citation: "R. v. Douale, 2013 ONCJ 436" parties: "Her Majesty the Queen v. Warsame Douale" party_moving: "Warsame Douale" party_responding: "Her Majesty the Queen" court: "Ontario Court of Justice" court_abbreviation: "ONCJ" jurisdiction: "Ontario" case_type: "motion" date_judgement: "2013-07-29" date_heard: "2013-07-03" applicant:
- "Warsame Douale" applicant_counsel:
- "Michael Engel" respondent:
- "Her Majesty the Queen" respondent_counsel:
- "Michael Malleson" judge: "Susan C. MacLean" winning_degree_applicant: 5 winning_degree_respondent: 1 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2013 decision_number: 436 file_number: "12-01084" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2013/2013oncj436/2013oncj436.html" summary: > The applicant brought a Charter application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed. The applicant was charged with impaired care or control and having care or control of a motor vehicle while over 80 mgms following a motor vehicle accident on Highway 401. The total delay from the offence date to the scheduled trial date was 15 months and 25 days. The court dismissed the application, finding that the delay did not violate section 11(b) and that the case fell within the Morin guidelines for acceptable delay in the Ontario Court of Justice. The court attributed approximately 8 months of the total delay to institutional/systemic delay, which was within the 8-10 month guideline established by the Supreme Court of Canada. interesting_citations_summary: > This decision provides a comprehensive analysis of section 11(b) Charter applications and the Morin framework for assessing reasonable delay. The court examined the distinction between inherent time requirements, institutional delay, and delay attributable to the defence. Key principles include: (1) the importance of accurate trial time estimates and the treatment of underestimated time as inherent to the case; (2) the requirement that counsel be "truly ready" for trial before institutional delay begins to run; (3) the distinction between general prejudice common to all accused and specific prejudice arising from delay; and (4) the application of the 8-10 month guideline as a guide rather than a strict limitation period. The decision also addresses the Crown's disclosure obligations and the defence's responsibility to bring disclosure disputes before the trial judge rather than using them as grounds for adjournments. final_judgement: "The section