Case Information
DATE: 2025-05-14
COURT FILE No.: 4815 998 23 48107163
COURT: Ontario Court of Justice
BETWEEN:
His Majesty the King
— AND —
Talha Naveed
Before Justice David Porter
Heard on September 18, 2024 and March 26, 2025
Reasons for Sentence released on May 14, 2025
L. Will for the Crown
H. Tse for the Defendant
Introduction
Porter J.:
[1] On September 18, 2024, Talha Naveed (“Mr. Naveed”) entered a plea of guilty to dangerous driving causing death contrary to section 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code.
[2] This offence is a pure indictable offence with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
The Circumstances of the Offence
[3] On Monday, May 1, 2023, Mr. Naveed, who was 18 years old at the time, attended a car dealership in Scarborough with two high school friends to test drive a car. Mr. Naveed drove the car, a Toyota Camry, with his friend Syed Mehdi, age 18, in the front passenger seat and his friend Mahdi Faizal, age 17, in the rear driver side seat. After proceeding along Lawrence Ave. East eastbound past Barrymore Rd., Mr. Naveed did a U-turn to travel westbound on Lawrence Ave. East in the middle lane.
[4] He accelerated the car at a rapid pace travelling at a very high rate of speed in a 50 km/hr posted senior safety zone entering into the intersection at Brimley Road where he collided with a Toyota Venza, driven by Mr. John David Stanley, who had just initiated a left turn.
[5] Mr. Stanley, who was 60 years of age, suffered grave injuries as a result of the collision, and tragically was pronounced deceased a short time later at the collision scene.
[6] There was a large debris field, heavy damage to both vehicles and a pedestrian signal pole was ripped from the ground. The Toyota Camry travelled a significant distance off the roadway coming to a stop against a tree on the northwest corner. There was a cyclist on the northwest corner of the intersection who narrowly missed being struck as the Toyota Camry left the roadway after the collision.
[7] The investigation showed that Mr. Naveed was travelling at 119 km/hr five seconds prior to the collision and accelerated to 140 km/hr at the point of impact with Mr. Stanley’s car. This speed was almost triple the posted speed limit of 50 km/hr in the posted senior safety zone.
[8] Mr. Naveed and his two passengers were transported to Sunnybrook Hospital with injuries after the accident.
[9] Mr. Naveed has no prior criminal record, and no prior record of provincial driving offences.
Victim Impact
[10] The victim of this offence, John David Stanley, was the beloved spouse of Christine Stanley who refers to him as “Dave”. Her victim impact statement eloquently expresses the enormous loss his death represents for her. She describes Dave as always making her feel safe and protected, and states in her victim impact statement that while she tries to cope, she misses him daily, noting that she does not have Dave to give her the support she always had from him.
[11] Tragically, Mr. Stanley died leaving his elderly parents to mourn their loss. They state in their victim impact statement that he was their only son who they described as “a giving loving son, father and husband, he not only looked after his wonderful family he would help anyone who needed it. He was truly the definition of a caring person.”
[12] David Stanley’s son, Christopher, who with other family members attended the sentence hearing, made his victim impact statement to the court. His statement stressed the sadness caused by his loss and states that not a single life event goes by where there isn’t something that reminds him of the loss of his father. In particular, he mourns the absence he and his fiancée felt about the loss of his father as an important presence at their anticipated wedding.
[13] J. Anton Stanley, another son of Mr. Stanley, has suffered significant challenges as a result of the trauma resulting from his father’s death including challenges in continuing his education and significant mental and physical health challenges.
[14] A family friend, Sandra Thatcher, describes Dave Stanley as the husband of her best friend Christine Stanley. They celebrated birthdays and holiday events together. She describes Dave Stanley as always willing to lend a hand and as a person who was an important confidante for her in her life.
[15] Other statements of the enormous loss suffered as a result of this tragic offence were provided by Mr. Stanley’s sister-in-law, Elizabeth Petluch, his mother-in-law Regina Stoeckl, and his aunt Carole Stanley.
[16] Understandably this tragic loss created an enormous hole in the lives of persons who knew and loved Mr. Stanley and received his abundant love and support. He was truly loved and will be greatly missed by his family and friends.
The Defendant Talha Naveed
[17] The Defendant Talha Naveed (“Mr. Naveed”) was born August 6, 2004 and therefore was 18 years old when he committed the offence of dangerous driving causing death on May 1, 2023.
[18] His background and circumstances are detailed in a pre-sentence report dated March 10, 2025 which has been of great assistance to the court. The presentence report is a very favourable report for Mr. Naveed. It reports that he had a stable childhood living with his parents and siblings with whom he has always had a positive relationship. He continues to receive significant emotional and financial support from his family.
[19] It is clear from the pre-sentence report that the commission of this offence is out of character for Mr. Naveed. Apart from this offence, his childhood and young adult hood has been characterized by pro-social activity. He received excellent grades in high school. After graduation, he was accepted into five local Community College programmes, and was engaged in the first year in the Police Foundations programme at Centennial College at the time of this offence. His ambition was to pursue a career as a police officer. As a result of this offence, and the significant lasting injuries which Mr. Naveed received in the motor vehicle collision, this goal is most likely now unattainable.
