Toronto (City) v. Mehendran Kandiah and Rhenu Jewellery Inc.
DATE: March 27, 2025
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
TORONTO (CITY)
Respondent
— and —
MEHENDRAN KANDIAH and RHENU JEWELLERY INC.
Appellants
Before Justice John North
Reasons released on March 27, 2025
Chris Bendick .................................................................................................. for the Respondent
Michael Tadros ................................................................................................. for the Appellants
NORTH J.:
INTRODUCTION
[1] The Appellants are Mehendran Kandiah and Rhenu Jewellery Inc. (“RJI”).[^1] RJI operates a jewellery store in Toronto. Kandiah is a director of RJI.
[2] On September 21, 2023, RJI and Kandiah were each found guilty, at an ex parte trial, of two counts of failing to comply with a continued section 7.0.2 order under the Reopening Ontario (A Flexible Response to COVID-19) Act, S.O. 2020, c. 17. Justice of the Peace Mutuma imposed fines of $2000 and $3000 against Kandiah and fines of $6000 and $8000 against RJI. The total quantum of the fines was $19,000.
[3] The Appellants appealed against conviction and sentence.
[4] For the reasons set out below, the appeals against conviction are dismissed and the sentence appeals are allowed.
BACKGROUND
[5] It was alleged that on November 30, 2020 and January 4, 2021, the Appellants permitted customers to enter the jewellery store for in-store shopping, contrary to a continued section 7.0.2 order.
[6] There was one count on each of the four informations:
- It was alleged that Kandiah committed an offence on November 30, 2020. (Information 2130010).
- It was alleged that RJI committed an offence on November 30, 2020. (Information 2130012).
- It was alleged that Kandiah committed an offence on January 4, 2021 (Information 2130090).
- It was alleged that RJI committed an offence on January 4, 2021 (Information 2130091).
FRESH EVIDENCE
[7] On the consent of counsel for the Respondent, the Appellants filed affidavits as fresh evidence. Two of the affidavits were from Kandiah. One affidavit was from Kandiah’s wife, Renu. One affidavit was from Banu Mahendran, who is Kandiah’s daughter. The affidavits from Kandiah and Renu provided details about their financial circumstances.
[8] Counsel for the Respondent did not cross-examine any of the affiants.
[9] While counsel for the Respondent did not object to the admissibility of the fresh evidence, he takes the position that this evidence is of limited relevance to the issues on these appeals.
[10] In these reasons, I will address the contents of the affidavits as they relate to a specific ground of appeal.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
[11] The grounds of appeal, as described in the two notices of appeal filed by Kandiah and RJI, were identical, except that RJI had one additional ground.
[12] The grounds of appeal for both Appellants were described in both notices of appeal as follows:
- “Finding of guilt in absentia.”
- “Disclosure outstanding.”
- “Defendant not aware of trial date.”
- “Fine is too harsh.”
[13] The additional ground of appeal that was included in RJI’s notice of appeal was described as follows:
- “Court lost jurisdiction over corporation charges.”
[14] The Appellants’ factum did not address all of these grounds. However, during his oral submissions, Mr. Tadros stated that the Appellants had not abandoned any of the grounds of appeal.
Jurisdiction
[15] Mr. Tadros argued that the principal issue on this appeal is whether the court lost jurisdiction “due to improper service and no information before the court.”[^2]
[16] Mr. Tadros advanced the following argument regarding jurisdiction in relation to RJI on Information 2130012:
“The first appearance for the defendants being March 12, 2021 where only one of the four charges would be before the court. The director of the corporation [Kandiah] would appear for himself and the corporation. The court on this date would lose jurisdiction over the defendant. Prematurely excusing Mr. Mehendran [Kandiah] as there was only one information before the court.”[^3]
[17] To address this ground of appeal, it is necessary to review the history of the proceedings in these matters. At the outset, I note that the last time that Kandiah appeared in court was on October 12, 2021.
