Real Estate Law - ONCA

The vendor of an apartment building appealed its property tax assessment and subsequently sold the property.

After closing, the assessment appeal succeeded, resulting in a tax refund that the City paid to the purchaser pursuant to s. 306(2) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The vendor sought the refund, arguing unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal held that the right to the refund was a chose in action that did not run with the land and was not assigned to the purchaser.

The Court further held that s. 306(2) is merely an administrative provision and does not provide a juristic reason for the purchaser to retain the refund.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims against her former solicitor and a charitable foundation regarding the transfer of her home with a retained life estate.

At trial, she argued non est factum and breach of fiduciary duty, both of which were dismissed based on credibility findings.

On appeal, she raised a new argument of solicitor negligence regarding ongoing property expenses, which the court declined to hear as it was not pleaded at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings and the award of substantial indemnity costs, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment determining title to certain former railway lands.

The application judge found the respondent had fee simple title to Part 1 and title to Part 15 subject to the appellant's possessory claim, directing a trial on whether the possessory claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's decision to require a trial for the limitation issue due to credibility concerns regarding discoverability, nor in her conclusion that the railway acquired title to Part 1 through legislated powers.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision, arguing a trial was required for its claim that the respondent intentionally interfered with its economic relations with a tenant through the tort of nuisance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant suffered damages as a result of the respondent's conduct, particularly regarding lease renewals.

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to execute a specific release and indemnity in favour of the respondent bare trustees before the trustees would convey certain lands.

The Court of Appeal found that the release requested by the respondents was broader in scope than the release provided for in the underlying trust agreement.

The appeal was allowed, and the order was varied to require the appellants to execute a release only in the terms set out in the trust agreement.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found them liable for trespass, issued a mandatory order, awarded damages including punitive damages, refused to order partition, and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's strong findings of fact or assessment of damages.

The court upheld the punitive damages due to the egregious nature of the trespass and affirmed the costs award.

The appellant declarant registered a condominium declaration requiring the respondent condominium corporation to purchase a manager's unit.

After a turnover meeting, the newly elected board of directors purported to terminate the purchase agreement pursuant to s. 112 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's application to enforce the purchase.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the power to terminate agreements under s. 112 does not extend to obligations arising from a condominium declaration, which has a distinct and higher legal status under the Act.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a title insurance claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge and finding that the claim was barred by the exclusions and exceptions relating to leases in the insurance policy.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment awarding damages to the respondent vendor for failing to close a real estate transaction.

The appellant argued he refused to close because he discovered a nearby landfill site, which he claimed the vendor had a duty to disclose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the appellant failed to lead any evidence that the landfill posed a health and safety risk, and that the real reason for failing to close was an inability to arrange financing.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order, setting aside the full indemnity costs awarded by the motion judge and replacing them with partial indemnity costs, as there was no finding of bad faith or unreasonable conduct.

The appellant appealed a decision holding that the respondent acquired title to a 50-foot commercial sign located on the appellant's retained land when the respondent purchased an adjacent motel property.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge did not err in concluding the sign was included in the sale as a chattel, given the broad definition in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the evidence of the transaction lawyers.

The Court further held that the easement for ingress and egress was intended to permit the placement and maintenance of the sign.

The appeal was dismissed, but the judgment was varied to declare that the easement permitted the sign's location.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision regarding its obligation to pay rent under a commercial lease.

The lease contained a latent ambiguity regarding the Completion Date and Rental Commencement Date.

The tenant argued it was not required to pay rent because the landlord had not completed all buildings in the shopping centre as stipulated in the lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was not commercially reasonable for the tenant to take possession, operate its business, and use the landlord's services without paying rent.

By taking possession and opening for business, the tenant effectively waived strict compliance with the landlord's obligation to complete all buildings as a condition precedent to paying rent.

Erie Sand and Gravel Limited entered into an oral agreement with Seres' Farms Limited to purchase land containing aggregate essential to Erie's business.

The land was subject to a right of first refusal held by Tri-B Acres Inc. Erie provided a written offer reflecting the oral agreement, which Seres' Farms presented to Tri-B. Tri-B failed to match the offer, but Seres' Farms accepted Tri-B's offer anyway.

Erie sued for specific performance.

The trial judge found a binding oral agreement existed and that acts of part performance took it outside the Statute of Frauds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Tri-B's appeal, upholding the specific performance order because the property was unique and damages were inadequate.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their amended statement of claim, which sought relief under the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act for lasting improvements made to a property they believed they owned.

The appellants also argued the motion judge erred by hearing the motion in an anteroom rather than open court, by effectively redrafting their pleadings, and by exhibiting a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in striking the statutory claim, as it was based on different legal grounds than the previously struck constructive trust claim.

The majority held that hearing the motion in chambers did not violate the open court principle, as no one was excluded and counsel did not object.

The appellant vendor appealed an order granting specific performance of a real estate contract to the respondent purchaser.

The appellant argued the respondent was disentitled to equitable relief due to 'unclean hands' for swearing a false affidavit regarding his status as a nominee, and that the property was not objectively unique.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's conduct did not prejudice the appellant and the property was uniquely suited to the intended commercial use, making damages an inadequate remedy.

The moving party (appellant) sought a stay of the judgment pending appeal.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that there were serious issues to be determined regarding the scope of a non-registration clause in an agreement of purchase and sale and its relation to a purchaser's lien.

The court also found that the moving party would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the responding party no longer had the $4.3 million deposit and intended to sell the property.

The balance of convenience favoured the moving party.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment enforcing an Indemnity Agreement and collateral demand mortgages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the Indemnity Agreement was a specialty subject to a 20-year limitation period and that the action on the collateral mortgages was brought within the 10-year limitation period, which commenced when moneys were advanced under the primary indemnity obligation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge erred by granting judgment on the mortgage covenants for an amount in excess of the primary indemnity debt, as the mortgages were collateral security.

The landlord sued the tenant in negligence after a fire started in the tenant's unit, causing property damage.

The parties brought a motion by special case to determine if the landlord's subrogated insurer was precluded from maintaining the claim.

The motion judge allowed the claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the Offer to Lease required the tenant to contribute to the cost of insurance, the risk of fire loss passed to the landlord, precluding the subrogated claim.

The appellant solicitors appealed an order confirming an assessment officer's report that significantly reduced their legal fees for a condominium conversion project.

The appellants argued the assessment officer lacked jurisdiction under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act because the terms of the retainer were in dispute, and that the officer improperly relied on expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the dispute was strictly over quantum and the allocation of work, not the terms of the retainer itself, and that the expert evidence was properly used to assess the value of the services.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the assessment officer erred in fully disallowing accounts related to construction liens, and increased the assessed accounts by $44,000.

The respondents originally brought an application for an oppression remedy under the Condominium Act, which was converted into an action by a consent order.

Years later, without delivering a statement of claim, the respondents returned the matter to a motion judge, seeking substantive monetary relief and alleging contempt.

The motion judge granted the monetary relief.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to grant substantive relief on a motion since the application had been converted to an action, and the relief could not be justified as a remedy for contempt.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's refusal to grant relief from forfeiture regarding a lease.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of equitable and discretionary power, concluding the order was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.