Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: 2019-06-19

Court File No.: Peterborough 182107

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

— AND —

R.M.

Before: Justice S. W. Konyer

Heard on: December 6, 2018, February 20 and June 6, 2019

Reasons for Judgment released on: June 19, 2019

Counsel

Mr. K. Doyle — counsel for the Crown

Ms. S. DiGuiseppe — counsel for the defendant R.M.

Judgment

KONYER J.:

[1] Background and Sentencing Context

[1] R.M. was sentenced in Brockville on May 7, 2015 for a charge of sexual interference. He received a sentence of 90 days jail to be served intermittently, 3 years of probation, and a 5 year prohibition order under section 161 of the Criminal Code. This last order prohibits R.M. from "having any contact – including communicating by any means – with a person who is under the age of 16 years". This prohibition is subject to three exceptions: under the supervision of an adult approved by the court; with his own children if their mother approves; and "with an adult over 18 years in regards to any other children."

[2] On December 6, 2018, R.M. pled guilty before me to two counts of breaching the s.161 order. Specifically, he admitted that between May 1 and August 1, 2018, he was twice in the company of a child under 16 without an adult present. The Crown is asking me to impose a sentence of 6 months jail consecutive for each breach, for a total of 12 months jail. The defence seeks a conditional sentence of between 9 and 12 months in total. Both parties agree that the jail sentence, whether served conditionally or not, should be followed by the maximum term of 3 years' probation, and they agree on the terms that should apply to the probation order. The issue I need to decide is whether a conditional sentence is a fit sentence in this case.

[3] In order to be fit, the sentence I impose must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offences and R.M.'s level of moral responsibility for committing those offences. The primary goals of any sentence for this type of breach must be to denounce the unlawful conduct and to deter R.M. and others from committing similar offences. Although rehabilitative and restorative goals are still important, they are not the primary focus of the sentence.

[4] I will first review the circumstances of the offences committed by R.M. in order to assess their seriousness. I will then set out R.M.'s background and character in order to assess his level of moral responsibility for committing these offences. I will then review the applicable law and sentencing principles in order to decide whether a conditional sentence is a fit sentence in this case.

The Seriousness of the Offences

[5] In order to place these offences in context, it is necessary to have some understanding of the circumstances of the offence which gave rise to the s.161 order. R.M. touched the genitals of his 12 year old stepson for a sexual purpose in 2013. He pled guilty to this offence in 2015 and was sentenced as I have described above. R.M. was 26 years of age when he was sentenced. He had no previous criminal record. His former partner, the mother of the victim, apparently remained supportive of R.M. initially, but they separated after he completed his intermittent jail sentence. His former spouse then initiated family court proceedings and obtained custody of their two daughters. Since then, R.M. has had very limited contact with his daughters.

[6] He started treatment with Dr. Paul Federoff, a forensic psychiatrist, in 2014, after he was charged with sexual interference against his stepson. Dr. Federoff prepared a report dated January 21, 2019, which was filed as an exhibit in this sentencing hearing. Dr. Federoff is the director of the Sexual Behaviours Clinic at the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre, which is a "clinic that specializes in the assessment and treatment of people with problematic sexual behaviours, including sex crimes."

[7] R.M. continued treatment at the Sexual Behaviours Clinic until March 2016, when he moved to the Peterborough area for a job. The firm's office was located next to a yoga studio owned and operated by J.F. At the time, J.F. was looking for yoga instructors. R.M., who is also a qualified yoga instructor, met J.F. in late 2016 and ended up teaching several classes at her studio. They became friends, and then partners in a home business that J.F. operated. R.M. became acquainted with her husband and three children, then aged 10, 7 and 5.

[8] According to the Agreed Statement of Facts, "[b]y the summer of 2018, J.F. describes R.M. as having fully integrated himself into their social and professional networks." R.M. was a frequent guest in the F. family home, and stayed overnight approximately 12 times. It is agreed that R.M. never disclosed his criminal conviction or the existence of the s.161 order to the F. family. He did tell the F.'s that he had children of his own, and that his ex-wife was "keeping his kids away from him".