March 12, 2021 (Informations 2130010 and 2130012). Kandiah appeared before the court. This was his first appearance on Information 2130010. Kandiah had not yet received disclosure. Kandiah’s matter (Information 2310010) was remanded to May 14, 2021. Kandiah left the court before the RJI information (Information 2130012) was addressed. When the RJI matter was later addressed, there was no one present on behalf of RJI. This was the first scheduled court appearance for RJI. The clerk told the justice of the peace that the summons for RJI indicated that it had not been confirmed. The prosecutor told the justice of the peace that a completed affidavit of service was sent to the court. Based on what the prosecutor said, the justice of the peace accepted that this had been done, and was satisfied that the court had jurisdiction. When the RJI matter was addressed, the justice of the peace and the prosecutor had not realized the connection between Kandiah and RJI. The RJI matter (Information 2130012) was adjourned to June 4, 2021.
April 30, 2021 (Informations 2130090 and 2130091). This was Kandiah and RJI’s first scheduled appearance for Informations 2130090 and 2130091. Kandiah appeared before the court. Kandiah’s daughter, Banu, introduced herself to the court. Banu told the court that she and her father were there for “two cases”, one being her “mother’s corporation, which is Rhenu Jewelley Inc.”. The prosecutor provided Kandiah and his daughter with information about how to order disclosure. Both Kandiah and RJI were remanded to June 1, 2021.
May 14, 2021 (Information 2130010). Kandiah appeared on this date. His daughter, Banu, told the court that she would be speaking on her father’s behalf. The prosecutor stated that disclosure had been provided, or it would be provided “shortly”. The prosecutor noted that Kandiah had another matter returning to court on June 1, 2021. The prosecutor asked if Kandiah required an interpreter. Banu initially replied, “not necessarily, but I guess he just wanted me to change the date, and now you’ve already sort of resolved that, so.” The prosecutor responded that an interpreter could be ordered for the next court appearance. Banu then stated that her father wanted a Tamil interpreter. A Tamil interpreter was ordered for the next court appearance. Kandiah was remanded to June 1, 2021.
June 1, 2021 (Informations 2130090, 2130091 and 2130010). Kandiah appeared on this date. A Tamil interpreter was present. Kandiah’s daughter Banu was also in attendance. The prosecutor noted that there were “three matters” before the court – two for Kandiah and one for “a related matter…at line 15 Rhenu Jewellery Inc.” The prosecutor told the court that “disclosure was provided again last week, so, the company as well as Mr. Kandiah need to review that, and decide whether not they’re going to seek any legal advice.” The prosecutor suggested that these three matters should return to court on July 27, 2021. The prosecutor noted that “there will be an additional charge for the company that will be making a court appearance this coming Friday…”.[^4] Banu asked if her father needed to attend court “again on Friday” The prosecutor replied, “…they won’t need to attend on Friday, as we’ll just adjourn Friday’s matter to that July 27th date.” Kandiah and RJI were remanded to July 27, 2021.
June 4, 2021 (Information 2130012). No one appeared for RJI. The prosecutor told the court that “this corporation actually had other charges up on Tuesday this week in court, and the principal for the corporation attended on that date…”. RJI was remanded to July 27, 2021, which was the same date as the other informations were scheduled to return.[^5]
July 27, 2021 (All four informations were before the court, and were before the court on all subsequent appearances). No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. A Tamil interpreter was present. The prosecutor told the court that “we had a Crown pre-trial scheduled twice, for which the defendant did not call in.” The prosecutor suggested that all matters should return to Court on October 12, 2021. The prosecutor stated that his office would attempt to contact “the defendant”. RJI and Kandiah were remanded to October 12, 2021.
