Family and Matrimonial Law - ONCA

The parties separated after a 36-year marriage during which they operated a dairy farm.

The application judge ordered a lump sum spousal support payment, refused to allow the husband to deduct future disposition costs from his net family property, found a milk quota transfer was not a gift, and ordered the in specie division of six jointly owned farm properties.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in refusing the disposition costs deduction and in ordering the in specie division of the properties under the Family Law Act and Partition Act.

The properties were ordered to be sold.

The appeal regarding the milk quota and spousal support was dismissed.

The respondent on appeal brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 61.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying family law trial resulted in orders for an equalization payment, child support, and costs against the appellant, who was found to be recalcitrant and had income imputed to him.

The Court of Appeal found good reason to believe the appeal had no merit and that the appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal.

The motion was granted, and the appellant was ordered to post $8,500 in security for costs.

The mother appealed a decision dismissing her status review application regarding her child, who had been made a Crown ward with no access.

On appeal, both the mother and the Children's Aid Society sought to introduce fresh evidence, including evidence that the child's prospective adoptive parents had separated.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could impact the outcome, and ordered an assessment report to evaluate the impact of the separation on the child.

The court also requested submissions from the Attorney General of Ontario regarding the mother's claim that institutional delays violated her section 7 Charter rights.

The appeal was reserved pending receipt of the further material.

The appellant father, who had sole custody of his autistic son, sought to relocate from Waterloo to Pickering to live with his new partner.

The respondent mother opposed the move.

The motion judge found a material change in circumstances but dismissed the motion, concluding the move was not in the child's best interests.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by placing the burden of proof on the father and misapprehended evidence regarding the benefits of the move.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz factors, the Court concluded the relocation was in the child's best interests.

Following an appeal where the appellant was partially successful in reversing a significant portion of the trial judge's award, both parties sought partial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that because neither party was wholly successful at either the trial or appellate level, the appropriate disposition was no order as to costs for the appeal, the motion, or the trial.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order, arguing the trial judge erred in imputing income to him.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant misrepresented his income, engaged in parental alienation, and was intentionally underemployed.

The court also upheld the income imputed to the respondent and the lack of a sunset date for access monitoring procedures.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a trial judge's order making their child a Crown ward, without access, for the purpose of adoption.

The child had been apprehended after being found with rickets and testing positive for cannabinoids due to a marijuana grow-op in the home.

The parents subsequently abducted the child and were on the run for five months before being arrested.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' application of the best interests test, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no error in the admission of fresh evidence.

The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) registered liens against a taxpayer's properties for unpaid taxes.

The taxpayer's wife and sister subsequently claimed prior unregistered equitable interests in the properties (constructive trust and equitable mortgages).

The CRA brought a motion to determine if its registered liens took priority over these unregistered equitable interests.

The motion judge held that the CRA's liens did not constitute a 'charge' under the Land Titles Act and therefore did not take priority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the CRA's appeal, confirming that the statutory liens do not arise from a voluntary act of the landowner and thus do not gain the priority afforded to a registered charge under the Land Titles Act.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order, arguing the trial judge failed to account for his significant family-related debt load in the 2009 calculation and that the retroactive award imposed an unreasonable hardship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly considered the debt load and that the retroactive amount resulted from the appellant's failure to make adequate payments.

No error in principle was found.

The husband appealed an equalization payment order, challenging the trial judge's findings on several disputed items in the net family property calculations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by denying the husband a deduction for property owned on the date of marriage, denying an exclusion for an inter vivos gift deposited into a joint bank account, and improperly valuing a vehicle acquired by gift.

The Court held that excluded property deposited into a joint account loses its exclusionary character only to the extent of the one-half interest presumed gifted to the spouse.

The equalization payment and costs awards were adjusted accordingly.

The appellant father appealed a trial judge's order awarding retroactive child support, retroactive section 7 extraordinary expenses, sole custody to the respondent mother, and the transfer of a life insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the criteria under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines and the D.B.S. factors for retroactive support.

