Ontario Court of Justice

Date: 2023 05 03 Court File No.: Toronto 22-50003122

Between:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

KEVIN GEORGE

Before: Justice Peter N. Fraser

Heard on: April 5, 2023 Reasons for Sentence released on: May 3, 2023

Counsel: P. Zambonini & A. Bradstreet ........................................................ counsel for the Crown C. Zeeh.................................................................... counsel for the accused Kevin George

Fraser J.:

[1] On June 19, 2021, Kevin George attended a birthday party for his own one-year-old child with a loaded gun. He was on bail for charges of possessing another loaded gun from January 2020 - charges he later plead guilty to. One of the conditions of that bail prohibited him from possessing any weapons.

[2] Shortly before 8:00 pm on June 19, gunfire erupted in the midst of the birthday party. Four men discharged a total of twenty-two rounds of ammunition during a firefight that left one combatant and two children seriously injured and sent countless more running for their lives. After a trial, I found that Kevin George fired six rounds at another man named Demar Cadogan and in the direction of a sea of children and other guests.

[3] Two more men, who remain at large, also fired upon Mr. Cadogan. I did not find Mr. George criminally liable for their actions. Mr. Cadogan was himself carrying a gun, and he fired back at the other three men. Mr. Cadogan was shot in both legs during the exchange. Five-year-old Tianna Green was shot in the head and remained in a coma for several days. Eleven-year-old Keandre Bailey was shot in the buttocks. One-year-old Kaiden Leitch, the birthday boy, suffered a small graze to his forehead during the chaotic scene which may also have been caused by a stray bullet. I found Mr. George guilty of the following five Criminal Code offences:

Count 1 – Discharge Firearm with Intent at Demar Cadogan [s. 244(1)] Count 3 – Discharge Firearm with Intent at Tianna Green [s. 244(1)] Count 5 – Aggravated Assault on Demar Cadogan [s. 268(1)] Count 7 – Aggravated Assault on Tianna Green [s. 268(1)] Count 12 – Fail to Comply with Release Order [s. 145(5)]

[4] The parties jointly submit, and I agree, that the aggravated assault convictions are duplicitous of the discharge firearm with intent convictions. In the circumstances of this case, the two sets of charges cover the same legal and factual ground. The aggravated assault convictions contained in counts 5 and 6 will be stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.

[5] I would also observe that these counts relate to only two specific people who were in the line of fire. However, as I found in the reasons for judgment, Mr. George endangered the lives of a great many people, young children among them. I consider the counts a representative sample of the deadly risk of harm visited on a larger group of innocent people that day. I must now sentence Mr. George for his role in these events.

Principles of Sentencing

[6] Sentencing is a highly individualized process: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 58. The judge must give effect to a number of different and often competing sentencing objectives. Section 718 of the Criminal Code directs that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and, more specifically, to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. According to s. 718.1, the fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality. The sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. One way of ensuring proportionality is by imposing a sentence similar to those imposed on other persons in similar circumstances: R. v. Lacasse, supra, at para. 2. That becomes a difficult matter in a case like this, where the circumstances are so uniquely serious there are very few, if any, truly comparable cases.

[7] Crimes involving firearms represent a grave danger to our society: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 at paras. 1, 6. The primary principles of sentencing in these cases are denunciation and deterrence: R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 at para. 71; R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692 at para. 47-49. Illegal handguns are particularly dangerous given how easily they can be concealed and transported into public places where innocent people are imperiled. The only purpose for these weapons is to intimidate, injure and kill.

[8] Illegal firearms have been correctly described at all levels of court as a scourge on our society and this city in particular: R. v. Danvers, [2005] O.J. No. 3532 (C.A.) at paras. 77-78; R. v. Thavakularatnam, 2018 ONSC 2380 at para. 21. Statistics filed in this case reveal that gun crime continues to plague the City of Toronto and has seen a dangerous increase in recent years. In R. v. Lacasse, supra, at para. 89, the Supreme Court recognized the frequency of a type of offence in a particular region is a relevant factor on sentence.

[9] The Courts must demonstrate in clear terms that our society will not tolerate the use of firearms in our streets and communities. Exemplary sentences are required to deter those who would engage in this kind of conduct and to protect the lives of law-abiding people: R. v. Danvers, supra, at paras. 77-78; R. v. Doucette, 2015 ONCA 583 at para. 59-60.

