ONCJ 2024

The defendant was charged with impaired operation (excess blood alcohol) after being stopped by police on private property as part of a RIDE program.

The officer believed the stop was authorized by the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that while a common law power existed for sobriety checks on private property, the officer's reliance on a mistaken understanding of the Highway Traffic Act rendered the detention unlawful, violating the defendant's Charter rights (sections 9 and 8).

Applying the Grant test, the court determined the breaches were technical and not serious, the impact on the defendant's rights was modest, and the reliable breath evidence was crucial to the Crown's case and society's interest in deterring drunk driving.

Consequently, the evidence was admitted, and the defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and operating a vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration above the legal limit.

He sought to exclude evidence due to alleged Charter breaches (ss. 7, 8, 10(b)) related to muted police body-worn cameras and delays in approved screening device (ASD) and approved instrument demands.

The court found no s. 7 breach, as there was no prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence.

It also found no s. 8 breach regarding the immediacy of the demands.

While the Crown conceded a s. 8 breach regarding ASD availability (due to R. v. Breault), the court found the breach minor and admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, citing good faith police conduct and minimal impact on the accused's rights.

The defendant was found guilty of operating with a blood-alcohol concentration above the legal limit but not guilty of impaired operation.

The father sought costs of $31,867.15 following an uncontested trial of his motion to change parenting arrangements.

The mother's response had been struck for failure to comply with previous costs orders.

The court found the father was presumptively entitled to costs as the successful party but reduced the quantum significantly.

The court declined to award costs for prior steps in the proceeding, noting the father sought costs for events where costs had already been decided.

The court also reduced the costs due to duplication of services by the father's two lawyers.

The father was awarded $7,317.55 in costs, and the mother was ordered to provide proof of payment before bringing any future motion to change.

In this family law matter, the court addressed parenting and child support issues after the respondent father's Answer/Claim was struck due to his repeated non-attendance.

The applicant mother sought retroactive child support from December 2018, ongoing child support, and contributions to section 7 expenses.

Applying the Colucci framework for retroactive support, the court found the mother had understandable reasons for her delay in seeking support and that the father had engaged in blameworthy conduct by underpaying support and failing to disclose income.

The court ordered retroactive child support and section 7 expenses, quantified current support obligations, and mandated the father to maintain health coverage for the children.

Davison Weir pleaded guilty to three counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought a 30-month jail sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court found the offences exceptionally serious due to extreme speed in a residential area, resulting in severe, life-threatening injuries to two children and serious injuries to another driver.

Despite mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, genuine remorse, and good character, the court emphasized that denunciation and deterrence were paramount.

A conditional sentence was deemed disproportionately lenient given the intentional risk-taking and degree of responsibility.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment, followed by 2 years of probation, a 4-year driving prohibition, and victim surcharges.

The applicant, D.N., brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that periods of defence delay and exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the National Day for Truth and Reconciliation, and unforeseen trial length due to the victim's unique testimony method, should be deducted.

The court agreed with the Crown, finding that after deducting these periods, the net delay fell below the Jordan threshold.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking temporary parenting, communication, contact, and child support orders, along with further financial disclosure from the applicant father.

The father opposed the relief and orally sought joint decision-making and unsupervised parenting time.

The court granted the mother's requests, ordering sole decision-making responsibility to the mother, supervised parenting time for the father, and imputing income to the father for child support purposes due to his intentional under-employment and non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The court cited the father's history of family violence, criminal charges, threats of self-harm, illegal immigration status, and lack of commitment to parenting time and financial obligations as reasons for its decision, emphasizing the child's best interests and safety.

The father's oral claims were dismissed.

Roland Nugent, charged with firearms and conspiracy offences, brought an S. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 25 months and 16 days (777 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown argued for exceptional circumstances, citing discrete events related to an ongoing homicide investigation and the particular complexity of the multi-accused case.

The court found no discrete exceptional circumstances for the Crown's decision-making delay but accepted that the case's complexity, including multiple accused, extensive disclosure, and necessary pre-trial motions, justified the remaining delay.

The application was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought to withdraw life support for a critically ill infant in its temporary care without court authorization, believing it had the authority under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The infant died after life support was withdrawn, but before an emergency court hearing could proceed.

The court, at the parties' request for future guidance, ruled that a children's aid society cannot withdraw life support for a child in its temporary or interim care without explicit court authorization, especially in the absence of parental consent, emphasizing procedural fairness and judicial oversight in such profound decisions.

The Father brought a motion to expand his parenting time with his 18-month-old son, MJ, from supervised twice-weekly visits to a graduated schedule leading to unsupervised overnight parenting time.

The Mother brought a cross-motion for a section 30 assessment or Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) referral, and to maintain supervised parenting time with only a slight increase in frequency.

The court dismissed the Mother's request for an assessment/OCL referral, finding no compelling clinical issues and that the Mother's concerns were largely unsubstantiated.

The court granted the Father's motion for a graduated expansion of parenting time, transitioning from supervised to unsupervised, finding it to be in the child's best interests to foster a meaningful relationship with both parents and that the Mother's restrictive approach was unfounded.

This decision concerns the sentencing of the defendant, P.H., who was convicted of one count of Sexual Interference involving a child victim, M.H., over multiple occasions when she was 3-4 years old.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the profound breach of trust, the victim's extreme vulnerability, the multiple incidents, and the use of physical force.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's status as a first-time offender for sexual offences, his struggles with addiction and mental health issues, and a low risk of sexual re-offending as supported by expert opinion and a decade without further sexual offences.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of 3-4 years and a 20-year SOIRA order, while the Defence sought an upper reformatory term of 18-24 months and opposed the SOIRA order.

