Family and Matrimonial Law - ONCA

The appellant challenged a decision declining to enforce a pre‑marriage agreement and ordering an equalization payment following the parties’ separation.

The application judge concluded the document did not qualify as a valid domestic agreement under the Family Law Act and, in any event, should be set aside under s. 56(4).

The agreement was found to be unclear, failing to identify the property to which it applied or address equalization, and the respondent did not understand its nature and consequences.

The Court of Appeal held these findings were open to the application judge on the evidentiary record and were supported by credibility assessments.

No error of law, principle, or palpable and overriding factual error was established.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a family law matter involving parenting, child support, spousal support, validity of a separation agreement, equalization of net family property, post-separation adjustments, and the sale of matrimonial properties.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's equalization calculation regarding loans from his mother, post-separation adjustments to equalization payments, and the commencement date of spousal support.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting an additional post-separation credit for inheritance funds deposited to a joint account, while dismissing other grounds of appeal.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a motion to vary parenting and support arrangements between the parties, parents of two children.

The appellant challenged 20 provisions of a comprehensive order, but the Court of Appeal found no basis for intervention.

The court upheld the motion judge’s findings of a material change in circumstances, the revised parenting schedule, the calculation of child support, the imputation of income, and the costs award.

The appellant’s motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellant, having initiated parallel spousal support proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice and divorce/equalization in the Superior Court of Justice, appealed the dismissal of her spousal support claim.

The initial dismissal was due to improper use of resources and jurisdictional issues.

The Superior Court appeal judge remitted the matter back to the Ontario Court of Justice for submissions on jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found this disposition failed to promote the primary objective of the Family Law Rules, which is to deal with cases justly and efficiently.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lower appeal order, and transferred the spousal support application to the Superior Court of Justice to be heard concurrently with the equalization and divorce claims, imposing a stay on the Ontario Court of Justice application.

Costs were awarded to the appellant.

The father sought a stay of a trial judge's decision that permitted the mother to relocate their child from Ottawa to Richmond Hill, Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the trial judge's comprehensive reasons and determination of the child's best interests were owed considerable deference.

The court concluded that the father was unlikely to succeed on appeal and that no irreparable harm would result from the child living with the mother pending the appeal.

The mother appealed a Superior Court decision that overturned a trial judge's order permitting her to relocate with the child to Mongolia.

The Court of Appeal considered the application of recent amendments to the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) and Divorce Act regarding relocation and parenting time, which came into effect during the appeal process.

The court found that the appeal judge erred by reweighing the trial judge's findings, misapplying the test for relocation, and incorrectly assessing the evidentiary record.

The Court of Appeal restored the trial judge's order, allowing the relocation, and varied the winter access provision based on fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed an order awarding retroactive and prospective spousal support to the respondent.

The appellant argued the order was a nullity because it was made under the Divorce Act after being severed from a divorce order, and alternatively, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had attorned to divorce proceedings in Alabama.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the support order was properly made under the Family Law Act and that the application judge correctly determined he had jurisdiction.

Costs of $12,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a trial judge's costs order made in favour of his former spouse.

The trial judge had ordered costs to be paid from funds held in court, noting the moving party's failure to meaningfully participate in the trial and the partial success of the responding party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no strong grounds to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary costs order.

In a group of six child protection appeals, the appellant J.B. brought a motion to reconstitute the panel, seeking to replace one of the judges due to her involvement in a prior unanimous decision that had reinstated a no-access order against J.B. The appellant argued for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion, reaffirming the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the high burden on the party alleging bias.

The court held that a judge's prior ruling against a party on a legal issue in a different case does not create a reasonable apprehension of bias for a new case involving different legal issues, even if the parties are the same.

The father appealed a trial judge's order granting the maternal uncle monthly weekend access to the children following the mother's death.

The trial judge had awarded sole custody to the father but ordered that the uncle have access one weekend per month, including overnight visits.

The father argued the trial judge erred in finding that access would not occur without a court order, that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for disbelieving his evidence that he would voluntarily provide access, and that the trial judge failed to consider potential psychological harm to the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision was properly driven by the children's best interests and entitled to deference.