[20] His pro-social nature is exemplified by his receipt of the Lieutenant Governor’s Community Volunteer Award for students which he received in June 2022. This was awarded for his completion of 1756 hours of community service in high school, far in excess of the requirement of 40 hours required for graduation. The pre-sentence report notes that in high school he was extensively involved in numerous clubs and enjoyed positive relationships with fellow students and teachers.
[21] A letter from Mr. Naveed’s mother confirms that after the tragic collision that is the subject of this case he was unable to return to classes at Centennial College, but he has obtained a Cybersecurity Analyst Diploma and, as confirmed in the pre-sentence report, received a diploma in the Help Desk and Network Support Program from a College in Ottawa he attended from May 6, 2024 to August 16, 2024.
[22] He is currently employed by a friend of his father’s doing desk work 2-3 hours per day due to his severe injuries caused by the collision.
[23] Mr. Naveed expressed great remorse to the author of the pre-sentence report for the tragic loss he has caused to the members of Mr. Stanley’s family. His sincere remorse is reflected in his plea of guilty, and in his extensive statement to the court during the sentencing hearing in which he expressed condolences to Mr. Stanley’s family and great remorse for the commission of this offence.
[24] It is clear from the pre-sentence report that this offence has had a devastating impact on both Mr. Stanley’s family and on Mr. Naveed himself. He has made several suicide attempts, and has been diagnosed at North York General Hospital as having “major depressive disorder, occurring in the context of a very severe motor vehicle collision resulting in the death of the driver of another vehicle”.
[25] It is clear that his sadness and remorse in relation to the commission of this offence has been increased for Mr. Naveed by the death of his grandfather in 2020, who he misses greatly, and is no longer available to him as a source of comfort and support which he had provided.
[26] In addition to the mental health challenges resulting from this tragic event, Mr. Naveed suffered severe injuries including three spinal cord fractures which required surgery. He has had metal rods placed in his back and continues to suffer pain and frequent blackouts. He is currently undergoing multiple treatments including physiotherapy and chiropractic care, psychotherapy and massage therapy. He is unable to walk for long periods of time. He is only able to sleep 2-3 hours per night, and experiences recurrent nightmares since the date of the offence.
[27] The pre-sentence report notes that Mr. Naveed does not engage in substance use, and the offence did not involve the use of alcohol or substances.
[28] The pre-sentence report notes that Mr. Naveed is willing to complete community service hours.
[29] The report concludes at p.7:
“Based on the information presented, the writer believes the subject would benefit from addressing the following identified areas of concern to mitigate his risk of reoffending: bereavement/grief counselling, employment assistance, and mental health/well being supports. Professional counselling supports, to address the above noted concerns, are available within the community in group and one to one settings.”
The Law
[30] The general principles of sentencing are established in the following provisions of the Criminal Code. Section 718 states:
“The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender, and other persons, from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims, or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community”
[31] Section 718.2 states:
“A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, ….
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.”
[32] The fundamental principle of sentencing is the principle of proportionality.
[33] Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code states that a sentence,
“must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”.
[34] In R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, the Supreme Court of Canada defined the principle of proportionality as follows at para. 37:
“The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) is intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing — the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just sanctions. Whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the various objectives and other principles listed in the Code, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality. Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justice system. As Wilson J. expressed in her concurring judgment in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, 1985 SCC 81, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 533:
It is basic to any theory of punishment that the sentence imposed bear some relationship to the offence; it must be a “fit” sentence proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. Only if this is so can the public be satisfied that the offender “deserved” the punishment he received and feel a confidence in the fairness and rationality of the system.
Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender. In the Canadian criminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other.”
[35] As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at para. 4:
“One of the main objectives of Canadian criminal law is the rehabilitation of offenders. Rehabilitation is one of the fundamental moral values that distinguish Canadian society from the societies of many other nations in the world, and it helps the courts impose sentences that are just and appropriate.”
[36] The sentencing principle of rehabilitation is important when sentencing a youthful first offender, as is the case with Mr. Naveed.
[37] The Court of Appeal has stressed the principle of restraint in imposing a custodial sentence on a youthful first offender. As Gillese J.A. stated in R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, [2009] O.J. No. 452 at paras. 32-34:
“[32] The principle of restraint operates in three ways in the present case. First, it is an important consideration because the appellant was a first offender. As such, the restraint principle requires that the sentencing judge consider all sanctions apart from incarceration and where, as here, incarceration must be imposed, the term should be as short as possible and tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused: see R. v. Priest (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 538, [1996] O.J. No. 3369 (C.A.), at p. 545 O.R. [page 651]
[33] Second, the principle of restraint requires the sentencing judge to consider rehabilitation in determining the appropriate length of the sentence. In lowering a sentence given to a first offender, this court stated in R. v. Blanas, [2006] O.J. No. 364, 207 O.A.C. 226 (C.A.), at para. 5:
[G]eneral deterrence cannot be the sole consideration. The appellant is relatively youthful and has no prior record and appears to have the full support of her family and community. Appropriate consideration must be given to the rehabilitation of the appellant.
[34] In serious cases and cases involving violence, rehabilitation alone is not the determinative factor -- general deterrence and denunciation are also significant factors to be considered. However, as this court ruled in R. v. Dubinsky, [2005] O.J. No. 862, at para. 1, it is an error to focus almost exclusively on general deterrence and fail to consider individual deterrence and rehabilitation, especially when sentencing a first offender.”