[9] The 3 year probation order imposed on May 7, 2015 had a term that prohibited R.M. from communicating with or being in the company of anyone under the age of 16 "unless in the presence of an adult over the age of 18 years who is aware of this conviction". This condition therefore expired on May 6, 2018. It is agreed that this condition was not in effect on the date of either offence for which I am sentencing R.M.

[10] However, there is no dispute that the probation order was in effect when R.M. first came to know J.F. and her children. It is clear that when R.M. first developed a relationship with the F. family, he would have been in the company of the F. children without having disclosed his prior conviction to the other adults present – their parents. R.M. himself testified, at a Gardiner hearing, that when he moved to the Peterborough area he was very guarded about his past in order to make friends and have meaningful human contact.

[11] Although I appreciate that I am not sentencing R.M. for breaching this term of his probation order, I agree with the Crown that his failure to abide by this term is an aggravating factor on the s.161 breach. I agree that the subsequent breach would never have occurred had R.M. not withheld the information that his probation order required him to disclose to the F. parents. His deceit in this regard is an aggravating factor.

[12] The F. family moved homes in the summer of 2018. R.M. assisted the family in moving. During the move, R.M. drove the F.'s 10 year old son from the old home to the new home because there was not enough room in the F. vehicle. No one else was present in R.M.'s vehicle. J.F. followed closely behind R.M.'s vehicle, and never lost sight of it. There is no suggestion of any inappropriate conduct between R.M. and the F. child during the drive, or on any other occasion for that matter.

[13] The F. family learned of R.M.'s criminal history through another couple they were friends with, the A. family. The A. family became friends with R.M. in May 2018. They have four children, all of whom were under the age of 16 at the time. R.M. visited their home about four times, and stayed overnight once or twice. From June 21 to 24, 2018, he accompanied the family on a camping trip to a park near Campbellford. R.M. attended a trade show during the day, and slept in his own tent at night. At the end of the camping trip, the A. vehicle was full, and R.M. offered a ride to their 13 year old son. On the way home, R.M. stopped at a Tim Horton's restaurant, while the A.'s vehicle did not. From that point until their arrival at the A. home, R.M. and the child were out of sight of the parents. The trip from the restaurant to the home would have taken about a half hour. There is no indication that R.M. was late in arriving at the home. There is also no suggestion that he engaged in any inappropriate contact with the A. child during that trip, or on any other occasion.

[14] The A.'s were also unaware of R.M.'s criminal history at the time of the car trip. R.M.'s probation order expired May 6, 2018. He became friends with the A. family at some point that same month. I cannot say whether the probation order was still in effect at that time. Therefore I cannot infer that R.M. withheld information from the A.'s that he was legally required to disclose to them at the time he was first in the company of their children.

[15] The A. family learned of R.M.'s criminal history in late July 2018, and immediately shared that information with the F. family. After being confronted by each set of parents at the time, R.M. has not had any contact with either family since.

[16] Section 161 orders are protective in nature. They are designed to protect the most vulnerable members of society – children – from the ongoing risk presented by those who have been convicted of sexual offences against children. Typically, these orders attempt to manage that risk by, in part, restricting the offender's ability to be with children in an unsupervised setting. It follows that any breach of such an order is inherently serious. As Justice Borenstein put it in R. v. Marin, [2011] O.J. No. 4270 (C.J.), at para. 23:

The authority of the court is potentially undermined if courts do not treat breaches of their orders seriously. This is particularly so in cases such as LTO or section 161 orders where the court has determined that an accused represents a risk and that order is meant to lessen the risk to others.

[17] Having said that, however, "[b]reaches of court orders, like any other offences, can occur in a multitude of ways": Marin, at para. 22. Counsel provided a number of authorities dealing with s.161 breaches with varying degrees of seriousness.

[18] In R. v. Exell, [2015] O.J. No. 5461 (C.A.), the accused attended a spa day at a local high school, where he had his hair cut and nails trimmed by students. He did so while bound by a s.161 order that prohibited him from being at various places where children might be expected to be present, including any school ground. There was no suggestion of any inappropriate behaviour by the accused while at the school. The Ontario Court of Appeal described the offence as "not a technical breach" (para. 8) and increased the sentence from an absolute discharge to 6 months jail plus probation.

