Court File and Parties

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: 2019-07-31

Court File No.: Ottawa 17RF1004

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

— and —

Peter Charles Croteau

Crown Application for Gardiner Hearing

Before: Justice P.K. Doody

Heard on: June 18, 2019

Reasons for Decision Released on: July 31, 2019

Counsel:

• R. Sonley, counsel for the Crown
• A. Paciocco, counsel for the defendant

Decision

DOODY J.:

Context and Issues

[1] The defendant Peter Croteau was charged with 5 counts of offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and 1 count of possession of currency knowing it to have been obtained by the commission of an indictable offence. The trial of those charges, and the hearing of a motion to stay the proceedings on the basis of an alleged breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter, were scheduled to begin on January 7, 2019.

[2] On January 2, 2019, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to two counts – one of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana of an undisclosed amount, and one of trafficking in marijuana under 3 kilograms.

[3] After the guilty pleas were entered, an Agreed Statement of Facts was entered. Mr. Croteau did not admit, in that document, that the amount of marijuana which he had conspired to traffic was over 3 kilograms. I found Mr. Croteau guilty of those two counts. I ordered a pre-sentence report, with which both the Crown and defence agreed. Because the pre-sentence report would take some time, the matter was adjourned to March 21, 2019 for sentencing submissions.

[4] On March 21, 2019, counsel asked for a brief adjournment because a matter had arisen. On March 29, 2019, I was advised that on March 20, 2019, the day before sentencing submissions were to be made, Crown counsel (who was not Mr. Sonley, and who I will refer to as "plea Crown counsel" where necessary to avoid confusion) had advised defence counsel that if Mr. Croteau did not admit that the amount of marijuana the defendant had conspired to traffic was over 3 kilograms, she would seek to lead evidence of that fact in a Gardiner hearing.

[5] The defence is not prepared to admit it. The Crown seeks to prove it. The issue before me is whether I should allow them to do so.

[6] The Crown takes the position that there was never an agreement that the only facts that would be put before the Court were those facts set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts. Mr. Sonley also submits that, in any event, this court has no discretion to refuse to consider evidence of additional facts unless an abuse of process has been established.

[7] Defence counsel submits that an agreement was reached with the Crown with that term. He submits that the evidence sought to be led by the Crown is inadmissible because its admission would prejudice the defendant in a number of ways.

[8] The first issue is whether there was such an agreement.

[9] There is also a dispute with respect to the admissibility of some of the evidence tendered on this application. The Crown submits that some of the evidence is protected by the privilege which prevents disclosure of communications between parties or their counsel in an attempt to resolve a dispute – the dispute resolution privilege. Defence counsel agrees with some, but not all, of that submission.

[10] There is also a dispute with respect to remedy – or the results if I do find that an agreement was reached as submitted by the defence. Ought I to find, in those circumstances, that the evidence of the amount of marijuana which the defendant conspired to traffic is inadmissible?

[11] I have decided that I can decide the first two issues, but not the third. I have concluded that there was an agreement between the defendant and the Crown in which the defendant agreed to plead guilty to the two counts and agree to the facts set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts, and the Crown implicitly agreed to not tender any evidence to establish additional facts not agreed to. Some of the evidence which has been tendered is inadmissible, but that does not affect my conclusion. These reasons will explain why I came to that conclusion.

[12] It would be unfair, however, for me to determine the third issue without hearing further from counsel. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, appears to me to be relevant to this issue. It was not addressed by counsel. I believe that the submissions of counsel on this issue would be assisted by my findings on the first two issues. I will hear counsel on this issue at a date to be set as soon as possible.

The Admissibility Issue – Some of the Evidence is Inadmissible

[13] Crown counsel submitted that parts of the evidence tendered by the defence on this application is inadmissible because it is protected by the dispute resolution privilege. Defence counsel did not significantly disagree about much of the evidence. Some issues remain.

[14] The law has been clearly established by the Supreme Court of Canada in two recent cases – Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2013 SCC 37 and Union Carbide Canada Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., 2014 SCC 35.

[15] As the Supreme Court held at para. 31 of Union Carbide, settlement privilege is a common law rule that protects communications exchanged by parties as they try to settle a dispute. It enables parties to participate in settlement negotiations without fear that information they disclose will be used against them in the litigation. Such communications are inadmissible in evidence.

