Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 4281792B - Regional Municipality of York

Date: May 2, 2017

Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

Regional Municipality of York

— and —

Stephanie Lam

Before: Justice of the Peace M. Coopersmith

Heard on: February 28, 2017

Reasons for Judgment released on: May 2, 2017

Counsel

Mr. C. Gabriel — for the prosecution

Mr. C. Kinapen — agent for the defendant Stephanie Lam

Endorsement

[1] Background

On May 1, 2016, around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at the intersection of 16th Avenue and Woodbine Avenue in Markham, there was a two-vehicle collision involving a motor vehicle being driven by Stephanie Lam and one being driven by Ramesh Mangra. As a result, the defendant, Stephanie Lam was charged under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. P.33, as amended, ["POA"] with careless driving, contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, as amended, ["HTA"].

I. Issues

There are several issues to be determined:

(a) Is the Police Officer's evidence on the proper functioning of the traffic control signals reliable?

(b) Were both the east/west traffic lights and the north/south traffic lights green at the same time?

(c) Is an assessment of the reliability and credibility of the evidence required – applying R. v. W.D.?

(d) Was the Defendant driving carelessly?

II. Evidence

[2] Trial Proceedings

The trial took place on February 28, 2017. Mr. Ramesh Mangra and York Regional Police Officer Thayalan Elaguppillai provided evidence for the prosecution. The defendant, Stephanie Lam, testified on her own behalf.

(a) Evidence of Ramesh Mangra

[3] Mangra's Account

On May 1, 2016, around 4:00pm, Mr. Ramesh was headed home. He was driving alone in his gray Hyundai Elantra motor vehicle, travelling eastbound on 16th Avenue in Markham and was intending to turn left to go northbound onto Woodbine Avenue. By the time he arrived at that intersection, the advanced left-turn green arrow had ceased and he faced a solid green traffic light. He proceeded in the left-turn lane, about five to seven feet into the intersection, and waited for what seemed like a couple of minutes for westbound traffic to clear so that he could safely turn left onto Woodbine. He stated that while he waited, facing a green light, a white Toyota Sienna motor vehicle came from the north, headed south on Woodbine Avenue, into the intersection and hit Mr. Mangra's vehicle. There was damage to the driver's side front tire, side quarter panel and bumper of his vehicle. The other vehicle had damage to the front-end.

(b) Evidence of York Regional Police Officer Thayalan Elaguppillai

[4] Officer's Investigation

Shortly after 4:00pm on May 1, 2016, Officer Elaguppillai responded to this two-vehicle collision at the intersection of Woodbine Avenue and 16th Avenue in Markham, in the Regional Municipality of York. He observed two motor vehicles in the middle of the intersection. Fortunately, there were no injuries. After getting the vehicles moved out of the intersection so that traffic could resume its normal flow through that intersection, the officer spoke with both drivers involved in this collision. Since he observed that the traffic lights were functioning properly, Officer Elaguppillai determined that another officer to control the flow of traffic at that intersection was not required. Mr. Mangra, who had been driving the Gray Hyundai Elantra, identified himself with a valid Ontario Driver's Licence. The officer identified the driver of the White Toyota Sienna as the defendant, Stephanie Lam, having compared her to the photo on her valid Ontario Driver's Licence. After completing his investigation, which included speaking with both drivers, noting the damaged areas of each motor vehicle, which was consistent with Mr. Mangra's evidence, and observing the proper functioning of the traffic lights, he issued a Part I Provincial Offence Notice for careless driving by the defendant, contrary to section 130 of the HTA.

(c) Evidence of Stephanie Lam

[5] Defendant's Account

May 1, 2016 was a cloudy, drizzly day. Around 4 o'clock that afternoon, the defendant, Stephanie Lam, was heading southbound on Woodbine Avenue. She was driving in the right lane of the two southbound lanes. Her mother was beside her in the front passenger seat and two of her children were seated behind. She was on her way to pick up her son from gymnastics. The maximum speed limit on Woodbine Avenue is 60 kilometres per hour and she advised that she was travelling approximately 55 kilometres per hour as she approached the intersection at 16th Avenue. There were no other motor vehicles in front of her. She stated that her light was green and as she entered the intersection, her vehicle collided with Mr. Mangra's vehicle that had been on the left turn lane on the west side of 16th Avenue.