[19] In Marin, the accused had been informed by his probation officer that he would need to seek a variation of the s.161 order from the judge who had sentenced him for possessing child pornography and voyeurism in order to have contact with the 10 year old son of his new partner. He never sought a variation, and was arrested after attending a public pool with the child, including the change room. One of the conditions of the s.161 order in that case prohibited him from attending places where children can be expected to be at, including public swimming pools. The court found the breach to be flagrant and serious, and imposed a 6 month jail term plus probation.

[20] In R. v. Bale, [2017] O.J. No. 4791 (C.J.), the offender repeatedly breached a prohibition against contact with children by being alone with a child and being "essentially responsible for her care": para. 5. The court imposed a sentence of 9 months jail.

[21] In R. v. Billings, [2014] A.J. No. 639 (Prov. Ct.), a s.161 order had been imposed on the offender as part of his sentence for luring offences. He breached the order by communicating with 12 different children between the ages of 9-17, some of which was sexual in nature. He received a global sentence of 12 months jail for 4 breaches of probation and 3 months jail concurrent for a breach of a s.161 order. This was the only case cited by counsel where the court considered whether a conditional sentence was appropriate for this type of offence.

[22] In R. v. Bansfield, [2008] O.J. No. 3292 (S.C.J.), the offender had a lengthy criminal history including multiple sexual offences against children, and numerous previous breaches of court orders. He was found guilty of breaching the s.161 order on seven occasions by taking the two children of his partner to playgrounds and pools where other children were present. The sentencing Judge described these breaches as "flagrant and deliberate" which demonstrated the offender's "lack of control and respect for court orders": para. 87. He received a global sentence of 7 years jail.

[23] In my view, the breaches committed by R.M. fall into a similar category as the breaches committed in Exell. Although there is no evidence of malicious intent, these were not technical breaches. R.M. was, on each occasion, alone with a child without another adult present, a direct violation of one of the terms of his order. Each breach he committed was the result of a deliberate choice he made to conceal the existence of the order.

[24] However, the breaches committed by R.M. were not as flagrant or serious as the breaches committed in Marin, Bale, Billings or Bansfield. I conclude that he committed each breach in order to avoid having to disclose the existence of the s.161 order to people with whom he had become friends. He chose to breach his conditions in order to spare himself humiliation and the likely end of those friendships. I accept that his conduct was not directed at grooming either of the children with whom he was briefly alone. I also accept that R.M. thought he did not pose a risk to either child because he harboured no sexual interest in them. While these factors do not excuse his behaviour, they do place that behaviour in context.

[25] In conclusion, any breach of a s.161 order is serious. Along the spectrum of seriousness for such breaches, however, I find that the breaches committed by R.M. to be at the lower end of the range. I turn now to a consideration of R.M.'s circumstances and his degree of responsibility for committing these offences.

R.M.'s Circumstances and Degree of Responsibility

[26] R.M. was 30 when he committed these offences. He is mature, educated, intelligent and articulate. He enjoys a supportive family. He does not have any history of childhood trauma, abuse or behavioural issues. In short, there is nothing in his background that would have impaired his judgement or interfered with his ability to understand the need to abide by the terms of the s.161 order.

[27] I have the benefit of a comprehensive Sexual Behaviours Clinic (SBC) Assessment prepared by Dr. Federoff. From this I know that R.M. began treatment for pedophilia in 2014, after being charged with sexual interference but before he was sentenced. His treatment at the SBC continued after his sentencing, up until R.M. moved to the Peterborough area for work in 2016. Since being charged with these offences, R.M. moved back to Ottawa, where he lives with his mother and has resumed treatment with Dr. Federoff.

[28] Since relocating back to Ottawa, R.M. has also become involved in an intimate, age-appropriate, adult relationship with a stable and supportive partner who is fully aware of these proceedings. He has also found stable employment in his field. These are factors which tend to reduce the risk he presents of re-offending in the future.

[29] The results of the SBC Assessment are generally positive. R.M. is diagnosed with pedophilia in remission, appears to have insight into his condition, and appears motivated to continue with treatment recommendations. A risk assessment was conducted using a number of clinical and actuarial tools, and R.M. was found to be at moderate risk of reoffending. This conclusion is explained further by Dr. Federoff's in the following way:

From a psychiatric perspective, there is nothing in any of the in-custody programs that cannot be offered in an outpatient program such as the SBC. R.M. is currently attending SBC groups under my direct supervision and is doing well in terms of participation. In my opinion, he is now fully aware of the importance of not only avoiding re-offence, but also obeying all conditions and avoiding any activities that could raise "suspicion". He currently is gainfully employed in a job he likes and which does not involve contact with children. His prognosis, in my respectful opinion, is better if he can continue to work. He appears eager to continue in therapy to ensure he does not overlook his responsibility to be fully compliant with the court's conditions.

