Court File and Parties

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: 2014-12-16

Court File No.: Halton 161/13

Between:

Magdalena Jassa Applicant

— And —

Ryan Davidson Respondent

Before: Justice Sheilagh O'Connell

Heard on: September 3, 2014

Reasons for Judgment released on: December 16, 2014

Counsel:

• D. Z. Frodis, M. Grimshaw — counsel for the applicant
• L. Liquornik — counsel for the respondent

O'CONNELL J.:

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is a motion for summary judgment brought by the applicant, Ms Magdalena Jassa ("Ms. Jassa"). Ms. Jassa seeks the following final order:

1. An order imputing income to the respondent, Mr. Ryan Davidson ("Mr. Davidson") in the amount of $250,000.00 per year;

2. An order requiring Mr. Davidson to pay child support to Ms. Jassa for the child, Jackson Jassa, born November 14, 2012 in the amount of $2,003 per month, retroactive to December 1, 2012;

3. An order requiring Mr. Davidson to contribute 90% towards the child's or extraordinary expenses, including but not limited to swimming and medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance;

4. An order requiring Mr. Davidson to designate and maintain Ms. Jassa as an irrevocable beneficiary in trust for the child of any existing life insurance policy;

5. An order requiring Mr. Davidson to maintain the child as a beneficiary of any medical, dental and extended health coverage available to him for as long as the child is entitled to support;

6. An order for costs on a full recovery basis to be enforced through the Family Responsibility Office.

BACKGROUND

[2] The parties dated for approximately two years. They were never married and never lived together. During their relationship, Ms Jassa became pregnant with their child, Jackson Jassa, born November 14, 2012 ("Jackson"). Ms Jassa notified Mr. Davidson of her pregnancy. By the time Jackson was born, the parties had ended their relationship.

[3] Ms Jassa is 30 years old. She is employed part-time as a customer sales representative at TD Canada Trust at an hourly rate of $16.18. She currently earns approximately $13,000.00 annually, and her only other source of income is the Child Tax Benefit. Jackson is her only child. She has not re-partnered.

[4] Mr. Davidson is 35 years old. He has one other child of a previous relationship, for whom he pays child support. He is engaged to be married. Mr. Davidson states that he is currently employed at Toshiba Business Systems earning a guaranteed salary of $100,000.00 per annum, plus bonuses yet to be determined.

[5] After Jackson's birth, Mr. Davidson disputed paternity and did not pay child support or provide any financial disclosure, despite a formal written request by Ms Jassa' counsel on October 17 2012, one month prior to Jackson's birth. Counsel requested that Mr. Davidson provide a sworn financial statement and financial disclosure in accordance with the Ontario Child Support Guidelines. No financial disclosure was provided. Despite a number of requests, Mr. Davidson did not submit to paternity testing.

[6] Ms Jassa commenced her application for custody and support on March 27, 2013, when Jackson was approximately six months old. Mr. Davidson was served with the application on March 29, 2013. Mr. Davidson did not file his Answer to Ms Jassa's application until November 27, 2013, despite being granted two previous extensions at two court appearances.

[7] On September 30, 2013, the parties attended the first case conference before me, the case management judge in this matter, after two previous appearances providing extensions to Mr. Davidson to file his materials. At that time, Mr. Davidson consented to an order that he would make arrangements for paternity testing within the next eight weeks. The paternity test results were released on October 7, 2013, approximately eleven months after Jackson's birth. The results confirmed that Mr. Davidson is Jackson's biological father.

[8] At the same case conference, the parties agreed that Ms Jassa be granted custody of Jackson and that she be permitted to travel with Jackson outside of Canada and obtain government issued identification for Jackson without the consent or signature of Mr. Davidson. The parties also agreed on a temporary without prejudice basis pending full financial disclosure that Mr. Davidson pay child support to Ms Jassa in the amount of $1,500.00 per month commencing October 1, 2013. Before this order, Mr. Davidson had made no voluntary child support payments to Ms Jassa.