[38] In its very recent decision in R. v. Perry, 2025 ONCA 241, in an appeal in a dangerous driving causing death case, the court stated at paras 9-10:
“The principle of restraint also directs courts, when sentencing a youthful offender for a first offence, not to prioritize denunciation and deterrence over rehabilitation: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, 99 C.R. (7th) 110, at para. 31.
The principles of denunciation and deterrence, however, are “particularly relevant to dangerous driving offences that are often committed by first-time offenders and otherwise law-abiding citizens”: R. v. Frickey, 2017 ONCA 1024, 22 M.V.R. (7th) 184, at para. 4; R. v. Augustine, 2019 ONCA 119, at para. 11. As this court stated in R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, 294 O.A.C. 261 at paras. 48-49, “[a] motor vehicle can, in a moment of recklessness, be transformed into an object capable of destroying lives” and, accordingly, the license to drive is a privilege that comes with immense responsibility.”
The Crown Sentencing Cases
[39] The Crown relies upon the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, in which the Crown successfully appealed, and the court imposed a nine-month period of custody and a five-year driving prohibition.
[40] The court noted that the accused was a 40-year-old first offender with no previous criminal record. She had driven 137 km/hr in a 50 km/hr zone. She and the driver of another vehicle involved in the collision were both charged with five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The other driver was in his 20s and did not have a criminal record and plead guilty. He was sentenced in a joint submission to a suspended sentence and 18-month period of probation with three months of house arrest and a one-year driving prohibition. The other driver had plead guilty to one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.
[41] Unlike the other driver, Ms. Rawn plead not guilty and was convicted of seven offences after an eight-day jury trial. The Court of Appeal rejected the submission that Ms. Rawn should receive a sentence similar to the sentence imposed on the other driver who also drove at 137 km/h in tandem with Ms. Rawn and was involved in the collision of the two vehicles resulting in the seven persons injured in the collision.
[42] In upholding its position that Ms. Rawn should be sentenced to a period of actual incarceration, in contrast to the youthful offender who received a suspended sentence and probation, the court noted at paragraphs 21-22:
“Mr. Clazzer was a youthful first offender who took responsibility and demonstrated remorse in the immediate aftermath of the accident. Ms. Rawn, while also a first offender, at no time accepted responsibility. In fact, in her response to the trial judge’s invitation to address the court in advance of being sentenced, she maintained that “the other kid in the car was more guilty than I was.”
[43] Mr. Clazzer early in the proceedings pleaded guilty to one offence and six charges were withdrawn. His sentence was the product of a joint submission. Ms. Rawn was convicted of seven offences after an eight-day jury trial. Ms. Rawn’s sentence was hotly contested.
[44] In R. v. Rawn, the Court of Appeal emphasized that general deterrence and denunciation are important principles in the determination of the proper sentence for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm or death. The Court stated at para. 33:
“General deterrence and denunciation are the most important factors in the determination of a sentence in a case such as this one: see R. v. Nusrat, 2009 ONCA 31,244 O.A.C. 241. Other like-minded people need to know that irresponsible use of a motor vehicle on our highways will not be countenanced. A sentence can only denounce conduct and deter others to the extent that it is punitive. The essence of general deterrence is, therefore, punishment: R. v. B.W.P., 2006 SCC 27 ... at paras 2-5.”
[45] The Court noted that, at this time, a conditional sentence was not available in law.
[46] At para. 45, the Court re-iterated:
“It is worth repeating - dangerous driving causing bodily harm is a serious offence. An appropriate sentence must give primacy to the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation. To meet the requirements of these principles, the sentence must clearly reflect the seriousness of the conduct and its consequences, both actual and potential. To meet the requirements of denunciation, it is necessary that there be absolutely no ambiguity in the message that such conduct is completely unacceptable.”
[47] The Court noted with respect to the driving prohibition at para 48:
“Second, in my view, a fit sentence in this case must include an extended period of driving prohibition. I emphasize this aspect of the sentence as driving is at the core of the criminal conduct being addressed and at the core of the harm caused and potential harm created. A motor vehicle can, in a moment of recklessness, be transformed into an object capable of destroying lives. The Alberta Court of Appeal expressed this view as follows in R. v. Field, 2011 ABCA 48, 499 A.R. 178: “[d]riving a ton of glass and metal through spaces where people can be expected to be present and at a speed where it is likely to be impossible to stop the vehicle in time to avoid calamity cannot be treated as a youthful indiscretion” (at para. 23).”
[48] The Court sentenced the 40-year old Ms. Rawn after an 8-day trial to 9 months of actual incarceration and a 5 year driving prohibition concurrent with the mandatory licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act.
[49] It is noteworthy that the youthful offender who plead guilty to identical driving, and one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, received a suspended sentence and a 1-year driving prohibition demonstrating the mitigating effect of a plea of guilty and acceptance of responsibility in sentencing.
[50] The Crown relies on R. v. Pandher, 2021 ONSC 5787, in which a 21-year-old professional truck driver plead guilty to one count of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. He had no prior criminal record.