Although his actuarial risk assessment places him at moderate risk (compatible with my clinical impression), the majority of sex offenders with scores as high as R.M.'s are not known to reoffend. With treatment, I believe R.M. will continue to stay in the non-reoffender category.

[30] R.M. pled guilty to these charges, and he appears to be remorseful for his conduct. His remorse is evident from his plea, the statement he made at the conclusion of his sentencing hearing, and the letters of support that were filed on his behalf. Most importantly, his meaningful re-engagement with Dr. Federoff and the SBC demonstrates to me that he has made genuine efforts to understand his behaviour and to prevent a recurrence. This conduct is also consistent with true remorse, and bodes well for R.M.'s rehabilitation.

[31] R.M. is intelligent, understood the conditions he was bound by, and made deliberate choices not to abide by the condition in question on two separate occasions. His judgement was not impaired by the use of intoxicants, mental illness or the effects of unresolved trauma. Some level of deception, at least by omission, formed a part of the offending behaviour. These factors all point to a high degree of moral responsibility on the part of R.M. for his conduct.

[32] On the other hand, R.M.'s choices appear to have been situational and not the product of a deliberate course of conduct. He did not plan to be alone with either child, but when the opportunity presented itself in the natural course of everyday events, he failed to remove himself from the situation. I find that he breached his condition on each occasion in an effort to preserve the relationship he had developed with each family. I expect that R.M. believed his behaviour was harmless, and that he did not expect to be caught. While these factors do not excuse his behaviour, they do lessen his degree of moral responsibility to some degree. Overall, I assess R.M.'s level of responsibility for committing these offences to be in the moderate to high end of the range.

The Applicable Principles of Sentencing

[33] I agree with both counsel that denunciation and deterrence must be the primary goals of the sentence that I impose for these offences. At the same time, the principle of proportionality requires me to impose a sentence that is not excessive taking into account the seriousness of the offences and R.M.'s level of moral responsibility. Further, although denunciation and deterrence may the primary goals of the sentence, I must still take into account rehabilitative and restorative goals, to the extent they can also be achieved through the sentence I impose.

[34] The real issue in R.M.'s case is whether a conditional sentence is appropriate. A conditional sentence is a legally available sentencing option for these offences. The principle of restraint requires that I consider whether there are reasonable alternatives to actual incarceration in every case, including this one. The first issue I must decide is whether the safety of the community would be endangered if R.M. were to serve his sentence in the community. If I find that the safety of the community would not be endangered, I must go on to consider whether a conditional sentence would be consistent with the need to denounce R.M.'s conduct and the need to send the appropriate deterrent message.

[35] A condition precedent to the imposition of a conditional sentence is that I must be satisfied that the safety of the community would not be endangered if R.M. served his sentence in the community. The Supreme Court of Canada has provided guidance on how to make this assessment in R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] S.C.J. No. 6, at para. 127:

In making this determination, the judge should consider the risk posed by the specific offender, not the broader risk of whether the imposition of a conditional sentence would endanger the safety of the community by providing insufficient general deterrence or undermining general respect for the law. Two factors should be taken into account: (1) the risk of the offender re-offending; and (2) the gravity of the damage that could ensue in the event of re-offence.

[36] The risk of the offender re-offending must also be assessed in light of the conditions that would be attached to the sentence: Proulx, at para. 72. In R.M.'s case, I consider the risk of re-offending to be low, especially when considered in light of the controls that can be imposed on him through a conditional sentence, particularly home confinement and counseling terms. I accept that R.M. has sufficient insight into his behaviour that he is unlikely to allow himself to be caught in a situation in the future where he is tempted to risk being alone with a child. Further, the damage that would likely ensue in the event of a similar re-offence is not serious, as there is no suggestion that R.M. attempted to harm either of the children who were briefly alone with him. Accordingly, I am satisfied that R.M. would not pose an undue risk to the safety of the community were he to serve his sentence in the community.

