, and they had her second child. Her partner became abusive early in their relationship. He was unable to work due to his severe social anxiety. Ms. Gallie was the sole provider for her family as a result.
[14] Her most recent pregnancy experienced complications. She needed abdominal surgery due to the nature of the birth. Her daughter was born in the spring of 2023. Before beginning the sentence imposed by Brown J., she had been the primary caregiver for her youngest daughter while she remained in the community on bail. While the child’s father currently provides for her, Ms. Gallie remains concerned that the longer she stays in custody, the more likely it is that her daughter could end up in foster care.
[15] While she was still pregnant with her youngest child, she contacted an agency serving Indigenous families to be proactive and obtain any support she anticipated she would need.
[16] Ms. Gallie considers herself Métis. She has Mi’kmaq heritage from her maternal family that stretches back generations, primarily from New Brunswick, but is regarded as Métis due to her mixed European and Indigenous ancestry. She did not learn about her Indigenous ancestry until her mid-20s. Consequently, she did not have significant cultural involvement with that part of her background during her childhood or teenage years. Her maternal grandfather informed her of his Mi’kmaq heritage before he passed away.
[17] When he was young, her grandfather lived in fear that others would discover his family’s Indigenous heritage. This could have led to him or one of his siblings being taken to a residential school. Unsurprisingly, their heritage was treated as a family secret as a result.
[18] Ms. Gallie graduated from high school and earned a pharmacy technician diploma from college in 2013. She worked at various pharmacies until 2020. In 2018, Ms. Gallie was involved in a car accident that resulted in a serious back injury, which required surgery. She was prescribed OxyContin and later became dependent on it. As the prescription medication proved insufficient, she developed a severe addiction. She has never experimented with any other type of drug. She explains, but does not excuse, her criminal conduct as an unfortunate reaction to her addiction. She chose to obtain drugs illegally.
[19] Ms. Gallie informed me during the sentencing hearing that she was deeply remorseful for her actions. She recognizes the severity of her crimes and what she has lost, including her professional career and access to her children. While in custody, she received help to overcome her addiction and is now stable, no longer taking OxyContin. She hopes to return to being a loving mother to her children as soon as possible.
Position of the Parties
[20] Ms. Erdei submits that an appropriate sentence for these offences would have been five years in prison. Because Ms. Gallie is serving a 4.5 year sentence now, she requests that I impose a global 3.5-year consecutive sentence to respect the totality principle.
[21] She points to the particularly deadly nature of fentanyl and the significant value of the drugs and cash found in Ms. Gallie’s possession. Firearms are inherently dangerous, and although this handgun was not loaded, it was found with readily accessible ammunition. It is also somewhat aggravating that Ms. Gallie was under an undertaking for other drug-related charges when she committed the index offences.
[22] Ms. Erdei takes the position that Ms. Gallie has not made any meaningful strides towards her rehabilitation since these offences occurred. Furthermore, in response to an argument made by Mr. O’Connor, Ms. Erdei submits that Ms. Gallie also cannot point to her family circumstances as a relevant factor unless she provides evidence of how increased jail time will adversely impact her children and family, relying on the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Brown, 2025 ONCA 164, at para. 11. In her view, that evidence is lacking here.
[23] Similarly, Ms. Erdei argues that Ms. Gallie should not receive any mitigation as an Indigenous Canadian for her offences. Although Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto provided a letter detailing some of Ms. Gallie’s family history and heritage, the author could not establish a strong enough connection between Ms. Gallie and this heritage to prepare a formal Gladue report.
[24] Mr. O’Connor submits that any sentence I impose should run concurrently with the sentence Ms. Gallie is currently serving. She fell into criminal behaviour only due to the terrible accident in 2018 that left her addicted to painkillers. While this does not excuse her criminal offences, it does place them in context. She turned to crime to sustain an addiction that she never sought or desired. Her story is just one more tragic example of the devastating effects of opioid addiction on otherwise pro-social members of society.