[51] He was involved in a collision driving 105 km/hr as he approached a backlog of traffic near a construction zone on Highway 401.
[52] At the time of the collision, he was talking on the phone with a friend, and collided with the vehicle in front of him killing the driver. The force of his tractor-trailer truck that he was driving caused 4 more secondary collisions resulting in two persons being seriously injured.
[53] Pandher was a professional driver driving a tractor-trailer truck. He had falsified his logbooks and was not complying with the regulations regarding hours of driving and hours of rest applicable to commercial vehicle operators.
[54] The judge noted at para. 37 the aggravating factor of Mr. Pandher’s falsification of his driving records:
“Mr. Pandher’s actions leading up to the day of the collision was fuelled by greed, he falsified his logbooks, drove double the hours he was reporting for the sole purpose of making more money. He put his personal economic interest ahead of public safety. Mr. Pandher’s moral blameworthiness is heightened by his tampering of his logbooks and by driving almost double the hours he falsely reported.”
[55] In imposing the sentence, the trial judge noted at para. 26 that there was “very little information about the accused other than he was 21 when the collision occurred.”
[56] The trial judge noted “I have no evidence of remorse coming from Mr. Pandher other than what he has said this morning.”
[57] In R. v. Lake, 2023 ONCJ 452, McLeod J. sentenced a 31-year-old man to two years less one day of custody for the defence of dangerous driving causing death.
[58] Mr. Lake had 14 prior MTO convictions over 12 years including a conviction for careless driving less than one year before the collision. In that case, McLeod J. rejected the defence position that a conditional sentence was appropriate noting at paragraphs 41-43:
“[41] Mr. Lake’s driver’s license was conditional. He was required to take his prescribed medication, to address his epilepsy, to ensure that he was capable of operating his conveyance in a safe manner. He had a long history with the MTO and his treating physician regarding this need. He had a long history of disregarding his physician’s prescription and treatment. His poor decision to not take his medication, despite his prescription, license conditions and recent seizure, elevates his moral blameworthiness.
[42] While a conditional sentence is available, it is not appropriate. In these circumstances, for this offender, a conditional sentence would not meet the principles of sentencing highlighted above. Furthermore, given the history of non-compliance, exacerbated by the poor history of MTO convictions, raises concerns for the safety of the public.
[43] The appropriate sentence is 2 years less one day custody, a driving prohibition for 10 years, s.109 order for 10 years, a DNA order and a s. 743.21 order.”
[59] The Crown also relies upon the decision of Rose J. in R. v. Paul, 2022 ONCJ 102, in which a 22-year-old accused with no criminal record was sentenced to two years of imprisonment and a five-year driving prohibition in total upon pleading guilty to dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing death. The sentence for dangerous driving causing death was 18 months of incarceration and a six-month consecutive sentence for failure to remain. In addition, a five-year driving prohibition was ordered.
[60] There were a number of aggravating features present in that case that are not present in the case at bar. Mr. Paul was driving to work on a rural stretch of Keele Street with a posted speed limit of 60 km/hr, but he was determined by a police officer doing speed enforcement to be driving 125 km/hr. The police pursued Mr. Paul with emergency lights activated. Mr. Paul accelerated while being pursued by the police to a speed of 130 to 140 km/hr.
[61] He lost control of his car and struck a cyclist on Keele Street, leaving the road and becoming airborne for 28 meters. The cyclist was killed in the collision.
[62] Mr. Paul then fled the scene on foot and was subsequently apprehended by the police after he fled the scene of the accident.
[63] An additional aggravating feature was that Mr. Paul had been operating his car since 2018 without the insurance which was a mandatory statutory requirement.
[64] Rose J. noted the mitigating circumstance of the plea of guilty and the fact that Mr. Paul was gainfully employed with positive reports about his employment and noted that there were very good prospects for rehabilitation. However, he stated at para. 26:
“The fact that Mr. Paul fled the scene is aggravating insofar as first responders did not know if Mr. Bertini [the cyclist killed] was the driver of the car. He made active attempts to flee, travelling through rural wooded areas. On the facts before me, he would have continued his attempts to evade the police were he not arrested.”
[65] Finally, the Crown relies upon the decision of De Filippis J. in R. v. Gawronski, 2023 ONCJ 67, in which a 23-year-old accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and for failing to remain at the scene of an accident involving death.
[66] The accused had no prior criminal record but had 3 prior Highway Traffic Act speeding convictions. The accused was driving in a 60 km/hr zone at a speed of 80 km/h. He struck an elderly pedestrian crossing the road resulting in her death. He then turned down an alleyway. His car was located in the driveway of his residence and the accused was located at 1:23 a.m. the following morning at an address close to his home. At paragraph 19 of his decision, De Filippis J. noted:
“The defendant’s personal circumstances are mitigating; he has a supportive family and is hard-working and studious. He is engaged in counselling. His remorse is genuine and substantial. I note that his speeding was not precipitated by, or part of, other illegal activity such as flight from police. However, he has a history of driving infractions, including speeding, and his moral blameworthiness is enhanced because he fled the scene. I accept that this was due to panic and not an attempt to avoid apprehension; he was bound to be caught as he left an easily identifiable damaged car at his nearby home. I also acknowledge that he could not have saved Ms. Parent had he remained on the scene – but he did not know this.”