Two consolidated appeals arising from a family law proceeding between parents concerning custody and access to their child.

The respondent appealed an order dismissing a recusal application against a judge, and the appellant appealed an order denying leave to amend pleadings to seek custody.

The court found the case had become a procedural morass characterized by lack of good faith efforts to resolve issues.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The court emphasized that the appellant had pursued indirect procedural tactics rather than direct routes of review, and that the custody issue had been finally determined by a subsequent order that was not appealed.

A creditor sought to void a transfer of a matrimonial home to a spouse as a transfer at undervalue under section 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The debtor and his spouse purchased a home in joint names, with the spouse making non-monetary contributions through household management and childcare.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the creditor's application, finding that the effective date of the transfer was more than one year before the bankruptcy event, and the creditor failed to prove insolvency or fraudulent intent at the time of the disposition.

Appeal from a trial judge's order granting sole custody of two children to their aunt and uncle (the respondents) with limited access to their biological mother (the appellant).

The trial judge applied the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the custody appeal but allowed the access appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his insufficient analysis of the children's views and preferences, familial relationships, and emotional ties.

The court increased the mother's access to eight weeks during summer and entire school breaks at Christmas and March.

The court also deleted a restrictive religious clause that prohibited the mother from including the children in activities contrary to the respondents' Jehovah's Witness beliefs, finding it contrary to Charter values and the mother's right to her own beliefs and lifestyle.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's order declaring that the respondent Mikhail Malkov was the sole beneficial owner of a property in Thornhill and requiring the appellant and her former husband to transfer all their right, title and interest in the property to Mikhail.

The trial judge had found that the appellant and her former husband held title to the property on a resulting trust in favour of Mikhail.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge conducted the proceedings unfairly by refusing to allow the appellant to call a lawyer as a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in refusing to allow the reopening of the case.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Information and Privacy Commissioner's order that the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) had custody or control of the Children's Lawyer's litigation records relating to child clients, and therefore such records were subject to freedom of information access requests under FIPPA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Children's Lawyer operates independently from MAG with respect to her core functions of representing children, and therefore MAG does not have custody or control of child client records.

The court emphasized the importance of confidentiality in the Children's Lawyer-child relationship to the proper functioning of the legal system and the best interests of children.

Appeal from a trial judgment concerning a dispute between a former unmarried couple over property rights in development properties.

The trial judge found that a property development agreement (PDA) existed between the parties despite a cohabitation agreement containing broad waivers of property rights.

The trial judge set aside the cohabitation agreement as it applied to the development properties under section 56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act, finding that neither party understood the consequences of the agreement regarding their property development venture.

The trial judge awarded the respondent $3,325,000 plus interest and costs.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: the trial judge erred in setting aside the agreement only as to development properties; in not setting aside the entire agreement including the spousal support waiver; and in calculating the amount owing under the PDA.

Appeal of a motion judge's decision dismissing a father's motion to change a custody order.

The father sought sole custody and primary residence of the parties' child, alleging a material change in circumstances based on the failure to implement a parenting coordinator as ordered by the trial judge.

The motion judge found no material change in circumstances and, in the alternative, would not have granted sole custody due to risk of parental alienation.

The appellate court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the ongoing conflict between the parties and the failure to appoint a parenting coordinator were anticipated by the trial judge and did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The court noted that a parenting coordinator was subsequently appointed and the plan had not failed.

A father appealed a declaration granted by the Superior Court that his 16-year-old daughter had withdrawn from parental control under section 65 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The father argued that he was entitled to be a party to the application and that the court should not have granted the declaration.

The Court of Appeal held that while parents must be parties to applications under Part III of the CLRA, the court retains discretion to direct the extent of their participation.

The court also held that the factors to be considered on such an application extend beyond the child's age to include the reasons for the declaration, its utility, and the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a child protection appeal, the appellant mother challenged the dismissal of her appeal from an order denying leave to bring a status review application.

The court held that the applicable analysis was discretionary and required consideration of the child's best interests.

Although the mother had made positive changes in her life, the court concluded that the appeal judge properly considered the broader context, including the child's age, limited contact with the mother, and the child's wish that the adoption proceed while preserving some ability to communicate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $12,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.