[25] In his submission, Ms. Gallie is a loving mother who cares deeply for her children. He asked me to place great weight on his client’s status as a first-time offender at the time of the offences. She also pleaded guilty, which is a significant mitigating factor given the potential complexity of a trial.
[26] She was pregnant at the time of these offences. Following that high-risk pregnancy, she required considerable recovery time. Now, she is separated from her youngest child. While that remains an inevitable consequence of being involved in crimes of this magnitude, Mr. O’Connor submits that I should view the family separation concerns present in this case as a significant collateral consequence.
[27] His client may not have a strong attachment to her Indigenous heritage, but that is not due to disinterest. It is because it was hidden from her due to the policies of this country, which historically mistreated Indigenous families and tore them apart. Denying her the benefit of Gladue principles in this hearing would only perpetuate that injustice.
[28] Finally, he submits that Ms. Gallie’s demonstrated ability to comply with her bail conditions and refrain from reoffending after her arrest proves that she will return to a crime-free life once she is ultimately released. While the offences before Justice Brown are technically distinct from those before me, they are best viewed as interconnected. They occurred due to the poor judgment Ms. Gallie exhibited while suffering from her addiction. This, in turn, requires this court to place significant weight on the totality principle. Had she resolved all her charges simultaneously, he submits that the effective sentence sought by the Crown (8 years between the two cases) would never have been imposed, as it is excessive and crushing.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
[29] I have considered the following aggravating factors:
- Ms. Gallie possessed a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition in a motel, where she endangered the safety of every other occupant had the firearm been intentionally or accidentally discharged;
- She was bound by an undertaking at the time for drug-related offences, albeit of a very different nature;
- She possessed a significant quantity of cocaine and fentanyl for drug trafficking; and
- She possessed over $10,000 in proceeds of crime.
[30] The mitigating factors include an early plea, which spared the courts the need for a lengthy preliminary hearing and trial. Additionally, Ms. Gallie’s difficult life experiences and her Indigenous heritage, as I will explain, also diminish her moral culpability to some extent.
Sentencing – Firearms and Drugs
[31] Sentencing “is a highly individualized process” requiring “a delicate balancing of the various sentencing principles and objectives”: R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, at para. 4. Individualization requires the sentencing judge to consider all of the relevant facts before the court, including the “status and life experiences” of the offender: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at para. 44.
[32] Proportionality remains the cornerstone of all sentencing decisions. A sentence must be “proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: Criminal Code section 718.1.
[33] The Ontario Court of Appeal has emphasized that the “toxic combination of drugs and guns poses a pernicious and persisting threat to public safety and the welfare of the community”: see R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 767, at para. 11.
[34] The parties agree that Ms. Gallie’s possession of the handgun falls at the “true crime” end of the spectrum identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at para. 84. Handguns are associated with all manner of evil, especially in large urban centres such as Toronto. The dangers and harm inflicted upon society by the illegal drug trade were described by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Lynch, 2022 ONCA 109, at para. 17. These include the exploitation of the vulnerable, the spread of addiction, adverse health consequences, and the crime and violence that inevitably follow the distribution and consumption of hard drugs in particular.
[35] The harms associated with fentanyl can only be described as a unique form of evil. Justice Barrett described them well in R. v. Ahmed, 2024 ONSC 6664, at para. 23:
Trafficking in a deadly drug such as fentanyl causes immeasurable harm to the community. As noted by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696, at para. 33, “Every day in our communities, fentanyl abuse claims the lives of Canadians.” Indeed, given its deadly and addictive properties, fentanyl has been described as “public enemy number one”: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, at para. 93; R. v. Mengesha, 2022 ONCA 654, at para. 16; R. v. Campbell, 2022 ONCA 666, at para. 83.
[36] The primary sentencing principles in this case must be general deterrence and denunciation: R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692, at para. 49; R. v. Lawal, 2024 ONSC 3621, at para. 27; R. v. Johnson, 2020 MBCA 10, at para. 12. However, while the firearms and drug offences are linked, they remain distinct. I caution myself not to effectively punish Ms. Gallie twice by imposing a sentence for one offence and then using the facts surrounding that offence as an aggravating factor for the related offences: see R. v. Pitt, 2023 ONSC 5470, at para. 32.
