Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: October 14, 2020

Court File No.: Halton 19-3201

Parties

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

— And —

Susan D. Fredson

Before: Justice D.A. Harris

Heard on: February 20, 2020 and September 16, 2020

Reasons for Sentence released on: October 14, 2020

Counsel

For the Crown: Arish Khoorshed and Rayem Zager

For the Accused: Wayne Richard

Decision

D.A. HARRIS J.:

Introduction

[1] Susan D Fredson pled guilty to one count of fraud over $5,000 and one count of fraud under $5,000. Both offences occurred between June 2017 and May 2018. Marino Peric's company was the victim of both offences.

[2] Fraud over $5,000 is an indictable offence. Crown counsel elected to proceed by indictment with respect to the fraud under charge.

[3] Ms. Fredson is before me today to be sentenced.

[4] Crown counsel suggested that I should sentence her to imprisonment for six months, followed by probation for three years. She also requested:

(1) a restitution order,

(2) an order pursuant to s 743.21, and

(3) a DNA order.

[5] Counsel for Ms. Fredson suggested that I suspend sentence and impose a lengthy probation order.

[6] He agreed that a restitution order was appropriate.

[7] He was opposed to the DNA order.

[8] I find that the appropriate sentence here is a conditional sentence of imprisonment for six months, followed by probation for three years. I will also be ordering restitution and the taking of DNA.

[9] My reasons for this are set out under the following headings:

(1) The law regarding conditional sentences of imprisonment,

(2) The fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing,

(3) The facts underlying the offences,

(4) The impact on the victim,

(5) Restitution,

(6) The background of Ms. Fredson and

(7) Analysis.

Conditional Sentence of Imprisonment

[10] The conditional sentence came into being when section 742.1 of the Criminal Code was proclaimed in 1996.

[11] The Supreme Court of Canada subsequently stated in R. v. Proulx that "Parliament clearly mandated that certain offenders who used to go to prison should now serve their sentence in the community."

[12] The Supreme Court of Canada stated further that an offender who meets the criteria of section 742.1 will serve a sentence under strict surveillance in the community instead of going to prison. Her liberty will be constrained by conditions to be attached to the sentence. In case of breach of conditions, the offender will be brought back before a judge who may order her to serve the remainder of the sentence in jail, as it was intended by Parliament that there be a real threat of incarceration to increase compliance with the conditions of the sentence.

[13] Section 742.1 lists five criteria that a court must consider before deciding to impose a conditional sentence. These are:

1. the offender must be convicted of an offence that is not specifically excluded by the legislation;

2. the offender must be convicted of an offence that is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment;

3. the court must impose a term of imprisonment of less than two years;

4. the safety of the community must not be endangered by the offender serving the sentence in the community; and

5. a conditional sentence must be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2.

[14] The first four criteria are prerequisites to any conditional sentence. These prerequisites answer the question of whether or not a conditional sentence is possible in the circumstances. Once they are met, the next question is whether a conditional sentence is appropriate. That decision turns upon a consideration of the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2.

[15] In Ms. Fredson's case, the first four prerequisite criteria have been satisfied.

[16] Fraud under $5000 is not excluded pursuant to section 742.1. Fraud over $5000 was excluded pursuant to section 742.1 (c) but the Ontario Court of Appeal has recently declared that section to be of no force and effect.

[17] Neither offence is punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment.

[18] I am satisfied that I should impose a sentence of imprisonment for less than two years. Crown counsel clearly agrees with this as she asked for me to imprison Ms. Fredson for six months.

[19] Finally, I find that Ms. Fredson serving her sentence in the community, subject to appropriate conditions, would not endanger the safety of the community. She had no prior criminal record. She has not been in any further trouble since being charged. I am satisfied that, with the appropriate safeguards in place, there is no danger that she would return to crime following the imposition of a conditional sentence.

[20] That then leaves the question of whether a conditional sentence is appropriate in all of the circumstances of this case. In making this decision, I must consider the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.

Fundamental Purpose and Principles of Sentencing

[21] The fundamental purpose of sentencing as expressed in section 718 is to contribute to respect for the law, the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the objectives of denunciation; deterring the offender and other persons from committing offences; separating offenders from society, where necessary; assisting in rehabilitating offenders; providing reparation for harm done to victims or to the community; and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.

[22] The relevance and relative importance of each of these objectives will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender.

[23] The fundamental principle of sentencing is that the punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The punishment should fit the crime. There is no single fit sentence for any particular offence.