[10] I consider the need to separate Mr. George from society in order to protect the public and the need to promote in him a sense of responsibility for the harm he has done.

[11] I also consider the principle of rehabilitation. This sentencing principle occupies a less prominent position in the circumstances of this case. Nevertheless, Mr. George is a young man, and I must consider his potential to change and become a contributing member of society.

Circumstances of the Offender

[12] Kevin George is 23 years old. He was 21 when he committed the offences before the Court. I have the benefit of a pre-sentence report, several character letters, and the submissions of counsel to assist me in understanding who Mr. George is as a person. He was born in Toronto to parents who immigrated to this country from Grenada. His father was deported to Grenada in 2002, but Mr. George describes having a good relationship with him and maintaining regular contact. He was raised primarily by his mother in the Jane and Finch area of Toronto.

[13] Mr. George is the father of Kaiden Leitch, who was injured in this incident on his first birthday. He also has a three-year-old child from a previous relationship.

[14] Mr. George reports that he attended school until grade 12. The writer of the pre-sentence report confirms he has been working toward his GED while in custody since January of 2022. He has previously worked in a factory assembling windows. And the pre-sentence report suggests he is a skilled basketball player.

[15] Mr. George presents some stark contradictions. He has been respectful toward the Court throughout these proceedings. He was cooperative, though guarded, with the writer of the pre-sentence report. His family members and friends describe him as a compassionate person and a caring father. And yet, he fired a hail of bullets into his own son’s birthday party, imperiling the lives of those very same friends and family members. He has now committed two firearms offences and represents a clear danger to the community.

[16] I conclude that, despite his positive qualities and good prospects, Mr. George has chosen not to be governed by the most basic societal expectations of behaviour. He has chosen to embrace criminality and to act without any regard for the laws of this country or the safety of other people, even members of his own family.

Impact of Race and Culture

[17] In R. v. Morris, supra, the Ontario Court of Appeal brought the implications of race and social context to the forefront of the sentencing process. This decision, and the line of inquiry it invites, may go some distance toward understanding the dangerous and terrible decisions Mr. George has made. At paragraph 1 of Morris, the Court held as follows:

It is beyond doubt that anti-Black racism, including both overt and systemic anti-Black racism, has been, and continues to be, a reality in Canadian society, and in particular in the Greater Toronto Area. That reality is reflected in many social institutions, most notably the criminal justice system. It is equally clear that anti-Black racism can have a profound and insidious impact on those who must endure it on a daily basis.

[18] In this case, the evidence touching on social context is limited. Counsel for Mr. George expressly declined to pursue an Impact of Race and Cultural Assessment (IRCA) report, which have begun to appear in courts in the wake of Morris. That being said, the pre-sentence report in this case contains some of the information I would expect to see in such a report:

In discussion with the subject about his experiences of racism and its impact, particularly within the Criminal Justice System (CJS). The subject stated that “sometimes I’m walking on the street, or I look like someone they are looking for”. He indicated that he believes he has been stopped, arrested, and wrongfully accused of crime by police. He recalled in 2018 dropping off his younger brother to daycare and being stopped and handcuffed because there was a car theft nearby and the police assumed the perpetrator was him.

[19] Based on his own self-report, Mr. George has been exposed to violence in the community. He claims to have been shot at more than once and to have lost a number of friends to gun violence. There is little in this record which serves to connect these life experiences to the offences before the Court. Mr. George has declined to speak about the shooting on Tandridge Crescent. I do not consider his refusal to address the subject matter of the charges an aggravating factor. But there is little beyond a general sort of inferential reasoning that would allow me to attribute Mr. George’s offending to systemic racism.

[20] In this more general sense, I am aided by the report tendered in the Morris case, entitled, Expert Report on Crime, Criminal Justice and the Experience of Black Canadians in Toronto, Ontario. As the Court of Appeal observed, “The report bears reading and re-reading by those called upon to prosecute, defend and sentence Black offenders, particularly young Black offenders.”

