WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 539(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 539(3) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection (1), read as follows:

539. ORDER RESTRICTING PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE TAKEN AT PRELIMINARY INQUIRY — (1) Prior to the commencement of the taking of evidence at a preliminary inquiry, the justice holding the inquiry

(a) may, if application therefor is made by the prosecutor, and

(b) shall, if application therefor is made by any of the accused,

make an order directing that the evidence taken at the inquiry shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way before such time as, in respect of each of the accused,

(d) if he or she is ordered to stand trial, the trial is ended.

(3) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER — Every one who fails to comply with an order made pursuant to subsection (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: September 20, 2019

Court File No.: Toronto 18-15007663

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

— and —

T.C.

Before: Justice Patrice F. Band

Counsel:

N. Golwalla, counsel for the Crown
D. Robitaille & L. Binhammer, counsel for T.C.

Reasons for Sentence

I. Introduction

[1] These are my reasons for sentence in the matter of T.C. who pleaded guilty to the offence of sexual interference against L.B., contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code. The Crown proceeded by Indictment and the plea was entered during the course of a preliminary inquiry.

[2] Between 2007 and 2012, T.C. was involved in an extra-marital affair with C.M. C.M. is L.B.'s mother. The sexual offending took place between 2008 and 2011, when L.B. was eight to ten years old. C.M. pleaded guilty to sexual interference as an abettor for her role in the offending against L.B. Her sentencing hearing was adjourned to January 2020.

[3] As will become apparent, this is an unusual case. Rarely does a mother present her own child to be sexually abused by another person. Obviously, these features lend this case strong emotional overtones. From the point of view of sentencing, they also give rise to thorny legal issues that are not commonly reflected in the authorities.

II. The Facts

[4] The plea was founded on an Agreed Statement of Facts that was filed as an exhibit. After some discussion on the date of the sentencing hearing, an addendum to it was also filed. I refer to the entire document as the "ASF" for the sake of simplicity.

[5] The parties have urged me to draw different inferences from that document – particularly as to whether T.C. stood in a position of trust vis-à-vis L.B. and whether his conduct can be characterized as systematic or pattern-like. Much is at stake; when proven, those features are powerful aggravating factors in cases involving sexual offences committed against children. For this reason, I reproduce the ASF in its entirety.

Agreed Statement of Facts

The complainant and her older sister are the children of C.M. The complainant was born on […], 2000. The family is from France.

During a vacation to Cuba, T.C. met C.M. T.C. and C.M. developed a friendship.

In 2008, when the complainant was around eight years old, the complainant, the complainant's sister, and C.M. relocated to Canada. They initially moved to Quebec City, where T.C. would visit C.M.

In 2010, when the complainant was around 10 years old, the complainant and C.M. moved to Toronto. The complainant's sister remained behind in Quebec City to finish school.

In the course of the relationship between C.M. and T.C., sexual activity between the two took place in front of the complainant. At some point, between 2008 and 2011, C.M. encouraged the complainant to perform fellatio on T.C., and the complainant did so. This happened more than once between 2008 and 2011, although the complainant cannot recall how many times it occurred.

The relationship between C.M. and T.C. ended, and the complainant no longer had contact with T.C.

In 2017, the complainant disclosed to her sister, and shortly afterwards reported to police.

C.M. and T.C. were subsequently arrested.

T.C. clearly recalls one episode of fellatio but concedes due to alcohol consumption and passage of time, it may have occurred twice, and concedes the Crown has proven two incidents of fellatio beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. Circumstances of the Offence

[6] T.C. and C.M. met in 2007 and were involved until 2012. At the outset, C.M. lived in France. She moved with her children first to Quebec and eventually to Toronto. The two saw each other in France, in Canada or on vacation. They also attended "swingers clubs" together.