[16] There are some exceptions to the rule. Protected communications may be disclosed to prove the existence, scope, and terms of a settlement. (Union Carbide, para. 35)

[17] The same principles apply in criminal cases. (R. v. Shyback, 2018 ABCA 331 at para. 29)

[18] Crown counsel does not submit that all of the evidence of communications between Crown counsel and defence counsel should be excluded. He agrees that those communications which are required to prove the alleged agreement are admissible.

[19] I will deal with all of the evidence objected to by Crown counsel. Evidence I do not discuss in this section was not objected to.

[20] Exhibit A to the affidavit of Sarah DeBoer is an email from defence counsel to plea Crown counsel of October 18, 2018, some 2 ½ months before the agreement was negotiated. It does not contain any reference to a settlement agreement, let alone its terms. It refers to the retainer agreement between defence counsel and the defendant and an upcoming s. 8 application. It is not relevant to the alleged agreement or its terms and is protected by dispute resolution privilege. It is excluded.

[21] Exhibit B to Ms. DeBoer's affidavit contains a number of emails between Crown counsel and defence counsel. Crown counsel objects to the third paragraph on page 6 of the exhibit, which is contained in an email of December 15, 2018 from plea Crown counsel to defence counsel. The first sentence sets out the Crown's position on sentence should a plea of guilty be entered by Mr. Croteau. That sentence is not relevant to the alleged agreement or its terms and is protected by dispute resolution privilege. It is excluded.

[22] In the balance of that paragraph, plea Crown counsel sets out its position with respect to money seized by the police. Plea Crown counsel herself provided evidence about this subject in an affidavit she swore on this application. It is relevant to the terms of the alleged agreement and the fact of detailed negotiations about those terms, which is circumstantial evidence which I can consider in determining whether the alleged agreement was reached. It is properly in evidence.

[23] Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Ms. DeBoer's affidavit deal with discussions between defence counsel and plea Crown counsel about resolution of these charges. They include information provided to plea Crown counsel by defence counsel. Paragraph 6 refers to Exhibit A to her affidavit. Defence counsel submitted that this evidence was tendered in response to paragraph 4 of Crown counsel's Statement of Fact and Law dated April 26, 2019, which stated that defence counsel contacted plea Crown counsel to attempt to resolve his client's charges after Mr. Croteau's section 8 application was dismissed on December 20, 2018. The evidence is not relevant to the issues on this application. Neither is the statement (made without evidence at the time) in paragraph 4 of the Crown's Statement of Fact and Law. Both are protected by dispute resolution privilege. All this evidence is excluded.

[24] In paragraph 10 of her affidavit, Ms. DeBoer states that plea Crown counsel made no mention in any correspondence between December 15, 2018 (when plea Crown counsel sent the first draft Agreed Statement of Facts to defence counsel) and January 2, 2019 (when Mr. Croteau pleaded guilty) that she may later seek to supplement the Agreed Statement of Facts by seeking to adduce additional evidence at the sentencing hearing. This is relevant to the issue of whether the agreement included the term at issue. It is circumstantial evidence on that point. It is properly in evidence.

[25] In paragraph 17 of her affidavit, Ms. DeBoer states that following receipt of the pre-sentence report on March 20, 2019, defence counsel telephoned plea Crown counsel to determine whether Crown counsel would agree with defence counsel that a conditional sentence was an appropriate disposition. In my view, that paragraph deals with discussions between Crown counsel and defence counsel with respect to an appropriate sentence. It is not relevant to the issue of whether an agreement was reached. Nor is it relevant to what the terms of that agreement were. It is excluded.

[26] I reach the same conclusion with respect to paragraphs 18 and 19 of Ms. DeBoer's affidavit. Those paragraphs speak to attempts to resolve the issue which is now before me. They are not relevant to whether an agreement was reached or its terms. Those paragraphs are excluded.

[27] Exhibit E to Ms. DeBoer's affidavit is a series of emails between plea Crown counsel and defence counsel between March 25, 2019 and March 28, 2019. They are not relevant to whether an agreement was reached or its terms. They are an attempt to resolve the dispute which is now before me. They are excluded.

