ONCJ 2012

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of his running vehicle during rush hour traffic.

He admitted to smoking a substance he believed to be marijuana approximately 30 minutes before being found.

The Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was marijuana, but argued the charge was proven as the accused consumed an unidentified drug.

The court found the accused guilty, holding that the accused voluntarily consumed a substance he knew to be a drug with intoxicating effects, and his subsequent decision to drive constituted recklessness sufficient to establish the requisite mens rea, regardless of whether the substance was the specific drug he believed he was consuming.

A young person was convicted of theft over $5,000, forcible confinement, use of an imitation firearm during robbery, and two counts of failure to comply with a recognizance, all arising from a home invasion on July 26, 2010.

The Crown sought a serious violent offence designation and 24 months custody and supervision followed by three years probation.

The defence argued against the SVO designation and sought a non-custodial sentence or deferred custody.

The court found the offences constituted a serious violent offence, imposed a custodial sentence of 24 months custody and supervision (16 months secure, 8 months open) followed by 24 months probation, and imposed various conditions including no contact with victims, community service, and a weapons prohibition.

Four accused were convicted of intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a residential property on August 22, 2010, knowing or being reckless as to whether the property was inhabited.

The victim's residence was firebombed with Molotov cocktails in what was characterized as a crime for hire based on false allegations that the victim was a pedophile.

The offenders caused approximately $10,000 in damage.

One accused also faced charges of disguising his face with intent to commit an indictable offence and breaching probation.

Another accused faced an additional charge of attempting to obstruct justice.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences ranging from two to four and one-half years, with the lead offender receiving the longest sentence.

The court emphasized the seriousness of arson, particularly when targeting an occupied residence, and applied principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown proceeded on facts arising from a collision with an Enbridge van.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches and excluded all evidence obtained from the unlawful stop through to the Intoxilyzer results.

An appeal from a conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for two breaches arising from a workplace accident.

The appellant, an automobile reconditioning company, was convicted of failing to provide information, instruction, or supervision to a worker in the safe operation of vehicles, and failing to take reasonable precautions to ensure a worker who drove vehicles had a valid driver's licence and proper training.

The trial justice erred in law by finding that the Crown did not need to prove the particulars of the charges and by imposing unreasonable standards of care.

The appellate court found that the worker was hired solely to clean vehicles and was explicitly instructed not to drive, making it unnecessary for the employer to provide driving instruction or supervision.

The conviction was set aside and a finding of not guilty was entered.

A status review application under the Child and Family Services Act concerning a child (M.) who had been in the care of the Children's Aid Society for 38 months following apprehension due to severe physical abuse of his half-sister (F.).

The mother was criminally convicted of assault causing bodily harm and uttering threats.

The parents sought return of M. to their joint care under supervision; the society sought a crown wardship order without access to facilitate adoption by M.'s paternal great aunt and uncle, with whom he had been placed since age two.

The court found M. continued to be in need of protection, rejected the parents' denial of responsibility for F.'s injuries, and determined that crown wardship without access was in M.'s best interests given his secure attachment to his current caregivers, the parents' lack of insight and cooperation, and the risk of harm if returned to parental care.

The applicant father sought an order under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction directing the return of his adopted daughter E. to Hungary after the respondent mother wrongfully removed and retained the child in Canada without notice.

The respondent resisted the application, invoking exceptions under Articles 13(b) and 20 of the Convention, claiming that return would expose the child to grave risk of physical and psychological harm due to persecution of Roma people in Hungary and the respondent's activism, and that the child's wishes should be respected.

The court found that the child was wrongfully retained, that the respondent failed to establish the Article 13(b) exception on the balance of probabilities, and that while the child expressed a preference to remain in Canada, this preference was influenced by the respondent and did not override the principles of the Convention.

The court ordered the child's return to Hungary.

A summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that two young children were in need of protection and an order making them Crown wards without access for the purpose of adoption.

The mother opposed the finding but agreed to Crown wardship with access.

The court found that the children were in need of protection due to exposure to domestic violence and parental substance abuse.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The children were made Crown wards without access, as the mother failed to meet the statutory test for access to Crown wards under section 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault causing bodily harm under Section 267(b) of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred on June 18, 2011, in the Town of Hanover and Township of Normandy.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, the accused's spouse, who alleged two separate violent assaults during a high school reunion weekend.

The accused provided a materially different account, claiming the complainant initiated physical attacks on him while driving, and that he acted only in self-defense and to restrain her.

The court found credibility issues with the complainant's account, particularly the discrepancy between her description of severe beatings and the relatively minor injuries documented.

The accused's evidence, while not entirely convincing, raised reasonable doubt sufficient to warrant acquittal on both counts.

This is a child protection case involving five children of the B. family.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship for all five children based on findings of neglect, inadequate supervision, failure to meet educational and health needs, and parental non-cooperation.

The court found that the children were in need of protection and made orders for Crown wardship with varying access provisions.