[21] As to the difficult question of how that experience informs the sentence, I consider the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Morris, and more specifically these remarks at paragraph 18 of the decision:

-- social context evidence relating to the offender's life experiences may be used where relevant to mitigate the offender's degree of responsibility for the offence and/or to assist in the blending of the principles and objectives of sentencing to achieve a sentence which best serves the purposes of sentencing as described in s. 718; -- the gravity or seriousness of an offence is determined by its normative wrongfulness and the harm posed or caused by that conduct in the circumstances in which the conduct occurred. Accordingly, unlike when assessing the offender's degree of personal responsibility, an offender's experience with anti-Black racism does not impact on the seriousness or gravity of the offence;

[22] In accordance with these remarks, the social context evidence does not affect my view of the seriousness of the offences. I am, however, prepared to accept that Mr. George’s experiences with community violence, economic disadvantage and systemic racism have some limited bearing on his level of moral responsibility for these offences.

Impact of the Offences

[23] The shooting at Tandridge Crescent has had a profound impact on all who live there. It has shattered their sense of safety and security. A brazen shooting at a child’s birthday party, in broad daylight, is the kind of incident that tears at the very fabric of the community. The victim impact statements describe the anxiety and fear felt by the residents of this community. The statements reveal how life has changed for so many people. They no longer feel safe leaving their homes. Their friends a family are scared to visit them. They fear for their children.

[24] Tianna Green was five years old when she was shot in the head. She remained in a coma for five days and lives now with a metal plate in her head. She has experienced hearing loss and memory issues. Her mother and aunt read victim impact statements, detailing the terrible and lasting impact of these events on them and on the child. A victim impact statement written by Tianna was also read out in court by her mother, expressing fears no child should ever experience and asking questions no child should ever have to ask. This incident will no doubt affect Tianna and her family for the rest of their lives.

[25] Eleven-year-old Keandre Bailey was shot in the buttocks. While no victim impact statement was provided by him, I am prepared to infer from the circumstances that these events had a significant impact on him and his family members. One-year-old Kaiden Leitch suffered a small graze to his forehead, which may also have been caused by a stray bullet. I have no doubt that Kaiden’s life was negatively impacted when his first birthday party descended into the chaos of a shootout precipitated by his own father.

[26] Demar Cadogan was shot in both legs during the exchange. He fired a gun that day too and was prosecuted separately for his involvement in the incident. No victim impact statement was forthcoming from him.

[27] The video footage of the shootout itself, and the images of the wounded children left in its wake, are shocking in the extreme. The community is rightly outraged by these events. Against this backdrop it remains vitally important that I sentence Mr. George only for his specific role in the shooting, as proved by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt.

[28] It was not established that Kevin George caused the injuries to these people himself. There were three gunmen firing into the crowd and, with one exception, I could not determine which shooter struck which person. [1] The Crown submits the injuries are aggravating factors on sentence, as Mr. George precipitated the gunfight and “but for” his actions the injuries would not have been sustained.

[29] According to s. 724(3)(e) of the Criminal Code, aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. I am not satisfied that a simple “but for” analysis resolves the issue. Causation is both a factual and a legal determination; involving questions of foreseeability, remoteness, intervening acts and the threshold of significant contributing cause: R. v. Smithers, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506; R. v. Nette, 2001 SCC 78; R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24; R. v. H.C., 2022 ONCA 409. In this case, I found Mr. George was not responsible, on any theory of party liability, for the actions of the other two shooters. The evidence fell short of proving they jointly planned the attack or otherwise acted in concert. There was no evidence Mr. George knew the other shooters were armed or that they would enter the gunfight when he started it. In my view, the injuries cannot properly be treated as aggravating factors in these circumstances.

[30] That being said, the devastating impacts to these people remain very much relevant. I view the injuries as emblematic of the danger Kevin George exposed so many people to that day. What happened to Tianna Green and Keandre Bailey was an obvious risk inherent in the actions of Kevin George. He placed many people in grave danger without any consideration for their lives or safety. What happened to Demar Cadogan was very much within the sphere of Mr. George’s intended consequences.

[31] Whether or not the bullets fired by Kevin George struck these people, his decision to fire repeatedly toward the crowd of children and other guests represents a wantonly dangerous and objectively horrifying criminal act.

Aggravating Factors

[32] First, the offence was committed with a handgun, which is by definition a prohibited or restricted weapon. As stated above, this is a particularly dangerous kind of firearm.