[7] In Toronto, C.M. lived with L.B. in a one-bedroom condo. L.B.'s sleeping space was hived off by a partition. C.M. was "very sexually open" and it was not unusual for her to walk around the condo topless and to be "openly affectionate" with him. L.B. walked into the bedroom a number of times while the couple were having sex. On at least one occasion, L.B. walked in and watched her mother perform fellatio on T.C. C.M. then encouraged L.B. to do the same.

[8] T.C. started consuming alcohol in 2006. During his relationship with C.M., he consumed alcohol regularly and to excess. (He is now a "social drinker.")

IV. The Impact on L.B.

[9] L.B. is now 18 years old. Her Victim Impact Statement is addressed to both her mother and T.C. The offence has affected her in a number of ways. It has affected her ability to make friends. As a child, she did not want other kids or family members to know what was happening at home. This made her awkward and caused her to have difficulty making friends. It is also why her sister is the only relative she is close to. Her lack of friends and close family ties makes her feel depressed. She tries "not to think about it." At times, she feels "lonely and not loved."

[10] Flashbacks and other triggers make her feel uncomfortable and cause her to need to take breaks from studying. She feels "extremely uncomfortable" when she has to walk near her childhood homes. While she loves Toronto, she feels that she will probably move away after her studies. As long as C.M. and T.C. are alive, L.B. wants them to have no contact with her, her sister, their future families or their friends.

V. T.C.'s Circumstances

[11] T.C. is a 53-year-old man. He has been married for 30 years and has adult children. He has three siblings. His mother passed away in 2018. His 84 year-old father is unwell and depends on him and his siblings. It is entirely possible that he will not survive T.C.'s term of incarceration.

[12] T.C. had a good childhood but did not thrive in school. He dropped out in grade 11 and entered the workforce. He has been hard-working and industrious ever since. He worked with his brother early on, and then started his own business employing up to 45 people in the waste management industry. His subsequent sale of that business generated legal proceedings that put a strain on T.C.'s marriage. Until his arrest, T.C. worked in a business owned by his wife; he resigned because the company has a number of contracts with "important stakeholders."

VI. Report of Dr. Jonathan Rootenberg

[13] T.C. was assessed by Dr. Jonathan Rootenberg, an expert in forensic psychiatry. Dr. Rootenberg found that T.C. is remorseful and that his "insight and judgment are fully intact." He does not externalize blame onto C.M. or any other individual. While he may suffer from "Adjustment Disorder with features of anxiety and depression," he does not suffer from any major mental, personality or sexual disorder. There is no evidence that he had any "long-standing interest in, or plans to engage in, sexual contact with minors." He has no interest in child pornography, "which is commonly associated with a sexual interest in children or teenagers." According to Dr. Rootenberg, T.C.'s offending was "most likely the result of an impulsive, foolish decision, one of 'opportunity.'" (I will have more to say about this passage later.)

[14] Dr. Rootenberg also had T.C. undergo a battery of risk assessments. He fell in the low category on the HCR-20. His low score of 3 on the Hare PCL-SV was reflective of "impulsivity and poor behavioral control." On the STATIC-99R, an instrument designed to predict sexual and violent recidivism for sexual offenders, T.C.'s score was 0.

[15] T.C. does not currently suffer from alcohol or other substance use disorders. He has strong support including family members and friends and is very amenable to therapeutic intervention. In the final analysis, Dr. Rootenberg concluded that T.C. presents a low risk to reoffend. The Crown did not challenge this assessment.

VII. Character/Support Letters

[16] The Defence filed numerous letters in which T.C.'s family, friends and colleagues described him in glowing terms. The letters also attest to his remorse and acceptance of responsibility. Through or despite it all, he also has the support of his wife.

VIII. Applicable Legal Principles

[17] The parties rightly agree that the objectives of deterrence, denunciation and the need to separate sexual predators from society take precedence over other sentencing principles in cases like this: see R. v. Stuckless, R. v. D.D., R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610 and R. v. Stuckless, 2019 ONCA 504. The focus should be on the harm caused to the victim: see Woodward, at para. 76 and Stuckless 2019, at para. 56.

