Warning
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Ontario Court of Justice
DATE: 2025-04-03
COURT FILE No.: Windsor 22-81103473
BETWEEN:
His Majesty the King
— AND —
Sevan Halabi
Before Justice S. G. Pratt
Sentencing submissions heard on 18 March 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on 3 April 2025
Andrea Harris ...................................................................................... Counsel for the Crown
Ahmad Ammar ........................................................................... Counsel for the Defendant
Reasons for Sentence
Pratt J.:
[1] On 9 December 2024, I found the Offender Sevan Halabi guilty of one count of sexual assault. My reasons for conviction are set out at 2024 ONCJ 635. Sentencing submissions were received on 18 March 2025. These are my reasons for sentence.
Facts
[2] The facts underlying the Offender’s conviction were set out in detail in my trial decision. I will briefly summarize the facts here.
[3] On 9 October 2022 the Victim K.M. engaged the services of the Offender as an Uber driver. She wanted him to drive her home from a party she’d attended. Rather than take her home, the Offender drove her to an empty parking lot. He told her they would have fun. He parked the car and got into the back seat. He moved closer to the Victim and forcibly kissed her. He put his hand under her dress and touched her vaginal area over her underwear. He ignored the Victim’s protests. After he tried again to kiss her and she did not respond, he moved away from her. She asked if he would still drive her home and he said no. She got out of the car, and he left her in the parking lot.
Positions of the Parties
[4] The Crown seeks a sentence of 12 months jail followed by three years of probation. In addition, the Crown also seeks various ancillary orders, none of which are disputed by the Offender’s counsel.
[5] For the Offender, counsel seeks a sentence of 6 months jail less one day, followed by probation. Counsel points to the potentially significant immigration consequences that may follow a sentence of more than six months. The difference between the Crown’s position and his position, he argues, can be offset by a carefully crafted probation order.
The Pre-Sentence Report
[6] I received a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) authored by Probation Officer Michael Williams. It provides useful information on the Offender’s background and current circumstances.
[7] The Offender was born in Iraq. He told Mr. Williams that his family faced difficulty in their country as they were of Chaldean heritage. He married his spouse in 2009. They have two sons, aged 10 and 14. In 2016 the family left Iraq and went to Jordan. They immigrated to Canada in 2018. His wife and children have since become Canadian citizens, but the Offender remains a permanent resident. In submissions, the Offender’s counsel advised he was unable to apply for citizenship because of the charge before this Court.
[8] The Offender still has family in Iraq. Following the trial in this matter, he returned to the country to help care for his mother, who was suffering from poor health. This sentencing was adjourned to allow him to continue caring for her, and to return to Canada.
[9] In Iraq, he obtained a bachelor’s degree in veterinary medicine. In Canada, he has studied civil engineering and has worked as a truck driver for the last two years. He is satisfied with his current employment. Until the charge before the Court, he was also employed as an Uber driver. That employment has ended.
[10] The Offender disclosed no issue with alcohol or other substances. This was confirmed by his spouse, Roaa Hirmiz. He is currently under the care of a doctor and takes medication for depression.
[11] Regarding the offence, the Offender maintained his innocence to Mr. Williams. Ms. Hirmiz also supported this assertion. Of course, the Offender is entirely within his rights to maintain his innocence and I take nothing negative from that. I do note that his position, and that of his wife, seems to have changed on this issue between the PSR interview and the date of sentencing submissions. To me, the Offender said he regrets what happened, has learned a lesson, and that this will not happen again. Ms. Hirmiz spoke on the day of sentencing submissions and acknowledged the mistake he made and the gravity of his actions. I don’t know what happened between the PSR interview and the present, but to me the Offender has now expressed remorse. I have no reason to doubt his sincerity, but it is a marked change from a report dated 5 February.
[12] The bulk of the Offender’s concern, however, seems to relate not to his offence but to the effect that offence may end up having on his family. Not unreasonably, he is concerned for his family’s future. I’m not sure, based on the PSR and his comments in court, if he truly understands the impact his crime has had on the Victim.
[13] Overall, I find the PSR to be neutral or positive. While I am concerned about his lack of insight into his offence, the Offender has strong family support and no criminal record. He has no issues with substances and is employed. The PSR paints a picture of someone unlikely to be back before the Court again.