[37] In R. v. Nguyen, 2019 ONSC 6358, Justice Spies reviewed the authorities regarding sentencing for Criminal Code section 92 offences, noting the significant differences between these and more serious section 95 offences (which involve loaded prohibited or restricted firearms). A range of 1-3 years in jail exists, depending on various aggravating and mitigating factors: see paras. 34-37. I note as well that the maximum penalty for a section 95 offence was raised to 14 years on December 15, 2023, demonstrating Parliament views this offence as being objectively more serious: see An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms) (S.C. 2023, c. 32).
[38] In R. v. Campbell, 2024 ONSC 2220, para. 46, Justice Boswell held that a sentence between two and three years was generally appropriate for trafficking in less than an ounce of fentanyl. In R. v. Ahmed, 2024 ONSC 6664, Justice Barrett held that even where an offender has “strong rehabilitative prospects,” a penitentiary sentence is normally required for fentanyl trafficking. In some cases, sentences as long as five years for this offence alone can be justified to send a strong message regarding deterrence and denunciation: see para. 34.
[39] In Pitt, the offender was 19 years old and had no prior criminal record. He was found guilty of possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of 28.58 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The sentence was four years in prison.
[40] Ms. Erdei brought to my attention several additional authorities, including R. v. Yogendran, 2021 ONCJ 125. In that case, a youthful first-time offender was arrested for being in constructive possession of 16.38 grams of fentanyl cut with caffeine and another agent, 19.91 grams of cocaine, approximately $14,000, and a loaded semi-automatic handgun. Despite his strong rehabilitative potential, Justice Pringle imposed a global six-year sentence, consisting of three years for the firearm offence and three consecutive years for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.
Restraint, Rehabilitation and Totality
[41] A penitentiary sentence is required to meet these sentencing principles and reflect the objective gravity of Ms. Gallie’s offences. Yet, as Mr. O’Connor has rightfully noted, Ms. Gallie was a first-time offender. I must not lose sight of the principles of rehabilitation and restraint, even given the nature of her crimes: R. v. Disher, 2020 ONCA 710, at para. 60; R. v. Desir, 2021 ONCA 486, at paras. 41-42.
[42] I must also consider the principle of totality, which is embedded in s. 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code. The totality principle requires a sentencing court to ensure that an offender who receives consecutive sentences for multiple offences is not subject to a sentence that exceeds her overall moral culpability. The sentence imposed must also not be “crushing” and extinguish nearly all hope of the offender’s rehabilitative potential.
[43] In R. v. Johnson, 2012 ONCA 339, the Ontario Court of Appeal addressed the totality principle in the context of an offender who has been previously convicted of prior offences and is serving a sentence for those offences, and who must then be sentenced for new, additional offences. The Court of Appeal noted that the totality principle applies in these situations but cautioned sentencing courts against placing undue emphasis on it. The Court wrote at para. 23:
The system must be seen to be fair and rational – both to the offender and the community – and its integrity must be preserved. Just as a sentence cannot be unduly harsh and excessive, neither can it be overly lenient or unresponsive to other purposes and principles that underpin the sentencing regime – denunciation, deterrence, the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of harm done to victims and the community, and the protection of the public: Criminal Code, s. 718. In this sense, an offender such as the appellant ought not to be seen to be reaping benefits from his previous serious criminal misconduct.
[44] Mr. O’Connor argues that the totality principle has unique salience in this case due to his client’s status as a first-time offender. He cited R. v. Al-Akhali, 2025 ONCA 229, where the Court of Appeal addressed the need for restraint concerning youthful first-time offenders with strong rehabilitative prospects. The importance of general deterrence is reduced in these cases, and “the long-term interests of society are better protected by ensuring that an offender’s underlying problems, which prompted his deviant behaviour, are corrected”: see paras. 73-75, citing among other authorities, R. v. Wesslen, 2015 ABCA 74, para. 41.
