Non-Publication and Non-Broadcast Order

WARNING The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Court File and Parties

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 2024 05 31 COURT FILE No.: Halton Info # 1211210 1470

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

R.M.

Before: Justice Jennifer Campitelli

Heard on: December 14, 15, 2022, March 11, 12, 27, 2024 Reasons for Judgment released on: May 31, 2024

Counsel: R. Morrow, for the Crown G. Lafontaine, for the accused R.M.

CAMPITELLI J.:

[1] R.M. faces seven counts on the information, which is before the court. The first count was withdrawn prior to the first day of his trial. R.M. is charged that he:

(2) that R.M. on or about the 13th day of September in the year 2020 at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did commit an assault on A.M., contrary to Section 266 of the Criminal Code

AND FURTHER

(3) that R.M. on or about the 15th day of September in the year 2020 at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did without lawful authority confine A.M., contrary to Section 279(2) of the Criminal Code

AND FURTHER

(4) that R.M. between the 1st day of October in the year 2020 and the 30th day of November in the year 2020, at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on A.M., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code

AND FURTHER

(5) that R.M. between the 1st day of October in the year 2020 and the 30th day of November in the year 2020, both dates inclusive, at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on A.M., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code

AND FURTHER

(6) that R.M. between the 1st day of October in the year 2020 and the 30th day of November in the year 2020, both dates inclusive, at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on A.M., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code

AND FURTHER

(7) that R.M. on or about the 23rd day of December in the year 2020 at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region did commit a sexual assault on A.M., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code

AND FURTHER

(8) that R.M. between the 26th day of December in the year 2020 and the 31st day of December in the year 2020, both dates inclusive, at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on A.M., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code

Factual Background

[2] R.M. and the complainant, A.M. (hereafter referred to as A.J.), were married and share children together. Following their separation, A.J. alleges that between September 13, 2020, and December 31, 2020, R.M. engaged in physically and sexually assaultive behaviour towards her. She also alleges that on September 15, 2020, he unlawfully confined her within the home they previously shared as she attempted to leave. She further alleges he followed her to her vehicle and continued to unlawfully confine her within it.

[3] R.M. adamantly denies engaging in any assaultive behaviour towards A.J. He strongly maintains any contact was either incidental or consensual. Moreover, he denies confining A.J. within their previously shared home or within her motor vehicle.

Grounding Legal Principles:

Sexual Assault

[4] With respect to the offence of sexual assault, the actus reus consists of three essential elements, each of which must be proven by the crown beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the crown must establish: (1) that R.M. knowingly touched the complainant (2) that the touching was of a sexual nature; and (3) that the complainant did not consent to that sexual contact: R. v. Nyznik, 2017 ONSC 4392, [2017] O.J. No. 4138 at para. 8 (SCJ).

[5] The presumption of innocence applies to a person accused of sexual assault in the same way that it applies in any other criminal offence. The crown must prove that this was an act of assault rather than consensual contact. I have reminded myself that there is no burden on the defence to prove that A.J. consented to the sexual contact, should I determine the contact between the parties was of a sexual nature. Rather, the burden is on the crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that R.M. had sexual contact with A.J. without her consent: R. v. Nyznik, supra at para. 10. That burden never shifts.

[6] Sexual assault is an assault within one of the definitions of that concept, which is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the victim is violated. The test to be applied in determining whether the impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective one: “Viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is the sexual or carnal context of the assault visible to a reasonable observer”: R. v. Chase, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 293 at para. 11 (S.C.C.), R. v. Taylor, (1985) 1985 ABCA 51, 44 C.R. (3d) 263 at pp. 269. The part of the body touched, the nature of the contact, the situation in which it occurred, the words and gestures accompanying the act, and all other circumstances surrounding the contact will be relevant. The intent or purpose of the person committing the act, to the extent that this may appear from the evidence, may also be a factor in considering whether the conduct is sexual. However, motive is simply one of many factors to be considered, the importance of which will vary depending on the circumstances. Sexual assault is a general, rather than a specific intent offence: R. v. Chase, supra at para. 11.