The court also held it was an error to make unrequested substantive orders regarding custody and life insurance.

To save time and expense, the Court of Appeal substituted its own order fixing arrears and setting future section 7 expense obligations.

The appellant payor appealed a trial decision awarding retroactive child and spousal support, ongoing spousal support, and costs to the respondent recipient.

The parties had a separation agreement, but the payor failed to disclose significant increases in income and negotiated reduced support payments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the retroactive child support award, finding the payor's failure to disclose income constituted blameworthy conduct.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding spousal support, limiting the retroactive spousal support to the period before the recipient became self-sufficient and setting aside the ongoing spousal support award due to the time-limited nature of the separation agreement.

The appellant brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

On consent of the parties, the court determined that the first level of appeal was properly to the Superior Court of Justice, and an order was made in accordance with the draft order filed.

The appellant husband appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary spousal and child support obligations contained in minutes of settlement.

He argued that the respondent wife's remarriage to a wealthy man constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the appellant knew of the serious relationship heading toward marriage when he signed the minutes of settlement, meaning the remarriage was foreseen and could not constitute a material change.

The court also upheld the child support and costs orders.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to stay proceedings pursuant to section 7 of the Arbitration Act.

The parties had previously signed a consent to attend mediation/arbitration.

After mediation failed, the appellant refused to proceed to arbitration and returned to court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no ambiguity in the term 'mediation/arbitration' and concluding that the motion judge did not err in finding a valid agreement to arbitrate.

This document is a summary note regarding the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Contino v. Leonelli-Contino.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, establishing that a party seeking to deviate from the Federal Child Support Guidelines under the shared custody provisions of section 9 must establish on clear and compelling evidence that the deviation is in the child's best interests, and the court must consider all statutory factors without giving pre-eminence to any single factor.

The appellant, a lesbian, challenged the constitutionality of federal regulations governing semen donation for assisted conception, arguing they discriminated against women using known donors who were not spouses or sexual partners.

Before the application was heard, the appellant successfully self-inseminated and the government amended the regulations, leading the application judge to dismiss the case as moot.

The Court of Appeal upheld the mootness finding and declined to hear the Charter issues as a court of first instance.

However, the Court granted a motion to add another woman in the same situation as a party and remitted her application to the Superior Court for an expedited hearing on the constitutional issues.

The parties signed Minutes of Settlement in 1996 providing for child and spousal support, which could be varied upon a material change in circumstances.

Shortly after signing, the appellant husband cashed in significant stock options and received a substantial salary increase, but failed to disclose this to the respondent wife.

The trial judge found these events constituted a material change in circumstances, implied a duty to disclose, and awarded retroactive child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the characterization of the stock options as income, the material change in circumstances, and the implied duty to disclose.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in awarding the Federal Child Support Guidelines table amount for the period prior to the Guidelines coming into force in May 1997.

The appellant, who had a long history of unsuccessful litigation and significant spousal support arrears, appealed two orders.

The first order dismissed his application to vary spousal support and declared him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, requiring him to obtain leave before initiating further proceedings.

The second order dismissed his subsequent application for leave to vary support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no conflict between s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act and s. 17 of the Divorce Act, and concluding that the vexatious proceedings order was appropriate given the appellant's abusive litigation conduct.

The appellant and respondent signed a cohabitation agreement in 1986 that included a mutual waiver of spousal support.

After their separation in 1997, the appellant sought to set aside the waiver under s. 33(4) of the Family Law Act and claimed spousal support.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, applying the stringent test for setting aside an entire domestic contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by not focusing on whether the waiver resulted in unconscionable circumstances at the time of the application.

Given the appellant's age, unemployability, and modest pension compared to the respondent's substantial wealth, the court found the circumstances unconscionable, set aside the waiver, and ordered spousal support of $3,500 per month.