[45] Ms. Gallie was not a youthful first-time offender when she committed her offences, at least not as that term is generally understood in the jurisprudence. I nevertheless agree with Mr. O’Connor that this decision from the Court of Appeal is highly informative, given that Ms. Gallie’s offending behaviour primarily resulted from the terrible addiction she developed due to her accident, and she still has strong rehabilitative potential. She is certainly not a hardened criminal with a history of recidivism.
[46] In that regard, I must be cautious regarding how I approach the outstanding set of charges Ms. Gallie was facing at the time she committed the current offences. While Ms. Gallie was subject to a bail order because of those charges, she had not been convicted of them when she committed the offences before this court. That significantly diminishes the weight I should place on that factor. Nor is she alleged to have violated a term of that prior bail order. Paciocco J.A., speaking for the Court of Appeal in R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, para. 65, noted the following:
…prior criminal convictions are ordinarily aggravating because it is contemptuous for offenders who have already been convicted to disregard that experience and offend again. If an offender has yet to be convicted of offence #1 that reasoning cannot apply. Similarly, a prior criminal record can be a predictor of the need for a harsher sentence to specifically deter the offender since the last penalty was not effective in doing so, given the subsequent offence. That inference is equally unavailable where no prior sentence has been imposed. Nor, in my view, can the earlier criminal conduct enhance the need for denunciation of the later offence.
[47] In R. v. Roshuk-Finch, 2025 ABCA 85, para. 25, the Alberta Court of Appeal expressed a similar sentiment in the context of how sentencing courts should apply the “step-up principle.” The Court of Appeal wrote:
The general rule is that before an increase in sentence can be imposed for a repeat offence, that offence must have been committed after conviction and sentencing for the initial offence: R v Skolnick, 1982 SCC 54, [1982] 2 SCR 47 at 58-59, 138 DLR (3d) 193 [Skolnick]; R v MV, 2023 ONCA 724 at paras 63-64. The rationale for applying the step concept is absent when the offender has not had the effect of the earlier sentence to deter their conduct: Skolnick at 54.
Gladue Principles and Family Separation
[48] In R. v. F.H.L., 2018 ONCA 83, the Ontario Court of Appeal explained that before an Aboriginal offender’s background should influence the court’s sentencing decision, “the systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal people in Canadian society must have impacted the offender’s life in a way that (1) bears on moral blameworthiness, or (2) indicates which types of sentencing objectives should be prioritized in the offender’s case.” However, there is no requirement for a “causal connection” between the crimes and the offender’s Indigenous heritage.
[49] In cases such as this one, where the offender has been severed from their heritage, denying them consideration of Gladue principles for that reason alone remains an error of principle. For example, in R. v. Kreko, 2016 ONCA 367, the appellant was an Aboriginal Canadian who had been adopted at one year of age by a non-Aboriginal family and was raised without knowledge of his Aboriginal heritage. Sometime after his 16th birthday, he learned of his Aboriginal background. The trial judge found that there was no clear causal link between the appellant’s Aboriginal heritage and his offences, and did not incorporate this factor in the final sentencing decision.
[50] The Ontario Court of Appeal held that this constituted an error. The Court found that the appellant’s dislocation from his identity affected his moral culpability and that his Aboriginal heritage, even if it had been unknown to him for many years, was relevant to the sentencing process. The trial court applied the incorrect approach. Instead, the trial court should have considered the intergenerational and systemic factors contributing to the appellant's disconnection from his heritage: see para. 24.
[51] In R. v. Kehoe, 2023 BCCA 2, the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault. He was Métis, 30 years old, and had a lengthy prior criminal record. The Crown's position at trial was that Gladue principles should play a limited role in his sentencing because many difficulties in his life could be traced to his non-Indigenous stepfather’s drug use and trafficking, rather than to his mother’s status as a Métis person. The appellant, as the trial Crown argued, was “not raised” with Indigenous cultural practices, which also weighed heavily against the incorporation of Gladue principles.