The Victim Impact Statement
[14] The Victim read her victim impact statement (VIS) into the record. It reveals the ongoing and pervasive impact the offence has had on her. She still suffers from panic attacks and flashbacks. The offence has hindered her professional life as a teacher and her personal life as well. She is fearful and angry. In the VIS she spoke of the fear she felt in the Offender’s car that night. She didn’t know if she would be raped or killed, and that fear continues to impact her life.
[15] To the Victim, I would say this. Your statement eloquently describes the impact this offence has had on you. But it also shows a strength and resolve to move forward. It will not be easy to do that, but your spirit, which shines through in your words, will carry you through. I hope you are able to get the help you need to continue healing. I wish you the best.
Principles of Sentencing
[16] The Criminal Code sets out several principles to guide judges in fashioning fit sentences. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and foster a respect for the law. These aims are achieved with sentences that focus on denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and reintegration, among other objectives.
[17] Parliament has directed judges to consider certain specific circumstances as well. These include cases where an offence is committed against a vulnerable person (see s. 718.04), or where an offence involves a breach of trust (see s. 718.2(a)(iii)). Both of these factors apply in the present case. I must prioritize denunciation and deterrence in the sentence I impose and must consider the abuse of a position of trust as an aggravating factor.
[18] A sentence must also be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the Offender, and the Court must also consider alternatives to custody where those alternatives are reasonable in the circumstances.
Caselaw
[19] It is troubling that sexual offences committed by professional drivers are sufficiently common that they have created their own body of caselaw. But that is what has happened.
[20] Both counsel relied on the cases of R. v. Ali, 2021 O.J. No. 1126 (S.C.J.), R. v. Einollahi, 2021 ONSC 6048, R. v. Kullab, 2024 O.J. No. 4884 (C.J.), and R. v. Ukumu, 2021 ONCA 91. While each turns on its own facts, the Kullab decision provides a very useful summary of the relevant law.
[21] In Kullab, the offender was working for Lyft, a service essentially identical to Uber. He picked up the victim, who wanted to go to a friend’s house. Instead, he took her to a different location, parked the car, and got in the back seat with her. He touched her breast, leg, and groin area over her clothing, and tried to touch her breast under her clothing. He asked if she wanted to have sex and she said no repeatedly. She pushed the offender off her and ran from the car.
[22] Kullab was convicted after a trial. In sentencing him to six months less one day, Justice Monahan reviewed the cases provided to me here.
[23] The Ali case involved an Uber driver who victimized two intoxicated women in separate incidents. He touched each woman’s breasts and tried to put his hand inside the shirt of one of the victims. He accompanied that victim into her house and into her bedroom, where he went through her wallet. The sentencing judge in that case noted the victims were essentially “helpless” given their intoxication and that Ali had used that fact in choosing them as victims. Ali was sentenced to 18 months, 20 days jail and three years probation.
[24] In Einollahi, Justice Akhtar of the Superior Court allowed a Crown sentence appeal. After trial, the offender was found to have forcibly kissed the female victim in the course of driving her home. He had dropped her friends off, leaving the victim alone in the car with him. He drove to a deserted area and kissed her without her consent. He also touched her breasts over her clothes. Not wanting him to know where she lived, she exited the car and he drove off. The trial judge imposed a 60-day conditional sentence followed by 18 months of probation. Finding that sentence to be demonstrably unfit, Justice Akhtar imposed a six-month sentence, minus the original 60-day sentence.
[25] Like in Ali, the Court in Einollahi also reviewed several relevant authorities dealing with drivers who sexually assaulted their fares and cited several decisions that confirmed such an offence is a breach of trust.
[26] In the Ukumu decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld a 12-month sentence on an offender who falsely claimed to be an Uber driver. He dropped off the female victim and her friend, but then called the victim back to his car on the pretence that she’d left something behind. When she leaned into the car to look, he pushed her into the vehicle, climbed on top of her, kissed her, and rubbed her genitals over her clothing. She managed to escape the car and note his license plate. The Court noted, “we cannot say that a 12-month sentence for a random and violent sexual assault on a complete stranger is unfit in any way.” This case is especially noteworthy as Ukumu was facing the potential of immigration consequences as a result of the sentence. I will address that point later in these reasons.
[27] A recent case from the Court of Quebec also dealt with similar circumstances. In R. v. Vaknin, 2023 Q.J. No. 10819, the offender posed as an Uber driver. He took his victim to a deserted place. He gave her money and told her he wanted to spend time with her. Once they’d parked, he digitally penetrated her and climbed on top of her, kissing and touching her. He eventually stopped and drove her back to the city. After a trial, Justice Longo imposed an 18-month sentence. Vaknin had no prior record, was an otherwise productive member of society, and had apologized to the victim.