October 12, 2021. Kandiah appeared before the court on this date. A Tamil interpreter was present. The prosecutor asked if Kandiah was appearing on behalf of both himself and RJI. Kandiah replied in English, “Rhenu Jewellery.” The Tamil interpreter then stated, “Rhenu Jewellery. Yes, for both.” The prosecutor responded by stating, “Okay, then he’s also here, then, Your Worship, for lines 17 through 18 for the corporation.” The prosecutor told the court that there had been “pre-trial discussions” with Kandiah, and added, “the position was canvassed with the gentleman, but it looks like we’re going to need to be setting a trial date.” In response to a question from the justice of the peace, Kandiah confirmed that he would not accept the prosecution’s proposed resolution of this matter. The justice of the peace then stated, “… we’re going to be setting this matter down for trial, for yourself, as well as the corporation. I just like to do a brief assessment of the amount of time required.” The prosecutor responding by stating, “…we may need to have a further discussion with this gentleman. We can do it with the assistance of a Tamil interpreter when we set it, but I think we may need a little more time to canvass those issues. I’m looking for my notes, I don’t have a clear time estimate.” The justice of the peace told Kandiah that it was expected that he and the prosecution would have discussions prior to December 7th to determine the number of witnesses who would be required for the trial and arrive at an estimate of how long the trial would take. Kandiah and RJI were remanded to December 7, 2021.
December 7, 2021. No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. The prosecutor told the court that a pre-trial had been conducted, and “the next step is going to be to set a JPT with respect to this matter.” Kandiah and RJI were remanded to February 25, 2022. The prosecutor noted that if no one attended court on the next occasion on behalf of Kandiah or RJI, the prosecution would be asking that a date be set for an ex parte trial.
February 25, 2022. No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. A Tamil interpreter was present. The matters were remanded to May 31, 2022.
May 31, 2022. No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. A Tamil interpreter was present. The matters were remanded to July 29, 2022 to set a date for an ex parte trial.
July 29, 2022. No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. A Tamil interpreter was present. The matters were remanded to October 25, 2022 to set a date for an ex parte trial. The justice of the peace stated that a bench summons would be issued.
October 25, 2022. The transcript indicates that no one appeared for Kandiah or RJI when the matters were addressed. The court clerk stated that “a bench summons was issued on all four of these matters, Your Worship, on the previous occasion”. The court clerk stated there was an affidavit of service, dated September 27, 2002 [sic], and they delivered it personally to the defendant.” The matters were remanded to December 16, 2022 to set a date for an ex parte trial.[^6]
December 16, 2022. No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. A Tamil interpreter was present. The justice of the peace concluded that he had jurisdiction for all four matters. The matters were remanded to February 14, 2022.
February 14, 2023. No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. A Tamil interpreter was present. The prosecutor told the court that “there is a history of non-appearances for these matters, and a bench summons was issued.” The prosecutor also stated that he did not have dates for an ex parte trial. The prosecutor requested that the matters return on another date for the purpose of setting an ex parte trial. The matters were remanded to June 9, 2022.
June 9, 2023. No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. The Court set September 21, 2022 for an ex parte trial.
September 21, 2023. No one appeared for Kandiah or RJI. A Tamil interpreter was present. There were four informations before the Court. An ex parte trial was conducted before Justice of the Peace Mutuma. The prosecution called two City of Toronto bylaw enforcement officers as witnesses. The prosecution introduced evidence in support of the conclusion that Kandiah was working at the store on both offence dates. Justice of the Peace Mutuma was satisfied that all of the elements of the four offences had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Kandiah was found guilty on two counts and RJI was found guilty on two counts. On the same date, Justice of the Peace Mutuma sentenced both Appellants.
Jurisdiction over the Offences
[18] In the Appellants’ factum, Mr. Tadros refers to section 34 of the Provincial Offences Act, and states that section 34 was not applied “in an effort to amend the defective certificate of offence”. Mr. Tadros also states that no provision in the Provincial Offences Act allows for an amendment to a promise to appear or certificate.
[19] On these issues, I agree with the following arguments that were made by counsel for the Respondent:
“…as there was no defect in the Informations, there was nothing for the Court to amend pursuant to section 34 of the Provincial Offences Act …”.