Unlawful Confinement

[7] Further, the authorities establish that if for any significant period of time, A.J. was coercively restrained or directed contrary to her wishes, so that she could not move about according to her own inclination or desire, there was unlawful confinement within the meaning of s. 279(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada: R. v. Pritchard, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 195, 2008 SCC 59 at para. 24 (SCC).

[8] Finally, unlawful confinement is a general intent offence, which requires the crown to prove only the intent to effect deprivation of freedom of movement: R. v. S.J.B., 2002 ABCA 143, [2002] A.J. No. 726 at para. 41 (Alta. C.A.)

The Defence of De Minimis Non Curat Lex

[9] The good judgment of prosecutors in eliminating trivial cases is necessary but not sufficient to the workings of the criminal law. Legal protection against convictions for conduct underserving of punishment exists through the defence of de minimis non curat lex, which is available to judges: Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4 at para. 200 (S.C.C.).

[10] Generally, the justifications for a de minimis excuse are that: (1) it reserves the application of the criminal law to serious misconduct; (2) it protects an accused from the stigma of a criminal conviction and from the imposition of severe penalties for relatively trivial conduct; and (3) it saves courts from being swamped by an enormous number of trivial cases: Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), supra at para. 204 (S.C.C.).

[11] However, given I am considering this defence against the backdrop of domestic violence allegations, I have reminded myself that, “the harm to society occasioned by domestic violence, even of a minor nature, cannot be understated”: R. v. Carson, [2004] O.J. No. 1530 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 25 (C.A.).

The Collection of Messages (Exhibit #4)

[12] The crown filed a collection of messages exchanged between the parties through ‘Facebook Messenger’ and ‘iMessage’. These messages were selectively captured by A.J. and provided to the court in an obviously incomplete format. On the whole, the messages feature extremely long and complex messages drafted by A.J., which allude to an enormity of information. R.M. provides more concise emotional responses, which on my review, are very general in nature. The messages are from different dates, with gaps in the dialogue exchanged.

[13] I find that I have been deprived of the requisite context such that I am unable to place any significant weight on these messages in my final analysis.

Count #6: The Sexual Assault Alleged Between October 1, 2020 and November 30, 2020

[14] I have commenced my analysis with the alleged incident captured by Count #6 on the information, as I found this area of A.J.’s evidence to be particularly troubling. A.J. testified that following her separation from R.M., she made the decision to ask him to work on her back. A.J. recalled that she had just moved out of the house, had to pay rent ‘up front’ and therefore, did not feel that she had the financial means to engage a professional. She felt at this point post-separation, R.M. was working with a therapist and getting better from what she observed.

[15] It was A.J.’s evidence that she attended her former residence, spoke with her children briefly, and then made her way to the master bedroom. She remembered R.M. asking her to take her clothes off, claiming it would be better for him to see her spinal alignment. A.J. then testified that R.M. asked her to remove her pants, so he could see exactly how her hips were shifted. She recalled hesitating, but ultimately trusting that R.M. would be professional. After removing her pants, it was A.J.’s evidence that as R.M. was massaging her hamstring, he moved his hands extremely close to her vagina. It was at this point A.J. recalled yelling for R.M. to stop, telling him she was leaving because he wasn’t helping her.

[16] A.J. was pressed strongly on this area of her evidence while under cross examination. It was suggested to A.J., consistent with R.M.’s statement to the police, that she had, in fact, attended their former residence on more than one occasion to have him work on her back. A.J. was confronted with the language she used when providing her statement to the police. In particular:

“…And I feel stupid that I would go to his house to do it versus public place, like the gym. And he would always—the kids were always home, and they would alwa –, it would always be around a time of them, like, eating dinner or something. And so he would take me into the master bedroom and be, like, ‘Okay, well, there’s more space here, then you’re not lying on the floor. So now I’m essentially lying in his bed’.” [1]

[17] A.J. maintained that it was not possible she attended R.M.’s residence on more than one occasion to have him work on her back during the period of their separation. When considered against the backdrop of the entire evidentiary record, which was placed before, I find her assertion to this end is simply not believable. On my review, the language A.J. chose when providing her statement to the police was very telling, and I do not except her characterization of pluralized language as representative of a single occurrence. Rather, I find as fact that there was more than one occasion when this interaction between the pair occurred after their separation.

