ONCJ 2019

The accused was convicted of being an occupant of a hotel room while knowingly permitting two 15-year-old females to use the room for acts of prostitution, contrary to section 171 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 12 months imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence as violating section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The court determined that a fit sentence without the mandatory minimum would be 60 days imprisonment followed by probation.

Finding that the 12-month mandatory minimum was grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the case, the court declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional as applied and imposed the alternative sentence.

The appellants, an employer and a supervisor, appealed their convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after a worker was seriously injured by a wood splinter ejected from an industrial saw.

The trial judge had convicted them, finding they failed to exercise due diligence because there was 'no evidence' of a system to regularly check and clean the saw's anti-kickback fingers.

The appeal court found this conclusion was unreasonable as it contradicted the uncontradicted and unrejected testimony of a worker who detailed his daily cleaning and maintenance routine.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered for both appellants.

The reasons for judgment in this criminal matter are not available at this time.

The case involves a Crown prosecution against the accused Bedada in the Ontario Court of Justice.

At a preliminary hearing, the Crown sought committal on charges of importing a Schedule I substance (cocaine) under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The defendant, an international traveler transiting through Toronto International Airport from St. Lucia to the United Kingdom, was stopped by border officials who discovered approximately 3.9 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the linings of his checked luggage.

The defendant admitted the luggage was his, that he had packed it, and was aware of its contents.

The defendant resisted committal arguing insufficient evidence of possession (no proof of knowledge of the hidden drugs), insufficient evidence of mens rea for importing (arguing he was merely in transit and never intended to import into Canada), and insufficient evidence of possession for trafficking purposes (arguing lack of expert evidence regarding quantity thresholds).

The court found reasonable inferences could be drawn from the circumstantial evidence supporting committal on both charges.

The defendant, charged with driving with excess blood alcohol, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total gross delay was approximately 25 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework and deducted 55 weeks of delay attributable to the defence, including periods where the defence was unavailable or sought adjournments not legitimately taken to respond to the charges.

The net delay of 12.5 months fell well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault following an incident on March 10, 2018, at the home of the complainant.

The complainant answered the door to a stranger who claimed to be visiting a friend.

After several brief encounters, the lights went out and the complainant was attacked.

The two main issues were whether the Crown proved the accused was the assailant and whether the physical contact was intentional or accidental.

The court found that the complainant's account could only be interpreted as an intentional assault, ruling out accident.

The court also found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the assailant based on the complainant's identification evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence including a taxi driver's near-contemporaneous observations and the accused's statements in the taxi.

This is a costs decision following a motion and cross-motion regarding parenting time and compliance/enforcement.

The applicant father was substantially successful in defeating the respondent mother's motion for the appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer and securing relief on his cross-motion.

The court found the mother acted in bad faith by submitting evidence that amounted to a personal attack on the father's counsel, and acted unreasonably by expanding the scope of her motion without leave.

The father was awarded costs of $15,500, inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable within 60 days.

The court declined to set-off the costs against the father's child support obligations, finding that the costs did not relate to support and there was no history of default.

The young person, while in custody at a youth centre, was charged with three counts of assaulting a peace officer.

The incident occurred when officers attempted to physically contain the young person after he refused to surrender a lighter he had secreted on his person.

The court reviewed testimony from two youth services officers and video surveillance footage.

The court found the officers' testimony credible and corroborated by the video evidence, which showed the young person punching at the officers.

The court rejected the suggestion of self-defence and found the young person guilty of the assaults.

The young person was charged with possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose after being found with a loaded BB gun concealed in his pants at a community centre.

The court rejected the young person's testimony that he possessed the BB gun innocently after shooting pop cans.

Applying the W.(D.) framework for credibility and the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence, the court concluded the only reasonable inference was that the young person possessed the imitation firearm to use and intimidate others.

The young person was found guilty.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit the accused to stand trial for possession of cocaine, ketamine, and oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime over $5000.

The defence conceded there was sufficient evidence for simple possession but argued the lack of expert evidence regarding drug quantities precluded committal for trafficking.

The court held that a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer the purpose of trafficking from the circumstantial evidence, including the presence of a digital scale, baggies, large amounts of hidden cash, and police observations of a suspected drug transaction.

The accused was committed to stand trial on all counts.

The applicant Society sought a temporary care and custody order to keep the 10-year-old child in care, while the respondent mother and First Nation requested the child be returned to the mother under supervision.

The child had significant behavioural challenges and trauma from past abuse, and had been placed in specialized foster homes far from her community, which prevented her from accessing necessary trauma therapy.

The court found that the mother had taken significant steps to secure housing and services, and that keeping the child in care without proper therapy was causing harm.