[9] Mr. Davidson provided a sworn financial statement dated July 25, 2013 at the case conference, deposing that he was self-employed, carrying on a business under the name of "Dr. Credit". He stated that he earned $60,000.00 annually. This was the first time that Mr. Davidson disclosed his income, however, no income tax returns, notices of assessment, corporate tax returns, business financial statements, bank or credit card statements were provided to support his statement. As well, according to his financial statement, Mr. Davidson deposed that he was paying child support in the amount of $1,500.00 per month for his other child, Jordan, which under the Ontario Child Support Guidelines, equates to an income of $175,000.00 annually.

[10] Ms Jassa obtained a copy of the child support order regarding Mr. Davidson's other child. The court order is dated February 21, 2012, and provides that Mr. Davidson pay child support in the amount of $3,500.00 per month to the child's mother. No income is set out in this order and the order provides that the "quantum of child support shall be fixed and non-variable for a period of three years at which time the quantum of support shall be subject to review." That order was made on consent of the parties. Under the Child Support Guidelines, this amount equates to an income of $450,000.00 annually.

[11] At the September 30th case conference in this matter, Mr. Davidson was ordered to produce various disclosure, including the following:

a) His complete income tax returns;

b) His personal bank and credit card statements;

c) All bank, line of credit and credit card statements for Dr. Credit;

d) His corporate financial statements, ledgers and bank statement for any other business owned or operated by Mr. Davidson;

e) Proof of the amount that Mr. Davidson is paying in child support for his other child.

[12] All of the above documents were due by October 30, 2013 and the case conference was adjourned to November 28, 2013.

[13] In addition to the above disclosure order, Mr. Davidson also agreed to permit Ms. Jassa's lawyer to speak to Mr. Davidson's accountant. It is not disputed that Ms. Jassa's lawyer wrote to Mr. Davidson's then counsel lawyer on several occasions requesting the contact information for the accountant. Copies of the correspondence requesting this information were filed at the summary judgment hearing.

[14] At the return of the case conference on November 28, 2013, Mr. Davidson did not attend. An agent for Mr. Davidson and his counsel advised that Mr. Davidson had been called out of the country "suddenly" and was in the United Kingdom. He requested that the case conference be adjourned. None of the financial disclosure that had been ordered to be produced at the first case conference had been produced by Mr. Davidson. However, Mr. Davidson, through his agent, agreed to provide the financial disclosure by December 18, 2013. On consent, the case conference was adjourned to February 3, 2014.

[15] The parties attend the third case conference hearing on February 3, 2014. None of the financial disclosure had been provided by Mr. Davidson at the return of this case conference, despite the order of September 30, 2013, and the extension of the court ordered deadline to December 18, 2013 at Mr. Davidson's request. Mr. Davidson sought a further adjournment to provide the financial disclosure that had been ordered on September 30, 2013. Mr. Davidson also advised at that case conference through counsel that he was now filing for bankruptcy. In addition to the complete absence of the required disclosure, Mr. Davidson had not prepared a case conference brief, nor had he prepared an updated financial statement. As a result, this case conference also needed to be adjourned. The court made the following endorsement at the February 3, 2104 case conference:

This is the third case conference in which nothing has been accomplished because Mr. Davidson had failed to provide any financial disclosure or comply with the outstanding court order made on September 30, 2103. Pursuant to Rule 24(7) and subsection 8 there will be an order of costs for the preparation and attendance for this wasted appearance and the failure to meet the December 18 th deadline for financial disclosure in the amount of $3500. This amount will be enforced as if it were an order for support by the Family Responsibility Office and shall be payable within 30 days. Mr. Davidson shall also pay the arrears of child support although today he has provided a money draft in the amount of $1500 dated February 3, 2014 for child support for the month of February. This matter will be scheduled for a settlement conference with leave to bring further motions if necessary and then proceed to a focused hearing if necessary.