[18] I was further troubled by the way A.J. provided this area of her evidence. She became somewhat evasive when pressed while under cross examination about her use of language, and her tone noticeably changed. The difficulties associated with this particular area of A.J.’s testimony are noteworthy, and they served to adversely impact the overall reliability of her evidence. However, I have reminded myself that sometimes an honest witness will be trying her best to tell the truth and will believe the truth of what she is relating, but nevertheless will be mistaken in her recollection. Such a witness will appear to be telling the truth and will be convinced they are right, but may still be proven wrong by incontrovertible extrinsic evidence: R. v. Nyznik, 2017 ONSC 4392, [2017] O.J. No. 4138 at para. 15. I believe this to be the case with respect to this aspect of A.J.’s evidence. I do not find that A.J. was intentionally providing dishonest evidence to the court. Notwithstanding, I have approached my analysis with respect to the reliability of the balance of A.J.’s evidence, keeping the obvious difficulties in this area front of mind.

[19] Only evidence that is both reliable and credible can support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: Nyznik, supra at para. 15. Therefore, given my findings relative to the reliability of A.J.’s evidence, I find R.M. not guilty as charged with respect to Count #6.

Count #2: The Assault Alleged on September 13, 2020

[20] A.J. alleges that on September 13, 2020, R.M. grabbed her hand with one hand and with his other hand, he pulled her engagement ring, wedding ring and anniversary ring off of her fingers. When asked how difficult it was for R.M. to remove the rings, it was A.J.’s evidence that the rings were not a “super tight fit”. They did not have to be “yanked off” her fingers. While under cross-examination, A.J. recalled that there was no pain associated with R.M. removing her rings. R.M. acknowledged that he took the rings off A.J.’s fingers on September 13, 2020, and told her she didn’t deserve them. He recalled that was when he learned that A.J. had kissed “another guy”.

[21] The defence has asked me to consider the defence of de minimis non curat lex relative to this count, arguing this allegation is trivial in nature, and the contact alleged by A.J. is incidental at its highest. Conversely, the crown reminds me that the incident alleged occurs in the context of an intimate partner relationship, and against the backdrop of domestic violence related allegations. This must inform my analysis.

[22] There is no question that R.M. removed A.J.’s rings from her fingers. He did not ask to take them. However, of note on this particular record, there was no pain associated with his actions to this end. Moreover, the rings came off without much difficultly. I have carefully considered the contact, which occurred between the parties on September 13, 2020. First, within the context of the complete evidentiary record, which was placed before me and additionally, against the backdrop of allegations of domestic violence. I do not find it rises to a level of criminality, such that it warrants the application of criminal law. The harm occasioned by society as a result of domestic violence cannot be understated; however, we must continue to see the forest from the trees. Criminal law is reserved for serious misconduct and the collateral consequences associated with a criminal conviction are severe. The contact associated with the September 13, 2020, interaction was trivial in nature, and the defence of de minimis non curat lex will succeed. The charge associated with Count #2 is accordingly dismissed.

Count #3: The Unlawful Confinement Alleged on September 15, 2020

[23] A.J. testified that on September 15, 2020, R.M. prevented her from leaving the residence they previously shared while repeating “we need to talk”. It was her evidence that R.M. was “obsessed” with having a conversation with her “right then and there”. A.J. recalled that she felt scared and intimidated. However, it was also A.J.’s evidence that, after asking R.M. numerous times to move, she took her hands and shoved his arm to move him out of the way. She remembered at this point in their interaction “he ended up moving”. Of note, R.M. significantly outweighed A.J. at that point in time and stood taller in stature than she did.

