ONCJ 2012

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion seeking an interim order placing a child in the temporary care and custody of the mother under Society supervision, subject to specified terms and conditions.

The central issue was whether the mother's resumption of alcohol consumption posed a risk to the child.

The court found that given the mother's extensive history of substance abuse, criminal convictions, parole violations, and recent incidents of impaired driving and poor judgment while consuming alcohol, the consumption of alcohol by the mother posed a risk of harm to the child.

The court ordered that the child remain in the mother's care subject to conditions including a prohibition on alcohol consumption while the child was in her care.

The accused was charged with seventeen offences relating to a loaded firearm, folding knife, and cash seized during a search of his residence.

The Crown conceded that the search warrants were invalid due to the affiant's failure to properly investigate the credibility of untested confidential informants and the heavily redacted informations to obtain warrants that did not disclose reasonable grounds.

The court found a section 8 Charter violation and proceeded to determine whether the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The court found the police conduct was seriously careless and reckless in drafting the informations, including misleading characterizations of the accused as a "Dangerous Offender" and failure to properly investigate the reliability of informants.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court excluded the firearm evidence, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute despite the serious nature of the offences and public interest in prosecuting gun crimes.

The accused was charged with three offences: possession of cannabis marijuana not exceeding 30 grams contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, wilfully obstructing a police officer by providing a false name, and breaching an undertaking by entering a restricted area.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated during police questioning and search.

The court found that the accused was unlawfully detained without being informed of his right to counsel, and that the detention and subsequent searches violated his Charter rights.

The marijuana evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of obstruct police and breach of undertaking, but acquitted of marijuana possession.

The accused was charged with robbery of a convenience store and concealing his face during the robbery.

The sole issue was identification.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the eyewitness identification of the store clerk, who testified that he recognized the robber as a customer he had seen approximately ten times over the previous year.

The court found the witness credible but determined that the reliability of the eyewitness identification was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court acquitted the accused, finding that while the witness's familiarity with the customer bolstered the reliability of the identification, it did not, in the context of all the evidence and the absence of corroborating evidence, establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought spousal support from the respondent, claiming they had cohabited as common law spouses for at least three years.

The respondent disputed the claim, arguing that the three-year threshold had not been met and that he had no financial obligation to the applicant.

The court found that the parties had cohabited as common law spouses for approximately eleven years, commencing around 1993 when the respondent moved into the applicant's residence at 907 Premier Road.

The court ordered ongoing spousal support, recognizing the applicant's contributions to the relationship and the economic consequences of the relationship's breakdown.

The court also considered the respondent's subsequent family obligations but determined that these did not eliminate his support obligations to the applicant.

The Meaford and District Fire Department faced three charges under section 25(2)(h) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from injuries to two firefighters at a structure fire on September 9, 2009.

The charges alleged failures to: (1) activate an accountability system to track firefighters; (2) maintain effective supervision through a command post; and (3) establish a Rapid Intervention Team.

Following the Crown's case, the defendant brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The court granted the motion on counts 4 and 6, finding insufficient evidence on the particulars alleged, but dismissed the motion on count 1, finding evidence capable of supporting a conviction.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He sought to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 10, specifically claiming the screening demand was not made forthwith as required by section 254(2) and that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found that the police did not breach the accused's constitutional rights.

The screening demand was made promptly once grounds were formed, the overall delay was reasonable given the volatile circumstances requiring officer safety and situation stabilization, and there was no realistic opportunity to provide counsel before the screening test given the brief nine-minute window and unstable conditions.

The defendant pleaded guilty to six counts of contravening the Travel Industry Act, 2002 by acting as a travel agent without being registered.

Over a period from October 2009 to May 2010, the defendant engaged in a scheme involving unauthorized use of credit cards, misrepresentation of bookings, and diversion of client payments.

The scheme caused significant financial losses to multiple victims including a children's charity, a travel agency, and individual consumers.

The defendant was sentenced to 90 days in custody served intermittently on weekends, two years probation, and a free-standing restitution order totaling $173,832.23.

The Society moved under section 64(8) of the Child and Family Services Act for an order placing a child in the care of the father subject to Society supervision and access to the mother.

The child had been placed in the joint care of both parents following a protection finding.

After the parents separated, the father unilaterally removed the child from the family home without urgent cause.

The court found that the father's act of self-help should not be rewarded and that the mother, as the primary caregiver, should continue to play an active and significant role in the child's upbringing.

The court issued a temporary order placing the child in the joint care and custody of both parents with specified access arrangements and supervision conditions.

The defendant, owner of a multi-unit residential building, was charged with five violations of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 relating to the Fire Code.

The charges involved: combustible materials stored in a means of egress; obstruction of a means of egress with items on stairs; obstruction of an exterior stairway; failure to maintain an exterior stairway in good repair; and a breach of fire separation requirements between dwelling units.

The defendant raised defenses of temporary storage and necessity, which were rejected.