[28] Paragraph 20 of and Exhibit F to Ms. DeBoer's affidavit are not relevant to the issues before me. They are excluded.

[29] To recapitulate, the following evidence is excluded: Exhibit A; the first sentence of the third paragraph on page 6 of Exhibit B; Exhibit E, Exhibit F, and paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Ms. DeBoer's affidavit. I should note that the numbering of the paragraphs in Ms. DeBoer's affidavit differed between copies of the affidavit. The numbering I am referring to in these reasons is the numbering in the affidavit marked as exhibit 4 on the sentencing proceedings.

The Agreement Issue – There Was an Agreement That the Crown Would Not Introduce Any New Facts on the Sentencing Hearing

[30] I have concluded that there was an agreement between the Crown and the defendant whereby the defendant agreed to plead guilty to the two counts before me and agreed to the facts contained in the Agreed Statement of Facts, and both Crown counsel and defence counsel agreed that no other facts relating to the offences would be put before me on the sentencing. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons.

[31] Whether an agreement is reached, and its terms, is an objective determination. The issue is not what the parties intended to agree to, but what they actually agreed to (subject to issues, at least in ordinary contract law, to unilateral, common, or mutual mistake, none of which was raised here). To determine that, it is necessary to examine what the parties said, and what they did.

[32] It is important to make this determination objectively because an accused person who has entered into an agreement must be able to know the terms of the agreement by seeing what was said and what was done.

[33] The objective facts lead to the conclusion I have set out above.

[34] The Agreed Statement of Facts is lengthy and detailed and was the subject of extensive negotiation.

[35] Crown counsel submitted before me on this application that:

What was agreed to is we're going to put a skeletal version of the facts in front of the court for the purposes of the plea and it's going to be adjourned for the purposes of obtaining a pre-sentence report and we weren't going to be held to the wording of this skeletal synopsis that was going to be provided to the court.

[36] The Agreed Statement of Fact is not a "skeletal version of the facts". It is 5 pages long and contains some 1,300 words. It sets out in detail the facts which establish the defendant's guilt. Those facts include:

(a) Mr. Croteau met between August and October 2015 with Peter Pavlovich Jr., who headed a drug distribution network dealing in significant quantities of cocaine and marijuana, at a location in which the police discovered multiple kilograms of cocaine, various sample supplies of marijuana, hundreds of thousands of dollars in Canadian currency and other drug trafficking paraphernalia;

(b) SMS conversations, phone intercepts, and surveillance reports which led to the inference that Mr. Croteau had spoken with Mr. Pavlovich and then delivered material to Alexander Saikely, Mr. Croteau's co-accused, on March 28, 2016;

(c) Mr. Croteau was in his car at Mr. Pavlovich's residence at 2:19 p.m. on April 15, 2016; he left there at 2:29 p.m. and went to a restaurant parking lot, parking beside Mr. Saikely's car; he took three large weighted garbage bags from his trunk and gave them to Mr. Saikely, and took another one out of his rear seat and put it in his trunk; Mr. Saikely then went to a residence with 3 large garbage bags and dumped them out; they contained smaller bags of marijuana;

(d) an SMS conversation at 2:50 and 2:52 p.m. on April 15, 2016 between Mr. Pavlovich and Jasen Morash, a co-accused of Mr. Croteau, in which they arranged for a "bread stick" between 5:30 and 6:00;

(e) a phone conversation between Mr. Croteau and Mr. Pavlovich immediately thereafter at 2:52 p.m. on April 15, 2016 in which Mr. Croteau agreed to a "surprise" between 5:30 and 6:00 and said that it would probably be "her" rather than himself;

(f) a woman arrived at Mr. Morash's residence later that day at 5:37 p.m. in Mr. Croteau's car, took a black garbage bag out of the trunk and gave it to Mr. Morash; and

(g) a number of items were seized from Mr. Croteau's home, including cell phones, $3,285 in Canadian currency, and documents.

[37] The Agreed Statement of Facts was entered into as a result of negotiation. The negotiations began with an email from defence counsel to Crown counsel on December 12, 2018 in which, after advising he had instructions to pursue a resolution, he wrote:

… we must next figure out: (1) the counts that Mr. Croteau would plead to; and (2) the facts in support of those counts. I appreciate that you have an especially busy week, and hopefully, you can get something to me, even if it's somewhat skeletal, next week instead. I would not hold you to the document as worded – we'll likely need to finetune it anyways.