[18] In R. v. Wismayer, Rosenberg J.A. wrote that "[i]n view of its extremely negative collateral effects, incarceration should be used with great restraint where the justification is general deterrence."

[19] In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that, ultimately, a fit sentence is one that is proportional. That is, it must reflect the gravity of the offence(s) and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. Proportionality is determined both on an individual basis – that is in relation to the accused and the offence(s), and by comparison to sentences imposed on other offenders for offences committed in similar circumstances.

[20] In relation to the first branch of the proportionality analysis, the circumstances of the accused are relevant: see R. v. Davies, 2017 ONCA 467. The second factor, known as the principle of parity, requires that like cases be treated alike. This of course is not an exact science. It is difficult and sometimes impossible to find other cases that are similar in all important respects. The Court of Appeal has applied the principle of parity in cases involving sexual offences involving children: see R. v. H.S., 2014 ONCA 323, at para. 56.

[21] While general deterrence, denunciation and separating offenders from the community are the primary principles, they are not the only ones to consider. Parity and the need to exercise restraint – particularly in the case of a first offender who presents a low risk of reoffending – are also in play.

IX. The Parties' Positions and Authorities Filed

[22] The Crown seeks a sentence of four years in the penitentiary as well the following orders:

SOIRA for 20 years;
ss. 161(1)(a), (a.1) and (b) for life;
no contact pursuant to s. 743.21;
a s. 109 weapons prohibition; and
DNA.

[23] The Defence seeks the maximum reformatory term of incarceration, two years less-a-day, followed by a two years' probation. The Defence agrees that all but the s. 161 ancillary orders sought should issue but acknowledges that it is open to me to make an order under ss. 161(1)(a.1).

[24] As such, the parties agree that the ranges set out by the Court of Appeal in D.D. and Woodward do not apply to T.C.

[25] The Crown's position is not moored in any similar cases. Crown counsel filed two cases at the hearing: Woodward and R. v. Manjra, 2009 ONCA 485. The first, as a matter of principle; the second, to support the argument that T.C. stood in and breached a position of trust. The Crown also submitted that by allowing L.B. to watch C.M. and him having sex, T.C. engaged in systematic and grooming behaviour.

[26] The Defence filed numerous superior court cases in which sentences falling in the mid-to-upper reformatory range were imposed and/or upheld by the Court of Appeal. Admittedly, none of them involve facts that are exactly like those before me. They are:

While I have read them all, I discuss only the ones I find most pertinent below.

[27] The Crown urges caution regarding the cases that either pre-date D.D. or do not make direct reference to it or Woodward. All but one of the cases filed by the Defence post-date D.D. To the extent that the Superior Court decisions do not cite those cases, I am inclined to believe that the sentencing judge felt it unnecessary as a result of the facts before the Court. To the extent that the Ontario Court of Appeal decisions do not cite D.D., I am inclined to believe that the Court felt it unnecessary as a result of the facts before it or the principles of appellate deference. I would certainly not presume that the Court overlooked one of its well-known precedents.

[28] While all sexual offences against children are serious and call for deterrence and denunciation, not all of them rise to the level of gravity found in D.D., Woodward or Stuckless 1998 and 2019. At para. 44 of D.D., the Court wrote:

As a general rule, when adult offenders, in a position of trust, sexually abuse innocent young children on a regular and persistent basis over substantial periods of time, they can expect to receive mid to upper single digit penitentiary terms.

[29] At para. 76 of Woodward, the Court wrote:

To conclude on the issue of the proper range of sentence, although sentencing is always an individualized process of decision making, where there is prolonged sexual abuse and assault of a child including penetration of an adult in a position of trust the minimum sentence will be five to six years in the penitentiary.

