Landlord and Tenant - ONCA

The moving party brought a motion to quash the proposed appellant's appeal of an order setting aside a stay of execution of a Writ of Possession.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal had previously granted a stay pending appeal on the condition that the proposed appellant pay outstanding rent within 14 days.

The proposed appellant failed to comply with this condition.

As a result, the stay was no longer in effect, the proposed appellant was out of time to appeal, and the appeal became moot.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and awarded costs to the moving party.

The appellant bank held a mortgage on a condominium owned by the respondent, who defaulted.

After default, the respondent leased the property to another respondent on highly favourable terms.

The bank applied under s. 52 of the Mortgages Act to set aside the tenancy.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding a conflict between s. 52 of the Mortgages Act and the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no conflict because setting aside a tenancy agreement under the Mortgages Act means the tenancy never existed, whereas terminating a tenancy under the Residential Tenancies Act brings a valid tenancy to an end.

The landlord appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Landlord and Tenant Board order granting rent rebates to three tenants of cottage sites.

The landlord argued that applying the security of tenure provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act would extend the 20-year leases beyond 21 years, thereby contravening the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act and rendering the leases void.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was bound by its previous decision in Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corp., which held that the rent control provisions of the RTA applied to similar land leases.

The court declined to address the potential conflict between the RTA and the Planning Act as the landlord had not sought to overrule Matthews or requested a five-judge panel.

The appellant operated a property management business and appeared before the Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of property owners without a paralegal license.

The Law Society obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting him from providing legal services.

On appeal, the appellant argued he was a 'landlord' under the Residential Tenancies Act and thus entitled to self-represent.

The Court of Appeal held that even if he met the definition of a landlord, he was providing legal services to third parties and had no right to self-represent under the Law Society Act.

The appeal was dismissed, but the injunction was narrowed to allow him to appear before the board only when he is the actual owner of the property.

The appellant landlord wrongfully terminated a commercial lease.

The application judge awarded the respondent tenant damages based on the rent the tenant would have received from its subtenants, but failed to deduct the rent the tenant would have owed the landlord for the remainder of the lease term.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, correcting the calculation error to properly reflect expectation damages, reducing the damage award from $130,600 to $35,600.

The appellants appealed orders dismissing their action against a landlord.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that under current law, a landlord is not an 'occupier'.

The court also found no basis for liability in negligence regarding the landlord's alleged failure to enforce the tenant's insurance covenant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action regarding the termination of a lease.

The trial judge found that the appellants failed to pay rent and lacked the financial ability to do so.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the respondents changed their evidence from discovery to trial without providing written notice as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the change in evidence regarding the exact date of termination was immaterial to the outcome, as rent was not tendered on either date.

However, the Court reduced the respondents' costs of the appeal due to their failure to provide proper notice.

The owner of a residential apartment complex defaulted on natural gas payments.

The City of Hamilton intervened under its Vital Services By-law, paid for the gas, registered a lien, and directed tenants to pay rent to the City pursuant to s. 221(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The first mortgagee subsequently sold the property under power of sale to a bona fide purchaser for value.

The City claimed its statutory right to collect rents survived the sale.

The Court of Appeal held that the City's right to direct rent payments is a statutory collection device, not an interest in land, and does not survive the transfer of the property to a bona fide purchaser for value.

The City of Toronto appealed a Divisional Court order certifying a class proceeding brought by a rooming house tenant.

The plaintiff alleged the City negligently failed to deliver statutorily-mandated rent reduction notices to tenants targeted by the Parkdale Pilot Project.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the City owed no private law duty of care to this specific subgroup of tenants, and that policy considerations would not inevitably negate such a duty.

The tenant of a commercial lease remained in the premises after the expiration of the term, relying on an overholding clause that stated the tenancy would become month-to-month if the tenant continued to occupy without further written agreement.

The landlord, who had secured a new tenant and demanded vacant possession, locked the tenant out.

The application judge found the tenant was validly overholding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the landlord's appeal, holding that an overholding clause requires the landlord's consent (usually evidenced by acceptance of rent) to create a month-to-month tenancy, and does not grant the tenant a unilateral right to remain.

The appellants purchased restaurant equipment and leased premises from the respondents.

After a dispute over insurance, the appellants began removing equipment but were allegedly locked out.

The respondents subsequently leased and sold the premises along with the remaining equipment.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' action for conversion, finding they had abandoned the equipment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to consider evidence showing the appellants' ongoing intention to claim possession and by assuming the equipment had no market value.

The appeal was allowed, and the respondents were found liable for conversion.

Due to unsatisfactory valuation evidence, nominal damages of $10,000 were awarded.