[33] Second, I take into account the sheer number of people who were imperiled by Mr. George’s conduct. The counts above refer only to Demar Cadogan and Tianna Green. The named victims were a representative sampling of the many victims in this case. In the reasons for judgment, I estimated conservatively that some fifty people were in the immediate vicinity when Mr. George started shooting, and many of them were clearly within the line of fire. This is a significant aggravating factor.

[34] Third, I consider that many of the people endangered by Mr. George were children. Children are among the most vulnerable members of society and they are the ones most in need of protection.

[35] Fourth, Mr. George owed a special duty to his own child. As a father, Mr. George was responsible for Kaiden’s safety and well-being. He violated that solemn duty when he discharged a hail of bullets into Kaiden’s birthday celebration.

[36] Fifth, I consider the number of shots fired. Mr. George discharged six rounds from a handgun in a sustained and concerted attempt to endanger the life of Demar Cadogan. The number of shots increased the danger to the many innocent by-standers at the party.

[37] Sixth, Mr. George was on bail and breached the terms of his release. He was found with a handgun during a vehicle stop on January 17, 2020 and was charged with possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. He was released on a surety bail with the condition he possess no weapons. With those charges still before the court, Mr. George acquired another firearm, brought it to his child’s birthday party and fired it multiple times. This was an egregious breach of his bail and constitutes a serious aggravating factor.

Mitigating Factors

[38] First, Mr. George has the support of his family and others in the community who provided character letters to the Court. This factor does not reduce his moral culpability or lessen the seriousness of the offence. However, the letters inform my assessment of Mr. George’s character, and the presence of support in the community speaks to his potential for rehabilitation.

[39] Second, Mr. George has some history of employment in the community and has been working toward his GED since January of 2022 while in custody.

[40] Third, as set out above, I find the evidence of race and social context goes some distance toward explaining Mr. George’s conduct and mitigates his moral culpability to a limited extent.

[41] Fourth, Mr. George is a young man. At the time he committed these offences, he had no criminal record. These are mitigating factors. However, Mr. George was convicted and sentenced for other offences after he committed the shooting on Tandridge Crescent on June 19, 2021. On February 4, 2022, he plead guilty to possessing a loaded prohibited firearm in connection with the vehicle stop mentioned above. He received a sentence of two years in jail. On March 30, 2022, he plead guilty to obstructing a police officer and received an absolute discharge.

[42] Mr. George should not be treated as a simple first offender in the manner contemplated by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Priest, [1996] O.J. No. 3369, R. v. Borde, [2003] O.J. No. 354 (C.A.) at para. 36 and R. v. Sousa, 2023 ONCA 100 at para. 37. This is not Mr. George’s first sentence of imprisonment. And having reviewed the reasons for sentence on the firearms conviction, I am aware he received the benefit of his position as a “youthful first offender” in that case. This conviction is not an aggravating factor in law, but it properly informs my assessment of Mr. George’s character and his prospects for rehabilitation: R. v. Finelli, [2008] O.J. No. 2537 (SC) at paras. 28-34; R. v. Wilson, 2020 ONCA 3 at para. 67.

Pre-Sentence Custody

[43] Mr. George has served 7 months in pre-sentence custody, which is not otherwise attributable to the sentence he has served for the firearms conviction. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, I award him credit at the rate of 1.5 to 1 and will reduce his sentence by 10.5 months.

[44] The defence seeks additional credit for time spent under particularly harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody: R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754; R. v. Marshall, supra. Counsel filed records from the institution, indicating Mr. George has been subject to 11 full day lockdowns and 119 partial lockdowns of three hours or less. The records cover the timeframe between November 8, 2021 and March 31, 2023. The majority of this time was attributable to the sentence Mr. George has already served. I am prepared to infer that some roughly proportionate share of the lockdowns occurred after the statutory release date of September 29, 2022 and during the period I now consider as pre-sentence custody on these charges. In accordance with the dicta in Marshall, I consider this a mitigating factor, rather than a specific deduction against the quantum of sentence.

Other Considerations

[45] Mr. George has not demonstrated any remorse for these crimes. He has not taken responsibility for his actions, either by way of a guilty plea or allocution. He has not shown any insight into the harm he has caused. I do not treat these points as aggravating factors on sentence. It is the absence of positive indicators that I note here. The lack of insight or remorse bears on my assessment of Mr. George’s character, the danger he poses, and his potential for rehabilitation.