The court imposed a sentence of 2 years less a day imprisonment, followed by a two-year probation order, and various ancillary orders, but dismissed the request for a SOIRA order, finding it grossly disproportionate given the low risk of sexual recidivism.

This is a sentencing decision following convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) for a workplace fatality.

The corporate defendant and two individual supervisors were found guilty of failing to ensure proper rigging of concrete blocks and adequate training/supervision, leading to a worker's death.

The court applied established sentencing principles, emphasizing deterrence and considering the increased maximum penalties for OHSA offences.

Fines were imposed on the corporate defendant and the two individual supervisors, reflecting the seriousness of the breach and the need for general deterrence.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought a temporary order for the placement of a 16-month-old child, W, in the care of his maternal grandmother (C.B.) with Society supervision, and supervised access for the parents (K.B. and O.A.).

K.B. sought W's return to her care or unsupervised parenting time with C.B. O.A. sought expanded supervised access and virtual/phone access.

The court found that the Society met its onus, establishing a real possibility of harm if W returned to K.B.'s care due to serious criminal charges against both parents (including child pornography) and K.B.'s unhealthy relationship with O.A. The court dismissed K.B.'s request for W's return and unsupervised access, and O.A.'s request for virtual access, ordering W to remain in C.B.'s temporary care with Society supervision and fully supervised in-person access for the parents.

Following a seven‑day trial concerning parenting, support, and related issues for a young child, the court determined that both parents were capable caregivers and that allegations of abuse against the father were not substantiated by professional evidence or child protection authorities.

Applying the statutory best‑interests framework, the court ordered a shared parenting regime transitioning from a 2‑2‑3 to a 2‑5‑5‑2 schedule with joint decision‑making responsibility and specific tie‑breaking mechanisms.

The court declined to impute income to either party, finding the mother’s limited employment justified by medical evidence and determining that funds advanced to the father by his parent were loans rather than income.

Child support was ordered using the shared‑custody formula, and spousal support was awarded for a fixed four‑year term.

Claims for retroactive spousal support and various additional relief were dismissed.

The Ontario Securities Commission prosecuted the defendant, a director of a startup company developing a blockchain token backed by a mining asset, for securities fraud, making misleading statements to the OSC, unregistered trading, and illegal distribution of securities.

The court found that while misrepresentations were made in some corporate materials regarding the company's interest in a mine, the investors did not rely on those materials, negating the deprivation element of fraud.

The court also found the defendant's statements to the OSC were factually correct, he was not in the business of trading securities, and the distributions he authorized fell within the private issuer exemption.

The defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a child, Z, seeking placement with the paternal grandparents (MY and LY) subject to supervision.

The father (ZF) and aunt (AR) sought to maintain the child in their joint care.

The mother (W-D) did not participate.

The court found that the grandparents and father had joint pre-intervention charge of the child.

The court dismissed the father's request, finding that placing the child with the father and aunt would pose a risk of harm due to parental non-compliance with no-contact orders, self-help tactics, and the aunt's inability to cooperate.

The court ordered the child to be placed in the temporary care and custody of the grandparents, subject to society supervision, and set out terms for parental access.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) brought an urgent motion to set aside a Summons to Witness served by Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services (Kina) on the child A.L.P. in a Secure Treatment Application proceeding.

Kina sought to question the child, arguing it was permissible under the Family Law Rules.

The OCL argued that Secure Treatment Applications fall under Part VII of the CYFSA, not Part V (Child Protection), and therefore Rule 20(3) regarding questioning as a right does not apply.

The court agreed with the OCL, finding that Rule 20(3) does not apply to Secure Treatment Applications and that Kina should have brought a motion under Rule 20(5) for an order to question the child, which it failed to do.

The OCL's motion was granted, and the Summons to Witness was set aside.

The accused, Tsung Ong, was charged with two counts of sexual assault.

The first count was dismissed by Crown concession.

The second count, arising from an incident at the accused's birthday party, involved the complainant alleging the accused sexually assaulted her by pressing his face into her crotch area.

The central issue was witness credibility and the Crown's burden of proof.

The court found the complainant's testimony emotionally difficult but credible, yet noted inconsistencies and lack of detail regarding the alleged incident's mechanics and surrounding events.

The defence witnesses' evidence, while not ruling out the incident, supported the accused's general practice.

Ultimately, the court found that while the accused's testimony could not be accepted as true to the exclusion of other evidence, a reasonable doubt remained regarding the reliability of the complainant's account.

Consequently, the second count was also dismissed.

This decision addresses the sentencing of an offender convicted of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking within a custodial facility.

The court considered the seriousness of drug trafficking, particularly fentanyl, and the aggravating factor of the offence occurring in a detention centre.

The offender's extensive criminal record and his misconduct in fraudulently delaying sentencing proceedings were also significant factors.

The court applied a "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-trial conditions but limited the "Summers credit" due to the offender's deliberate attempts to obstruct justice.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion in a child protection application concerning two children, MA (4) and MH (3), who had a history of being in and out of society care due to parental instability, substance abuse, and criminal involvement.

The mother, C. B.-H., was the only participating respondent, seeking placement of the children in her care or increased access.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the mother's chaotic lifestyle, incarceration, and failure to address protection concerns rendered her unable to provide a safe and stable home.

The court granted the society's request for extended society care for both children, with discretionary access for the mother (minimum three times annually) and paternal aunt (minimum two times annually if requested), and no access for the father and paternal uncle.

Sibling access was ordered a minimum of twice monthly.