III. Submissions of the Parties

(a) Defence Submissions

[6] Defence Position on Credibility

Mr. Kinapen, agent for the defendant, re-iterated the evidence provided by the three witnesses in examination-in-chief and in cross-examination. He then advised that there were two versions of what had occurred and both seemed credible. The Court, therefore, should apply the case of R. v. W.D. and dismiss the charge against his client.

[7] Defence Challenge to Traffic Light Evidence

Regarding the evidence of the police officer on the functioning of the traffic lights, Mr. Kinapen relied on R. v. McCoy, [2004] O.J. No. 6224 (O.C.J.), where, starting at paragraph 6 Justice F.L. Forsyth writes:

The officer said it was his usual practice to go back to the intersection and check the lights after charging somebody with failing to stop for a red light. However, as I have already indicated, there was no evidence as to what that check consisted of. I am also concerned about the officer failing to note going back to check the lights on this specific occasion. Evidence is more reliable and confirmatory when an officer keeps notes of important aspects of things they do during the course of an investigation.

The functioning of traffic control lights is not self-evident. A reliable inquiry must be made so it is clear that the subject lights were functioning correctly on the time and date in question. Especially when the officer was not facing the same light the defendant was facing at the intersection. If the officer is going to be relying on their usual practice for the specific observations made on the functioning of a traffic control light machine, months and months after the alleged offence date without noting what those observations consisted of, then I cannot be certain that they in fact made those observations.

The difficulty here is that in the absence of the officer noting and explaining what he observed when going back to check the traffic control lights in question, support the conclusion that those observations were not, in fact, made at the time of this specific occurrence.

[8] Defence Argument on Notes

Mr. Kinapen submits that Officer Elaguppillai did not record in his notes that he observed the functioning of the lights and, hence, his evidence of the proper functioning of the lights is not reliable.

(b) Prosecution Submissions

[9] Prosecution Position on Traffic Lights

The prosecutor submits that one of the issues in this matter is the colour of the traffic control signals. The defendant advised that the southbound light was green and Mr. Mangra stated his eastbound light was green. However, following the collision, the police officer was at the collision site for two hours, during which time he advised that the traffic lights were functioning properly and there had been no need to call upon a second police officer to conduct traffic control through the intersection of 16th Avenue and Woodbine Avenue.

[10] Prosecution Argument on Credibility

Mr. Gabriel agrees that there is an issue of reliability and credibility of the evidence provided by the two drivers of the motor vehicles involved in the motor vehicle collision. Mr. Mangra's evidence was that he was eastbound on 16th Avenue, stopped about five to seven feet into the intersection waiting to turn left to go northbound on Woodbine Avenue. His testimony was unshakable, while the defendant's was not. Although she was able to advise that the other vehicle was eastbound in the left turn lane in the intersection, Ms. Lam could not tell this Court whether Mr. Mangra's vehicle was in motion when their vehicles collided. She was able to say only that she went through a green light and was in a motor vehicle collision, but did not testify that Mr. Mangra drove his vehicle through a red light and hit her vehicle.

[11] Prosecution Conclusion

The prosecutor asks this Court to accept as credible and reliable the evidence of Mr. Mangra and dismiss that of Ms. Lam. He submits that the defendant acted without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for others using the highway. The defendant did not show that she exercised due diligence and, in accordance with the current case law on careless driving, she should be convicted of the charge as laid.

IV. Findings and Analysis

[12] Duty to Provide Reasons

I am bound by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 and subsequent cases which have advocated a functional context-specific approach to adequacy of reasons. Consequently, I have a duty to give reasons for my findings and decisions that are sufficient (1) to justify and explain the result; (2) to tell the losing party why he or she lost; (3) to provide for informed consideration of the grounds of appeal; and (4) to satisfy the public that justice has been done.