[16] In addition to the above, on February 3, 2014, Mr. Davidson was also ordered to provide the following additional disclosure based on independent investigation by Ms. Jassa that he was involved in a number of other companies:

1. Employment contracts with Mogul Energy International and Auto Strada Motor Group;

2. T4's from Mogul Energy International and Auto Strada Motor Group for 2011, 2012 and 2013, when available;

3. 2013 end of year pay stub from Mogul Energy International and Auto Strada Motor Group;

4. Financial statements from the last three years for Easyresults.ca and AutoStrada Motor Group.

[17] The matter was adjourned to a settlement conference scheduled for April 1, 2014. At that time Mr. Davidson was no longer represented by counsel. He provided some of the disclosure that had been ordered on that day in court, but much of the disclosure was still outstanding. Mr. Davidson further advised that he would be commencing employment with Toshiba Business Systems on May 15, 2014 with a T4 income of $100,000.00. He provided a cheque for $3,000.00 to Ms. Jassa at the April 1, 2014 hearing for the previous costs that had been ordered. He further advised that his accountant was in the process of preparing his taxes for his trustee in bankruptcy.

[18] By April 1, 2014 the following disclosure was still outstanding:

a) Complete income tax returns with all schedules and attachments and in particular statements of business expenses or professional activities for the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012

b) The 2012 Notice of Assessment from CRA;

c) All bank, line of credit, and credit card statements for Mr. Davidson's business Dr. Credit Incorporated from January 1, 2011 to present;

d) The list of all vehicles that Mr. Davidson drives, whether owned by him or not. If he is not the owner, confirmation of the ownership of the 2010 Land Rover;

e) All personal bank and investment account statements from January 2011 to present;

f) All personal credit card and line of credit statements from January 1, 2011 to present;

g) All bankruptcy documents including any proposals made, the statements of affair, the complete creditor's package;

h) All corporate financial statements, ledgers, and bank statements for any businesses owned and operated by Mr. Davidson;

i) Details of proof of any income earned through any other employment;

j) Proof of the amounts of child support paid for Mr. Davidson's other child from September 1, 2012 to the present;

k) Employment contracts with Mogul International and Auto Strada Motor Group;

l) Copy of first pay stub from Toshiba Business Systems and his employment package with Toshiba Business Systems.

[19] Contact information for Mr. Davidson's accountant was eventually provided on April 1, 2014, five months after the consent order for that information was made. When Ms. Jassa's counsel Ms Grimshaw called the accountant, she was advised that he was only an "external accountant" and that he had very little involvement with Mr. Davidson's finances.

[20] At this point Ms. Jassa had been requesting financial disclosure from Mr. Davidson for over nineteen months, most of which he had been ordered to produce by the court and still very little, if nothing had been provided.

[21] As a result, the court adjourned the matter for a continuing settlement conference or for a summary judgment motion regarding child support if the disclosure had not been provided by Mr. Davidson.

[22] On June 23, 2014 the disclosure had not been produced. Mr. Davidson attended with a lawyer who is acting as an agent for a lawyer that Mr. Davidson intended "re-retain". He requested an adjournment as his lawyer was not available to attend on June 23, 2014. The motion for summary judgment had been served on June 10, 2014 after Mr. Davidson once again failed to produce the financial disclosure that had been ordered. After argument, I granted the adjournment request and scheduled the summary judgment motion to be heard on September 3, 2014 at 2:30 p.m. This date was made peremptory and the costs of the hearing on June 23 rd as well as the costs regarding the settlement conference were reserved to that day.

Mr. Davidson's Income

[23] Mr. Davidson is the sole owner of Dr. Credit, a business through which he brokers car deals. The income that Mr. Davidson earned from Dr. Credit is unknown as he has never produced any business financial statements, bank or credit card statements or corporate tax returns from that business. [1] When Mr. Davidson's accountant spoke to Ms. Jassa's lawyer on May 1, 2014 he advised that as of April 2014 Dr. Credit Incorporated was still active. Mr. Chu advised that Dr. Credit does not have a payroll and he has not seen any T4's, invoices or other proof of Mr. Davidson's income from this business. Mr. Chu also indicated that all expenses for Mr. Davidson are paid through Dr. Credit.