“…there was no defect in the summonses, and even if there was, “section 90 of the Provincial Offences Act provides that the validity of a proceeding is not affected by any defects in process.””[^7]
[20] In my view, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the court, at any time, failed to exercise its jurisdiction over any of the four informations. In any event, even if the court had failed to exercise jurisdiction over one or more of the informations, the court would retain jurisdiction over the informations and offences.[^8]
Jurisdiction over the Appellants
[21] I now turn to the issue of whether jurisdiction was lost over the Appellants. Given this record, it is my view that this jurisdictional argument could only be made in relation to RJI on Information 2130012. Consequently, my reasons will be focused on whether the court had jurisdiction over RJI on Information 2130012 at the ex parte trial.
[22] As previously stated, on March 12, 2021, Kandiah was excused by the court before the information for RJI was addressed. On that day, Kandiah did not tell the Court that he was appearing on behalf of RJI.[^9] Kandiah’s information was adjourned to May 14, 2021. RJI’s information was adjourned to June 4, 2021.
[23] After March 12, 2021, these informations were adjourned on multiple occasions. However, on October 12, 2021, all four informations were before the Court. Kandiah appeared before the court on this date. A Tamil interpreter was present. The prosecutor asked if Kandiah was appearing for himself and RJI, and Kandiah replied “Rhenu Jewellery.” The Tamil interpreter stated, “Rhenu Jewellery. Yes, for both.”
[24] In The Regional Municipality of York v. Klein, 2022 ONSC 5005, paras. 42-44, Justice O’Connell concluded that the loss of jurisdiction over a person can be regained if an accused attends in court.[^10]
[25] In R. v. 1283499 Ontario Inc., 2003 ONCA 639, Justice Doherty (in the context of a Liquor Licence Act prosecution), concluded as follows:
“If jurisdiction over the person was lost, it was regained when counsel appeared on September 16 or, alternatively, if could be, and still can be, regained by the issuance of a summons.”
[26] In the case at bar, even if the court lost jurisdiction over RJI on Information 2130012, it was regained on October 12, 2021, when Kandiah attended court and confirmed that he was appearing on behalf of RJI and himself.
[27] I do not accept the Appellants’ argument that jurisdiction could not be regained over RJI because Kandiah was dealing with a “language barrier.” As previously noted, a Tamil interpreter was present on October 12, 2021. The suggestion made by Kandiah in his affidavit dated March 12, 2024, that he did not attend court on these matters after October 12, 2021 was because of a “language barrier” is not credible. This claim, in my view, is belied by the record. Once again, on October 12, 2021 (the last time Kandiah attended court) all four informations were adjourned to December 7, 2021. The transcript from October 12, 2021 shows that immediately after the justice of the peace told Kandiah to “write down that return date, December 7th”, the Tamil interpreter stated, “on behalf of the defendant” – December 7th, ten-thirty”. I note that a language barrier did not prevent Kandiah from appearing before the court on these matters on four occasions before October 12, 2021.[^11]
[28] Further, on July 29, 2022, the justice of the peace stated that a bench summons was “to be issued.” On October 25, 2022, the court confirmed that a bench summons had been issued and “delivered personally to the defendant” in relation to all four informations.
[29] To summarize, jurisdiction over a person can be regained if an accused subsequently attends court or a summons is issued. Both occurred in this case. The court had jurisdiction over the Appellants to set and conduct the ex parte trial on all four informations.[^12]
Disclosure
[30] The Appellants argue that before a court can set a date for an ex parte trial it must be satisfied that a defendant has received all the disclosure from the prosecution. The Appellants provided no authorities to support this proposition. I am unaware of any case that supports this proposition. There is no merit to this ground of appeal.
Sentence Appeals
[31] Section 122(1) of the Provincial Offences Act provides that on an appeal against sentence the court shall consider the fitness of the sentence appealed from and may, upon such evidence, if any, as it thinks to fit to require or receive:
a) Dismiss the appeal; or
b) Vary the sentence within the limits prescribed by law for the offence of which the defendant was convicted.