[67] De Filippis J. imposed a 15-month sentence for dangerous driving causing death, a six-month consecutive sentence for failing to remain at the scene and a driving prohibition for five years.
The Defence Cases
[68] Defence counsel cites the decision of Dellandrea J. in R. v. Boutrous, 2023 ONCJ 266, in which Ms. Boutrous plead guilty to dangerous driving causing death and was sentenced to a conditional sentence of two years less one day. Counsel notes the similarities between that case and the case at bar.
[69] The circumstances of the offence were that Ms. Boutrous was driving southbound on Torbram Road at 151 km/hr, and collided with the victim’s car as he slowly initiated a U-turn towards the northbound lanes of Torbram Road.
[70] The speed limit on the road was 60 km/hr in the area which was mainly residential. The evidence showed that the deceased’s car turned left into the lane in which Ms. Boutrous was speeding. In this sense the driving by the person who was killed factually contributed to the collision’s occurrence, but it was also accepted that given Ms. Boutrous’ excessive speed of 151 km/h there was virtually no opportunity for her to react in any manner that could have avoided the collision. Accordingly, the court concluded at para. 33 that her dangerous driving was a significant contributing cause to the harm occasioned by the collision.
[71] Ms. Boutros was 18 years of age at the time of the offence. She was working full-time as a shift supervisor at McDonald’s while completing high school. She did not have either a criminal or a Highway Traffic Act record. At the time of the offence, she had just obtained her G2 license, and at the time of driving was in contravention of the passenger limits applicable to that license category as she had offered to drive 2 young co-workers home on her break from work instead of them taking public transit home.
[72] Dellandrea J. found that Ms. Boutros had experienced significant guilt and shame arising from the enormity of her driving misconduct, resulting in a serious bout of acute depression and a suicide attempt. She expressed her willingness to and desire to continue in therapy.
[73] In imposing the conditional sentence, Dellandrea J. noted at para. 51:
“Owing to the obvious gravity of the offence, appellate courts have recognized that denunciation and deterrence are the paramount objectives when sentencing an offender for dangerous driving causing death: Rawn, at para. 33; Singh, 2018 ONSC 4598 at para. 22-25; aff’d 2019 ONCA 872.”
[74] She also noted at para. 75 the importance of restraint and rehabilitation in sentencing a youthful offender. She stated:
“Deterrence and denunciation are paramount in this case, but they are not the only principles of sentencing that apply. I must also consider the principles of restraint and the objective of rehabilitation in the sentencing of Ms. Boutrous as a young and deeply remorseful offender.”
[75] Dellandrea J. imposed a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day with house arrest for the first 18 months, with GPS monitoring and the remaining 6 months with a curfew from 11 p.m. to 6 a.m. There was also a 2-year period of probation ordered with 100 hours of community service.
[76] Dellandrea J. noted at para. 77:
“It is true that a conditional sentence is not the equivalent of a carceral jail sentence as incarceration remains the most formidable denunciatory weapon in the sentencing arsenal: Killam, 1999 ONCA 2489, at para. 13. However, a conditional sentence is a punitive sanction, capable of achieving denunciation and deterrence where the conditions are designed to meet these objectives. A breach of a conditional sentence order can lead to new charges which can collapse the sentence into one of real custody. This mechanism serves the objectives of both specific and general deterrence.”
[77] Of great assistance to the court in the determination of the appropriate sentence in this case is the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Ryanov, 2008 ONCA 667.
[78] In that case, two 18-year-olds who had just completed high school, and neither with a criminal record, plead guilty to dangerous driving causing death in circumstances in which they had jointly driven at an excessive speed in 2 cars up Mount Pleasant Ave. in Toronto resulting in a collision with a taxi driver, Mr. Khan, resulting in his death.
[79] In particular, Mr. Khan, the taxi driver, while driving southbound on Mount Pleasant had stopped at the intersection of Mount Pleasant and Whitehall Ave. to turn left. He was driving about 20 km/h and was partway through the left turn when Mr. Ryazanov’s car crashed into the right side of his taxi travelling at 119 km/h at the moment of impact.
[80] Prior to the collision, both Ryazanov and the other driver drove for approximately 1.5 km north on Mount Pleasant Rd. at speeds which varied from 80 to 140 km/h prior to the collision involving Ryazanov’s car hitting Mr. Khan’s taxi. Each of Ryazanov and Ross plead guilty to dangerous driving causing death.
[81] At trial, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day involving house arrest, with the usual exceptions for work, school, religious observance and medical and legal appointments for a period of 12 months, followed by a curfew of 12 months with general terms requiring counselling, performance of 150 hours of community service and prohibition on driving a motor vehicle. There was a separate driving prohibition order for four years concurrent to the conditional sentence and a two-year period of probation.
[82] The central issue on the appeal was whether the term of house arrest for only 12 months of the 2 years less a day conditional sentence, was adequate in the circumstances to reflect the applicable sentencing principles of denunciation and general deterrence.
[83] The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal and found that the second half of the conditional sentence, which it described as “merely being grounded without driving privileges” was inadequate to satisfy the requirement that a conditional sentence be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing set out in section 718 of the Criminal Code.