[37] Although the primary focus of the sentence must be on denouncing R.M.'s unlawful conduct and sending the appropriate deterrent message to him and others, restorative and rehabilitative sentencing objectives cannot be ignored. As the Supreme Court in Proulx noted at para. 109, "[t]he importance of these goals is not to be underestimated, as they are primarily responsible for lowering the rate of recidivism." I will consider each of these objectives in turn.

[38] Denunciation requires that the sentence communicate society's condemnation of the conduct in question. Generally, the harsher the sentence, the more this message is communicated. In Proulx, the Supreme Court held at para. 102 that:

Incarceration will usually provide more denunciation than a conditional sentence, as a conditional sentence is generally a more lenient sentence than a jail term of equivalent duration. That said, a conditional sentence can still provide a significant amount of denunciation. This is particularly so when onerous conditions are imposed and the duration of the conditional sentence is extended beyond the duration of the jail sentence that would ordinarily have been imposed in the circumstances.

[39] Deterrence can be both general and specific. Like denunciation, the goal of deterrence involves communicating a message through the sentence imposed. The goal of specific deterrence is to deter the specific offender from reoffending. Generally, a harsher sentence is expected to have more deterrent effect on the individual offender.

[40] The Supreme Court described the goal of general deterrence as follows in R. v. B.W.P.; R. v. B.V.N., 2006 SCC 27, [2006] S.C.J. No. 27, at para. 2:

General deterrence is intended to work in this way: potential criminals will not engage in criminal activity because of the example provided by the punishment imposed on the offender. When general deterrence is factored in the determination of the sentence, the offender is punished more severely, not because he or she deserves it, but because the court decides to send a message to others who may be inclined to engage in similar criminal activity.

[41] There is a great deal of debate, both academic and judicial, about the effectiveness of promoting general deterrence through harsher sentences. In R. v. Wismayer, [1997] O.J. No. 1380, the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote at p. 11 that "the enactment of the conditional sentence regime represents a concession to the view that the general deterrent effect of incarceration has been and continues to be somewhat speculative and that there are other ways to give effect to the objective of general deterrence." This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Proulx, which cautioned at para. 107 that "Judges should be wary […] of placing too much weight on deterrence when choosing between a conditional sentence and incarceration." Conditional sentences with punitive conditions may be sufficient to achieve the goal of general deterrence, depending on the circumstances of the case.

[42] Restorative sentencing goals share many of the same purposes as punitive goals like deterrence and denunciation. A truly rehabilitated offender, like a truly deterred offender, provides the best protection for the safety of the community in the long term. In R.M.'s case, he has demonstrated a commitment to getting the necessary help to rehabilitate himself. A sentence that he can serve in the community, where he enjoys stability and support, offers the best protection to the public in the long-term from the risk that he will re-offend. Such a sentence can also achieve a significant degree of denunciation and deterrence through its length and the use of punitive conditions.

[43] Fortunately, I do not have to make a binary choice between a sentence that will achieve the punitive goals and one that designed to foster R.M.'s ongoing rehabilitation. A conditional sentence that is longer than the jail sentence I would otherwise impose, and that includes both punitive and restorative conditions is, in my view, capable of adequately denouncing R.M.'s conduct and of sending the necessary deterrent message to him and others. In the long term, by requiring him to continue with the necessary counseling and therapy, such a sentence will afford the best protection to the public from the risk he presents of re-offending.

[44] I therefore impose consecutive conditional sentences of 6 months for each offence, for a total of 12 months. This will be followed by 3 years of probation. I am attaching the conditions for each order in appendices to these reasons. These sentences can all be transferred to Ottawa for enforcement.

Released: June 19, 2019

Signed: "Justice S. W. Konyer"

Appendix "A" – Terms of Conditional Sentences

Statutory Conditions

• Keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
• Appear before the court when required to do so.
• Report as the Court directs in person to a supervisor and thereafter report when required by the supervisor and in a manner directed by the supervisor.
• Remain in Ontario unless you have prior written permission from the Court or the supervisor to leave the province.
• Notify the court or supervisor in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change in employment or occupation.