[24] A.J. then proceeded to enter her motor vehicle, which was in the driveway, with R.M. following and entering the passenger seat. A.J. testified that she asked him about five or six times to leave the vehicle; however, he kept repeating “we need to talk”. It was A.J.’s evidence that she felt “trapped” and felt more “scared and intimidated” than she felt inside the home. A.J. recalled that she used her cell phone to call 911, and she heard the dispatcher’s voice. She described R.M. as leaving the vehicle “instantly” at this juncture, at which point she hung up her phone. It was A.J.’s evidence that the police tried to call back a few times, but she was too scared to answer.

[25] Each case will always involve a fact specific analysis. With a view to this particular evidentiary record, I do not find A.J. was deprived of freedom of movement for a significant period of time. When the interaction inside the residence is considered in its totality, A.J. was able to push past R.M. and exit the residence without any degree of difficulty. This, notwithstanding R.M. was both heavier and taller than she was in September of 2020. On A.J.’s evidence alone, she testified that R.M. “ended up moving” in response to her moving him “out of the way”. Moreover, R.M. left the vehicle immediately once A.J. dialed and connected with the 911 dispatcher. In engaging in my assessment of this issue, I have reminded myself that confinement can be psychological in nature. A.J. testified that she felt “trapped”, “scared” and “intimidated” by R.M.’s actions and insistence that they have a conversation on September 15, 2020. However, I have concluded, in these particular circumstances, that A.J. was not restrained or deprived of freedom of movement for a significant period of time. Therefore, R.M. will be found not guilty as charged with respect to Count #3.

Count #4: The First Sexual Assault Alleged by A.J. between the 1st day of October and the 30th day of November in the year 2020

[26] A.J. testified that sometime around the end or October and into November of 2020, she and R.M. had an interaction on the front porch of the residence they previously shared, which was captured by a doorbell camera. A.J. recalled that when she was dropping off her daughter, R.M. asked if they could have a conversation. She agreed to speak to him; however, she insisted they speak on the front porch. In the course of their interaction, A.J. remembered that R.M. asked her for a hug to which she replied, “no I don’t want to hug”. It was A.J.’s evidence that R.M. then started to grab her while she continuously said, “get off me”. A.J. described an interaction between the pair where R.M. was grabbing her to pull her in for a hug by her shoulders, while she was using a significant amount of force to push him off her, attempting to maintain a distance. A.J. recalled that R.M. eventually released her, but as she turned to walk away off the front porch, he “smacked” her in her “butt”. A.J. described the slap as hard enough that she through her down winter jacket and the rest of her clothes. It was A.J.’s evidence R.M.’s actions towards her made her feel “scared”, “weak” and “terrified” of him. A feeling, which lasted for the remainder of that evening.

[27] I have carefully reviewed the relevant video footage captured by the doorbell camera. [2] I find that it is corroborative of A.J.’s evidence. It captures a struggle, which clearly ensues between the pair, where R.M. is attempting to pull A.J. towards him, while she attempts to push him off her person and leave the porch area of the residence. With respect to R.M. making contact with A.J.’s buttock, I find the video shows him looking directly at that area of her body and subsequently striking her with an open hand. His actions were deliberate and intentional, and I do not find this contact to be incidental in nature, as argued by the defence. Conversely, I have determined that R.M. intentionally applied force to the area of A.J.’s buttock without her consent.

[28] However, after objectively reviewing the totality of the circumstances, I cannot conclude the impugned conduct was sexual in nature. Although, R.M.’s actions were obviously not consensual and frightened A.J. as she described, I do not find they violated her sexual integrity. As a result, with respect to Count #4, R.M. will be found not guilty of the offence of sexual assault charged; but guilty of the lesser included offence of assault simpliciter contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Count #5: The Second Sexual Assault Alleged by A.J. between the 1st day of October and the 30th day of November in the year 2020