[84] The court stated at paragraphs 74-78:
“Conditions such as these fall far short of communicating denunciation and general deterrence in sufficiently strong and clear terms. Moreover, the circumstances of this case require the added deterrent effect of significant driving prohibitions to support the imposition of conditional sentences. The sentences imposed, therefore, are not fit and call for this court's intervention.
(4) Variation of the sentences
[75] Conditional sentences should be punitive. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Proulx, at para. 117: “[P]unitive conditions such as house arrest should be the norm, not the exception.” In my view, that comment applies throughout the duration of a conditional sentence. Therefore, the house arrest conditions should be extended to the full term of the respondents' conditional sentences.
[76] Turning to the driving prohibition, it is driving that is at the core of this case. When young people are granted the privilege of driving they take on a grave responsibility. When that privilege is abused through irresponsible conduct -- in this case conduct that took a man's life -- the loss of the privilege must be felt, both by the perpetrators and by others who would engage in similar conduct.
[77] Given that the sentencing judge chose to impose conditional sentences, it was necessary that he combine those sentences with sufficiently lengthy driving prohibitions to convey the message that conduct similar to that which occurred in this case will not be tolerated.
[78] In my view, the driving prohibition should be extended from four years to seven years. A driving prohibition that extends a further three years after the respondents complete their conditional sentences and probation would, it is hoped, have a meaningful impact, particularly in terms of general deterrence.”
[85] In R. v. Khan, 2023 O.J. No. 5300 on a plea of guilty to criminal negligence causing death, and dangerous driving for street racing prior to the collision that resulted in death, Justice Durno imposed the maximum conditional sentence, of two years less a day, with house arrest for the entire conditional sentence, 240 hours of community service over 18 months, and the requirement of GPS monitoring for the entire period of the conditional sentence order (para. 185-190). The court also ordered a period of probation of 3 years with a requirement of 100 hours of community service (para. 232-233). There was a 3-year driving prohibition at the time of sentencing, for the dangerous driving offence, noting that he had already been prohibited from driving for 5 years while on a house arrest bail (Para. 163).
[86] The circumstances of the offence were that the accused Khan was involved in racing another vehicle on an urban road at 130-140 km per hour where the limit was 60 km/h. As a result of driving with excessive speed, coming into contact with another vehicle and losing control, a passenger in his car was ejected from the rear seat of the car and died at the scene. (para. 10 and 16). The accused was 20 years of age at the time of the offence and was studying at York University.
[87] It should be noted that the offence in that case related to the fatality was criminal negligence causing death. The offence of dangerous driving related to the racing and driving prior to the collision that resulted in the fatality.
[88] Defence counsel relies upon R. v. Machado, 2012 ONSC 4614. In that case, 2 brothers were driving to work at 120 km/hr in an 80 km/hr zone. In the parallel case of the other brother, Durno J. found that he could not conclude that the two cars were racing. The accused before the court Brian Machado plead guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death of two passengers in another car. The court notes in paragraph 11 that, at this time, the maximum sentence on a charge of dangerous driving causing death was 14 years. The maximum sentence for this offence at the time of the offence before the court is life in prison.
[89] The fatal collision occurred when Brian Machado pulled onto the right gravel shoulder of the road to pass a dump truck, lost control of his car resulting in a multiple vehicle collision that caused the death of two women.
[90] Brian Machado was 30 years of age, with no criminal record or negative driving record. The Crown and defence agreed that a conditional sentence was appropriate. He had served seven days of pretrial custody and by the time of sentencing had been under house arrest or curfew with reporting condition for 15 months with a driving prohibition and travel restrictions for a period of 30 months.
[91] Tulloch, J., as he then was, presiding as a trial judge in the Superior Court, imposed a conditional sentence of 18 months with nine months of house arrest. He also imposed a three-year probation order and 100 hours of community service as part of the probation order. In the probation period Mr. Machado could only drive to and from work, and for medical emergencies. Tulloch J. made specific note of the fact that the accused had been subject to significant restrictions, including a driving prohibition, for 30 months prior to the sentencing: R. v. Machado, supra, at paras 28 and 43.
Sentencing Youthful First Offenders
[92] The Court of Appeal has recently addressed the particular principles applicable to sentencing youthful first offenders in R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830. Tulloch, C.J.O. stated at paras 31-36:
“Sentencing judges must also respect several other settled principles when sentencing youthful offenders for their first criminal offence. First, they must practice restraint. This requires them to avoid imprisoning young adults when possible. When imprisonment is necessary, it also requires them to make the sentence as short as possible to achieve the principles and objectives of sentencing. See Priest, at pp. 544-546. Second, they must prioritize rehabilitation as the paramount sentencing objective. Where necessary, they must also prioritize specific deterrence. See Brown, at paras. 5 and 10. Third, they cannot focus exclusively on denunciation and general deterrence or elevate those objectives above rehabilitation and specific deterrence. See Borde, at para. 36; Brown, at para. 7. Fourth, they must consider young adults’ reduced moral culpability and the harsher impact that incarceration causes them due to their stage of life. See R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, 477 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at paras. 161 and 165; R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26, 487 D.L.R. (4th) 201, at paras. 132 and 152.