[24] There is evidence of an affluent lifestyle. Mr. Davidson drives a Range Rover, a Mercedes, and a Porsche. It is not disputed that he frequently travels to various locations all over the world. Shortly prior to the summary judgment hearing, Mr. Davidson was travelling in Hong Kong and China.

[25] On the statement of tax arrears that Mr. Davidson produced regarding Dr. Credit, Canada Revenue Agency assessed Dr. Credit's income taxes owing in the amount of $243,071.00 for the period ending February 28, 2010 and $212,672.00 for the period ending February 28, 2011. While corporate tax returns for Dr. Credit have never been produced, the income tax assessed for these periods would indicate that Dr. Credit earns a substantially higher income than Mr. Davidson claims.

[26] There was also some evidence that Mr. Davidson may be working for a company called Auto Choice Sales and Leasing. When Mr. Davidson provided proof of the ownership for the Land Rover, it appeared that the Land Rover was transferred out of Mr. Davidson's fiancée's name and into a numbered company. The numbered company was Auto Choice Sales and Leasing which according to the company website, has annual revenue of $838,400. Ms. Jassa's counsel contacted Auto Choice Sales and Leasing and spoke to the president who confirmed that Mr. Davidson is an employee of Auto Choice Sales and Leasing and that he works in and out of the office. Mr. Davidson has denied this.

[27] In addition, Mr. Davidson has posted on his Linkedin.com and Zoominfo.com webpages that he is employed by "Mogul Energy International", a company located in Seattle, Washington. He was previously the president of a company called Auto Strada Motor Group; and he is the founder of a company called EZ-results.ca.

[28] As previously noted, pursuant to the court order dated February 21, 2012, Mr. Davidson is required to pay child support for this child in the amount of $3,500.00 per month, fixed and non-variable until August of 2015. Under the Child Support Guidelines, this equates to an income of just over $450,000 per year. This order was made on consent by both parties.

[29] Mr. Davidson claims that he is not paying $3500 a month to the mother of this child. He produced a consent order that was obtained shortly before the summary judgment motion indicating that the child support order had been changed from $3,500.00 per month to $880.00 per month, based on his salaried income at Toshiba Business Systems. It is not disputed that the recipient under that order had subsequently married a very wealthy business person and relocated to Florida.

[30] At the hearing for the summary judgment on September 3, 2014, Mr. Davidson did not attend, due to "medical issues" according to his counsel [2]. His counsel then produced affidavits from his assistant and from Mr. Davidson, sworn September 2, 2014, providing some of the disclosure that had been ordered twelve months ago. In his affidavit, Mr. Davidson deposed that he had been suffering from bouts of depression and anxiety which had made it difficult for him to work and that he has experience significant financial distress. He indicated that he had gone bankrupt personally and provided a copy of his Form 21 personal bankruptcy. He indicated that his accountant was preparing to have his company, Dr. Credit Incorporated go bankrupt as well as the company owes more than one million dollars and that he would provide the further bankruptcy documents in the coming weeks.

[31] This was the first time that Mr. Davidson deposed that he was suffering from bouts of depression in these proceedings. During the time period that he indicated that he was too depressed or ill to address these proceedings, the bank statements attached to his affidavit indicated that shortly before the summary judgment hearing, Mr. Davidson was travelling in Hong Kong and China, according to the various transactions in the August 2014 bank statements produced for the first time in court at the summary judgment hearing. No explanation was provided regarding the nature of Mr. Davidson's trips to Hong and China in August of 2014.

[32] Ms Jassa's counsel reviewed the bank statements produced that day before the summary judgment hearing commenced. The bank statements were provided for the period of May 2014 to August 2014. He calculated that during a four month period, Mr. Davidson deposited $33,760.00 into a chequing account, or an average of $8,400.00 per month, independent of the salary that he was receiving from Toshiba. No explanation was provided for the source of that income.