[28] Overall, the cases support the Crown’s position that the range for offences of this nature is from 6-18 months custody. The range reflects the seriousness of the conduct, the breach of trust, the vulnerability of victims, and the impact the offence can have on them. I also note the following passage, from paragraph 10 of Ali:
Moving to the nature of the sexual assaults, there is no doubt that the more invasive, the more aggravated is a sexual assault. The obverse does not necessarily follow, however. Sexual assault constitutes an unwanted intrusion into a victim's bodily integrity and sense of identity. It is often more about the profound and lasting psychological fallout than about the precise nature of the physical violation itself: R. v. Carrasco, 2020 ONSC 5308 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 8. For that reason, in evaluating the nature and extent of the intrusion, factors other than invasiveness are important. These include vulnerability of the victim, the situation in which the assault took place, and a myriad of other factors some general, some personal. In the present circumstance, both women were touched sexually by a stranger while they were in an intoxicated, unconscious and helpless state. While not as invasive as some sexual assaults, the complainants' feelings of well-being, safety, security and bodily autonomy and integrity were badly shaken. Women are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault and are likely to be profoundly affected by the crime.
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
[29] The primary mitigating factor in this case is the Offender’s lack of a prior criminal record. As this is his first offence, I cannot ignore the concept of rehabilitation. He has said this was a mistake that will not happen again. Prior to this point, he had lived successfully in Canada since 2018. That is important, though I do observe he’d only been in Canada for four years when this offence was committed.
[30] He has also shown some degree of remorse. He said he regrets what happened and that he has learned his lesson. It’s not clear, however, if that regret stems from his actions or from the consequences he has brought on his family. As I said, it is difficult to reconcile his statement to the PSR author with what he said in Court. In the end, I cannot say there is no evidence of remorse. It is not strong, but I cannot say it is absent.
[31] The Offender also has strong family support. His wife spoke on his behalf and his uncle and children were present when sentencing submissions were made. On that point, both children were visibly upset and crying during the proceeding. Respectfully, I question why they were here in the first place. It was not a case where their father was in custody and so this would have been a rare opportunity to see him in person; the Offender has been out of custody throughout this case and only appeared virtually from Iraq. I cannot find they were brought into the courtroom to engender sympathy from the Court but given the Offender’s focus on how my sentence could affect his family, that is certainly an inference available to be drawn.
[32] In aggravation, the Offender’s breach of the trust placed in him is very significant. That trust is obvious in the very nature of the private transportation industry. We are told growing up never to get in a car with a stranger. We are also told to be careful who we speak to online. The entire business model of Uber and similar companies is to contact a stranger over the internet so you can get in their car. It goes against everything we are taught and everything we teach about staying safe. As a result, the trust we necessarily place in these drivers is enormous. When that trust is broken with criminal actions, courts must respond harshly.
[33] The vulnerability of the Victim is another factor I must consider. The Victim was alone and largely defenceless. She was in the Offender’s vehicle, and he was driving. He controlled where they went. That vulnerability requires me to prioritize denunciation and deterrence and makes an already bad situation even worse.
[34] At paragraph 27 of R. v. Jakupaj, 2018 N.J. No. 134, Justice McGrath of the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court General Division said this:
Canadian case law supports the Crown's position that the sexual assault of young, vulnerable passengers by a taxi driver is deserving of the public outcry and abhorrence that ensues. Members of the public are entitled to expect that young people will be free from harm when they place their trust in a taxi driver to bring them home after a night out with friends.
[35] Where the driver in question is not a municipally licensed taxi driver, but simply someone with a cell phone who offers rides to strangers, that trust is magnified.
[36] Finally, I remind myself that the Offender exercising his right to a trial is not an aggravating factor. While a guilty plea is mitigating, a trial is not aggravating.
Immigration Consequences
[37] Throughout sentencing submissions, I was reminded of the Offender’s precarious immigration status. As I said, he came to Canada with his family in 2018. They left Iraq because of the unrest and instability they experienced. While his wife and children have since become Canadian citizens, the Offender remains only a permanent resident. He is, as a result, still subject to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). To determine how, if at all, the interplay of immigration and criminal law should affect the sentence I impose, it is important first to set out exactly what the Offender’s situation is.
[38] Section 34 and onward of the IRPA deals with admissibility of permanent residents and foreign nationals in Canada. Relevant to this case is section 36, which states:
36 (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for
(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed;
(b) having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or
(c) committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.