[29] A.J. testified that in October or November of 2020 she was dropping one of her children off after gymnastics and pulled into the driveway of the former family home. She recalled R.M. followed their other child out of the home and unexpectedly entered her motor vehicle. A.J. remembered that she felt “scared” and intimidated” by his presence. It was A.J.’s evidence that R.M. turned to her and said, “just give me a kiss and I’ll get out”. A.J. told R.M., “No, I don’t want to”; however, he persisted saying, “just give me a kiss. Just give me a kiss and I’ll get out”. Ultimately, A.J. testified that she felt she had no other choice but to kiss R.M., feeling that was the only way to get him out of her motor vehicle. A.J. recalled that when she kissed R.M., he took his hands and grabbed her breast without her consent. It was her evidence that at that point in their interaction, R.M. turned back towards her and said, “was that so hard?”.

[30] When providing his statement to investigators, R.M. denied this incident happened. He did not recall touching A.J.’s breast in the context she described, and he specifically denied saying, “was that so bad?” [3] following the alleged interaction. On my review of R.M.’s statement in its entirely, I found him to be forthcoming and candid with investigators. He made admissions against his interest, which served to enhance the overall credibility of the totality of the information he provided. Consequently, I have difficulty reconciling his denial of this incident with the evidence of A.J.

[31] I have considered the evidence R.M. provided to the police relative to this incident within the context of the entire evidentiary record, which has been placed before me. In particular, keeping in mind my previous concerns with respect to the reliability of A.J.’s evidence. When the totality of the evidence is considered, I simply cannot be sure what happened in A.J.’s vehicle between October 1st and November 30, 2020. I am not able to make a finding of guilt based on evidence such as this, as I am left in doubt. It is simply not safe to convict. Consequently, R.M. will be found not guilty with respect to Count #5.

Count #7: The Sexual Assault Alleged on December 23, 2020

[32] A.J. testified that on December 23, 2020, she was picking up her children to take them to her family’s cottage, when she realized she forgot their ‘Elf on the Shelf’ inside the home. A.J. recalled that when she returned inside the home to retrieve the toy, R.M. pinned her up against the wall, lifted her shirt up, pulled her bra down and touched her breast. It was A.J.’s evidence that no words were exchanged between the pair, but that she shoved R.M. away from her and said, “get off me”. A.J. described that she felt “completely violated” by R.M.’s actions on this occasion. Particularly, because the incident happened while she was holding one of their children’s toys.

[33] R.M. doesn’t recall the December 23, 2020, incident the same way as A.J.; however, he does admit to touching A.J.’s breast on that occasion. R.M. recalled asking A.J. if he could “check something”, in reference to her body. He remembered asking A.J. if he could “take a look”, and then A.J. independently lifting up her shirt. At this point, R.M. admitted to touching A.J.’s breast. R.M.’s recollection of A.J.’s reaction to this physical contact was that she said, “what are you doing?”. [4] R.M. explained that he had taken something that his therapist told him “wrong” and didn’t act the way he was “supposed to”. [5] It appears that R.M.’s therapist encouraged him to express himself by asking A.J. if he could touch her sexually while they were engaged in the massages, which are connected to count six on the information before me. Obviously, the critical piece in the therapist’s suggestion to R.M. was ask A.J.

[34] Regardless of who lifted up A.J.’s shirt on December 23, 2020, it is clear on the record before me that R.M. touched A.J.’s breast without first obtaining her consent. I find this was intentional contact, which A.J. did not consent to. As such, the contact was assaultive. Carrying my analysis forward, I must now objectively consider the totality of the relevant circumstances and determine whether this contact was sexual in nature.

[35] Certainly, the intention of the person committing the act may be a factor in considering whether the conduct at issue is sexual. On this record, and relative to this particular incident, I find R.M.’s intentions are very telling. It is clear from R.M.’s statement to investigators that, at the relevant time, he had a desire to express himself sexually towards A.J. He makes reference to conversations with his therapist, where he was encouraged to “act” on his feelings to that end. [6] On December 23 2020, I find he did just that. However, he did so without first obtaining A.J.’s consent. His actions consequently violated A.J.’s sexual integrity, and I have determined the impugned contact was of a sexual nature. As such, with respect to Count #7, I find R.M. guilty of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Count #8: The Sexual Assault Alleged between December 26, 2020 and December 31, 2020

