ONCJ 2012

The accused was charged with forcible confinement, threatening bodily harm, assault, and criminal harassment arising from events on March 20, 2011, involving his former romantic partner.

The Crown's case consisted primarily of the victim's testimony.

The assault charge was dismissed at the conclusion of the Crown's case for lack of prima facie case.

Following trial, the accused was acquitted on all remaining charges.

The court found reasonable doubt on the confinement charge regarding whether the victim's presence in the vehicle was unwilling, on the threat charge regarding whether the words conveyed a genuine threat in context, and on the harassment charge regarding whether the conduct caused the victim to reasonably fear for her safety.

The applicants sought a restraining order against the respondents, requesting that they be restrained from directly or indirectly contacting the applicants or their child, and from coming within 200 metres of the applicants, the child, or their residences, schools, or places of employment.

The applicants alleged a history of domestic violence, harassment, and inappropriate conduct.

The respondents sought dismissal of the application with costs.

The court found no objective factual basis for the applicants' fears, noting that allegations of abuse and assault had not been substantiated by authorities, and that the applicants' evidence lacked credibility.

The court dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with uttering threats, assault, and sexual assault with a weapon against his estranged wife, as well as breaching probation orders.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's testimony as fabrication.

The court found that the accused physically assaulted the complainant, threatened her and her friend with a knife, and subsequently sexually assaulted her.

The accused was found guilty of uttering threats, assault, and the lesser included offence of sexual assault, as the knife was not used during the sexual assault itself.

Defendants were charged with failing to maintain a minimum distance for an accessory building (shed) from the property line, contrary to Town of Richmond Hill Zoning By-law 128-04, section 5.1.4(a), and the Planning Act.

The shed was located 18 inches from the rear lot line when the applicable setback requirement was significantly greater (either 4 feet under the predecessor by-law or 7.5 metres under the amended by-law).

The defendants argued the property was zoned "Residential" rather than "Urban," that they had been charged under the wrong by-law, and that they had relied on prior court proceedings and town approvals.

The court found the property was zoned "Urban," the applicable by-law was By-law 128-04, and the shed violated the setback requirements.

The court rejected defences based on res judicata, abuse of process, officially induced error, and legal non-complying use.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The trial proceeded with a blended Charter application challenging the validity of the breath sample evidence.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: (1) the demand under s. 254(2) Criminal Code was not made "forthwith" as required, with a 22-minute delay from formation of suspicion to commencement of testing; (2) the accused's s. 10(a)(b) Charter rights were not provided immediately after the roadside test failure.

Under s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the court excluded the Certificate of Analysis evidence as the breaches were multiple, protracted, and contrary to the officer's training, warranting disassociation by the justice system.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and over 80 on April 23, 2011.

She brought a motion to stay the charges pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging that she was not tried within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled to commence on January 25, 2012, but did not conclude until July 13, 2012, resulting in a delay of approximately 14.5 months from arrest to the second trial date.

The court found that the Crown's inattention to disclosure obligations, including the failure to timely provide police officer notes and a 911 recording, contributed significantly to the delay.

The court concluded that the applicant's s. 11(b) rights were violated and granted a stay of proceedings.

The applicant brought a motion for contempt of a prior custody order, alleging that the respondent failed to communicate effectively regarding issues affecting their child and denied Christmas access in 2011.

The respondent argued that the applicant failed to provide proper notice of his intention to exercise access, specifically failing to include contact information within the required 45-day notice period.

The court found that while the respondent's conduct was problematic and appeared designed to frustrate the applicant's access rights, on a strict reading of the order, the respondent was technically within her rights to deny access due to the late provision of contact information.

The contempt motion was dismissed.

The accused, a 37-year-old woman with a lengthy criminal record related to drug addiction, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic 28.75 grams of crack cocaine.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of approximately 15 months, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence with the first six months subject to electronic monitoring, followed by two years of probation.

The decision reflects a modern approach to sentencing addict-traffickers, emphasizing genuine rehabilitation efforts and the possibility of community-based sentences where appropriate.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Blow Over 80 after being found in the driver's seat of his vehicle in a ditch with the engine running.

The Crown alleged the accused had more than the legal limit of alcohol in his blood system.

The defence challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, argued the vehicle was immovable and therefore the accused could not have care or control, and contended the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The trial judge found reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest existed, the presumption of care or control was not rebutted, but the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable due to an unexplained 31-minute gap between the first and second tests.

The Blow Over 80 charge was dismissed due to the loss of the statutory presumption.

The Operation Impaired charge was also dismissed despite moderate indicia of impairment, as the Crown did not seek a conviction on this charge.

The Society applied for an order of Crown wardship without access to allow a child born to two parents with cognitive limitations and mental health issues to be adopted.