[30] In my view, those often-quoted passages must be read in context. In D.D., the offender, who held a position of trust, regularly and persistently engaged four children aged five to eight years in all manner of sexual activity for periods ranging between two to seven years. Rightly described as a predator, he was sentenced to nine years in the penitentiary. That sentence was upheld on appeal. In Woodward, the offender lured a 12-year-old girl whose family was in dire financial straits into engaging in sexual activity including fellatio and vaginal intercourse by offering her astronomical amounts of money. His global sentence of six-and-a-half years was upheld, even though it was described as lenient. Woodward had a relevant criminal record. Both offenders were sentenced after lengthy trials.

[31] In G.B., supra, the offender forced a three-to-four-year-old girl to perform fellatio and pushed her down the stairs a short time later. At para. 61, the Court of Appeal held that his sentence of 21 months and three years' probation after trial was "within the range for this type of offence, which involved violating the sexual integrity of a young child and breach of trust."

[32] In C.B. 2008, supra, the offender committed various sexual assaults on his niece from the time she was 12 to 16 years old when he was in his 20s. The incidents took place three-to-four times per week for approximately one-and-a-half years. In upholding the sentence of three years, imposed after a jury trial, the Court of Appeal wrote at para. 55:

This court has repeatedly and consistently upheld upper reformatory to low penitentiary sentences in cases of sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust.

[33] In H.S., supra, the offender pleaded guilty to historic sexual assaults against his vulnerable 15 year-old foster child. He had sexual intercourse with her several times, and she became pregnant. While the Court of Appeal noted that the facts supported a five year sentence, owing to the other factors at play, it imposed a sentence of three years.

[34] In P.M., supra, after grooming his niece for an extended period of time, the accused sexually assaulted her in increasingly serious ways culminating in intercourse when she was between 11 and 16 years old. At para. 19, the Court characterized the fact that he had induced her into believing that they were boyfriend and girlfriend as "exploitation of the worst order." Fifteen years later, he sexually assaulted her sister. While the facts supported a penitentiary sentence, owing to the other factors at play, the Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of two years less-a-day.

[35] In Cerda, supra, the offender groomed and sexually assaulted three children aged 10 to 12 for over one-and-a-half years. The conduct included fellatio. The Court of Appeal found that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that a sentence of two years less-a-day in the reformatory was appropriate after trial. The Court then substituted a sentence of 18 months for the conditional sentence that had been imposed by the sentencing judge.

[36] In Barua, supra, the accused was the husband of the 10 year-old victim's babysitter. He approached the child who was in bed and sexually assaulted him by pulling his pants down, kissing him, licking his penis and "humping" him. At para. 34, the Court observed that the sentencing judge had "correctly concluded that a sexual assault on a young victim in the circumstances of this case would normally attract a medium to high range reformatory sentence even for a first offender" (my emphasis).

[37] In R.R., supra, the accused sexually assaulted his girlfriend's daughter multiple times over a period of ten months when she was eight to nine years old. He was in his 50s and was in a position of trust. They lived as a family and the victim viewed him as a father figure. The impact on the victim was profound. The offender, who had a prior criminal record for violence, was sentenced to 18 months in jail after trial.

[38] In Manjra, supra, cited by the Crown, the offender was the neighbour of the seven-year-old victim. One day when she visited his home, he pulled her pants and underwear down and licked her "privates." He was sentenced to 17 months in jail after trial. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to find that the relationship "was at low-end of a trust relationship, and to use that as an aggravating factor on sentence." The victim had visited his home many times. She called him "'uncle' as a generic term." He gave her and other kids popsicles. The trial judge had concluded that he "was a man the complainant should have been able to trust." See paras. 29-31.

X. Aggravating Factors

[39] The Crown submitted that T.C. was L.B.'s "de facto father" because he was involved in a long-term intimate relationship with C.M. While he acknowledged that this was not a "classic relationship of trust," he argued that T.C. was "able to control traffic in the home relating to L.B." and that "she would have been submissive to his authority." In those circumstances, he argued, one can understand why she would see him as an adult, a partner to her mother and father figure. In the alternative, the Crown submitted that the relationship is akin to one of trust because T.C. would have had no access to L.B. without being part of C.M.'s life.