[24] Doherty J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R. v. Hamilton that:

The "gravity of the offence" refers to the seriousness of the offence in a generic sense as reflected by the potential penalty imposed by Parliament and any specific features of the commission of the crime which may tend to increase or decrease the harm or risk of harm to the community occasioned by the offence.

[25] He went on to state that:

The "degree of responsibility of the offender" refers to the offender's culpability as reflected in the essential substantive elements of the offence - especially the fault component - and any specific aspects of the offender's conduct or background that tend to increase or decrease the offender's personal responsibility for the crime.

[26] He then quoted Rosenberg J.A. who had previously described the proportionality requirement in R. v. Priest:

The principle of proportionality is rooted in notions of fairness and justice. For the sentencing court to do justice to the particular offender, the sentence imposed must reflect the seriousness of the offence, the degree of culpability of the offender, and the harm occasioned by the offence. The court must have regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors in the particular case. Careful adherence to the proportionality principle ensures that this offender is not unjustly dealt with for the sake of the common good.

[27] Proportionality is the fundamental principle of sentencing, but it is not the only principle to be considered.

[28] Section 718.2(a)(iii) provides that evidence that an offender, in committing an offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim, shall be deemed to be an aggravating circumstance and that the sentence should be increased to reflect that.

[29] Section 380.1 of the Criminal Code enumerates the following aggravating circumstances in cases of fraud.

380.1 (1) Without limiting the generality of section 718.2, where a court imposes a sentence for an offence referred to in section 380, 382, 382.1 or 400, it shall consider the following as aggravating circumstances:

(a) the magnitude, complexity, duration or degree of planning of the fraud committed was significant;

(b) the offence adversely affected, or had the potential to adversely affect, the stability of the Canadian economy or financial system or any financial market in Canada or investor confidence in such a financial market;

(c) the offence involved a large number of victims;

(c.1) the offence had a significant impact on the victims given their personal circumstances including their age, health and financial situation;

(d) in committing the offence, the offender took advantage of the high regard in which the offender was held in the community;

(e) the offender did not comply with a licensing requirement, or professional standard, that is normally applicable to the activity or conduct that forms the subject-matter of the offence; and

(f) the offender concealed or destroyed records related to the fraud or to the disbursement of the proceeds of the fraud.

(1.1) Without limiting the generality of section 718.2, when a court imposes a sentence for an offence referred to in section 382, 382.1 or 400, it shall also consider as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the value of the fraud committed exceeded one million dollars.

(2) When a court imposes a sentence for an offence referred to in section 380, 382, 382.1 or 400, it shall not consider as mitigating circumstances the offender's employment, employment skills or status or reputation in the community if those circumstances were relevant to, contributed to, or were used in the commission of the offence.

(3) The court shall cause to be stated in the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it took into account when determining the sentence.

[30] Only sections 380.1(1)(a), (c.1) and (d) and section 380.1(2) are applicable in this case.

[31] The Ontario Court of Appeal has consistently affirmed that in cases of large-scale fraud committed by persons in a position of trust, general deterrence and denunciation are the dominant sentencing principles.

[32] Mitigating factors and rehabilitation become secondary considerations.

[33] In R. v. Gray, supra, Carthy J.A. also stated that:

There are few crimes where the aspect of deterrence is more significant. It is not a crime of impulse and is of a type that is normally committed by a person who is knowledgeable and should be aware of the consequences. That awareness comes from sentences given to others.

[34] In R. v. Wismayer, Rosenberg J.A. wrote:

General deterrence, as the principal objective animating the refusal to impose a conditional sentence, should be reserved for those offences that are likely to be affected by a general deterrent effect. Large scale well-planned fraud by persons in positions of trust, such as the accused in R. v. Pierce, would seem to be one of those offences. Even then, however, I would not want to lay down as a rule that a conditional sentence is never or even rarely available. Each case will have to be determined on its own merits.

[35] In R. v. Pierce, Finlayson J.A. wrote:

I would, however, refuse the application to permit the appellant to serve the sentence in the community. The abuse of a position of trust or authority in relation to a victim is an express aggravating circumstance set out in the sentencing guidelines under s. 718.2. This factor has traditionally drawn a severe custodial term even with first offenders. I do not believe that this court should exercise its discretion in favour of having the appellant serve her sentence in the community where, as here, the trial judge has clearly stated his concerns as to how a non-custodial term would be viewed by the community. Despite the passage of s. 742.1, the principles of general deterrence and public denunciation require a custodial term in these circumstances.