[38] Crown counsel responded 3 days later, on December 15. She wrote:

Please be advised that in order to resolve this matter, the Crown would be seeking Mr. Croteau plead guilty to count 1, conspiracy to traffic marihuana, and count 3, trafficked marihuana under 3 kg on April 15, 2016, on information 17-RF1004. All other charges against Mr. Croteau would be withdrawn. Specifically, the Crown will not require a guilty plea to count 6, proceeds of crime, irrespective of the outcome of the Charter Application currently held on reserve. I have attached a draft Agreed Statement of Facts which would be relied on in support of the resolution.

[39] On December 19, defence counsel responded. He wrote:

we are in agreement in terms of counts to plead to. I also have written directions confirming Mr. Croteau's intention to plead, which recognize, of course, that we're still sorting out the particular facts (we're close), and what to do with the $3500 odd dollars.

Finally, you'll find attached the proposed defence edits to the Agreed Statement of Facts. I have provided comments for the few changes that are made, in an attempt to source in the disclosure why I'm proposing these changes.

[40] Defence counsel wrote to Crown counsel again the next day, December 20. He told Crown counsel that he had advised the scheduled trial judge that he anticipated some sort of resolution for Mr. Croteau, and that he had secured a court appointment before me on January 4 to have Mr. Croteau plead guilty. He wrote:

The expectation on January 4 will be to do the ASF then adjourn for a PSR.

This will also give us some time, including the first week of January, to finalize the ASF and sort out the money issue.

[41] Crown counsel responded the next day, December 21, advising that she had another commitment on January 4 and suggesting that the matter be relisted either before Alder J. on January 4 or in guilty plea court the first week of January before any judge other than the scheduled trial judge. Defence counsel wrote back on December 27, saying that he had relisted the matter before me on January 2. He wrote:

Assuming we can sort out the facts before then, we can do the plea on the 2nd. Otherwise, if we need the extra day or two, we can adjourn from the 2nd to the 4th so that Alder J. takes the plea, assuming she's receptive to that.

[42] Crown counsel responded on December 31. She wrote:

I have reviewed your suggested edits to the synopsis. The Crown accepts the recommended changes. I would suggest that the pleas be entered before Justice Doody on Wednesday on the basis of the agreed statement of facts and the matter be adjourned for sentencing.

[43] This correspondence shows a negotiation over more than two weeks (albeit during the holiday period) in which Crown counsel drafted the first version of the proposed Agreed Statement of Facts, defence counsel proposed some changes, and after reviewing those changes, Crown counsel accepted them. The Agreed Statement of Facts was mutually agreed upon. It was to be, as Crown counsel wrote on December 15, "relied upon in support of the resolution."

[44] It was clear from defence counsel's correspondence that it was necessary that he and Crown counsel "sort out the particular facts" and "finalize the ASF" before the plea agreement was complete.

[45] Crown counsel submits that when defence counsel wrote on December 12 "hopefully, you can get something to me, even if it's somewhat skeletal, next week instead. I would not hold you to the document as worded – we'll likely need to finetune it anyways" he was explicitly promising that the Agreed Statement of Facts, however it was finalized, could be expanded upon by Crown counsel. The correspondence does not support that submission.

[46] It is clear to me, when the context of the email is considered, that the objective meaning of that statement was that defence counsel was simply stating what is commonplace in negotiation of documents to be agreed upon. Someone has to write the first draft, and often things are put in or left out that, on reflection, need to be dealt with before it is finalized. Defence counsel was advising Crown counsel that he would not be taking the position in the negotiations that any changes would only be at his behest and not hers. Such a position, while unfortunately not uncommon in negotiations, leads to delay and can stand in the way of a successful agreement. It was not, viewed objectively, a statement that he would not hold Crown counsel to the Agreed Statement of Facts as ultimately agreed upon. Such a position would make the negotiations unnecessary and unimportant.

