Court of Appeal

The appeal concerned whether post-closing transactions triggered accelerated earn-out payment obligations under a share purchase agreement.

The court deferred to the application judge’s contractual interpretation and factual findings, concluding no trigger event requiring immediate full earn-out payment had been established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged refusal to set aside a struck defence and a default judgment imposing trust-based liability for unpaid construction invoices.

The court upheld the motion judge’s findings on delay, credibility, and absence of arguable defence, and confirmed quantum based on deemed admissions under default rules and Construction Act trust obligations.

This commercial lease appeal addressed validity of default and termination notices, the resulting lease termination findings, and related costs rulings.

The court upheld the application judge’s determinations and dismissed both the main appeal and the costs appeal after granting leave on costs.

The appellant challenged dismissal of a motion for leave to issue a third-party claim, arguing limitation issues were wrongly decided.

The court held the motion judge made no error in finding the claim was statute-barred and rejected arguments premised on separate proceedings and later party discussions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties (Vendors) sought to lift an automatic stay of an order requiring the responding party (Purchaser) to pay €855,155 pending the hearing of an application regarding an earn-out payment dispute.

The Purchaser had appealed the order, triggering an automatic stay under Rule 63.01(1).

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to lift the stay under Rule 63.01(5), finding that the Purchaser's financial instability created a material risk of non-payment, which constituted financial hardship for the Vendors.

To balance the risk to the Purchaser, the stay was lifted on the condition that the Vendors pay an equivalent amount into court as security pending the appeal.

The appeal challenged the validity of a guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

Both parties acknowledged the plea did not reflect their agreement and resulted from mutual misapprehension.

The court allowed the appeal, substituted a conviction for common assault, and left sentence intact.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found that the individual appellant, who was the sole officer and employee of the corporate appellant, had serially engaged in vexatious litigation since 2017, including bringing proceedings outside the court's jurisdiction and failing to pay significant costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's application of the relevant factors and concluding that the order against both the corporation and the individual directing its litigation was entirely justified.

The Crown appealed stays of proceedings granted to two respondents charged in a massive cross-border drug trafficking investigation.

The application judge had found the delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling and declined to deduct time for joint-trial scheduling or find the case exceptionally complex.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 107 days of joint-trial scheduling delay should have been deducted as a discrete exceptional circumstance.

Furthermore, the overarching complexity of the multi-agency project prosecution, which involved voluminous disclosure, justified the remaining modest delay above the ceiling.

The stays were set aside and the matters remitted for trial.

Following a joint trial, both appellants challenged convictions for possession of cocaine for trafficking and related proceeds offences, largely on factual grounds.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial findings.

Leave to appeal sentence for one appellant was granted but dismissed on the merits.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter after shooting two men outside a nightclub.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by admitting evidence obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, misapprehending eyewitness testimony, improperly assessing the provocation defence, and refusing to grant a mistrial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or assessment of the evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the 18-year parole ineligibility period as proportionate.

The representative plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy for packaged bread sought to amend their pleadings and the Certification Order to add Maple Leaf Foods Inc. as a certified defendant.

The original Certification Order had refused certification against Maple Leaf on the basis that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action against it, and this decision was not appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the motion, finding that the original refusal to certify was a final order that gave rise to res judicata.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act does not permit relitigation of matters finally decided, and the motion judge did not err in refusing to exercise his limited discretion to bypass res judicata.

The appellant challenged multiple convictions as unreasonable, legally flawed, and affected by ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court found the evidentiary record supported the trial findings, identified no legal error, and held no miscarriage of justice was shown.

The appeal was dismissed.

Two defendants appealed a trial judgment awarding substantial damages for breach of fuel-delivery contracts and for inducing breach.

The court upheld findings that Remote breached contract and good faith duties, that Wasaya induced the breach, and that mitigation findings were available on the record.

However, it held the trial judge erred by not applying the contractual limitation clause, reducing Remote’s liability to $50,000 while leaving Wasaya liable for $856,458.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action arose from a social media post by the respondent about Halal mortgages, which the appellant claimed referred to him and his former company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the post related to a matter of public interest and that the appellant failed to show the defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned words did not identify him.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant challenged orders in bankruptcy proceedings including standing rulings, estate consolidation, and treatment of approved claims.

The court found no right of appeal under s. 193(a) or (c) of the BIA, declined leave under s. 193(e), and held the appellant had not timely invoked available statutory claim-challenge mechanisms.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents and third parties brought a motion for security for costs against the appellants pending an appeal of a summary judgment order in a mortgage enforcement action.

The motion judge found that the appeal had a low prospect of success and that the appellants were unlikely to pay a costs award, satisfying the 'other good reason' requirement under Rule 61.06(1)(c).

The court ordered the appellants to post security for costs, though the amount for the plaintiff was reduced as a party should not have to give security simply to defend an order obtained below.

The appellants, FedEx, appealed an order certifying a class proceeding brought by the respondent, who alleged FedEx charged undisclosed and unsolicited customs brokerage fees in breach of the Consumer Protection Act.

FedEx argued the claim disclosed no cause of action, lacked common issues, and had an overly broad class definition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the systemic nature of the billing practices raised common issues, and the class definition appropriately included claims that might face limitation or jurisdictional defences, which are better addressed at trial.

The appellant advanced two criminal appeals and sought an adjournment to retain counsel and add new grounds.

The court refused adjournment, found no reversible error in conviction or sentencing processes, and held the appellant had already received ample procedural accommodation.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The applicant pleaded guilty to exercising control over a person providing sexual services and was sentenced to time served plus probation.

More than three years later, he brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal his conviction, arguing his plea was involuntary due to harsh custodial conditions and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the applicant failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, provided no reasonable explanation for the delay, and raised grounds of appeal that lacked merit.

The moving party, who was previously declared a vexatious litigant and prohibited from filing further materials without leave, sought leave to file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing her action for delay.

The underlying action involved allegations of improper disclosure of confidential youth records by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed notice of appeal contained the same fatal flaws as her previous pleadings and failed to raise tenable grounds.

The court also declined to grant leave to amend the notice of appeal, finding that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the respondent would suffer prejudice.

The motion for leave to file a notice of appeal was dismissed.