[36] It might be argued that $44,000 does not qualify as a large-scale fraud when compared to the above cases, but I am certain that the victim in this case and many others would not see things that way. $44,000 is a great deal of money to most people.

[37] I am satisfied that denunciation and deterrence are the most important sentencing objectives in this case.

[38] I must however also consider section 718.2(d) which provides that "an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances".

[39] I must also consider the impact of section 718.2(e) which provides that "... all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders."

[40] The Supreme Court of Canada discussed the application of this section in Gladue v. The Queen and said that section 718.2(e) applies to all offenders, and that imprisonment should be the penal sanction of last resort. Prison is to be used only where no other sanction or combination of sanctions is appropriate to the offence and the offender.

[41] The Supreme Court also stated that section 718 now requires a sentencing judge to consider more than the long-standing principles of denunciation, deterrence and rehabilitation. Now a sentencing judge must also consider the restorative goals of repairing the harms suffered by individual victims and by the community as a whole, promoting a sense of responsibility and an acknowledgment of the harm caused on the part of the offender, and attempting to rehabilitate or heal the offender. As a general matter restorative justice involves some form of restitution and reintegration into the community. A conditional sentence is much more effective than jail in achieving these restorative justice goals.

[42] I also note that the Supreme Court of Canada expressly said in R. v. Proulx, supra that a conditional sentence is "a punitive sanction capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence" although it is not as effective as a sentence of real imprisonment.

[43] I also note that:

there need not be any equivalence between the duration of the conditional sentence and the jail term that would otherwise have been imposed. The sole requirement is that the duration and conditions of a conditional sentence make for a just and appropriate sentence.

[44] I can therefore impose a conditional sentence that is longer in duration than the jail term that I might otherwise have imposed.

[45] I can also impose a blended sentence.

[46] It is settled law that it is improper to blend a custodial sentence with a conditional sentence in the context of a single offence.

[47] However, "when an accused is being sentenced for more than one offence, it is legally permissible to blend a custodial sentence with a conditional sentence so long as the sentences, in total, do not exceed two years less one day and the court is also satisfied that the preconditions in section 742.1 (b) have been met in respect of one or more but not all of the offences."

[48] The Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Middleton that "intermittent and conditional sentences can be effectively combined to take appropriate advantage of their complementary purposes -- in full compliance with the statutory conditions by which they are respectively governed."

[49] Fish J. elaborated on this stating:

Intermittent sentences strike a legislative balance between the denunciatory and deterrent functions of "real jail time" and the rehabilitative functions of preserving the offender's employment, family relationships and responsibilities, and obligations to the community.

That balance cannot be sustained indefinitely. Parliament has therefore fixed its duration at a reasonable limit of 90 days. Beyond that limit, intermittent sentences lose their purpose: the recurring "taste of jail" becomes disproportionately punitive as a deterrent and counter-productive as a rehabilitative and correctional alternative to continuous terms of imprisonment.

It has not been suggested, on the other hand, that the combination of an intermittent and a conditional sentence -- even when their aggregate duration exceeds 90 days -- is similarly objectionable on any ground of correctional policy, or inconsistent with the sentencing principles enacted by Parliament in the governing sections of the Criminal Code.

On the contrary, it is conceded that their combination in this case served the purposes of both intermittent and conditional sentences. This fit combination of sentences harmonizes the differing correctional advantages of conditional and intermittent sentences, while respecting the letter and the spirit of the provisions of the Criminal Code dealing with both.

[50] I have also considered the fact that in 2004 Parliament amended the Criminal Code to increase the maximum sentence for fraud over $5,000 to imprisonment for 14 years rather than 10 years. I should view this amendment as a reflection of Parliament's intention to punish such offences more harshly.

[51] The maximum sentence for fraud under $5000 is imprisonment for two years.

The Offences

[52] Ms. Fredson worked as a part-time receptionist for a company owned by MP.

[53] In that capacity she created a Capital One Mastercard in the name of the company. She used that card to pay personal expenses totalling $37,834.18. She also used company funds to pay $3,280 for her personal bill with Rogers and to pay $3,160 for other bills.

[54] All of this occurred between June 2017 and May 2018.