(a) Is the Officer's Evidence on the Functioning of the Traffic Control Lights Reliable?

[13] Conflicting Light Claims

Ms. Lam stated that her southbound light was green when she proceeded into the intersection of Woodbine Ave and 16th Avenue in Markham. Mr. Mangra states that the eastbound light he was facing was green at that time.

[14] Defence Reliance on McCoy

As stated above, Mr. Kinapen relies on R. v. McCoy, supra, to argue that, since the officer made no note of checking the functioning of the traffic control signals, Officer Elaguppillai's evidence on this point is unreliable and, hence, there is no evidence that the lights were functioning properly at the time of the motor vehicle collision.

[15] Court's Finding on Officer Reliability

I do not agree. Although there is no mention in the officer's notes that he checked the functioning of the traffic control signals, I accept that these notes serve the purpose of refreshing the officer's memory. Officer Elaguppillai did more than rely any "usual practice" of checking the traffic lights. In fact, he recalls that, on May 1, 2016, he remained at the intersection of 16th Avenue and Woodbine Avenue in Markham for about two hours. He testified that he checked the functioning of the lights, but not the timing of them, to find that they were, in fact, functioning properly. Moreover, after clearing the intersection, if he had observed damage to a hydro pole or the traffic light standards or if the lights were not functioning correctly to keep traffic moving safely through the intersection, he would have requested a second officer to direct traffic while he completed his investigation and reporting of the incident. Since Officer Elaguppillai found the traffic control signals at the intersection to be functioning properly, no such officer was required. Given the totality of the evidence of this police officer, I find Officer Elaguppillai's evidence reliable; that is, that the traffic lights at the intersection of Woodbine Avenue and 16th Avenue in Markham were functioning correctly.

(b) Were Both the East/West Traffic Lights and the North/South Traffic Lights Green at the Same Time?

[16] Presumption of Regularity

The prosecutor relies on the presumption of regularity to argue that both the north/south lights and the east/west lights could not have been green at the same time.

[17] Nature of the Presumption

I am satisfied that in the absence of other evidence to the contrary, the presumption of regularity would apply. It is a rebuttable presumption that would give way to contrary evidence. The strength of the evidence necessary to displace the presumption of regularity depends on the nature of the case and the person claiming evidence to the contrary bears the burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that such contrary evidence exists.

[18] Mutual Exclusivity of Traffic Lights

In determining that both the northbound/southbound traffic lights and the eastbound/westbound lights cannot be green at the same time, I am persuaded by R. v. Scetto, [2013] O.J. No. 2043 (O.C.J.), in which Justice of the Peace R. Quon states that this mutual exclusivity is "based upon the presumption of regularity and based on the policy reason of safety and the protection of the public using the intersection". He continues at paragraph 186 of his judgment:

… In particular, it can be logically presumed that the sequence and phases of the traffic lights at the intersection would not be designed or set up by the municipality so as to make the intersection unsafe or dangerous to motorists and pedestrians using or crossing at the intersection. For example, the traffic lights would not be sequenced so that there would be a green light for both Hurontario Street and Bristol Road at the same time, because logically, having green lights being on at the same time for both the east-west and the north-south directions would cause a very dangerous and unsafe situation. Therefore, the sequence of traffic lights at an intersection clearly would not be designed to be unsafe. And, it is this premise that would be the basis for finding that the sequence of automatic traffic lights at an intersection would not be designed to be unsafe, but designed and sequenced for protecting the public, and that the erection of automatic traffic lights at an intersection to control traffic and pedestrians for all directions of the intersection would be presumed to be regular and erected to protect the public.

[19] No Rebuttal Evidence

The defence has provided no evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity and, as I stated above, I accept Officer Elaguppillai's evidence that the traffic control signals were functioning properly. For all of these reasons, I find that both the north/south traffic lights on Woodbine Avenue and the east/west traffic lights on 16th Avenue could not have been green at the same time. Hence, I find that the defendant travelling southbound on Woodbine Ave and Mr. Mangra travelling eastbound on 16th Avenue could not both be facing a green light at the same time.