[32] The standard of review for Provincial Offences Act sentence appeals was considered in Ontario (Labour) v. New Mex Canada Inc., 2019 ONCA 30, paras. 38-52.[^13]
[33] In assessing the fitness of a sentence, an appellate court must consider the relevant objectives and principles of sentencing.[^14]
[34] Section 10(1) of the Reopening Ontario (A Flexible Response to COVID-19) Act, provides that every person who fails to comply with a continued section 7.0.2 order is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction:
(a) in the case of an individual, subject to clause (b), to a fine of not more than $100,000 and for a term of imprisonment of not more than one year;
(b) in the case of an individual who is a director or officer of a corporation, to a fine of not more than $500,000 and for a term of imprisonment of not more than one year; and
(c) in the case of a corporation, to a fine of not more than $10,000,000.
[35] There is no mandatory minimum sentence under Section 10(1) of the Reopening Ontario Act.
[36] The Appellants argued that the sentences imposed by Justice of the Peace Mutuma were unfit. The Appellants asserted that the fresh evidence regarding their financial circumstances supports the conclusion that the fines would cause extreme hardship to the Appellants. The Appellants take the position that “the fines are too financially hard and would cripple [the] business.” Mr. Tadros argued that the sentence appeals should be allowed and the court should substitute a $500 fine against Kandiah and a $1000 fine against RJI.
[37] Mr. Bendick takes the position that the sentence appeals should be dismissed. He argued that these were serious offences and noted that they were committed at the height of the pandemic. Mr. Bendick asserted that any hardship could be addressed by giving the Appellants additional time to pay the fines. Finally, Mr. Bendick argued that fines suggested by Mr. Tadros would be “woefully inadequate for addressing specific deterrence, general deterrence and respecting the fine structure of the Reopening Ontario Act.”
[38] In one of Kandiah’s affidavits, Kandiah stated that he and his wife operate a family-owned business. Kandiah stated that the “total income” for himself and his wife is $54,000 a year. During his submissions, Mr. Tadros told the court that Kandiah “comes out with around $54,000 after taxes...”. Kandiah’s affidavit stated that his family’s monthly expenses are $6,440. During Mr. Tadros’s submissions, the court was told that the jewellery store makes “about a $100,000 gross”, and “net he [Kandiah] makes about 80,000 between him and his wife.” The court was provided with RJI’s unaudited balance sheets from 2022 and 2023, which included information about RJI’s sales, expenses, assets and liabilities. According to these documents, during that period RJI’s assets were not insignificant. However, RJI’s liabilities exceeded its assets.
[39] I will now review the relevant sentencing principles and objectives. I will also refer to some authorities that provide guidance when assessing the merits of this sentence appeal.
[40] Many of the sentencing principles and objectives found in the Criminal Code also have application to sentencing an offender for an offence governed by the Provincial Offences Act offences.[^15] They include proportionality, specific and general deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation, parity, and protection of the public.
[41] A court must impose a sentence that is proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The application “of this principle to sentencing for regulatory offences is clear.”[^16]
[42] Deterrence “performs a broader role in regulatory offences than its conventional role in criminal offences” as “regulatory sentencing plays the double role of not only deterring by threat of punishment, but also communicating condemnation for the moral wrong to the public good.”[^17] In making this point, Blair J.A. in R. v. Cotton Felts Ltd., 1982 ONCA 3695, 2 CCC (3d) 287 (OCA), at page 295, relied on the following passage from R. v. Roussy, [1977] OJ No. 1208 (C.A.), para. 5:
“A sentence by emphasizing community disapproval of an act, and branding it as reprehensible has a moral or educative effect, and thereby affects the attitude of the public. One then hopes that a person with an attitude thus conditioned to regard as reprehensible will not likely commit such an act.”[^18]
[43] After referring to the above passage from Roussy, Blair J.A. in Cotton Felts Ltd., at page 295, stated as follows:
“This aspect of deterrence is particularly applicable to public welfare offences where it is essential for the proper functioning of our society for citizens at large to expect that basic rules are established and enforced to protect the physical, economic and social welfare of the public.”