Victim Impact

[55] MP chose not to provide a Victim Impact Statement. He did provide some comments which Crown counsel passed on to me. These were as follows:

• He will leave it to the court.
• He was hurt.
• He trusted her.
• He hopes she will be ordered to repay the money.
• He does not want her to go to jail.

[56] In the Pre-Sentence Report, MP indicated that her fraudulent behaviour has affected his "thinking" and he expressed his disappointment in her actions. He stated, "she's not a bad person", and opined a custodial sentence may not be an appropriate disposition for the current offences. He requested that a restitution condition be included as part of this disposition and further remarked that a period of community supervision may be appropriate to monitor her restitution payments.

Restitution

[57] Ms. Fredson has repaid $900 to the victim.

[58] She assured me that she wants to repay the whole amount and that she will be able to pay $250 every month.

Background of Ms. Fredson

[59] I received a Pre-Sentence Report and two reference letters. These provided me with the following information.

[60] Ms. Fredson is now 51 years of age.

[61] She was born and raised in Hamilton.

[62] Her mother was also employed by MP. Her mother worked there for 20 years, before her retirement in 2006. Her father was employed at a local steel factory for 50 years prior to his passing in 2018. The subject has an older brother who is 54 years old and is married with three children.

[63] Ms. Fredson described her childhood as pleasant. Her parents as "happy". Her family held regular contact with her extended maternal relatives.

[64] She attended multiple schools in Hamilton as her parents frequently moved around.

[65] Her primary school experience was unremarkable and her relationship with her teachers and peers was cordial. She reported she was never suspended from school.

[66] In high school, a lack of interest in school led to her being truant from class, which resulted in her suspension. She found school, "boring" and in 1986, at the age of 17, she permanently ceased her secondary school education. In 2016, she attempted to complete post-secondary advancements, but she did not complete the program.

[67] In 1987, she met her first husband through mutual friends. They shared a positive relationship and wed in 1989. Soon after that, she became pregnant with her eldest son and four years after that, she had her youngest child. Over time, she and her husband "drifted apart". In 2007, her marriage had developed into a contentious union and she later discovered her partner engaged in an extra-marital affair. She left the familial home with her youngest son, while her eldest remained with his father. The relationship was terminated at that time, and the divorce was finalized in 2008.

[68] Following her first marriage, she became involved with another male whom she characterized as abusive. They married in 2010. The relationship was unhealthy due to her spouse's abusive behaviours and addiction issues. There was police involvement due to domestic violence concerns but there were never any charges laid. She divorced him in 2012.

[69] After she married her first husband, she held part-time employment in the hospitality industry. Historically, she has worked at two jobs; one was a fast-food restaurant and the other was at the victim's business.

[70] She was hired by the victim in 2006, assuming her mother's role as a bookkeeper, within the company. She described her employment experience as positive and reported she shared a close relationship with the victim, prior to her offence.

[71] In 2016, she was diagnosed with anxiety, after she suffered several panic attacks. She was prescribed medication to treat her symptoms and notes that the medication has helped. Her mental health is stable, and she remains under the care of her family physician.

[72] In 2017, her father developed congestive heart failure, and other health related-concerns. He died in 2018. Ms. Fredson reflected his passing had a significant impact on the family and she still has difficulty talking about it. After the passing of her father, her mother faced financial hardship and Ms. Fredson's eldest brother provided financial support for the funeral costs. This ultimately caused strain between her mother and brother. Since her father's passing, Ms. Fredson has been estranged from her brother.

[73] Currently, she is living with her youngest son and with her mother, who requires care. She described her living situation as stable and noted she has the love and support of her family.

[74] Currently, she is working at a Mr. Sub restaurant in Burlington. She has worked there for a number of years. She made her employer aware of her offence but did not disclose specific details to him. He provided a reference letter in which he speaks glowingly of her. A similar letter was provided by the previous owner.

[75] Counsel advised me that Ms. Fredson was about to be interviewed regarding a possible job with Toyota. I asked to be advised if she received a job offer but I have heard nothing further.

[76] I also emphasized to Ms. Fredson that I needed her to be realistic with respect to her ability to pay restitution. She then assured me that she is capable of paying of $250 per month.

Analysis

[77] Doherty J.A. aptly described my task here when he began the judgment in R. v. Hamilton, supra by stating:

The imposition of a fit sentence can be as difficult a task as any faced by a trial judge.

[78] Sentencing is not an exact science. The determination of the sentence that is just and appropriate in a given case is "a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation."