(c) Assessing Reliability and Credibility – Applying R. v. W.D.

[20] Faryna v. Chorney Test

As issues of credibility have arisen, I look to the legal principles that guide me in assessing the reliability and credibility of the defendant, Ms. Lam, and Mr. Mangra. Beginning with the test in Faryna v. Chorney, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.), commencing at paragraph 10 this case reads:

If a trial Judge's finding of credibility is to depend solely on which person he thinks made the better appearance of sincerity in the witness box, we are left with a purely arbitrary finding and justice would then depend upon the best actors in the witness box. On reflection it becomes almost axiomatic that the appearance of telling the truth is but one of the elements that enter into the credibility of the evidence of a witness. Opportunities for knowledge, powers of observation, judgment and memory, ability to describe clearly what he has seen and heard, as well as other factors, combine to produce what is called credibility, and cf Raymond v. Bosanquet (1919), 50 D.L.R. 560 at p. 566, 59 S.C.R. 452 at p. 460, 17 O.W.N. 295. A witness by his manner may create a very unfavourable impression of his truthfulness upon the trial Judge, and yet the surrounding circumstances in the case may point decisively to the conclusion that he is actually telling the truth. I am not referring to the comparatively infrequent cases in which a witness is caught in a clumsy lie.

The credibility of interested witness, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. Only thus can a Court satisfactorily appraise the testimony of quick-minded, experienced and confident witnesses, and of those shrewd persons adept in the half-lie and of long and successful experience in combining skilful exaggeration with partial suppression of the truth. Again a witness may testify what he sincerely believes to be true, but he may be quite honestly mistaken. For a trial Judge to say "I believe him because I judge him to be telling the truth", is to come to a conclusion on consideration of only half the problem. In truth it may easily be self-direction of a dangerous kind. [Emphasis added.]

The trial Judge ought to go further and say that evidence of the witness he believes is in accordance with the preponderance of probabilities in the case and, if his view is to command confidence, also state his reasons for that conclusion. The law does not clothe the trial Judge with a divine insight into the hearts and minds of the witnesses. And a Court of Appeal must be satisfied that the trial Judge's finding of credibility is based not on one element only to the exclusion of others, but is based on all the elements by which it can be tested in the particular case.

[21] Adoption of Faryna Principles

This case law has been cited innumerable times since 1952. It has been embraced by our Ontario Courts and the Supreme Court of Canada [see e.g. R. v. C.S., 2007 ONCJ 712, [2007] O.J. No. 4207 (O.C.J.), R. v. Haddon, [2007] O.J. No. 2186 (S.C.J.) and F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, [2008] S.C.J. No. 54].

[22] R. v. W.(D.) Test

Finally, I have considered the general guideline regarding credibility as set out in R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, wherein Justice Cory, in writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada at pages 757-758, writes as follows:

First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.

Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.

Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.

[23] Burden of Proof

Simply because the defendant's testimony may be found to lack credibility, that does not equate to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offence never shifts from the prosecution.

[24] Application to Vehicle Damage Pattern

Applying the case law to which I have referred, I make the following findings. As stated in Faryna v. Chorney, supra, "the truth of the story of a witness … must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions." Mr. Mangra stated that he entered eastbound into the intersection on a green light and waited there for the oncoming westbound traffic to clear so that he could safely turn northbound onto Woodbine Avenue. He was still waiting in that position when his vehicle was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The damage to his vehicle was to the front driver's side at the front tire, quarter panel and bumper. This is consistent with him being five to seven feet into the intersection and the defendant travelling in the right lane of the two southbound through lanes. The defendant stated that she was proceeding straight through the intersection when Mr. Mangra's vehicle struck hers. Yet I do not find her evidence reliable given that the damage to her vehicle was to her front end. This is not consistent with her testimony that Mr. Mangra drove into her vehicle. Had that been the case, a practical and informed person would have expected that the front, not the side, of Mr. Mangra's vehicle would have been damaged and damage to the defendant's vehicle would have been to be on the passenger side. Hence, I reject the defendant's evidence and I am satisfied that Mr. Mangra entered the intersection on a green light.