[46] The Crown submits Mr. George is affiliated with a street gang based in the area of Jane and Finch. The Crown relies on the assertion of DC Natasha Hardie, as reported in the pre-sentence report, and a series of rap videos in which Mr. George is said to identify with the “gangster lifestyle.” I find the evidence before me falls short of establishing Mr. George’s involvement in gang activity to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I decline to treat the music videos as aggravating features on sentence.

[47] Section 770(1) of the Criminal Code directs that a judge who has knowledge of a breach of a release order is required to note the bail for estreat by way of an endorsement in Form 33. This is a precondition for forfeiture of the money pledged. It falls to the Justice in estreatment court to determine whether that money is forfeited or not. While the Crown acknowledges this provision has not always been followed, in my view it should be since it is not discretionary. The credibility of the bail system requires regular enforcement. The effectiveness of surety bails depends on the accused’s belief there will be consequences to the surety for non-compliance: R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para. 54; Canada (Attorney General) v. Horvath, 2009 ONCA 732 at para. 41. I will endorse the release order accordingly.

The Range of Sentence

[48] The maximum sentence for the offence of discharge firearm with intent is 14 years. There is a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years where a restricted or prohibited firearm is used, as it was in this case. The maximum sentence for failing to comply with a recognizance is 2 years where the Crown proceeds by indictment.

[49] The Crown seeks the maximum sentence of 14 years in jail. The defence invites me to impose a sentence of 8 years.

[50] Since proportionality is the fundamental principle of sentencing, I am guided by sentences handed down in other cases.

[51] In R. v. Bellissimo, 2009 ONCA 49, the accused fired several shots in a restaurant, seriously injuring one victim and endangering others. The Court of Appeal held the range of sentence for these kinds of serious gun related offences is between seven and eleven years. The sentence in that case was increased to 10 years.

[52] The range set out in Bellissimo has been applied consistently in sentencing decisions across the province since then: see, for example, R. v. Jarvis, 2022 ONCA 7; R. v. Abderazak, 2022 ONSC 6737; R. v. Jefferson, 2014 ONCA 434. There is support in the authorities for the proposition that this range applies to cases involving injury or an attempt to injure: R. v. Jama, 2021 ONSC 4871, at para. 44; R. v. Dhaliwal, 2019 ONCA 398 at para. 2. This is clearly such a case.

[53] Sentencing ranges are not hard and fast rules, they are summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para. 36. There will be situations that call for a sentence outside the existing range: R. v. Lacasse, supra, at para. 58. The following trilogy of cases illustrates this point. Justice McMahon sentenced three men separately for their involvement in a shooting at a playground that seriously injured two children. Two of them received sentences above the range set out in Bellissimo.

[54] The first decision, R. v. Robertson, [2020] O.J. No. 6129 (S.C.J.), dealt with the shooter, who fired ten bullets into a playground in a planned attempt to kill another man. The intended target was not injured, but a five-year-old girl was shot in the abdomen and a nine-year-old girl was shot in the leg. Mr. Robertson plead guilty to attempted murder and two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to 13 years. He had a prior conviction for a firearms offence from seven years earlier and was subject to a weapons prohibition. Justice McMahon observed the guilty plea was a significant mitigating factor and gave “enhanced credit” for the plea since it was entered in the fall of 2020 during the height of the Covid 19 pandemic when courts were rendered largely unable to function.

[55] In the second decision, R. v. Rhoden, [2020] O.J. No. 6128 (S.C.J.), the man who accompanied Mr. Robertson to the playground shooting plead guilty to discharging a firearm with intent to wound, two counts of aggravated assault, and possessing a loaded restricted firearm at the time of arrest a few days later. He also received a sentence of 13 years. Justice McMahon observed his moral culpability was less than Robertson’s, but his criminal record was worse, and he possessed another gun in the days after the shooting. The guilty plea was a significant mitigating factor.

[56] In the third decision, R. v. Eriya, [2021] O.J. No. 7486 (S.C.J.), the man who drove the other two to the playground shooting was sentenced. He was a youthful first offender with a lesser degree of moral culpability as compared with the other two. He received a sentence of 10 years.