The court concluded there were no reasonable grounds to believe the child was likely to suffer harm if returned to the mother, and ordered the child returned subject to a supervision order with conditions.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police.

The officer questioned the accused, who provided a false name and date of birth, and subsequently attempted to leave the scene before being arrested at gunpoint.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained and subjected to unreasonable search and seizure, and that his rights to counsel and to be informed of the reasons for his arrest were violated.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence of the false name and the accused's recognizance status under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in acquittals on charges of obstructing a peace officer and breaching a recognizance.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant's vehicle crashed into a ditch.

A civilian found him exiting the driver's side and called police.

The defendant demonstrated signs of alcohol consumption and language difficulties.

The court found two violations of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel: the officer failed to translate the right to counsel despite clear language barriers, and failed to properly implement the right by steering the defendant to duty counsel without inquiry.

The breath samples were excluded as a remedy.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired care or control based on circumstantial evidence including the unexplained accident, strong odour of alcohol, physical presentation, and vomiting.

A 16-year-old youth intentionally drove a stolen pickup truck the wrong way on Highway 401 at high speed, intending to commit suicide by colliding with a transport truck.

Instead, he collided head-on with a vehicle driven by a 30-year-old man, killing his 30-year-old fiancée and seriously injuring him.

The youth pleaded guilty to manslaughter, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and taking a motor vehicle without consent.

The Crown sought an adult sentence of four and a half years.

The court found that while the youth's moral culpability was high due to the planning, premeditation, and recklessness involved, a youth sentence of three years Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision was sufficient to hold him accountable while promoting rehabilitation and reintegration.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a young person (the niece of his wife) following a trial.

The offences occurred on July 29, 2017, during a backyard barbeque at the accused's residence.

The first incident involved touching over clothing while the victim was lying down in the basement; the second involved digital penetration in the living room later that evening.

The accused was in a position of trust toward the victim.

At sentencing, the accused absconded to Brazil, and sentencing proceeded in his absence.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the sexual assault convictions as duplicitous with the sexual exploitation convictions.

The accused received a global sentence of 10 months imprisonment with ancillary orders including weapons prohibition, DNA designation, SOIRA registration, and probation conditions.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother sought a second adjournment of the society's summary judgment motion after retaining new counsel.

The society and the child's counsel opposed the request, arguing that further delay would prejudice the child.

The court balanced the child's interest in a timely resolution against the mother's right to procedural fairness and adequate legal representation.

Finding that the mother had not intentionally delayed the proceedings and that the child was stable in kin care, the court granted a short adjournment to allow the mother's counsel to properly prepare.

The accused was charged with six offences arising from a home invasion, robbery, forcible confinement, and kidnapping for ransom.

The accused admitted committing the actus reus of all charges but raised a defence of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The accused claimed he suffered from delusional disorder and believed he was on a mission assigned by Chinese anti-corruption authorities to locate and apprehend corrupt Chinese officials in Canada.

The trial proceeded in two phases: the first addressing the Crown's case and the accused's testimony; the second addressing psychiatric evidence.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, rejecting the NCR defence after finding the accused's account of his motivations was not credible and that he had not proven on a balance of probabilities that his mental disorder deprived him of the capacity to know his actions were wrong according to Canadian societal standards.

A child protection application brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking to find an 8-month-old child in need of protection.

The central issue was whether the child qualified as a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court determined that the child met the threshold for identification as a Métis child based on information from the maternal grandmother and great-grandmother, despite the lack of identified Métis communities in provincial regulations.

The court found the child in need of protection and ordered interim society care with a kinship assessment to proceed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit, assault, and marijuana possession arising from an incident on July 24, 2017.

The accused admitted to driving while impaired but raised the defence of necessity, claiming she fled a dangerous situation.

The court found that the accused was attacked by the complainant and subsequently threatened by others at the scene, and that she had no reasonable legal alternative but to drive away.

The court accepted the defence of necessity and acquitted the accused of the driving offences.

The court also found that the accused acted in self-defence against the complainant and acquitted her of the assault charge.

The accused was found guilty of possessing a small amount of marijuana but acquitted of possessing a larger quantity due to reasonable doubt.

The applicant Director sought a restraining order against the respondents, who claimed to be the legal guardians of a Métis child by virtue of an Aboriginal custom adoption.

The child was subject to a continuing custody order in British Columbia and had been placed in Ontario.

The respondents had attempted to apprehend the child from her school in Ontario.

The court declined to decide the validity of the custom adoption, recognizing the British Columbia custody order instead.

Finding that the Director had reasonable grounds to fear for the child's safety, the court granted the restraining order.