Optional Conditions

• Report in person to a supervisor within 2 working days and after that, at all times and places as directed by the supervisor or any person authorized by a supervisor to assist in your supervision.

• Co-operate with your supervisor. You must sign any releases necessary to permit the supervisor to monitor your compliance and you must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this Order to your supervisor on request.

• Live at a place approved of by the supervisor and not change that address without obtaining the consent of the supervisor in advance.

• Home Confinement (first 6 months of sentence):

  • Remain in your residence at all times EXCEPT:
    • Between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. every Saturday in order to acquire the necessities of life
    • For any medical emergencies involving you or any member of your immediate family (spouse, child, parent, sibling)
    • For going directly to and from or being at school, employment, court attendances, religious services and legal or medical or dental appointments
    • For going directly to or from and being at assessment, treatment or counselling sessions, including attendance at the Royal Ottawa Health Care Group for counseling, group sessions and other treatment
    • For going directly to or from and performing community service hours
    • You will confirm your schedule in advance with the supervisor setting out the times for these activities
    • With the prior written approval of the supervisor. The written approval is to be carried with you during these times
    • For the purpose of exercise, including running and yoga, on a schedule approved of in advance by your supervisor

• During your period of home confinement:

  • Do not change your place of residence without first obtaining the written permission of your supervisor.
  • You must present yourself at your doorway upon the request of your supervisor or a peace officer for the purpose of verifying your compliance with your home confinement condition.

• Do not contact or communicate in any way, either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with J.F., D.F., C.F., B.F., S.F., A.A., J.A., B.A., C.A., X.A., K.A.

• Do not be within 500 metres of any place where you know any of the person(s) named above to live, work, go to school, frequent or any place you know the person(s) to be EXCEPT for required court attendances.

• Do not be in the company of or communicate directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with any person under the age of 16 years, unless in the presence of another person(s) approved of in writing and in advance by the supervisor EXCEPT:

  • Communication with your nephew C.H. in the presence of his parent S.M. or J.H., your mother L.M., or another adult approved of by your supervisor
  • Communication with your own children in accordance with a family court order or the approval of the Children's Aid Society
  • Incidental contact for the purposes of employment or in a retail context

• Not to attend a public park or public swimming area where any persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre.

• Not to seek, obtain or continue any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in any capacity, that involves being in a position or trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years.

• Attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by the supervisor and complete them to the satisfaction of the supervisor including, but not limited to, treatment, counseling or group therapy under the care of Dr. Paul Federoff or his designate.

• Perform 50 hours of community service work on a rate and schedule to be directed by the supervisor but must be completed within 11 months of the start date to this Order.

Appendix "B" – Terms of Probation

Statutory Conditions

• Keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
• Appear before the court when required to do so.
• Notify the court or probation officer in advance of any change of name of address and promptly notify the court or probation officer of any change in employment or occupation.

Optional Conditions

• Report in person to a probation officer within 2 working days of the completion of your conditional sentence, and after that, at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorized by a probation officer to assist in your supervision.

• Your reporting requirement ends when you have satisfied your probation officer that you have completed all of your counselling and completed all of your community service hours.

• Cooperate with your probation officer. You must sign any releases necessary to permit the probation officer to monitor your compliance and you must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this Order to your probation officer on request.

• Do not contact or communicate in any way, either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with J.F., D.F., C.F., B.F., S.F., A.A., J.A., B.A., C.A., X.A., K.A.

• Do not be within 500 metres of any place where you know any of the person(s) named above to live, work, go to school, frequent or any place you know the person(s) to be EXCEPT for required court attendances.

• Do not be in the company of or communicate directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with any person under the age of 16 years, unless in the presence of another person(s) approved of in writing and in advance by the supervisor EXCEPT:

  • Communication with your nephew C.H. in the presence of his parent S.M. or J.H., your mother L.M., or another adult approved of by your supervisor
  • Communication with your own children in accordance with a family court order or the approval of the Children's Aid Society
  • Incidental contact for the purposes of employment or in a retail context

• Not to attend a public park or public swimming area where any persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre.

• Not to seek, obtain or continue any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in any capacity, that involves being in a position or trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years.

• Attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by the probation officer and complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer.

• Perform 100 hours of community service work on a rate and schedule to be directed by the probation officer but must be completed within 18 months of the start date to this Order.