[47] Crown counsel appearing on this application submitted that the Crown counsel who conducted the negotiations for the plea agreement had relied on defence counsel's statement that he would not hold her to the document as worded when she agreed to the final version of the Agreed Statement of Facts. There is no evidence of that. Crown counsel who conducted the negotiations did not give that evidence. All she said in her affidavit on this point was that defence counsel had made that statement in his initial email of December 12.

[48] I reject the submission contained in paragraph 12 of Crown counsel's "Brief Reply Statement of Fact and Law" that, in light of this statement in his December 12 email, defence counsel is "very close to what the Law Society Rules of Conduct call sharp practice." The record does not suggest that he is taking advantage of a slip, irregularity, or mistake on the part of plea Crown counsel.

[49] Crown counsel did not take the position in negotiations or before the court, prior to March 20, 2019, that she intended to lead evidence in support of facts other than those agreed to.

[50] On January 2, 2019, after Mr. Croteau pleaded guilty to the two counts, I had conducted a plea inquiry, the Agreed Statement of Facts was entered, and I had found him guilty, I asked how much court time would be needed for the sentencing submissions. Defence counsel said that he would be providing medical materials and other documents in advance, and would be 20 minutes. He said he thought the Crown would be less, and suggested that half an hour would suffice for submissions in total. I suggested an hour, unless Crown counsel thought she would need more time. Crown counsel said "I would err on the side of caution and say an hour." That did not suggest that Crown counsel would be leading evidence to supplement the Agreed Statement of Facts which had just been entered.

[51] Crown counsel who negotiated the plea agreement and appeared when the guilty pleas were entered has provided an affidavit in which she swears that it was always her intention to provide further information to the sentencing judge to expand on portions of the agreed statement of facts with regard to Mr. Croteau's role in the conspiracy and the volume of drugs being trafficked. She swore that the Crown had prepared additional material it intended to file during the sentencing hearing which included photographs and videos taken during the course of the investigation. She stated:

The Crown did not anticipate that such easily proved details from the videos of Mr. Croteau and Mr. Saikely taken during the course of surveillance, hallway videos and video of Mr. Saikely counting and handling the marihuana received from Mr. Croteau would be contentious.

[52] I accept this evidence. She was not cross-examined and there is no reason to doubt its truth. But it is clear that her expectation was that defence counsel would agree to this evidence being tendered – that he would, on his client's behalf, admit to its truth. Otherwise it would take much more than the maximum 40 minutes which she had estimated in order to "err on the side of caution".

[53] The expectation that defence counsel would agree to more facts than those admitted in the Agreed Statement of Facts is not objectively apparent from the correspondence. The point of the negotiations was to attempt to determine what facts would be agreed upon. An expectation that other facts would be agreed upon is inconsistent with such a negotiation.

[54] When asked to estimate the time it would take to tender the evidence on the sentencing hearing, Crown counsel's initial estimate was three days. In final argument on this application, Mr. Sonley said that he now believed it would take only one day, on the basis that some of the evidence would be entered by filing hearsay reports of police officers. Even if that evidence would be admissible in that way (a matter I have not determined) it is clear that if the Crown had to prove the additional facts it seeks to establish, it would take much more than 40 minutes.

[55] The submission on January 2 by Crown counsel that the sentencing submissions could be completed in an hour or less is, considered objectively, inconsistent with a shared understanding that more facts may be proven by a contested Gardiner hearing.

[56] The two counts to which Mr. Croteau pleaded guilty are worded that he:

… did conspire with a person or persons unknown to commit the indictable offence of trafficking in a controlled substance … to wit: cannabis marihuana

And

… unlawfully did traffic in a substance included in Schedule II .. to wit: 3 kg or less of cannabis marihuana.

[57] Prior to the plea inquiry I conducted, I asked which counts he intended to plead guilty to. The following exchange occurred:

Crown counsel: Count one and count three, Your Honour.

The Court: Which are what?

Crown counsel: The first count is a conspiracy to traffic in marijuana, and the second is a trafficking of marijuana.

Defence counsel: It's under three kilograms, your Honour.

The Court: Mr. Croteau, I understand that you intend to plead guilty to conspiracy to traffic in marijuana. Mr. Paciocco, you said it was under …?

Crown counsel: The conspiracy doesn't list under or over Your Honour.

The Court: Oh, okay.

Crown counsel: The actual trafficking would be under three kilograms.