[33] In the affidavit produced, Mr. Davidson further deposed the following:

a) On June 23, 2014, the first return date for the summary judgment hearing, the order for child support in regard to his other son had been varied to provide that he pay $880 per month based on his income at Toshiba Business Systems of $100,000;

b) He does not own any other companies;

c) He does not receive any income from any other companies;

d) He does not own a vehicle. His fiancée leases a vehicle which he sometimes drives;

e) He does not have any credit cards;

f) From January 2011 he has not had any lines of credit, credit cards or other accounts;

g) He has produced for the first time today account statement for his only personal account, namely a chequing account with BMO from May to August 2014;

h) He has never worked for Mogul Energy;

i) He has never been an employee or owner of Auto Strada;

j) Although he did start a web design software company called EZ-results in 2009 he does not own any shares in the company nor has he been involved in the company since 2010;

k) He does not work for Auto Choice Sales and Leasing. He previously referred some customers there but he is not an employee there nor does he receive any commissions or income from that company.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

[34] Section 22 of the Child Support Guidelines provides that where a parent fails to comply with the financial disclosure obligations under s.21 of the Guidelines, the other parent may apply:

(a) to have the application for an order for the support of a child set down for a hearing, or move for judgment; or

(b) for an order requiring the parent or spouse who failed to comply to provide the court, as well as the other parent or spouse or order assignee, as the case may be, with the required documents.

[35] Section 23 of the Guidelines provides that where court proceeds to a hearing or moves for judgment under paragraph 22(1)(a) above, the court may draw an adverse inference against the parent who failed to comply and impute income to the parent in such amount it considers appropriate.

[36] In my endorsement dated April 1, 2014, I specifically directed that this matter proceed by way of a motion for summary judgment if adequate disclosure was not provided by Mr. Davidson. The relevant provisions of Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules provides as follows:

16. (1) After the respondent has served an answer or after the time for serving an answer has expired, a party may make a motion for summary judgment for a final order without a trial on all or part of any claim made or any defence presented in the case.

"(2) A motion for summary judgment under subrule (1) may be made in any case (including a child protection case) that does not include a divorce claim. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 16 (2) .

"(4) The party making the motion shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 16 (4) .

"(4.1) In response to the affidavit or other evidence served by the party making the motion, the party responding to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. O. Reg. 91/03, s. 5.

"(5) If a party's evidence is not from a person who has personal knowledge of the facts in dispute, the court may draw conclusions unfavourable to the party. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 16 (5) .

"(6) If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 16 (6) ."

[37] What is clear from this rule is that where there is no genuine issue for trial, it is mandatory that the court make a final order. The onus is on the moving party to persuade the Court that there is no genuine issue for trial. If there is not a genuine issue for trial, the Court is required to make a final order and grant summary judgment.

[38] On a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to take a hard look at the merits of the case to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. While summary judgment should proceed with caution, it is not, however, limited to or granted only in the clearest of cases. A party answering a motion for summary judgment cannot simply rest on bald denials. Mere allegations or blanket denials or self-serving affidavits not supported by specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue for trial must be insufficient to defeat a claim for summary judgment. (Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. A. (M.), [2002] O.J. No. 2371 (Ont. C.J.)).

[39] In determining if there is sufficient evidence led by the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, the question is not whether there is any evidence to support the position, but whether the evidence is sufficient to support a trial. (Children's Aid Society of the County of Dufferin v. J.R., [2002] O.J. No. 4319, per Baldock J.

[40] There has recently been some debate in the case law as to whether or not the court should adopt the broader approach to a court's powers on a summary Judgment motion, by finding that subrule 16 (6) has been bolstered by the new tools the court has pursuant to Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that permit a court to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of deponents and draw reasonable inferences. The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of Hryniak v. Mauldin 2014 SCC 7, has clarified the process of applying the expanded summary judgment rule.