[32] Sentencing judges must always give serious and sufficient consideration to all these principles. Merely referring to them as relevant is not always sufficient to show their proper application. Failing to apply or unreasonably underemphasizing them is an error in principle. See Ijam, at para. 52; R. v. Faroughi, 2024 ONCA 178, 435 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 81.
[33] The courts have long followed these principles because they protect society, which Parliament has made the fundamental purpose of sentencing. Because young adults are still maturing, they have “high rehabilitative prospects.” See Bertrand Marchand, at para. 152. Often, the shock of arrest and conviction is a turning point that leads them to reflect on their actions, avoid crime, and choose a pro-social path. Prioritizing rehabilitation thus helps protect society by preventing reoffending. See R. v. Swann, [1975] O.J. No. 137 (C.A.), at para. 4; R. v. Dunkley, [1976] O.J. No. 1663 (C.A.), at para. 4; and R. v. Demeter and Whitmore (1976), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 379 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 381-382.
[34] In contrast, crushing sentences can endanger society by “harden[ing]” young defendants into an anti-social path. See R. v. Desir, 2021 ONCA 486, at paras. 32 and 47; see also Dunkley, at para. 4. Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of correctional authorities, prisons sometimes struggle to rehabilitate young adults. See Hills, at para. 165. Instead, they can become a “finishing school” for crime because they may contain bad influences to which impressionable young adults are vulnerable, such as drugs, gangs, bullying, violence, and negative peers and mentors who share anti-social values and criminal experience. See R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 16; see also Hills, at para. 165; and R. v. Wismayer (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 225 (C.A.), at pp. 242-243.
[35] These principles also respect Parliament’s direction to impose proportionate sentences. As Hamilton held, at para. 91, proportionality requires courts to consider factors that “decrease the offender’s personal responsibility.” For young adults, immaturity is one such factor. While as adults they are morally responsible for their actions, “[f]ull maturity and all the attributes of adulthood are not magically conferred on young [adults] on their 18th birthdays.” See R. v. Clarke, [2018] EWCA Crim 185, [2018] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 52, at para. 5. Instead, young adults are more impulsive, emotionally volatile, and susceptible to negative influences and bad judgment. This can make them less blameworthy than more mature adults. See R. v. Scott, 2015 ABCA 99, 28 Alta. L.R. (6th) 78, at para. 13; Fournier c. R., 2012 QCCA 1330, at paras. 42-45. By accounting for immaturity, courts ensure that turning 18 “does not present a cliff edge for … sentencing.” See Clarke, at para. 5; see also Bertrand Marchand, at para. 132; R. v. Leask (1996), 113 Man. R. (2d) 265 (C.A.), at para. 3.
[36] Proportionality also requires considering the greater impact of incarceration on young adults. See Hills, at para. 135. Incarceration disrupts a transitional stage where they should be “developing … job prospects and relationships that provide the base for a productive life” and learning pro-social skills and values from positive mentors and peers. See R. v. Hutchings, 2012 NLCA 2, 316 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 211, at para. 107. Each year is felt more keenly during this critical period of transition. See R. v. Lai, 2006 BCCA 368, 229 B.C.A.C. 236, at para. 104.”
[93] A proportionate sentence must give significant emphasis to denunciation and general deterrence in light of the gravity of any offence such as the case at bar which involves the tragic death of a member of the public.
[94] However, it is also appropriate to bear in mind that a properly structured conditional sentence can satisfy the sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation: R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10, at para. 35.
[95] As stated by Lamer C.J. in R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para. 22:
“The conditional sentence incorporates some elements of non-custodial measures and some others of incarceration. Because it is served in the community, it will generally be more effective than incarceration at achieving the restorative objectives of rehabilitation, reparations to the victim and community, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender. However, it is also a punitive sanction capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. It is this punitive aspect that distinguishes the conditional sentence from probation, …..”
[96] In R. v. Proulx, supra, the Court rejected a presumption against conditional sentences for certain categories of offences. Lamer C.J. stated at paras. 79, 81 and 83:
“79 Thus, a conditional sentence is available in principle for all offences in which the statutory prerequisites are satisfied….
81 In my view, while the gravity of such offences is clearly relevant to determining whether a conditional sentence is appropriate in the circumstances, it would be both unwise and unnecessary to establish judicially created presumptions that conditional sentences are inappropriate for specific offences. Offence-specific presumptions introduce unwarranted rigidity in the determination of whether a conditional sentence is a just and appropriate sanction. Such presumptions do not accord with the principle of proportionality set out in s. 718.1 and the value of individualization in sentencing, nor are they necessary to achieve the important objectives of uniformity and consistency in the use of conditional sentences.
83 My difficulty with the suggestion that the proportionality principle presumptively excludes certain offences from the conditional sentencing regime is that such an approach focuses inordinately on the gravity of the offence and insufficiently on the moral blameworthiness of the offender. This fundamentally misconstrues the nature of the principle. Proportionality requires that full consideration be given to both factors. As s. 718.1 provides:
A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.” [Emphasis added.]”
Analysis
[97] As in any case, the sentence in this case must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.
[98] The offence in this case is very serious as it resulted in the death of an innocent member of the public. Mr. Stanley’s family has lost the love and support of a cherished member of the family as a consequence of the offence in this case. Sadly, no sentence can compensate them for the loss they have suffered.
