ONCJ 2014

Following a 19-day trial, the accused was convicted of 60 firearms and weapons offences, including possession of prohibited and restricted firearms with readily accessible ammunition, breach of prohibition orders, unsafe storage of firearms, and possession of firearms with removed serial numbers.

The accused, a former RCMP officer and convicted gun trafficker on federal parole, was arrested after police executed a high-risk search warrant and seized 67 firearms, prohibited devices, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and explosives from his residence.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years 9 months (resulting in 6 years after pre-trial custody credit), with consecutive sentences for breach of prohibition orders.

The court also granted a 3-month sentencing remission as a remedy for the accused's unlawful detention for 15 days without being brought before a judicial officer, which constituted an abuse of process and breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown appealed acquittals on charges of acting as livestock dealers without a licence contrary to the Livestock and Livestock Products Act.

The accused purchased and sold approximately 2,156 cattle for $1,367,000 and sold 2,811 cattle for approximately $1,619,000 over an 11-week period in 2007.

The trial judge found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused were engaged in the business of buying or selling livestock, as opposed to operating as livestock producers.

The appellate court upheld the acquittals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having an excessive concentration of alcohol in her blood while in care or control of a motor vehicle.

The accused did not dispute that her ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired and that her blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the accused was in care or control of the vehicle at the time of observation.

The court applied the test from R. v. Boudreault and found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused created a realistic risk of danger and was therefore in care or control of the vehicle.

The court convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from an incident on February 5, 2012.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of section 8 rights, contending that the officer lacked a warrant to enter the accused's property and that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand breath samples.

The court rejected both Charter arguments, finding that the officer was lawfully present under the common law implied invitation to knock and that the officer had sufficient grounds for arrest based on observations of impairment.

The court admitted the breath sample evidence and convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused brought a motion for severance of two break and enter charges.

The Crown's case relied solely on video surveillance evidence for identification purposes under the Nikolovski test.

The defence argued that a trial judge should not make more than one Nikolovski determination for the same accused, and that the interests of justice required severance.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while there was minimal factual nexus between the counts, there was a legal nexus, no prejudice to the accused, and the Crown's wide discretion under section 591(1) of the Criminal Code supported a joint trial.

The reasons for judgment in this criminal matter are not available at this time.

The respondent sought to set aside the registration of a child support order from the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida dated August 22, 2012.

The respondent argued that the registration should be set aside on grounds of lack of proper notice, lack of reasonable opportunity to be heard, lack of jurisdiction, and that the order was contrary to public policy in Ontario.

The court found that while the respondent had proper notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and that the Florida court had jurisdiction, the Florida order was contrary to public policy in Ontario because it imposed child support obligations significantly higher than would have been ordered under Ontario law, and because the applicant should have pursued a variation application under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act rather than commencing a fresh proceeding in Florida.

The registration was set aside and the original Ontario order was varied.

The accused brought a motion on the second day of trial to dismiss charges of impaired driving and driving with over 80mg of alcohol in 100ml of blood.

The accused argued that the Crown was barred by statute from proceeding without the consent of the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General.

The accused was charged in February 2011, released on a Promise to Appear with a March 2011 court date, but no Information was before the court at that appearance.

The accused heard nothing until receiving a Summons in February 2012, over one year later.

The court found that jurisdiction was lost when no Information was before the court at the first appearance, and that the Crown failed to regain jurisdiction within the three-month statutory period.

Accordingly, the charges were deemed dismissed for want of prosecution, and the Crown could not proceed without the required consent, which was never obtained.

The motion was granted and the charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with care and control while being over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved that breath samples were received directly into an approved instrument as required by section 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The qualified technician testified that the accused provided breath samples into the instrument, but did not explicitly testify that the samples were received directly into the instrument.

The court found that the evidence was insufficient to establish this critical requirement beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused, holding that judicial notice cannot be used to supply this proof and that the liberty interest of the accused requires strict interpretation of the statutory requirement.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following observations of erratic driving on Highway 400.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results taken approximately 113 minutes after the alleged offence.

The court addressed three key issues: whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving; whether the first breath test was taken within two hours of the offence; and whether the Crown proved impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed, the two-hour requirement was satisfied, and the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on civilian witness observations of repeated lane weaving, officer observations of physical signs of impairment, and breath test results.

A motion for temporary care and custody of three young children apprehended by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto.

The father sought placement of the children in his care, while the society sought to maintain temporary custody.