[41] In Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton v. K.C.L., Justice Roselyn Zisman referenced the Supreme Court of Canada's decision and considered the expanded summary judgment rule. She states the following at paragraphs 17, 18, and 19 of that decision:

"The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of Hryniak v. Mauldin 2014 SCC 7, has clarified the process of applying the expanded summary judgment rule. The court held that the judge should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial based on the evidence before her, without using the new fact-finding powers. There will be no genuine issue for trial if the summary Judgment process provides her with the evidence required to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute and is a timely, affordable and proportionate procedure. If there appears to be genuine issue for trial, she should then determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the new powers under Rules 20.04 (2.1) and (2.2).

Accordingly, the first step under either process is to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial based on the evidence presented without relying on any expanded powers to weigh evidence or assess credibility.

In determining if there is sufficient evidence led by the parent, the question is not whether there is any evidence to support the position, but whether the evidence is sufficient to support a trial. (Children's Aid Society of Dufferin v. J.R., [2002] O.J. No. 4319 (Ont. C.J.))."

[42] It is also necessary to consider Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules which states that the primary objective of the Rules is to ensure that cases are dealt with justly by ensuring the procedure is fair to all parties, saves time and expense and that case are dealt with in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity by giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking into consideration the need to give resources to other cases. In Hryniak, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada also directed that cases should be litigated in a responsible and proportional manner and stated that the best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that with the most painstaking procedure. Undue process and protracted trials, with unnecessary expense and delay can prevent the fair and just resolution of disputes [at paragraph 24].

[43] Counsel for Mr. Davidson acknowledges that Mr. Davidson has not made adequate disclosure regarding Dr. Credit Inc. However, he submits that the very fact that it is difficult to determine Mr. Davidson's income, given the material dispute on this issue, requires a trial. He submits that there is enough evidence to suggest that Mr. Davidson's only income is $100,000.00 from Toshiba and that this is a triable issue.

[44] I respectfully disagree. In this case, I have no hesitation in finding that as a result of the almost complete failure to comply with his legal and court ordered obligation to provide financial disclosure for more than one year, there is no genuine issue for trial regarding the determination of Mr. Davidson's income for child support purposes. Pursuant to section 23 of the Child Support Guidelines, Mr. Davidson's clear breach of his disclosure obligations permits me to draw an adverse inference and to impute income on the evidence available. [3] Court orders are not made as a form of judicial exercise. An order is an order, not a suggestion and non-compliance must have some consequences. [4]

[45] Ms Jassa and the court should not be required to guess what Mr. Davidson's income is for child support purposes. The last minute disclosure provided by Mr. Davidson at the summary judgment hearing contained mostly bald denials. The bank statements that he did produce showed unexplained deposits totalling $33,000.00 over a four month period in addition to his regular salary. To order a trial of this issue would only result in further unnecessary expense and delay for Ms Jassa. A trial of this issue would not likely be scheduled for several months, with no realistic expectation that the financial disclosure required to determine Mr. Davidson's income would ever be produced, based on his past history. This will only cause further lengthy and protracted proceedings, thereby preventing the fair and just resolution of this case, particularly in light of Ms Jassa's very low income as a single parent supporting her child with little or no financial assistance from Mr. Davidson. This is not consistent with Rule 2 of our Family Law Rules and the Court's direction in Hryniak, supra.

[46] I draw an adverse inference against Mr. Davidson for his failure to comply with his legal and court ordered obligation for financial disclosure and I will impute the income for child support purposes that I consider appropriate at this hearing.

[47] At the time the motion for summary judgment was argued, the following evidence was available to the court:

a) Mr. Davidson works at Toshiba Business Systems earning a base salary of $100,000 per year. He is employed as a regional sales manager and he indicated that there is commission income and bonus income yet to be determined.