[52] The B.C. Court of Appeal characterized the position taken by the Crown, which was adopted by the trial judge, as “deeply flawed”: see para. 51. At paras. 52-57, the Court of Appeal explained why:
The overall thrust of the Crown’s submission was plain: because Mr. Kehoe and his mother were disconnected from their Métis heritage, Gladue principles should play essentially no role in determining a fit sentence for Mr. Kehoe. Mr. Kehoe’s difficulties were related primarily to his non-Indigenous step-father’s behaviours, not his heritage.
This position is highly problematic for two reasons.
First, as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted at pp. 1–3 of its summary report, “Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future,” Canada developed and implemented “a coherent policy to eliminate Aboriginal people as distinct peoples and to assimilate them into the Canadian mainstream against their will.” Canada “pursued this policy of cultural genocide because it wished to divest itself of its legal and financial obligations to Aboriginal people and gain control over their land and resources.” Residential schooling was one of many tools Canada used to achieve its assimilationist objectives.
As a consequence of Canada’s colonial history and assimilationist policies, many Indigenous people have become disconnected from their ancestral communities, cultures, and associated positive social structures. This disconnection has contributed to the social and economic marginalization of Indigenous people in Canada, including their disproportionate interactions with the criminal justice system.
Disconnection is one of the very harms associated with Canada’s colonial history and assimilationist policies that Gladue and Ipeelee seek to address. Accordingly, the Crown’s reasoning that Gladue principles should play a very limited role in this case because Mr. Kehoe was disconnected from his Indigenous culture, community and supports subverts the remedial purpose of s. 718.2(e) of the Code and penalizes Mr. Kehoe for the success of Canada’s destructive policies.
Second, when determining whether and how Gladue principles applied to Mr. Kehoe, the issue was never whether he was disconnected from his Métis community, culture and supports. Rather, the issues were: (1) the role Canada’s colonial history and post-colonial assimilationist policies played in causing that disconnection; and (2) the role that disconnection played in his coming before the court.
[53] Therefore, I reject Ms. Erdei's position that the evidence in this hearing precludes my consideration of Gladue principles for Ms. Gallie. I accept Mr. O’Connor’s argument that sufficient evidence exists for me to infer that the tragic legacy of the residential school system and Canada’s historic mistreatment of its Indigenous peoples has played a role in bringing her before the courts. In this case, as in many others, it is difficult to measure with precision how Canada’s assimilationist policies and the associated intergenerational trauma affected Ms. Gallie’s life trajectory and family history. That does not mean they are to be ignored.
[54] While the letter from Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto indicates that the author is unable to complete a formal Gladue report, it does not question Ms. Gallie’s Indigenous heritage. Her family’s connection to its Métis background is rooted in a deep history that she articulates and describes in considerable detail. This includes her grandfather’s sharing of his personal experience of having to hide his Aboriginal identity. This decision stemmed from fear of the consequences that might befall him or his siblings should their identity become widely known. Canada’s Métis people, like many Indigenous groups, have a proud tradition of relying on oral histories to pass down their family stories, legends, and knowledge. This was recognized by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: see Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 1997 SCC 302, at paras. 87 and 106-107.
[55] That Ms. Gallie’s connection to her culture was severed in the past is tragic, but sadly, it is not uncommon. Her recent efforts to reconnect with that culture are meaningful and admirable. I note that the author of the letter from Aboriginal Legal Services states clearly that, despite the limits on the assistance they were able to provide Ms. Gallie, nothing in the letter “should be read in any way as stating that Ms. Gallie is not an Indigenous person.”
[56] I also accept that there is more than enough evidence in this case to give the family separation concerns identified by Mr. O’Connor significant weight. Ms. Gallie was, and remains, a loving mother to all her children. She was the primary caregiver for her youngest child before she was incarcerated. Her eldest daughter informed the author of the pre-sentence report that her mother is a “good person” who has always been there for her children, and that she was “the glue that keeps their family together.” I am absolutely satisfied that the longer Ms. Gallie remains in custody, the greater the indirect impact this will have on her entire family.