The court found the defendant guilty on all five counts based on clear photographic evidence and testimony from the Fire Prevention Officer.

The applicant sought to vary a separation agreement dated May 24, 2010 to increase spousal support from $100 per month to $500 per month and to obtain an order designating her as beneficiary of the respondent's union pension.

The applicant claimed she could not support herself and her pet on the current support amount.

The court found no material change in circumstances since the execution of the agreement.

The applicant had drafted the separation agreement herself, knew what she was doing, and the respondent had complied with all terms.

The court dismissed the motion without costs.

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood.

The Crown called two police officers who testified regarding the traffic stop, the approved screening device test, and the subsequent breath samples provided at the police station.

The central issue was whether a proper demand pursuant to section 254(3) of the Criminal Code had been made.

The trial judge found that the officers had only made an approved screening device demand under section 254(2), not the required approved instrument demand under section 254(3).

The trial judge concluded that a proper demand under section 254(3) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of the breath certificate and that the Crown could not rely on the presumption of accuracy.

An acquittal was entered.

The accused pleaded guilty to three charges: mischief under $5,000 by interference with an ATM, possession of a forgery device (skimmer device), and possession of a credit card obtained by crime.

The accused was observed manipulating an ATM where a skimmer device and pinhole camera had been installed to steal debit card data and record PINs.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court rejected both positions, finding that incarceration was necessary but that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the accused's youth, first-offender status, and the need to balance general deterrence with rehabilitation principles.

The accused was charged with seven serious offences including two counts of robbery while armed with a firearm, two counts of forcible confinement, disguise with intent, break and enter, and failure to comply with probation.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused proposed two sureties and a release plan including house arrest.

The court found that the proposed supervision plan was inadequate given the accused's criminal history, the serious nature of the charges involving a home invasion, and the strength of the Crown's case.

The court granted the Crown's detention order.

This is a costs decision following the dismissal of a motion to change relating to section 7 expenses under a consent order.

The applicant sought to reduce his child support obligations but failed to comply with three prior court orders and owed substantial arrears in child support and costs.

The court dismissed the motion to change with costs at an early stage under the Family Law Rules.

The costs decision addresses the applicant's claim of inability to pay and applies the three primary objectives of costs orders: indemnification, settlement encouragement, and sanctioning of inappropriate behaviour.

The applicant brought a motion to reduce or terminate his spousal support obligations under a 2004 separation agreement, citing his terminal cancer diagnosis, retirement, and the respondent's repartnering.

The court found the agreement permitted a de novo review.

The court imputed income to both parties, finding the applicant had not fully withdrawn from his business and the respondent had not made reasonable efforts to become self-sufficient.

The court also considered the financial benefit the respondent received from her new partner.

Spousal support was reduced in a stepped manner for 2011, 2012, and 2013 onwards.

The applicant's request for retroactive reduction to 2010 was denied, and he was ordered to pay arrears under a cost of living clause.

The appellant, a holder of an Ontario commercial fishing license, was convicted after trial of two counts of unlawfully failing to comply with a condition of the license by overfishing.

He was sentenced to fines totalling $4,000 and a ten-year prohibition from participating in commercial fishing activities.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on multiple grounds, including that he was not the operating mind of the business, that there was a breach of section 7 of the Charter and an abuse of process, that the trial court conducted the trial unfairly and with bias, and that crown counsel behaved improperly.

The appellant also appealed the sentence as harsh and excessive.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the convictions and the sentence.

The defendants, a restaurant corporation and its president, faced quasi-criminal charges under the Liquor Licence Act for permitting disorderly conduct and drunkenness.

Prior to trial, the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario held an administrative hearing and found the corporation had contravened the Act, suspending its licence.

The defendants brought a pre-trial motion to stay the quasi-criminal charges, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction based on res judicata and double jeopardy.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that regulatory proceedings to determine licence fitness are fundamentally different from quasi-criminal prosecutions, involve different burdens of proof, and do not trigger double jeopardy protections.

The defendant was charged with speeding (111 km/h in a 70 km/h zone) under the Highway Traffic Act, prosecuted under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act.

The defendant brought an application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The trial commenced on November 17, 2010, but was adjourned due to lack of court time.

The trial was subsequently rescheduled multiple times, with the defendant explicitly waiving his Charter rights for one period.

The court found that 15 months and 16 days of the total 23 months and 20 days of delay was attributable to unacceptable institutional delay.

The court concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial had been prejudiced and that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy.

This is a child protection trial following the apprehension of two children from their parents' care.

The parties agreed to findings under the Child and Family Services Act based on substandard home conditions and parental conflict.

The central issue was disposition: which parent should have care and control of the children subject to supervision.

The court found that the father had successfully remediated his deficits through parenting programs and consistent implementation of learned strategies, while the mother continued to struggle with attention deficits, anxiety, stress, and decision-making capacity.

The court placed the children in the father's care and control subject to supervision, with specific terms addressing monitoring, computer use, relationship disclosure, and parental counselling.