[39] Here, the Offender has been convicted of sexual assault. While the Crown has proceeded by summary conviction, that election is irrelevant under the IRPA. Section 36(3) states explicitly:
(3) The following provisions govern subsections (1) to (2.1):
(a) an offence that may be prosecuted either summarily or by way of indictment is deemed to be an indictable offence, even if it has been prosecuted summarily;
[40] The offence of sexual assault, when prosecuted by indictment, carries a maximum sentence in the present circumstances of 10 years jail. This means that it meets the definition of “serious criminality” set out in s. 36(1)(a). By virtue of the conviction alone, the Offender is no longer admissible in Canada.
[41] What follows is not automatic deportation, as many believe.
[42] Section 44 of the IRPA states that an immigration officer who is of the opinion that a foreign national or permanent resident is no longer admissible may create a report outlining the facts of the situation. That report is forwarded to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. If the Minister finds the report is well-founded, he or she can refer it to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing. At that hearing, the Immigration Division has four options, one of which is to order the removal of the foreign national or permanent resident if they are found to be inadmissible. That order would remove permanent resident status from the individual in question.
[43] Ordinarily, a removal order could be appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division. That is not always the case, however. Section 64 of the IRPA states:
64 (1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, sanctions, serious criminality or organized criminality.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least six months or that is described in paragraph 36(1)(b) or (c).
[44] The end result of applying the IRPA to the Offender’s case is that he has been found guilty of an offence of serious criminality. He is potentially subject to a removal order. Whether he can appeal that removal or not will depend on the length of the sentence he receives. If the sentence is six months or more, he will have no right of appeal. This is why he argues for a sentence of six months less one day.
[45] Pursuant to s. 72 of the IRPA, however, the Offender could still apply for judicial review of a removal order by the Federal Court, even if he did not have a right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division.
[46] Courts have long dealt with how to incorporate immigration consequences into their sentences, going back at least as far as R. v. Melo, [1975] O.J. No. 723 (C.A.). In that case, Justice Arnup considered the impact of immigration consequences on whether a court should impose a conditional discharge. At paragraph 20, His Lordship stated:
In my view, the fact that a convicted shoplifter may be in jeopardy under the Immigration Act is not, in itself and in isolation, a sufficient ground for the granting of a conditional or absolute discharge. It is one of the factors which is to be taken into consideration by the trial court, in conjunction with all of the other circumstances of the case. In a case where clearly on the facts disclosed a discharge would not be granted, the fact that the convicted person may be subject to deportation is not sufficient to "tip the scales" the other way and lead to the granting of a discharge.
[47] The Melo decision was cited by Justice Doherty in the case of R. v. Hamilton, [2004] O.J. No. 3252 (C.A.) aff’g R. v. Hamilton, [2003] O.J. No. 532 (S.C.J.). At paragraph 156, His Honour stated:
… the risk of deportation cannot justify a sentence which is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose and the principles of sentencing identified in the Criminal Code. The sentencing process cannot be used to circumvent the provisions and policies of the Immigration and Refugee Act. As indicated above, however, there is seldom only one correct sentencing response. The risk of deportation can be a factor to be taken into consideration in choosing among the appropriate sentencing responses and tailoring the sentence to best fit the crime and the offender: R. v. Melo [citation omitted].
[48] The notion that sentencing should not be used as a workaround against immigration law was repeated by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in the case of R. v. R.B., 2013 ONCA 36.
[49] The Supreme Court of Canada weighed in on the issue in R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15. At paragraphs 14-16, Justice Wagner (as he then was) observed:
The general rule continues to be that a sentence must be fit having regard to the particular crime and the particular offender. In other words, a sentencing judge may exercise their discretion to take collateral immigration consequences into account, provided that the sentence that is ultimately imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
The flexibility of our sentencing process should not be misused by imposing inappropriate and artificial sentences in order to avoid collateral consequences which may flow from a statutory scheme or from other legislation, thus circumventing Parliament’s will.
These consequences must not be allowed to dominate the exercise or skew the process either in favour of or against deportation. Moreover, it must not lead to a separate sentencing scheme with a de facto if not a de jure special range of sentencing options where deportation is a risk.