[40] This, like all aggravating factors, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown's position invites me to "read between the lines" in a way that I do not believe I am entitled to do. While it is possible that L.B. saw T.C. as a father or authority figure, the evidence in this case does not demonstrate that beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike the judge in Manjra, who presided over a trial of the matter, I have before me an ASF that was carefully drafted by the parties and a Victim Impact Statement that is silent on the issue. Dr. Rootenberg's report contains no admissions or other information on this point either. In these circumstances, I would be speculating if I were to find otherwise.

[41] That said, C.M. was clearly in one of the clearest and most exacting trust relationships that exist in our society. As an adult and father in his mid-forties, T.C. was obviously aware of that.

[42] The Crown also argued that T.C.'s behaviour was systematic or pattern-like and that it constituted grooming. It is here that this case's unusual features are the most difficult to untangle. It is true that T.C. sexually assaulted L.B. on two separate occasions between 2008 and 2011. While that is an aggravating factor, it does not constitute a pattern of offending. Likewise, while systematic behaviour need not necessarily be sophisticated, it must nonetheless constitute a design of some sort. A person who acts systematically has a purpose. The same is true of grooming. Hill J. explained this concept, albeit in the context of luring in R. v. Pengelley, [2009] O.J. No. 1682 (S.C.J.). At para. 96, he wrote:

… computer communications may serve to sexualize or groom or trick a child toward being receptive to a sexual encounter, to cultivate a relationship of trust, or to undertake a process of relinquishing inhibitions, all with a view to advancing a plan or desire to physical sexual exploitation of a young person.

I accept that without his relationship with C.M., T.C. would not have had access to L.B. But that fact speaks to the mechanics of the offence, not to what motivated it. The evidence does not support a conclusion that being able to sexually abuse L.B. was among the reasons T.C. entered into or maintained his relationship with C.M.

[43] That said, T.C.'s role in engaging in frank sexual behaviour with C.M. in L.B.'s presence over an extended period of time and allowing her to watch is an aggravating factor in this case. I do not find, on these facts, that he did so with a view to exploiting L.B.; however, at the very least, the inevitable and predictable consequence of this abhorrent behaviour was to normalize it. This, in turn, facilitated the offence.

[44] The additional aggravating factors are these:

L.B. was between eight and ten years old at the relevant times;
There was a great age difference between T.C. and L.B.;
The two instances of fellatio were a serious invasion of L.B.'s personal and sexual integrity; and
Their effects, which interfere with L.B.'s daily life, were and remain harmful.

XI. Mitigating Factors

[45] The Defence urged me to find that T.C.'s offending was "opportunistic." It appears that this submission was informed by Dr. Rootenberg's findings, which I have described above. I disagree with it for two reasons. First, I very much doubt that Dr. Rootenberg would have come to that conclusion if it had been made clear to him that T.C. had sexually assaulted L.B. more than once. Second, it is based on slippery reasoning. Taken to its logical conclusion, that explanation would apply with equal force to the most systematic grooming behaviour: once the victim's defences are completely dismantled, the offender has the "opportunity" to strike. But that misses the point.

[46] A related argument, based on his lack of a criminal record and letters of support describing his qualities, is that T.C.'s offending was completely out of character. Again, given the two instances of sexual assault and the context in which they took place, that submission loses some of its force. On this record, it seems to me more accurate to say that for a period of approximately four years, T.C. lost his way. While that is not a brief moment in time, it was a relatively short chapter in his life.

[47] The Defence also submitted that by being open with his friends, family and work associates, who wrote letters of support and attended the proceedings, T.C. exposed himself to humiliation before his community. He could have done otherwise, as many do, and it was not an inevitable consequence of the charges. As such, it constitutes a collateral consequence that should have a mitigating effect. While this argument has some elegance, I am unable to endorse it. First, T.C. brought this result upon himself. While that is testament to his character, remorse and prospects for rehabilitation, telling members of his community that he had sexually assaulted a small child when he was in his mid-40s was inevitably going affect the esteem in which they held him. It seems to me that the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, at para. 49 are apposite:

where the consequence is so directly linked to the nature of an offence as to be almost inevitable, its role as a mitigating factor is greatly diminished.

