Family and Matrimonial Law - ONCA

The appellants appealed an order voiding transfers of funds used to purchase two condominiums, which were found to be fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat the respondent's claims for spousal and child support arrears.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the badges of fraud to shift the evidential burden, nor in his assessment of fraudulent intent at the time of the transactions.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed for failing to meet the Palmer test.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary a final custody order to implement a week-about residential schedule.

The trial judge found no material change in circumstances since the order was made.

On appeal, the father argued the mother's concession of one extra day of access constituted an acknowledgment of a material change, and that his changed employment circumstances warranted a variation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the mother's concession was contemplated by the original order and did not constitute a material change, and found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the father's employment changes.

The mother's motion to adduce fresh evidence was also denied.

The appellant and her husband were granted a divorce, but the order was stayed pending further court order.

Before the stay was lifted, the husband died.

A dispute arose between the appellant and the husband's children over whether the marriage was terminated by divorce or death.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion for a declaration.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that because the divorce order was stayed, it had not taken effect under the Divorce Act prior to the husband's death.

Therefore, the marriage was terminated by death, and the divorce order was permanently stayed.

The appellants appealed a Crown wardship order without access regarding their two children.

They argued the trial judge erred by failing to identify the mother as Indian or native, failing to apply Gladue principles, drawing negative inferences from the mother's flat affect, and failing to consider the children's best interests regarding access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the children did not meet the statutory definition of Indian or native person under the Child and Family Services Act, and that an access order was statutorily precluded because it would impair adoption prospects.

The Court also strongly condemned the systemic delays in the child protection proceedings.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside an uncontested custody and child support order.

The appellant had failed to respond to the initial application, leading to the uncontested hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's refusal to set aside the order, noting the appellant failed to explain his failure to respond to the proceedings and that the best interests of the children were considered.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following an appeal in a family law matter where the respondent was largely successful, the court determined the costs of the appeal.

Applying the Family Law Rules for guidance, the court awarded the respondent $25,000 in costs, finding the amount fair and reasonable.

The court also ordered that the costs award be enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a support order.

The court declined to address the costs of the underlying motion, noting that leave to appeal was required.

The appellant appealed orders varying his access to his eight-year-old daughter to supervised access pending a satisfactory mental health evaluation, and imposing a restraining order.

The appellant argued the motion judge failed to consider key evidence and the best interests of the child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's comprehensive analysis of the appellant's mental health and its effect on the child.

The court noted that the appellant had since undergone a medical assessment, and the respondent was prepared to consent to unsupervised access and the removal of the restraining order in the lower court.

Following an appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs, and the court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent costs of the appeal in the agreed amount of $12,500, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Following the release of the Court of Appeal's decision allowing the appeal and awarding the statutory pre-retirement death benefit to the appellant, the respondent requested that the court address her entitlement to support under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

The trial judge had previously dismissed the respondent's SLRA application because she had awarded the death benefit to the respondent, finding no further need for support.

Because the Court of Appeal's decision removed the basis for that dismissal, the court set aside the trial judge's order dismissing the SLRA application and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for determination.

The appellant, a declared vexatious litigant, appealed a child support variation order that awarded lump sum child support to the respondent and dismissed his request for a retroactive reduction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lump sum award and the dismissal of the retroactive reduction, noting the appellant's failure to pay support voluntarily, lack of financial disclosure, and protracted litigation.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in failing to consider the appellant's motion for leave to request access to the child.

The appeal was allowed only to permit the appellant to request leave to bring a motion for access, and was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant failed to appear for his appeal from an order dismissing his motion to set aside an uncontested trial judgment in a protracted matrimonial dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned due to his non-attendance.

The Court further noted it would have dismissed the appeal as an abuse of process, as the appellant had wilfully breached multiple court orders regarding financial disclosure and support payments, and had been 'gaming the process'.

The mother brought an application under the Hague Convention for the return of her 13-year-old child to Mexico.

The child had previously made a successful refugee claim in Canada based on allegations of abuse by the mother.

The motion judge ordered the child's return.

The father appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to conduct a meaningful risk assessment regarding the return of a recognized refugee.

The court set aside the return order and directed a new hearing.

The appellant, the aunt of two orphaned children, sought an extension of time to file materials to be added as a party to a custody proceeding after missing a peremptory deadline.

The motion judge denied the extension, prioritizing the scheduled trial date and the children's need for stability.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision, noting the appellant had previously been involved but failed to take the necessary steps in time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought an application for spousal support, which the respondent moved to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a valid Iranian divorce.

The motion judge granted summary judgment and dismissed the application, finding the appellant had a real and substantial connection with Iran.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant's uncontradicted affidavit raised genuine issues requiring a trial, and the motion judge erred in making factual findings on a summary judgment motion without evidence from the respondent.

The mother appealed a trial judgment ordering joint custody of the parties' three children and requiring her to pay child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the joint custody order, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the parents could communicate effectively regarding the children.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding support, finding the trial judge erred by failing to impute income to the father despite evidence he worked part-time while receiving a disability pension.

The Court also set aside the future support orders due to the uncertainty of multiple contingencies, ordering instead that each parent bear the expense of supporting the children while in their care.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding matrimonial issues, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to include an allegedly concealed $81,000 investment in the respondent's net family property and by refusing to award occupation rent for the matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly accounted for children's trusts and properly exercised discretion under section 24(1) of the Family Law Act in denying occupation rent.

The mother and two children travelled from Greece to Ontario for a vacation.

The mother subsequently decided to remain in Ontario and commenced a custody application.

The father brought an application under the Hague Convention for the return of the children to Greece, their habitual residence.

The mother argued that the father had consented to or acquiesced in the children's retention in Ontario under Article 13(a) of the Hague Convention.

The applications judge found that the father had not consented or acquiesced, and ordered the children returned to Greece.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's appeal, affirming that acquiescence requires clear and cogent evidence of unequivocal subjective consent, which was not established on the facts.

The appellant sought to enforce child and spousal support arrears against the respondent, who resided in Egypt and had no assets in Canada.

The respondent was entitled to compensation funds from the United Nations Compensation Commission, which were to be distributed through the Government of Canada.

The motion judge initially restrained the payout but later ruled he lacked jurisdiction due to Crown immunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that under the Financial Administration Act, the funds belonged to Canada once received, and the Crown could consent to their distribution.

The Court appointed the appellant as a receiver under the Courts of Justice Act to receive the funds in satisfaction of the support arrears.

The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim, which sought a declaration that the respondent's deceased son was the biological father of her adult son, and requested paternity testing from the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the parens patriae jurisdiction could not be invoked to override section 5(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, which expressly prohibits an application for a declaration of parentage unless both persons whose relationship is sought to be established are living.

The appellant challenged a contempt order arising from non-payment of a lump-sum support-related amount ordered in dependant support proceedings under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal held that rules 60.05 and 60.11(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permit contempt enforcement only for orders requiring an act other than the payment of money, and that this includes support orders.

The court rejected any purported family law exception and held that the Rules displaced any inherent jurisdiction to use contempt for money judgments in proceedings governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The contempt order was set aside and the motion for contempt was dismissed.