[79] General deterrence and denunciation are clearly the most important principles of sentence in this case, warranting a sentence of imprisonment. However, I must not lose sight of the other principles.

[80] I must craft a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed and the degree of responsibility of Ms. Fredson and yet, at the same time, one that is responsive to her unique circumstances.

[81] I must consider both the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors when determining the appropriate sentence here.

[82] The aggravating factors may be found in the offence itself. It was a serious breach of trust. The offences were not particularly sophisticated, but the high level of trust placed in Ms. Fredson by her employer allowed her to conceal her actions for nearly a year. I note that this level of trust started with Ms. Fredson's mother who performed the same job before her. Finally, Ms. Fredson stole a significant sum of money.

[83] The impact on the victim was serious. He lost $44,000. He also lost some faith in humanity.

[84] Other specific aggravating factors set out in section 380.1 of the Criminal Code are not applicable here.

[85] Further, her actions were motivated more by financial need than a desire to live the good life.

[86] Neither of these last two comments are meant to excuse her behaviour. They are intended solely to provide context.

[87] Crown counsel argued that her failure to make restitution is an aggravating factor here.

[88] I disagree.

[89] I view the making of restitution as a mitigating factor that might justify imposing a lesser sentence than might otherwise be appropriate. The absence of restitution means that this mitigating factor is also absent.

[90] On the other hand, there are mitigating factors present in this case.

[91] Ms. Fredson pled guilty. I take this to be both an acceptance of responsibility and an expression of remorse.

[92] This feeling of remorse has been consistent throughout these proceedings. Ms. Fredson freely confessed to MP when he questioned her, and she also confessed to the police when they became involved. She expressed remorse in the Pre-Sentence Report and before me in court.

[93] She had no prior criminal record. She committed no offences for the first 49 of her 51 years. This factor is somewhat diminished in value by the fact that she would not have been in a position to commit the offences otherwise.

[94] Her previously good name is gone forever.

[95] She has complied with the terms of her release since being charged.

[96] She is a caregiver for her mother.

[97] Taking all of this into account, denunciation and deterrence are the most important sentencing objectives in this case.

[98] However, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly said in R. v. Proulx, supra that a conditional sentence is "a punitive sanction capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence"

[99] In R. v. Wismayer, supra, Rosenberg J.A. said that there is no rule that a conditional sentence is "never or even rarely available" in cases such as this.

[100] In addition, I must not ignore the principle of rehabilitation. Ms. Fredson has already taken on responsibility for the care of her mother. Hopefully, the terms contained in her conditional sentence order and her probation order will lead to her assuming even more responsibilities within her community.

[101] I must also consider the principle of restorative justice. Ms. Fredson has already repaid $900 to MP. She has assured me that she is willing and able to make further restitution payments at a rate of $250 every month. This money too will then go to benefit MP. Further, Ms. Fredson is aware of the potential penal consequences should she break her word and not make the payments. I realize that, at this rate, she will only be paying back less than 25 % of what she took, but that is still $10,000 that MP might never see otherwise.

[102] Needless to say, this money will not be available if I send Ms. Fredson to jail and she loses her employment.

[103] With that in mind, I also point out that I was satisfied that imprisonment for 90 days would have been an appropriate sentence. I would have permitted Ms. Fredson to serve that sentence intermittently so that she could remain employed. I understand however that in the current Covid 19 climate, the jails are simply placing such people in temporary absence programs. In other words, she would not serve her time in an actual jail.

[104] That would not be a meaningful sentence.

[105] I can instead impose a longer conditional sentence of imprisonment. I am satisfied that a six-month conditional sentence will address the need for denunciation and general and specific deterrence here. It also allows Ms. Fredson to rehabilitate herself and to at least make a start towards restorative justice. Finally, it is the least restrictive sanction that may be appropriate in the circumstances.

Sentence

[106] For all of the above reasons, with respect to each charge, I sentence Ms. Fredson to a conditional sentence of imprisonment for six months, to be served in the community. That will be followed by probation for three years. The sentences will be concurrent.