[44] In order to achieve specific and general deterrence, “the amount of a fine imposed on a corporate defendant must be sufficient that the fine will be ‘felt’ by the corporation and not merely a ‘slap on the wrist’”.[^19] Having said that, “punishment should not be more aggressive than the public interest requires”.[^20]
[45] The principle of restraint applies when determining the quantum of a fine.[^21] A fine imposed by a court “must be no greater than is required to meet the objectives of sentencing”.[^22]
[46] A “fine imposed on a corporation must take into consideration the economic means of the corporation in order to achieve both specific and general deterrence”.[^23]
[47] A maximum penalty for corporations that is different for individuals “speaks to a different sentencing range”.[^24]
[48] It would be an error for a court to reduce a fine against an individual in anticipation that the individual would also be paying a corporate fine.[^25]
[49] There is a paucity of reported decisions that address the appropriate range of sentence for the offence that is before the court in the case at bar.
[50] In R. v. Nawrocki and Zest for Living Etobicoke Inc., 2022 ONCJ 307, Justice Rondinelli stated as follows regarding a joint submission for a $5000 fine against a corporate defendant who pleaded guilty to operating a non-essential business contrary to the Reopening Ontario Act:
“In all of these circumstances, it is hard to see how the proposed fine of $5,000 (i.e. 0.0005 percent of the maximum fine) is ‘so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would leave reasonable and informed persons…to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down’, (Anthony-Cook, at para. 34) especially when an extension of time to pay the fine would go a long way in attenuating the burden of the fine. The Justice of the Peace should not have ‘tinkered’ with the proposed amount in this case: Anthony-Cook, at para. 63.”[^26]
[Emphasis added]
[51] In the case at bar, about five weeks after the Appellants were charged with the first two offences, they once again violated a measure that was designed to protect public safety in a pandemic. This supports the conclusion that specific deterrence is a relevant factor in this case. Justice of the Peace Mutuma appears to have taken specific deterrence into account as an aggravating factor, appropriately in my view, when sentencing the Appellants.
[52] The fact that the Appellants did not plead guilty to any of the offences is not an aggravating factor. However, the Appellants are not entitled to the mitigation in sentence that they would have been if they had pleaded guilty.
[53] Given that this was an ex parte trial, Justice of the Peace Mutuma was unable to make any inquiries regarding the Appellants’ ability to pay the fines. There is now fresh evidence before the court that is relevant to that issue. Evidence of this nature is also relevant in determining an effective specific deterrence and general deterrent sentence.[^27] Based on the fresh evidence, I am satisfied that the sentence appeals should be allowed. To be clear, but for the unchallenged fresh evidence regarding the Appellants’ financial circumstances, I would have dismissed the sentence appeals.
[54] While I have concluded that the sentence appeals should be allowed, the fines proposed by the Appellants would be nothing more than a slap on the wrist. They would fall short of recognizing the seriousness of the offences and the moral blameworthiness of the Appellants. They would fail to properly serve the objectives of deterrence and denunciation.
[55] Fines imposed for an offence of this nature must be sufficiently high to ensure that they are not viewed as little more than a cost of doing business. When sentencing offenders like the Appellants who violated measures that were introduced to protect public safety in a pandemic, courts should impose significant sentences that emphasize deterrence and denunciation.
[56] I have concluded that the fines set out below are proportionate to the seriousness of the offences and the moral blameworthiness of the Appellants. They emphasize the objectives of deterrence and denunciation. They take into account the size of RJI and the maximum fines prescribed by statute.[^28] They communicate condemnation of the Appellants’ actions that were contrary to the public good. At the same time, they reflect the principle of restraint. I have also taken into account that there is no evidence that the Appellants had a prior record for criminal or regulatory offences. Finally, based on the evidence about the financial circumstances of the Appellants (including the assets and liabilities of RJI) I am satisfied that these fines would not be crushing to the Appellants. The Appellants, if given 24 months to do so, will be able to pay these fines.