The child had been in Society care since five days after birth due to unsanitary living conditions, domestic violence concerns, and parental inability to provide adequate childcare.

The parents sought return of the child or, alternatively, an extension of Society wardship with therapeutic access.

The court found that while the parents had made efforts to improve and had some strengths, they had not demonstrated adequate parenting ability over 21 months despite intensive support.

The court ordered Crown wardship but granted an access order, finding the relationship between the child and parents was beneficial and meaningful and would not impair adoption opportunities.

The accused was arrested for driving with excess alcohol after failing an approved screening device.

Following arrest, he provided his lawyer's name and two phone numbers to the arresting officer.

The officer attempted to contact the lawyer but was unsuccessful, and subsequently called duty counsel instead.

The accused spoke to duty counsel for approximately four minutes.

The central issue was whether the accused's right to consult with counsel of choice under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated.

The court found that the officer's evidence regarding her attempts to contact the accused's lawyer was unreliable and that the accused was effectively denied the right to consult with counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breathalyzer results and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with attempting to obstruct or pervert the course of justice in a judicial proceeding by threatening to use his vote, position and influence as a jury member to cause a hung jury irrespective of the evidence at trial.

The accused sent communications to the Ministry of the Attorney General, the Sheriff's office, and a newspaper reporter expressing his intention to deliberately vote to hang any jury on which he served.

The court found that the jury selection process constitutes a judicial proceeding under the Criminal Code.

However, the court acquitted the accused, finding that his actions constituted mere threats to obstruct justice rather than an attempt to do so, as he did not bring his materials to court and had no contact with potential jurors.

The court found the accused was attempting to avoid jury duty rather than to obstruct justice.

A police officer charged the defendant with careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act by filing a Certificate of Offence.

However, the officer had deliberately struck out the title "Certificate of Offence / Proces-verbal d'infraction" and other portions of the prescribed form, intending to convert it into a Summons.

The court examined whether these alterations invalidated the document under section 84 of the Legislation Act.

While the striking out of the Fine Boxes and modifications to the Certification Box were found not to invalidate the document, the deliberate removal of the title was found to fundamentally alter the substance of the prescribed form and render it no longer a valid Certificate of Offence.

A child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving two children who had been in the care of their paternal grandparents pursuant to a section 57.1 custody order.

The children were apprehended due to concerns about physical harm.

The paternal grandparents agreed they could no longer care for the children.

The biological parents each sought placement of the children with them, alternatively seeking access.

The court found the children were in need of protection and made a crown wardship order, granting access to the paternal grandparents but denying access to the biological parents.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The accused drove to a hospital following an ambulance after his wife suffered a serious leg injury at their rural residence.

The accused raised the common-law defence of necessity.

The court found that the defence failed on all three elements: there was no imminent peril once paramedics took charge of the wife's care, reasonable alternatives were available to the accused, and the harm of impaired driving outweighed the potential benefit of the accused's presence at the hospital.

The court found the accused guilty.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that the delay between his arrest on October 5, 2010 and his trial date of March 7, 2012 (17 months and 2 days) violated his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The Crown conceded that the total delay warranted Charter scrutiny but argued that the institutional delay, after appropriate deductions for intake and neutral periods, was approximately 11 months, which fell within acceptable guidelines.

The court found that while the accused suffered some prejudice from the frustration of his first trial date, the majority of his claimed prejudice was charge-related rather than delay-related.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the accused had not satisfied the balance of probabilities test for establishing a section 11(b) breach.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault level one (section 266 of the Criminal Code) arising from alleged incidents on July 30, 2010 and between October 1 and November 30, 2008.

The victim was the accused's former wife.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the accused pleaded not guilty.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant, police officers, and the accused and his adoptive father.

The court applied the R. v. W.D. analysis and found the accused guilty on both counts based on the credibility of the complainant's evidence, corroborating photographic evidence of injuries consistent with bite marks, and the lack of credibility in the accused's categorical denials.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a single-vehicle collision on the QEW highway.

The trial addressed two key issues: whether the lab technician had lawful authorization to take a blood sample, and whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court found that the accused's job description, stored electronically, constituted valid written authorization under the Criminal Code.

The blood sample analysis revealed a BAC of 258 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with a stay entered on the impaired driving count at the Crown's request.

The accused was charged with theft under $5,000 arising from an incident at a Walmart store where she allegedly left the store with unpaid merchandise.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of a loss prevention officer who observed the accused placing items into her shopping cart and then leaving without paying for them.

The accused testified that she was distracted by young children and urgent medical appointments, and that unpaid items had been placed in the cart by her children or had become concealed beneath a baby car seat.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the accused's intent to steal and dismissed the charge.

A Charter application alleging breach of section 7 rights due to lost surveillance video was also dismissed.