[50] In Pham, the court also noted at paragraph 11 that immigration consequences are not, strictly speaking, a mitigating factor, and that incorporating the impact of those consequences is at least partly aimed at assisting rehabilitation:
In light of these principles, the collateral consequences of a sentence are any consequences for the impact of the sentence on the particular offender. They may be taken into account in sentencing as personal circumstances of the offender. However, they are not, strictly speaking, aggravating or mitigating factors, since such factors are by definition related only to the gravity of the offence or to the degree of responsibility of the offender (s. 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code). Their relevance flows from the application of the principles of individualization and parity. The relevance of collateral consequences may also flow from the sentencing objective of assisting in rehabilitating offenders (s. 718(d) of the Criminal Code). Thus, when two possible sentences are both appropriate as regards the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offenders, the most suitable one may be the one that better contributes to the offender's rehabilitation.
[51] The thread running through all these cases is that a sentence must be fit, regardless of collateral consequences to the offender. Allowances can be made for such consequences, but they cannot come at the cost of an unfit sentence.
[52] Specifically referring to sexual assault, Justice Trotter of the Court of Appeal upheld a nine-month sentence imposed on a permanent resident in the case of R. v. McKenzie, 2017 ONCA 128.
[53] The offender in Kullab was in a very similar position to the Offender. He too was a permanent resident whose family had already become Canadian citizens. His citizenship application had been delayed by the charges he faced. Justice Monahan sentenced Kullab to six months less a day based largely on the immigration consequences he faced. Justice Monahan described this sentence as “generous” but “still within the acceptable range.”
Result
[54] The circumstances of this offence are extremely serious. The Offender violated the Victim’s bodily integrity and disregarded her wishes. He exploited a situation where he held significant power and control. The effects of his violation are severe and long-lasting. The Victim wanted him to drive her home. Instead, he drove to a deserted parking lot, in the opposite direction from the Victim’s residence. He got into the back seat of the car. He forcibly kissed the Victim, sticking his tongue in her mouth despite her obvious resistance. He put his hand up her skirt and touched her vaginal area over her clothing. Throughout, she was saying no. I must above all denounce his conduct and deter him and others from engaging in the same behaviour in the future.
[55] That said, I cannot ignore the prospect he has of rehabilitation. His lack of a record shows he can be a successful member of society. My sentence must punish his conduct, but not in a way that entirely overlooks other worthwhile sentencing objectives. I must also exercise restraint and make a first custodial sentence no longer than it needs to be to meet the ends of justice.
[56] The guiding caselaw on this point support the notion of a 6-18 month range. In my view, for this offence committed by this offender, the appropriate sentence is in the middle of that range.
[57] The Offender will be sentenced as follows:
He will be imprisoned for a period of 10 months.
On release from custody, he will be bound by a probation order for a period of two years. In addition to the statutory terms, the conditions will be:
a. Report in person to a probation officer within two working days of your release from custody, and after that at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorized by a probation officer to assist in your supervision.
b. Do not contact or communicate in any way, by any physical, electronic, or other means, with K.M.
c. Do not be within 100m of any place you know K.M. to live, work, go to school, or any place you know the person to be except for required court attendances.
d. Do not possess anything defined in the Criminal Code as a weapon.
e. Attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by the probation officer and complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer.
He will provide a sample of his DNA to the Windsor Police Service for inclusion in the national DNA databank, on or before 31 May 2025.
He will be prohibited from possessing anything defined in the Criminal Code as a weapon for a period of ten years, pursuant to s. 110.
While serving his custodial sentence, he will be prohibited from contacting K.M. in any manner, pursuant to s. 743.21.
He will be required to register under the Sex Offender Information Registry for a period of ten years.
[58] In light of the custodial sentence, I will waive the victim surcharge.
[59] I have considered the immigration consequences this sentence may set in motion. I am not unsympathetic to the Offender’s family. In my view, however, a sentence of six months less a day for this conduct would be unfit. It would prioritize the Offender’s personal circumstances over the need to denounce and deter his conduct and would not be in line with relevant caselaw. It would be an inappropriate and artificial sentence imposed only to avoid legitimate consequences created by Parliament. This is not a case where I am asked to impose one day less than what would otherwise be a fit sentence. The sentence sought by the Offender would not reflect the seriousness of his actions or the impact they have had on his victim. It would require me to cut the sentence nearly in half, solely to assist him in avoiding future penalties. I cannot do that.
[60] I further note the Offender was a permanent resident when he committed this offence. He knew he was in Canada as a guest and that his continued presence here was not assured. He knew the impact misconduct could have on him and his family when he assaulted the Victim. He now asks me to impose an unfit sentence so that his family does not suffer the consequences of his actions. I decline.
Released: 3 April 2025
Signed: Justice S. G. Pratt