[57] How the sentence I impose will affect her youngest child warrants particular consideration. While that child is currently in the care of her father, he has not previously taken on the role of a primary long-term caregiver and has his own internal struggles. His ability to be a stable, long-term parent is uncertain. In R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, para. 44, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that sentencing judges must give “serious and sufficient consideration to family separation consequences” when determining an appropriate sentence. These consequences may justify a sentence adjustment, even for “grave offences” where the primary sentencing principles are deterrence and denunciation: see para. 45. As explained by the Court of Appeal at para. 46:
This benefits society because families are its foundational fabric. See R. v. Clayton (1982), 1982 ONCA 3860, 69 C.C.C. (2d) 81 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 83. Our society depends on families to raise and nurture children, transmit knowledge, skills, and values from generation to generation, and provide love, care, emotional, economic, and social support to their members. See Moge v. Moge, 1992 SCC 25, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at p. 848. Courts thus try to minimize the impact of sentencing on defendants’ families because, as Spencer recognized, interfering with this foundational social institution, even for just reasons, can endanger community safety and society’s well-being.
[58] These factors demand even greater weight in cases involving Indigenous families. I take very seriously the risk that Ms. Gallie’s youngest daughter may find herself in the child welfare system; a risk that is amplified by the duration of Ms. Gallie’s prison sentence. This is anything but a speculative concern. In Reference re An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2024 SCC 5, the Supreme Court of Canada commented on the historic over-use of the child welfare system to split apart Indigenous families. The Supreme Court acknowledged the harm and intergenerational trauma that resulted from these policies and noted that the harm is still being felt today.
[59] Courts must acknowledge this tragic history and craft sentences, as much as possible, to prevent the harm associated with it from being perpetuated. Indigenous children in the child welfare system experience higher rates of notoriously adverse ill effects, such as mental health issues and lower educational achievements. They are also more likely to experience depression and anxiety, largely attributable to the trauma and disruption caused by separation from their families and communities, along with the concomitant loss of cultural identity: see Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, Research Department, Child Welfare and Education Fact Sheet, (March 19, 2024), available online: https://abo-peoples.org/.
Conclusion
[60] If not for the sentence Ms. Gallie was already serving, I agree with Ms. Erdei that a sentence as high as five years would have been appropriate for these offences. However, imposing a consecutive sentence of anything approaching that amount would be excessive and violate the totality principle. At the same time, I cannot accede to Mr. O’Connor’s request for concurrent sentences. These were separate offences, involving the possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, as well as the possession of a firearm with nearby ammunition. The amount of money located and the value of the narcotics themselves demonstrate that Ms. Gallie had fallen into the illegal drug trade to a dangerous degree. They call for an increase in the total sentence Ms. Gallie is serving.
[61] I impose an 18-month consecutive sentence. This will effectively create a six-year global sentence for these offences and those before Justice Brown. For a first-time Indigenous offender, this remains a significant penalty. I will reduce the 18 months by a credit of six months based on the agreement of the parties regarding the impact that the onerous house arrest conditions on Ms. Gallie’s release order had on her liberty interests: see R. v. Downes, 2006 ONCA 3957.
[62] I endorse the informations as follows: a three year sentence both counts of possession of Schedule I substances for the purpose of trafficking, to be served concurrently to any sentence she is already serving; a concurrent one year sentence for the careless storage of a firearm; a concurrent one year sentence for the possession of proceeds of crime; and a consecutive one year sentence to any sentence currently being served for the possession of restricted or prohibited firearm knowing that possession was unauthorized.
[63] There will be a forfeiture and destruction order concerning the seized firearm and ammunition pursuant to Criminal Code section 491(1). I order forfeiture of the seized funds as proceeds of crime in accordance with Criminal Code section 462.38.
[64] There will be a Criminal Code section 109 order for ten years at the request of the Crown.
[65] These are secondary designated offences for DNA purposes, and I find it is in the best interests of the administration of justice to impose the orders: Criminal Code section 487.051(3)(b).
[66] The victim fine surcharges are waived.
Released: May 16, 2025
Signed: Justice Brock Jones