[25] Corroborating Evidence

My findings are further strengthened by Mr. Mangra's testimony that oncoming westbound traffic was still moving at the time of the motor vehicle collision. The defendant provided no evidence to contradict this. I believe a practical and informed person would recognize that Mr. Mangra's recounting of the events of May 1, 2016 is reasonable in that place and in those conditions. He gave his evidence in a straight-forward, unwavering, thorough and forthright manner and I could detect no contradictions in his testimony and no back-peddling of his responses. The defendant, on the other hand, gave little detail of the accident, other than that the collision occurred. Logically, then, if westbound traffic was still flowing at that time, then I find the eastbound and westbound lights were still green at the time of impact. And, in accordance with my findings above, the northbound and southbound lights could not have also been green, but had to have been red.

[26] Rejection of Defendant's Evidence

Therefore, I reject the defendant's evidence that she entered the intersection on a green light. I accept the evidence of Mr. Mangra that he was on 16th Avenue in Markham facing a green light eastbound, waiting for westbound traffic to clear before turning left onto Woodbine Avenue, when his vehicle was struck by that of the defendant travelling southbound on Woodbine through a red light.

(d) Was the Defendant Driving Carelessly?

[27] Careless Driving Charge

The defendant is charged with careless driving under section 130 of the HTA. That section reads:

130 Careless Driving – Every person is guilty of the offence of driving carelessly who drives a vehicle or street car on a highway without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway and on conviction is liable to a fine of not less than $400 and not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both, and in addition his or her licence or permit may be suspended for a period of not more than two years.

[28] Standard of Care – Beauchamp Test

In determining the requisite standard of care and skill required of a motorist facing a charge of careless driving, I look to the often cited Ontario Court of Appeal judgment, R. v. Beauchamp, [1953] O.R. 422, in which the standard is not one of perfection. Instead, Justice MacKay, writing for the Court, sets out the appropriate legal test as follows:

… It is whether it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that this accused, in the light of existing circumstances of which he was aware or of which a driver exercising ordinary care should have been aware, failed to use the care and attention or to give to other persons using the highway the consideration that a driver of ordinary care would have used or given in the circumstances? The use of the term "due care", which means care owing in the circumstances, makes it quite clear that, while the legal standard of care remains the same in the sense that it is what the average careful man would have done in like circumstances, the factual standard is a constantly shifting one, depending on road, visibility, weather conditions, traffic conditions that exist or may reasonably be expected, and any other conditions that ordinary prudent drivers would take into consideration. It is a question of fact, depending on the circumstances in each case. [Emphasis added.]

[29] Modern Jurisprudence on Careless Driving

Recently, there has been some fine-tuning to the case law in Beauchamp, supra. In his endorsement in R. v. Shergill, 2016 ONCJ 163, [2016] O.J. No. 4294 (Ont. C.A.), MacFarland J.A. rejects the moving party's argument that the appeal judge's decision, wherein he set aside the acquittal of the moving party, represents a departure from the settled law in Beauchamp, supra, in relation to careless driving in Ontario, in that it does not have to be proved that the conduct be "deserving of punishment". Starting at paragraph 3, he writes:

Here, the moving party argues that the appeal judge in effect by his ruling "overruled" the leading case on careless driving which is this court's decision in R. v. Beauchamp, [1952] O.J. No. 495 (C.A.).

I do not accept this submission. The appeal judge in his reasons accepts Beauchamp as authoritative in all but one respect and that is the need for the Crown to prove the conduct giving rise to the charge be "deserving of punishment". In his reasons, the appeal judge carefully considers the jurisprudence that has followed Beauchamp including R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49 and R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] S.C.J. No. 26.