[99] The moral blameworthiness of Mr. Naveed is significant, as at the time of the collision, he was driving at an extremely high speed which made it impossible for him to avoid the fatal collision that resulted in Mr. Stanley’s death. This represented an extremely serious error in judgement by Mr. Naveed in the relatively short time in which he accelerated to his excessive speed prior to the collision.
[100] However, there was no indication of any alcohol or substance use that contributed to the offence. Mr. Naveed had no criminal record, or any previous driving offences. Prior to the offence his life was characterized by pro-social community service for which he had received an award from the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario. He was only 18 at the time of committing this offence, which demonstrated a tragic lapse in judgment which had tragic consequences.
[101] The aggravating factors in this case are the very high speed being driven by Mr. Naveed at the time of the collision, and the serious consequences involving the death of Mr. Stanley resulting from the collision.
[102] There are substantial mitigating circumstances which must be taken into account. Mr. Naveed is truly remorseful for this offence as reflected in his early plea of guilty and in his statement to the court.
[103] He has received a very favourable pre-sentence report which demonstrates how out of character this offence was for Mr. Naveed and which shows that, subject to the significant physical limitations he now has caused by the accident, his prospects of rehabilitation are excellent.
[104] Mr. Naveed has suffered severe collateral consequences to his physical and mental health as a result of this offence. In this regard, he will pay dearly for his offence for the foreseeable future. This is a relevant factor in sentencing: R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, paras 46-47.
[105] The Crown has acknowledged that a period of incarceration of two years less a day is appropriate in this case, albeit that the Crown submits that the offence is so serious that the period of incarceration must be served in actual custody. The Crown seeks a three-year period of probation, a seven-year driving prohibition, a DNA order and a non-communication order with the other passengers in the car who were injured in the collision while Mr Naveed is in custody.
[106] The Crown urges that the principles of sentencing, which must reflect denunciation and general deterrence in this case, requires that the period of incarceration to be served is a period of actual custody.
[107] The defence submits that the applicable principles of sentencing including the principles of general deterrence and denunciation may be given full effect in a maximum conditional sentence, with substantial house arrest, which appropriately balances the principles of general deterrence and denunciation with the rehabilitation of this youthful first offender.
[108] In my view, the proportionate sentence in this case that can give full effect to denunciation and general and specific deterrence, and the sentence that reflects the gravity of the offence and the moral culpability of Mr. Naveed, is a two years less a day conditional sentence, with house arrest for the full two years less a day.
[109] Mr. Naveed will know that, in the event that he breaches any of the terms of the conditional sentence, he may be required to serve the remainder of his sentence in actual custody. Furthermore, the maximum conditional sentence of two years less a day has a significant punitive aspect, as he will be required to remain in his residence for the full two years less a day, subject to the limited exceptions which I will order.
[110] Mr. Naveed will be required to perform 180 hours of community service in the first 18 months of his conditional sentence, to be organized by his conditional sentence supervisor, respecting the physical limitations currently experienced by Mr. Naveed as a result of the motor vehicle collision.
[111] As I am imposing a 5- year driving prohibition starting today, Mr Naveed will be prohibited from driving a car throughout his conditional sentence.
[112] He will be permitted to be absent from his residence only in the following circumstances:
To pursue bereavement counselling, assessment and counselling in relation to his mental health, and to take such treatment or counselling for his mental health as is directed by his conditional sentence supervisor, on a schedule to be provided to his conditional sentence supervisor;
To attend employment and/or education or training or counselling for employment, on a schedule to be provided in advance to his conditional sentence supervisor, including to attend his graduation ceremony on May 31, 2025 at Willis College in Ottawa;
To attend medical diagnostic or therapeutic appointments with doctors, psychiatrists, physiotherapists, chiropractors or other physical or mental health professionals to receive diagnosis or treatment, on a schedule to be provided to his conditional sentence supervisor;
To attend for religious services or observance, on a schedule to be provided in advance to his conditional sentence supervisor;
For 4 hours per week, at a time to be agreed upon with his conditional sentence supervisor, to attend to the necessities of life;
For urgent medical or dental care for himself or his immediate family;
To attend appointments, or court or legal proceedings, or appointments with legal counsel in relation to legal proceedings;
To perform his community service, on a schedule to be provided to his conditional sentence supervisor.
He must sign releases to permit his conditional sentence supervisor to monitor his compliance with these conditions.
[113] Mr. Naveed will have a 3-year period of probation, starting at the conclusion of his conditional sentence, with the following terms:
Report by telephone or in person to your probation officer within 3 business days of the completion of your conditional sentence order, and thereafter as directed,
Take such assessment and counselling for bereavement and mental health issues as may be directed by your probation officer;
Make reasonable efforts to pursue education and/or employment;
Perform 100 hours of community service within the first 18 months of your probation, as directed by your probation officer, after considering any applicable physical limitations;
Sign releases for your probation officer to monitor your compliance with your terms of probation.
[114] There will be a DNA order as dangerous driving causing death is a secondary designated offence: s. 487.04.
[115] As Mr. Naveed has been prohibited from driving for over 23 months since the date of his arrest, there will be a further 5-year driving prohibition starting today.
Dated: May 14, 2025
Justice David Porter