[57] The defence relies on R. v. Bough, 2021 ONSC 8408. In that case, three men plead guilty to aggravated assault, reckless discharge of firearm and related counts for their respective roles in a shooting. All three men fired bullets at a car with three people inside, causing serious injury to one of the occupants. In the decision, Justice Forestell surveys some the cases occupying the lower end of the Bellissimo range.

[58] The first shooter, Bough, was 20 years old at the time of the offence and had no criminal record. Being a youthful first offender who had plead guilty, Justice Forestell found that a sentence in the range of 8 years would normally be warranted. However, she imposed a sentence of 6 years on account of what she found to be harsh presentence conditions and the collateral consequences of serving a sentence during the COVID-19 pandemic. The second shooter, Reece, was similarly situated and received the same sentence. The third shooter, Liburd, was 28 years old. He had a criminal record and was subject to a weapons prohibition at the time of the shooting. He received a sentence of 7.5 years, taking into account his guilty plea and the unique circumstances of the Covid-19 pandemic.

[59] I have also found instructive the decisions in R. v. Sauve, 2019 ONSC 960 and R. v. Weeden, 2019 ONSC 773 wherein the offence of discharge firearm with intent attracted sentences of 11 years and 9.5 years respectively.

[60] In light of the cases referred to here, and several others I have reviewed, I return to the Crown’s sentencing proposal of fourteen years. In R. v. Cheddisingh, 2004 SCC 16, the Supreme Court observed that a maximum penalty of any kind will be imposed rarely and is only appropriate if the offence is of sufficient gravity and the offender displays sufficient blameworthiness. Terms appearing in earlier jurisprudence such as “worst offence”, “worst offender” or “stark horror” add nothing to the analysis and should be avoided. That being said, I consider the principles of proportionality and parity in sentencing to continue to invite comparisons to other cases and to realistic hypotheticals involving aggravating factors not present in the case at bar.

[61] I did not find Kevin George criminally liable for the actions of the other shooters. I was unable to determine who caused the terrible injuries in this case. And I was not satisfied, to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. George had the specific intent for attempted murder. If some or all of those factors had been proved, a sentence in the range of the one proposed by the Crown would have been appropriate. I do not find the maximum sentence is required in the particular circumstances of this case.

Parole Eligibility

[62] The Crown invites me, in the event that I decline to impose the maximum sentence, to order Mr. George’s parole eligibility be delayed pursuant to s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code. I have approached this question according to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Zinck, 2003 SCC 6.

[63] There is no question that Mr. George, as he is now, represents a danger to the public. But he is still very young, and he faces a significant penitentiary sentence. The man Kevin George becomes by the time he is eligible for parole may be very different from the man he is today. In my view, it is in the long-term interests of society to give him the chance to prove himself during his time in custody. And to give him a reason to change for the better. I decline to make an order delaying parole eligibility and I leave the question of early release to the discretion of the parole board.

The Fit Sentence

[64] I have carefully considered the applicable sentencing principles. I have weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, and evaluated them according to the guiding principle of proportionality.

[65] Based on Mr. George’s specific involvement in this incident, as proved beyond a reasonable doubt, I find the maximum sentence is not required and the range identified by the Court of Appeal in Bellissimo applies. In my view, however, the extremely serious nature of these offences requires a sentence at the top of that range. The citizens of this city must be protected from gun violence. A clear message must be sent that criminals who arm themselves with illegal firearms and use them in public will face severe consequences.

[66] I find that a fit and proper sentence is one of 11 years in the penitentiary. This sentence is reduced by 10.5 months on account of time spent in pre-sentence custody. The remaining sentence to be served is one of 10 years, 1.5 months. This sentence will apply to the two counts of discharging a firearm with intent concurrently. For the charge of failing to comply with a recognizance, I impose a sentence of 12 months concurrent.

[67] I make an order under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, directing Mr. George to have no contact with Demar Cadogan, Tianna Green or any member of her immediate family, and Keandre Bailey or any member of his immediate family.

[68] There will be a DNA order in connection with the two primary designated offences.

[69] There will be a s. 109 weapons prohibition for life.

Released: May 3, 2023 Signed: Justice Peter N. Fraser

[1] I was able to determine that the first bullet to strike Demar Cadogan in the leg was fired by a shooter other than Mr. George.