[36] A.J. testified that between December 26, 2020, and December 31, 2020, she attended R.M.’s gym in Oakville to exercise. A.J. remembered it was in the evening, and that she and R.M. were the only people in the gym. It was A.J.’s evidence that, near the end of her workout, R.M. came up behind her, lifted up her shirt and pulled down her pants. Once her abdomen was exposed, A.J. testified that R.M. said, “look at yourself”. A.J. recalled that R.M. used a tone of “disgust” and communicated that she felt “exposed”, “disrespected”, and violated. A.J. remembered at that time, she believed R.M. was trying to express that she needed to take better care of herself.

[37] R.M. denied pulling down A.J.’s pants to a point where her underwear was exposed; however, he admitted to rolling them down to her hips, and pulling up her top, which exposed her abdomen. R.M. recalled at this point in their interaction, that he “put her in front of the mirror”, in reference to A.J. I accept that R.M. only exposed A.J.’s abdomen as he described, by pulling down what he referred to as “high-waisted Lululemon pants” and pulling up “her top”. R.M. explained to investigators that A.J. “had put a bunch of weight on”, so he asked her, “how can I help you?”. [7] R.M. remembered saying the following as A.J.’s abdomen was exposed in front of the mirror:

“…It kills me right now that, that you look this way, and I hate that you’re, that you’re so unhappy with the way you look.” and “…Look what you’re doing. How can I help you? It kills me right now.” [8]

[38] I find that when R.M. “put” A.J. “in front of the mirror” and moved her clothing to expose her abdomen, the associated contact was more than incidental. It was intentional and occurred absent A.J.’s consent. Consequently, I find this contact to be assaultive. I accept that A.J. felt violated by R.M.’s assaultive behaviour; however, I cannot objectively conclude, in light of all the circumstances, that the contact was of a sexual nature. I find R.M.’s actions towards A.J. were demeaning, degrading and quite frankly, deplorable. There is no question on this record that A.J. felt disrespected, exposed, and violated by the father of her children as she described. I accept that. But not every personal violation, even between former intimate partners, touches on sexual integrity. Each case will always require a fact specific analysis. In this instance, I do not find that R.M.’s actions violated A.J.’s sexual integrity. As a result, with respect to Count #8, R.M. will be found not guilty of the offence of sexual assault charged; but guilty of the lesser included offence of assault simpliciter contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Conclusion:

[39] In the result:

(1) Count #2: The defence of de minimis non curat lex is successful. As such, the charge associated with Count #2 is dismissed;

(2) R.M. is not guilty as charged with respect to Count #3;

(3) With respect to Count #4, R.M. is not guilty of the offence of sexual assault charged; but guilty of the lesser included offence of assault simpliciter contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code of Canada;

(4) R.M. is not guilty as charged with respect to Count #5;

(5) R.M. is not guilty as charged with respect to Count #6;

(6) With respect to Count #7, R.M. is guilty of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada;

(7) With respect to Count #8, R.M. is not guilty of the offence of sexual assault charged; but guilty of the lesser included offence of assault simpliciter contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Released: May 31, 2024 Justice Jennifer Campitelli

[1] Transcript of A.J.’s March 29, 2021, Statement Page 33 lines 22-25 and Page 34 lines 1-4. [2] Exhibit #1 [3] Exhibit #3: Transcript of R.M.’s statement to investigators, page 22, line 11. [4] Exhibit #3: Transcript of R.M.’s statement to investigators, page 32, lines 9-15. [5] Exhibit #3: Transcript of R.M.’s statement to investigators, page 32, lines 19-21. [6] Exhibit #3: Transcript of R.M.’s statement to investigators, page 32, line 24. [7] Exhibit #3: Transcript of R.M.’s statement to investigators, page 34, lines 2-5, 17, 24; page 35, lines 2-3. [8] Exhibit #3: Transcript of R.M.’s statement to investigators, page 35, lines 5-6.