[107] The terms of the conditional sentences of imprisonment will require that Ms. Fredson:

1. keep the peace and be of good behaviour;

2. appear before the court when required to do so by the court;

3. report to a supervisor within two working days and thereafter report when required by the supervisor and in the manner directed by the supervisor;

4. notify the supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the supervisor of any change of employment or occupation;

5. remain within the Province of Ontario unless written permission to go outside the Province is obtained from the court or the supervisor;

6. cooperate with her supervisor. She must sign any releases necessary to permit the supervisor to monitor her compliance and she must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this order to her supervisor on request;

7. live at […] Street, Hamilton, Ontario, or a place approved of by the supervisor and not change that address without obtaining the consent of the supervisor in advance;

8. a home confinement condition will be in effect for the full duration of the sentence

9. during that time, she will remain in her residence at all times except

   (a) between 1 pm and 5 pm on Saturdays in order to acquire the necessities of life,

   (b) for any medical emergency involving her or any member of her immediate family (spouse, child, parent, sibling),

   (c) for going directly to and from or being at school, employment, court attendance, religious services and legal or medical or dental appointments for herself or her mother, or looking for work, or attending at a criminal court office to pay restitution

   (d) for going directly to and from or being at assessment, treatment or counselling sessions

   (e) she will confirm her schedule in advance with her supervisor setting out the times for these activities

   (f) with the prior written approval of the supervisor. The written permission of the supervisor is to be carried with her during these times.

10. during the period of home confinement, she must present herself at her doorway upon the request of her supervisor or a peace officer for the purpose of verifying her compliance with her home confinement condition.

11. not contact or communicate in any way, either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means with Marino Peric except through or in the presence of counsel, or for the purpose of conducting or defending court proceedings or for the purpose of paying restitution;

12. not attend at Global Electric and Lighting, 1140 Heritage Road, Unit 12, Burlington, Ontario;

13. make reasonable efforts to seek and maintain suitable work

14. not seek, obtain or continue any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or become or be a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority with respect to financial matters unless she has notified her employer, in writing and in advance, of her criminal record

15. attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling, or rehabilitative programs as directed by the supervisor, and complete them to the satisfaction of the supervisor for financial counselling, life skills, employment counselling or any other program directed by her supervisor

16. make restitution of $1000 to Global Electric and Lighting Inc. to be made in installments of not less than $250 per month payable on or before the first day of each month commencing January 1, 2021 and ending April 1, 2021. All restitution payments are to be made by cash or certified cheque or money order payable to the Minister of Finance through any criminal court office for payment to the victim / aggrieved party.

[108] The terms of the probation will require that Ms. Fredson:

1. keep the peace and be of good behaviour;

2. appear before the court when required to do so by the court;

3. notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or the probation officer of any change of employment or occupation;

4. report to a probation officer within two working days of completing her conditional sentence of imprisonment and after that, at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorized by a probation officer to assist in her supervision;

5. cooperate with her probation officer. She must sign any releases necessary to permit the probation officer to monitor her compliance and she must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this order to her probation officer on request;

6. not contact or communicate in any way, either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means with Marino Peric except through or in the presence of counsel, or for the purpose of conducting or defending court proceedings or for the purpose of paying restitution;

7. not attend at Global Electric and Lighting, 1140 Heritage Road, Unit 12, Burlington, Ontario;

8. make reasonable efforts to seek and maintain suitable work

9. not seek, obtain or continue any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or become or be a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority with respect to financial matters unless she has notified her employer, in writing and in advance, of her criminal record

10. attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling, or rehabilitative programs as directed by the probation officer, and complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer for financial counselling, life skills, employment counselling or any other program directed by the probation officer

11. make restitution of $9,000 to Global Electric and Lighting Inc. be made in installments of not less than $250 per month payable on or before the first day of each month commencing May 1, 2021 and ending April 1, 2024. All restitution payments are to be made by cash or certified cheque or money order payable to the Minister of Finance through any criminal court office for payment to the victim / aggrieved party.

[109] It should be noted that the $1000 restitution in the conditional sentence order and the $9,000 restitution in the probation order are to be treated separately from each other. My intention is to require Ms. Fredson to pay restitution totalling $10,000 over the next 42 months.

[110] I am also making the following orders.

[111] Pursuant to section 738 of the Criminal Code, Ms. Fredson is ordered to pay restitution to Global Electric and Lighting Inc. in the amount of $43,374.18. This amount is to be reduced to reflect any restitution payments made by Ms. Fredson pursuant to her conditional sentence order, or pursuant to her probation order. I have already deducted the $900 previously paid by her.

[112] Fraud over $5000 is a secondary designated offence, and I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of the administration of justice for me to make an order pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code, authorizing the taking from Ms. Fredson of any number of samples of one or more bodily substances, including blood, that are reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis.

Released: October 14, 2020

Signed: Justice D.A. Harris