The court found that despite the father's efforts and family support, the children could not be adequately protected in his sole care due to longstanding concerns regarding domestic violence, inadequate home conditions, failure to meet developmental needs, poor school attendance, inability to arrange appropriate services, and the parents' intellectual limitations.

The court ordered that the children remain in the temporary care and custody of the society with supervised access to both parents.

An applicant sought a stay of proceedings on the grounds that he was ineligible for legal aid, indigent, and unable to retain private counsel, and that his right to a fair trial would be materially compromised without state-funded counsel.

The applicant was charged with break and enter under section 348 of the Criminal Code and was legally blind with only 7% vision in one eye.

The Crown's case relied on video identification evidence.

The court granted the stay, finding that the applicant's legal blindness presented a serious obstacle to self-representation in a case turning on video identification, and that counsel was essential to ensure a fair trial consistent with Charter values of equality and the right to a fair trial.

The applicant sought sole custody of the child Sofia, subject to reasonable access to the respondent, child support pursuant to the child support guidelines, section 7 expenses, and costs.

The respondent sought sole custody or, in the alternative, joint custody.

The court found that the applicant has been the primary caregiver since separation and granted her sole custody.

The respondent was granted generous access including overnight visits on Tuesday and Thursday, alternate weekend access, and extended holiday access.

The court imputed income to the respondent for child support purposes and ordered guideline support.

The court rejected the respondent's allegation that the applicant engaged in a deliberate plan to deprive him of access, finding instead that the parties were mismatched individuals who experienced an acrimonious separation but whose access arrangements had regularized over time.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, operation over 80 mg/100 ml of blood alcohol, dangerous driving, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter application challenging the validity of the breath demand and the admissibility of evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired driving, operation over 80, and dangerous driving, but acquitted him of failing to remain at the scene.

The court found that while the initial breath demand by the arresting officer was not read as soon as practicable, the subsequent demand by the qualified technician was valid and properly obtained.

The accused brought a Charter application under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for delay in trial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The information was sworn on August 13, 2013, and the trial was scheduled for January 5-6, 2015, representing a delay of approximately 17 months.

The court applied the four-factor test from R. v. Morin, examining the overall length of delay, waiver by the accused, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

The court found institutional and Crown delay of 11.5 months, which while exceeding the 8-10 month guideline, did not constitute a violation of s.11(b) rights when balanced against society's interest in a trial on the merits and the absence of material prejudice to the accused.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified.

A Charter application was brought alleging violations of section 9 (arbitrary detention) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found no section 9 breach, as the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the officer's observation of evasive driving and information about a prohibited driver.

However, a clear section 10(b) breach was established and conceded by the Crown, as the accused was detained and questioned for approximately 30 minutes without being advised of his rights to counsel.

The court found the evidence obtained prior to the breach was not tainted by the subsequent violation, as the connection was too tenuous.

The accused was convicted of driving while disqualified.

A sentence reduction was imposed as a remedy for the Charter violation.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a child victim between the ages of 11 and 14 over a period of approximately two years.

The trial judge found the accused guilty based on the credible evidence of the complainant and corroborating witness testimony.

The sexual interference charge was conditionally stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was sentenced to five years imprisonment for sexual assault with eight months concurrent for invitation to sexual touching, less eight months pre-trial custody, resulting in a net sentence of four years and four months.

Ancillary orders included DNA sampling, lifetime reporting under SOIRA, a lifetime prohibition order under section 161, a contact prohibition, and weapons prohibition orders.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference with a person under 14, and invitation to sexual touching arising from a secretive sexual relationship with the complainant between 1993 and 1995 when she was aged 11 to 13 and he was 25 to 27.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's blanket denial based on internal inconsistencies including his admitted awareness of the complainant's crush, his capacity for secretive relationships, and implausible claims about limited contact with corroborating witnesses.

The complainant's testimony was found credible and corroborated by her childhood friend.

The accused was convicted on three counts; a fourth count was stayed by the Crown.

The accused was found guilty under the Canada Elections Act of preventing or endeavouring to prevent electors from voting during the 2011 federal election.

He participated in a scheme that sent thousands of automated telephone calls directing targeted non-supporters to false polling locations.

The Crown sought 18 to 20 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence or a short, sharp sentence of 14 to 30 days.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and general deterrence, noting the severe impact of the conduct on the democratic process.

The accused was sentenced to 9 months' imprisonment followed by 12 months' probation.