CONCLUSION
[57] The appeals against conviction are dismissed.
[58] The appeals against sentence are allowed. I have substituted the following sentences:
- Kandiah – the $2000 fine for the November 30, 2020 offence is varied to $1500. (Information 2130010).
- Kandiah – $3000 fine for the January 4, 2021 offence is varied to $2500 (Information 2130090).
- RJI – $6000 fine for the November 30, 2020 offence is varied to $4000 (Information 2130012).
- RJI – $8000 fine for the January 4, 2021 offence is varied to $6000 (Information 2130091).
[59] The total quantum of the fines, as varied, is $14,000.
[60] The Appellants are required to pay these fines within 24 months from the date this judgment is released.
NORTH J.
[^1]: Without meaning any disrespect, for the sake of brevity I will refer to Mr. Kandiah by his surname.
[^2]: Appellants’ factum, at paragraph 23.
[^3]: Appellants’ factum, at paragraph 3.
[^4]: Which was June 4, 2021.
[^5]: Contrary to what was stated at paragraph nine of the Appellants’ factum, Kandiah knew that one of the informations would be before the court on June 4, 2021, as this issue was addressed in court on June 1, 2021.
[^6]: I note that in the transcript from June 9, 2023, at pages 1 to 2, the justice of the peace stated, “it appears that on October 25, 2022, which was the return date for the summons, the daughter had called in, but called in late. So, both matters for the company of the individual appear to be proper.”
[^7]: Respondent’s factum, at paragraph 12.
[^8]: See section 31 of the Provincial Offences Act.
[^9]: Mr. Tadros stated, at paragraph three of the Appellants’ factum that on March 12, 2021 Kandiah “would appear for himself and the corporation”.
[^10]: See also R. v. Wink, 2014 ONSC 2495; R. v. Gougeon, 1980 ONCA 2842, 55 CCC (2d) 218, at p. 229 (ON CA).
[^11]: For the same reasons, I do not accept the Appellants’ argument that they were not aware of the trial date because of a language barrier.
[^12]: See section 54 of the Provincial Offences Act.
[^13]: See also R. v. 1222149 Ontario Ltd., 2024 ONCA 543, at footnote 1.
[^14]: New Mex Canada Inc., at para. 51.
[^15]: R. v. Kirk, 2005 ONCJ 352, at para. 16; Ontario (Ministry of Finance) v. 1375923 Ontario Inc., 2022 ONCJ 277, at para. 67; R. v. Persaud, 2009 ONCJ 210, at para. 17; City of Toronto v. Hill, 2007 ONCJ 253, at para. 30.
[^16]: New Mex Canada Inc., at para. 68.
[^17]: New Mex Canada Inc., at para. 62.
[^18]: This passage was also relied on by the Court in New Mex Canada Inc., at para. 62.
[^19]: 1222149 Ontario Ltd., at para. 16; Cotton Felts Ltd., at pp. 294-295.
[^20]: New Mex Canada Inc., at para. 82.
[^21]: New Mex Canada Inc., at paras. 81-82.
[^22]: R. v. Nova Scotia Power Inc., 2008 NSPC 72, at para. 56; New Mex Canada Inc., at paras. 81-82; R. v. Karen Robinson, 2019 ONCJ 888, at para. 81.
[^23]: 1222149 Ontario Ltd., at para. 16.
[^24]: 1222149 Ontario Ltd., at para. 32.
[^25]: New Mex Canada Inc., at paras. 93-94.
[^26]: The justice of the peace in Nawrocki and Zest for Living Etobicoke Inc. rejected a joint submission for a $5,000 fine and imposed a $3000 fine. While concluding that the justice of the peace erred by rejecting the joint submission, Justice Rondinelli concluded, at paragraph 22 that “the fine should remain the same, since the City of Toronto requested that the fine not be increased should the appeal succeed.”
[^27]: New Mex Canada Inc., at para. 111.
[^28]: See Cotton Felts Ltd. at p. 294; and New Mex Canada Inc., at paras. 97-100.