He concluded at paragraph 22:

In light of the jurisprudence since Beauchamp it would now appear to be settled law that careless driving is a strict liability offence and, since mens rea is not a relevant factor for consideration, that the count ought not to look at the conduct to determine whether it is "blameworthy and deserving of punishment". To the extent that Beauchamp added that consideration as an element of the charge it has, in my view, been effectively overruled.

It will be recalled that Beauchamp was decided in 1952, some years before the Supreme Court's seminal decision in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 which put it beyond dispute that careless driving was a strict liability defence.

In her factum at para. 22 Ms. Lai also notes that Beauchamp preceded the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Hundal, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867 by some forty years and where that court:

... clarified the degree of negligence required for criminal and quasi-criminal liability. The subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence to which the appeal judge adverted, distils the essence of the inquiry as (i) whether the impugned driving constitutes a departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver in the circumstances and (ii) if so, whether the departure of significant degree to "deserve" the liability at issue -- from the marked and significant" departure that constitutes criminal negligence, to the "marked" departure that constitutes dangerous careless driving to the "mere" departure that constitutes careless driving or attract civil liability. The appeal judge's reasons do no more than to recognize that this continuum of driving negligence already incorporates the necessary degree of blameworthiness, rendering any stand-alone consideration of this factor inappropriate and redundant.

I accept this submission.

[30] Strict Liability Offence

As stated, the offence of driving carelessly is a strict liability offence. As expressed by Justice MacKay in the Court of Appeal decision in R. v. McIvor, [1965] 2 O.R. 475; affirmed, [1966] S.C.R. 354, in regard to the application of the rule of strict liability:

"Section 60 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, [the predecessor to the current section 130] prohibits a defined type of conduct; it is silent as to intent or mens rea. In such case, the Crown need only prove that the accused committed the prohibited act and the accused will be convicted unless he can show that the forbidden act was done without negligence or fault on his part."

[31] Application to Facts

On May 1, 2016, around 4:00pm, at the intersection of 16th Avenue and Woodbine Avenue in Markham, it was overcast and drizzling. Eastbound and westbound traffic on 16th Avenue was flowing normally as Mr. Mangra waited to turn left in order to proceed northbound onto Woodbine Avenue. There is no evidence that the defendant was subject to other than ordinary traffic and driving conditions. When she proceeded southbound on Woodbine, into the intersection at 16th Avenue, and struck Mr. Mangra's vehicle, I am satisfied that she was driving without due care and attention, as provided in section 130 of the HTA.

[32] Conclusion on Careless Driving

In accordance with the jurisprudence and based on my findings and the circumstances that existed, I conclude that Stephanie Lam did not give due care and attention as she travelled southbound on Woodbine Avenue against a red traffic control signal, through the intersection at 16th Avenue in Markham on May 1, 2016 and striking Mr. Mangra's vehicle that had been waiting, a few feet into the intersection facing a green light, to turn north onto Woodbine Avenue. I am satisfied that all of the elements of driving carelessly as provided by s.130 of the HTA have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

V. Conclusion

[33] Summary of Findings

I am satisfied that the traffic lights at the intersection of 16th Avenue and Woodbine Avenue in Markham at around 4:00pm on May 1, 2017 were functioning properly. The east/west lights and the north/south lights could not both be green at the same time. Having assessed the credibility and reliability of the evidence of Mr. Mangra facing eastbound and the defendant travelling southbound, both claimed they were facing a green traffic light, I have rejected the defendant's evidence and rely on that of Mr. Mangra to find his traffic light was green and the defendant's was red as she proceeded through that intersection. Applying the current jurisprudence on careless driving to all of the evidence before me that I do accept, I find the elements that go to the offence of careless driving has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

[34] Conviction

For all of the reasons I have provided, I find Stephanie Lam guilty of careless driving, contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act. There will be a conviction registered.

Released: May 2, 2017

Signed: Justice of the Peace M. Coopersmith