Real Estate Law - ONCA

The buyers appealed a partial summary judgment declaring they breached two agreements of purchase and sale for abutting residential properties.

The buyers argued the agreements were void for contravening the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act and that the seller tendered defective closing documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the parties intended a simultaneous conveyance that complied with the Planning Act, and the seller's tender was valid.

Although the Court criticized the use of partial summary judgment in this context, it declined to set aside the judgment as doing so would only cause further delay and expense.

The appellants, a real estate agent and brokerage, appealed a trial judgment granting rescission of an agreement of purchase and sale and the return of a $50,000 deposit to the respondent purchaser.

The appellants had negligently misrepresented the size of the home as 2,000-2,500 square feet, when it was actually 1,450 square feet.

The appellants argued that the purchaser's physical inspection of the property displaced his reliance on their misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that inspection does not absolutely displace reliance in law, and the trial judge correctly considered contextual factors including the substantial discrepancy in size and the purchaser's inexperience.

Following a successful appeal where the court suggested wording to amend section 22 of a condominium declaration regarding the duty to repair and maintain, the parties were unable to agree on the final wording.

The appellant accepted the court's proposed wording, while the respondents sought different wording and the removal of a paragraph from the earlier reasons.

The Court of Appeal rejected the respondents' submissions as an attempt to reargue the decided issues and ordered that the formal order reflect the court's originally proposed wording.

The appellants moved to stay orders granting the respondent mortgagee possession of two investment properties pending appeal.

The mortgage loans had been in default for over three years with no payments made.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found no serious question to be determined regarding the respondent's right to possession, no irreparable harm to the appellants, and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellants and respondent, owners of adjoining properties, disputed the use of a mutual driveway.

The application judge found that a 1975 right-of-way agreement bound successor owners despite lacking a formal enurement clause, as the agreement's wording showed a manifest intention to create an easement running with the land.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings on rectification and factual issues regarding vehicular access and substantial interference.

The appellant purchased land from the respondent, agreeing to develop it for retail use.

The agreement included an indemnity clause for community cost-sharing agreements.

The appellant later obtained a zoning amendment for residential development, triggering a $2.8 million fee for school lands, and sought indemnity from the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant breached its obligation to develop the land for retail use and could not profit from its own breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the contract.

The plaintiff developer built stacked townhouses and applied for a condominium exemption under the Condominium Act to bypass Planning Act requirements.

The City granted the exemption but imposed a condition prohibiting the units from being used as boarding or rooming houses.

The developer sued, arguing the City lacked authority to impose conditions and challenging barrier-free accessibility requirements.

The motion judge struck the condition but upheld the accessibility requirements.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the City had broad authority under the Condominium Act and Municipal Act to impose conditions on exemption approvals to protect health and safety.

The developer's cross-appeal regarding accessibility requirements was dismissed as moot.

The appellant landlord wrongfully terminated a commercial lease held by the respondent, who was the sole shareholder of a corporation operating a restaurant on the premises.

The termination caused the restaurant to close and the respondent's shares to become worthless.

The landlord appealed the summary judgment awarding the respondent damages for the diminution in share value, arguing the claim was barred by the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rule does not apply where the wrong was committed against the shareholder personally and the corporation has no cause of action.

The appellant commenced an action to recover a $50,000 deposit from an aborted real estate transaction.

The respondents counterclaimed for breach of contract.

After years of delay, the motion judge dismissed the appellant's action for delay but did not address the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider that dismissing the claim left the mirror-image counterclaim alive, which was not in the interests of justice.

The dismissal was set aside and the matter remitted to the Superior Court.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment order granting specific performance to the respondent vendor after the appellant failed to close on a $3 million custom-built home.

The appellant argued the agreement was void due to misrepresentations and lack of solicitor review, and that specific performance was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the agreement was valid and that the property's unique customizations and the flooded housing market justified specific performance rather than damages.

An application to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellant mortgagor defaulted on a third mortgage.

The respondent mortgagee obtained summary judgment for the principal amount on consent, and the motion judge subsequently assessed and reduced the ancillary amounts claimed for fees, penalties, and costs.

The motion judge also granted possession to the mortgagee.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's assessment of the amounts owed or the granting of possession, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against her.

She argued the motion judge erred in denying an adjournment, failing to find the mortgage charged a criminal rate of interest, and granting summary judgment despite her allegations of fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the adjournment and fraud issues, and declined to hear the criminal interest rate argument as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

The appeal was allowed solely to correct calculation errors in the judgment amount related to an abandoned advance.

The appellants and respondent entered into agreements of purchase and sale for a property to be severed.

The agreements required a second deposit upon the city's approval of the severance.

The appellants obtained approval but withheld this information from the respondent for over six months.

Upon finally informing the respondent, the appellants demanded immediate payment of the second deposit and subsequently terminated the agreements when the respondent, who was out of the country, requested an extension.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants acted unreasonably and breached the duty of good faith performance by imposing an arbitrary and impossible deadline.

The Town of Grimsby appealed a decision declaring that a private works yard was a permitted use on the respondent's property, which was zoned as a 'Utility Zone'.

The Town argued the use must be related to a public or quasi-public utility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the modern principles of statutory interpretation.

The zoning by-law unambiguously defined 'Works Yard' as a permitted use without restricting it to public or utility purposes, and the by-law's plain language governed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs of the appeal to the respondent in the fixed amount of $16,800.00, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision finding it had not validly exercised its option to renew a commercial lease and denying relief from forfeiture.

The tenant argued the landlord waived the requirement for written notice of renewal through email negotiations about rent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the landlord did not waive strict compliance with the renewal provision and that the tenant's conduct—including hedging its bets on renewal and paying rent late—did not warrant equitable relief from forfeiture.

The appellant, the former developer of a condominium, appealed the dismissal of its application to declare the respondent condominium corporation's notices of sale against its units null and void.

The appellant had refused to pay common expenses and a special assessment levied by the new owner-elected board after the appellant turned over control with depleted accounts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the special assessment was validly levied under an adopted budget and that the notice provided sufficient and accurate reasons.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent possessory title over a portion of his beachfront property by way of adverse possession or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the finding of adverse possession because the respondent had not effectively excluded the appellant from the property.

The Court also varied the easement finding, limiting it to non-vehicular traffic on a specific path, as there was no continuous 20-year period of vehicular use.

The trial judge's costs orders, including an order against the appellant's counsel personally, were set aside.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision allowing the respondent commercial tenant to exercise a lease renewal option despite being in arrears.

The tenant had purported to exercise the option, but the landlord argued the option was void for uncertainty and that the tenant was in default of rent-related covenants.

The Court of Appeal held that while the renewal option was not void for uncertainty, the tenant was in default of its obligation to pay additional rent when due.

As the tenant failed to meet the precondition of paying all rent when due, the purported exercise of the renewal option was invalid and unenforceable.

The appeal was allowed and the tenant was ordered to vacate the premises.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion, which sought to declare mortgages granted by the respondent parents to their children as fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge found good consideration for the mortgages and no intent to defraud, dismissing the action against the children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the motion judge's factual findings were entitled to deference and rejecting the appellant's attempt to raise new claims on appeal.