It also bears mentioning that collateral consequences are to be considered only to a "limited extent," and they "cannot be used to reduce a sentence to a point where the sentence becomes disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender." See Suter, supra, at para. 56.

[48] The mitigating factors in this case are the following:

T.C. pleaded guilty before L.B. was exposed to cross-examination by either counsel;
T.C. has no prior criminal record;
For the vast majority of his life, T.C. has been of good and pro-social character;
T.C. is very remorseful for his conduct;
T.C. does not have a sexual interest in children and presents a low risk to reoffend;
T.C. has good insight regarding his offending;
T.C. is open and amenable to therapeutic intervention;
T.C. has very strong support among a wide section of the community including family, friends and work associates;
The offence took place during a chapter in T.C.'s life that has been closed for many years; and
T.C. is an excellent candidate for rehabilitation.

XII. Fit and Proportional Sentence

[49] Given its nature and the harm it has caused, T.C.'s sexual abuse of L.B. was very serious. His degree of moral blameworthiness is high. The central sentencing principles in this case call for a significant term of incarceration. That said, as I have tried to explain, it would be unfair to characterize T.C. as a predator or as someone who systematically or regularly sexually assaulted L.B.

[50] Arriving at the fit and proportional sentence in this case has been difficult. While I view the Crown's position as excessive in all the circumstances, it is not unreasonable. However, I am persuaded by the Defence's approach in this case: accepting that T.C. must be incarcerated for a significant period, what is the least restrictive sentence that can meet the legitimate ends of deterrence, denunciation and the need to separate an offender from society in the case of a mature first-offender whose prospects for rehabilitation are excellent and who poses little risk of reoffending?

[51] The facts of this case are unsettling and I confess that my gut has been telling me that the fit sentence should fall somewhere closer to three years. But I prefer to be guided by the authorities that I have reviewed. While they do not clearly establish a range, they serve as a collection of persuasive benchmarks. I also acknowledge that the rigorous application of the principle of restraint can cause one to impose a sentence that is somewhat lower than one feels could be warranted. There is a certain unease that comes with that, but there are no clear lines in cases like this.

[52] While I acknowledge that none of the cases I have reviewed is an exact fit, I am convinced that a sentence of two years less-a-day is within the appropriate range in this matter. To the extent that T.C. needs to be separated from society, that need is coextensive with the need to deter and denounce his conduct. Because he is not a danger to the community, punishing him for a greater period would be gratuitous.

[53] For these reasons, I order T.C. to serve a sentence of two years less-a-day in the reformatory, to be followed by two years' probation. I do not impose the period of probation to further stigmatize T.C., as the Defence suggested. I do not believe that is the purpose of such an order. Rather, I do so because he suffers from anxiety and depression, has struggled with impulse control, may benefit from counseling regarding alcohol use and is amenable to therapeutic intervention. In short, a period of probation will assist in fostering his rehabilitation. That order will prohibit T.C. from having any contact, direct or indirect, with L.B. and her sister.

XIII. Ancillary Orders

[54] On consent, I order T.C. to provide a sample of his DNA and to comply with the requirements of the SOIRA for 20 years and of s. 109.

[55] While in custody, T.C. is prohibited from having any contact, direct or indirect, with L.B. and her sister, pursuant to ss. 743.21(1).

[56] Pursuant to s. 161(1)(a.1), I order that T.C. not be within 500 meters of any place where L.B. or her sister live, go to school, work or any other location at which he knows either of them to be. That order will be in place for life. I decline to impose orders pursuant to ss. 161(1)(a) and (b) as they do not respond to T.C.'s specific circumstances: see R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906 at para. 48.

Released: September 20, 2019

Justice Patrice F. Band

R. v. T.C., 2019 ONCJ 662

Case Summary