b) As of April 2014, Dr. Credit Incorporated was still operational. Mr. Davidson estimated that he earned $50,000 through Dr. Credit in 2013, although the company owed in excess of $200,000.00 in taxes in 2013. In addition to the income earned through Dr. Credit Mr. Davidson runs various expenses through the business, according to his accountant;

c) At the hearing of the summary judgment motion there were unexplained bank deposits totalling approximately $33,000.00 in a recent four month period, in addition to his salary from Toshiba deposited during the same period;

d) Mr. Davidson leases or leased numerous very expensive cars, travels extensively and enjoys an affluent lifestyle;

e) There was evidence from two individuals that Mr. Davidson also works for Auto Choice Sales and Leasing, despite his bald denials, although he did acknowledge that he was "a representative and ambassador of the company, which has an annual revenue of $838,400.00;

f) Mr. Davidson appears to have some involvement with Auto Strada Motor Group and EZ-results.ca;

g) Until the return of the summary judgment motion, Mr. Davison was required to pay child support for his other child in the amount of $3500 per month which equates to an income of over $450,000 per year. He also agreed that this level of support would be fixed and non-variable for three years (until August of 2015).

[48] I therefore find that income should be imputed to Mr. Davidson at the conservative level of $225,000.00, retroactive to April 1, 2013, the month immediately following the day that Mr. Davidson was personally served with this application for child support. I also order Mr. Davidson to contribute 90% towards the child's or extraordinary expenses, including but not limited to swimming and medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance. This amount is actually less than his actual proportional contribution of 94%, based on the parties' incomes, but is the amount being sought by Ms Jassa.

[49] Regarding the other relief sought, unfortunately, I do not have the jurisdiction to make the orders regarding life insurance and benefits, pursuant to section 34 (1) (i) and (j) and 34 (2) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 34 (2) ; 2006, c. 19 , Sched. C, s. 1 (2). I recognise that Ms Jassa has repeatedly requested this information and these benefits for Jackson from Mr. Davidson and he has refused.

CONCLUSION

[50] For the above reasons, the Court makes the following final order:

1. The respondent, Mr. Davidson shall pay child support to the applicant, Ms Jassa in the amount of $1,818.00, payable on the first day of each month, commencing, based on an imputed income of $225,000.00, commencing April 1, 2013. This is the table amount for one child in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines for Ontario.

2. The respondent shall pay 90% of any ongoing special expenses. The applicant shall present the respondent with proof of the cost of any such expenses and the respondent shall within 14 days pay his share. If the respondent fails to pay his share the applicant can submit the expenses to the Family Responsibility Office to be collected as child support.

3. This order is made without prejudice to the respondent being permitted to bring a motion, on proper notice to the applicant, to seek to change his financial support obligations in this order, without the necessity of proving there has a material change in his circumstances, upon providing proof to the court that he has complied with all of the outstanding disclosure orders made on September 30, 2013, and February 3, 2014, and that he has complied with his legal obligation to provide ongoing financial disclosure.

4. The respondent shall provide to the applicant commencing June 30, 2015 and each year thereafter, copies of his income tax returns, both personal and corporate with all attachments and copies of his notices of assessment or any Notice of Re-Assessment.

5. The applicant shall provide the respondent commencing June 30, 2015 and each year thereafter, a copy of her income tax return with all attachments and a copy of her notice of assessment or any notice of re-assessment, for so long as she seeks section 7 expenses.

6. The respondent's share of the special expenses shall be re-adjusted to take into consideration any tax credits. Until changed on consent or by further court order the amount of child support payable shall remain as in this order.

7. Support Deduction Order to issue.

8. If the applicant seeks costs, brief submissions with a bill of costs and any offer to settle to be attached to be served and filed within 30 days. Any response by the respondent to be served and filed within 2 weeks thereafter and any reply within 1 week.

Released: December 16, 2014

Signed: "Justice Sheilagh O'Connell"

Footnotes

[1] On the day of the summary judgment hearing, Mr. Davidson's counsel provided some disclosure of bank statements.

[2] No evidence was provided regarding the medical issues.

[3] See Richardson v Richardson, 2013 CarswellOnt 15672 (Ont. C.J.) at paragraph 23; Maimone v. Maimone, 2009 CarswellOnt 2909 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paragraph 49

[4] See Mason v Blanchard, 2013 CarswellOnt 10052 (Ont. O.C.J.) at paragraph 12; Gordon v. Starr, 2007 CarswellOnt 5438 (Ont. S.C.J.)