[58] This exchange would lead an objective observer to conclude that Crown counsel was aware that the conspiracy charge, as laid, did not specify the amount of marijuana at issue and that all the defendant was being asked to admit to, as he immediately thereafter was told by me in the plea inquiry, was the facts supporting the essential elements of the offences as alleged by the Crown, along with the facts in the Agreed Statement of Facts.

[59] The guilty plea was entered into at a time when, to the knowledge of both Crown counsel and defence counsel, the defendant had filed and was prepared to argue an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter to stay his charges because of the delay in brining those charges to trial. Both parties were aware that by entering the guilty plea and agreeing to the facts set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts, he was, among other things, waiving his right to proceed with that application. On an objective basis, this is consistent with both Mr. Croteau and the Crown conceding certain issues in order to come to an agreement on what the facts were that would be put before the court on the plea and sentencing.

[60] Similarly, I am not persuaded by Crown counsel's submission that it must have been obvious from the extensive amount of disclosure, which included the evidence it now seeks to lead to establish the amount of marijuana subject of the conspiracy charge, that the Crown would be putting the quantum before the court on the sentencing hearing. I do not find it unusual that the Crown would agree to not put before the court some facts which counsel believes she could prove in order to obtain an agreement to plead guilty. That is often part of a plea agreement and can serve as an inducement to the defendant to enter into the plea agreement.

[61] Nor, in my view, does the fact that Mr. Croteau was put to his election as to mode of trial on the conspiracy count support an inference that he knew he was being charged with conspiracy to traffic over 3 kilograms. If the charge does not specify that it is under 3 kilograms of marijuana, the accused has a right to elect trial in this court or the Superior Court. If it was particularized to be under 3 kilograms, it would be within the absolute jurisdiction of this court. That does not mean that when he pleaded guilty, he was admitting that he conspired to traffic over 3 kilograms. He did not admit to that in the Agreed Statement of Facts. And he heard Crown counsel say, before he entered his plea, that the conspiracy charge did not specify whether the amount was under or over 3 kilograms.

[62] On all of the evidence, I am satisfied that, considered objectively, the Crown and the defence entered into an agreement that Mr. Croteau would plead guilty to these two counts, abandoning his right to a trial and his right to apply for a determination of whether his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been infringed, and in return the Crown agreed that the facts relied upon for the sentencing would be the facts set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts.

Next Steps

[63] I must determine what, if anything, flows from this. Defence counsel submitted that I should rule the proposed evidence inadmissible because its probative value was exceeded by the prejudice to his client would if it was admitted. Crown counsel submitted, as an alternative to his submission that there was no such agreement, that the defendant be allowed to have his plea of guilty struck and a trial scheduled. Defence counsel did not ask that the plea be struck.

[64] I have considered the decision in R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34. It was not the subject of submissions before me. In my view, it may be relevant to the issue of whether the Crown may lead evidence on a Gardiner hearing even though it implicitly agreed that it would not do so. I wish to hear counsel on this point.

[65] I would also like to hear defence counsel on the issue of whether Mr. Croteau wants his plea to be struck if I conclude that the Crown may lead evidence on a Gardiner hearing. I also want to hear Crown counsel on issues arising from whatever position Mr. Croteau takes on this. The Court of Appeal released R. v. Espinoza-Ortega, 2019 ONCA 545, a decision dealing with striking guilty pleas, after I heard submissions.

[66] Defence counsel may wish to file evidence on his application to strike a guilty plea. Since he did not ask for that remedy in the proceedings which gave rise to this decision, I will allow him to do so. But I want it clearly understood that I do not want a series of further applications and court hearings in this matter. I invite counsel to obtain an appointment before me so I can hear submissions on:

(a) the effect of Nixon on the issue of whether the Crown may lead evidence in a Gardiner hearing; and

(b) whether the defendant wishes to and, if he does, whether the court should strike his plea in the event that the Crown is permitted to lead evidence.

[67] Once the appointment is obtained, I will set a timetable for submission of further evidence (if any) and submissions on the striking of the plea issue. If the defendant chooses to not apply then to have the Court strike his plea, I will not permit a future application on the basis of the matters now before me.

July 31, 2019

Signed: Justice P.K. Doody