The case involved a complex history of Society involvement dating back to 2006, with persistent concerns about supervision, school attendance, health care, and parental responsiveness to intervention.

Appeal from convictions under section 28(16) of the Conservation Authorities Act for undertaking development without authorization from the Grand River Conservation Authority on property in the Township of North Dumfries.

The appellants were convicted of creating a laneway and berm through protected wetland without obtaining the required permit.

The appellants challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, the conservation authority's jurisdiction over private property, and alleged incompetence of trial counsel.

The appellate court upheld the convictions and sentences, finding the trial judge's findings of fact were reasonable, the jurisdiction issues were properly addressed, and there was no merit to allegations of counsel incompetence or conflict.

The defendant was charged with drug and firearm-related offences following a search warrant executed at his residence.

The defendant brought a Charter s. 8 motion challenging the validity of the search warrant on the grounds that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was legally deficient and that the search violated his right to privacy.

The court found that the affiant made material misstatements and omissions in the ITO, including mischaracterizing a witness as a confidential informant, failing to disclose relevant information about the witness's credibility and relationship with the defendant, and providing incomplete information about the defendant's criminal record.

The court determined that paragraphs containing information from the mischaracterized witness must be excised from the ITO.

After excision, the remaining information from the legitimate confidential informant was insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the search warrant.

Additionally, the court found that there was no evidentiary foundation to believe the firearm would be found at the defendant's residence.

The search warrant was set aside as improvidently issued, and the evidence seized was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

An interjurisdictional support order application brought by a father residing in Winnipeg, Manitoba against a mother residing in Sault Ste.

Marie, Ontario.

The father sought child support from the mother for their biological child and a child to whom he stood in loco parentis, and sought to vary or terminate existing support orders from British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba courts.

The application was converted to a case conference due to both parties' absence.

The court identified significant procedural deficiencies in the applicant's application and the respondent's failure to file required documentation, and adjourned the matter to allow both parties to cure these deficiencies.

The applicant mother sought to amend her claim in a custody application from joint custody of her adult son (age 18) to sole custody, with paternal access subject to the child's wishes.

The respondent father opposed the amendment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to make custody orders for adult children under section 18(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, which limits the definition of "child" to minors.

The court granted the amendment, holding that section 18(2) does not preclude custody orders for adult children and that such orders are necessary and desirable in practical circumstances where adult children remain dependent on their parents.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking and breaches following his arrest on June 14, 2006.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and trial to determine whether the arrest was lawful and whether evidence obtained from a search incident to arrest should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused moved to exclude evidence based on alleged breaches of s. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arrest was unlawful and the detention arbitrary, as the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds based on an unreliable confidential informant tip and minimal corroborating observations.

The court excluded the evidence seized, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

A 19-year-old First Nations offender pleaded guilty to robbery after assaulting a victim and stealing a small amount of marijuana.

The victim sustained a broken jaw from a single punch.

The court applied Gladue principles in sentencing, considering the offender's Aboriginal background, criminal history, youth, and genuine remorse.

The Crown sought a mid to upper reformatory range sentence (12 months to 2 years less a day), while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a sentence of time served (218 days in custody) plus two years probation with conditions including substance abuse counselling and culturally appropriate First Nations-based programming.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of section 11(b) rights (trial within a reasonable time) in a speeding charge under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was charged on April 24, 2011, and filed a Notice of Intention to Appear on April 29, 2011.

The central issue was whether the five-month delay in scheduling a first attendance meeting with the prosecutor should be counted as institutional delay or treated as a neutral intake period.

The court found that the defendant had voluntarily requested the first attendance meeting and was aware that a trial date would not be scheduled until after the meeting.

After deducting various neutral periods and the first attendance meeting delay, the remaining institutional delay was 6 months and 24 days, which fell below the acceptable guideline of 8 to 10 months.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with break and enter with intent to commit assault and assault with a weapon (frying pan) against Christine Higgins on December 7, 2010, in Oakville.

The Crown's case relied primarily on eyewitness identification evidence from the victim and her daughter, who identified the accused as the assailant.

The accused advanced an alibi defence, claiming he was at his mother's house at the time of the attack.

The court found the identification evidence reliable despite some frailties and rejected the alibi as not worthy of belief.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether police complied with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code when demanding an approved screening device sample.

The officer formed reasonable suspicion at 12:25 a.m. but did not make the demand until 12:32 a.m., and the approved screening device was not administered until 12:44 a.m., resulting in a 19-minute delay.

The court found that the officer failed to comply with the immediacy requirement and breached the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2), and the charge was dismissed.

The defendant, a construction company, was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act with failing to ensure that a temporary wooden brace used in a winch system was designed and constructed to support or resist all loads and forces to which it was likely to be subjected.

The charge arose from a fatal construction accident in which a worker died when the wooden brace failed.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the wooden brace was inadequately designed and constructed for the likely forces it would encounter, given its intended use for achieving alignment rather than applying maximum force.

The court also found that the defendant exercised due diligence by relying on manufacturer instructions and industry standards.

The defendant was acquitted.