Family and Matrimonial Law - ONCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Albert Edward Green from the order of Justice John Krawchenko regarding the division of property and spousal support following the breakdown of his marriage to Kristine Jill Hill.

The court upheld the trial judge’s findings on asset valuation, the application of the Family Law Act’s equalization mechanisms, and the denial of spousal support, finding no error in the trial judge’s approach or conclusions.

Costs of $35,000 were awarded to the respondent.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal was advised that the trial, which addressed equalization, child support, and spousal support, had recently concluded but the trial reasons for decision had not yet been released.

The appellant argued that the appeal should not proceed without these reasons, a position the respondent's counsel acknowledged as arguably premature.

Given the significance of equalization and the issues before the panel, the Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal until after the trial reasons are released.

The parties were ordered to bear their own costs for the attendance.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her application for parenting orders, retroactive and ongoing child support, and s. 7 expenses under the Family Law Act.

The motion judge had dismissed the application due to an existing divorce judgment from Michigan that already contained parenting and child support orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of legal principles or exercise of discretion, noting that there was little else in dispute beyond child support.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the moving party's motion for security for costs of an appeal.

The appellant, Rosetta Commisso, was found to be impecunious and there was good reason to believe her appeal, challenging factual findings of a summary judgment dismissing her trust claims against her former mother-in-law, was frivolous and vexatious.

The court applied the two-part test under Rule 61.06(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 38(26) of the Family Law Rules, emphasizing the holistic consideration of justice.

The appeal was deemed to lack merit as it primarily challenged factual findings rather than errors of law, and partial summary judgment was found appropriate.

The moving party (respondent in the appeal) sought security for costs of the appeal and trial.

The court granted security for costs of the appeal ($20,000) due to the appellant's unpaid costs from a previous motion, significant unpaid child support arrears, and questionable financial conduct, despite the appeal concerning the best interests of a child.

The court refused security for trial costs, finding legitimate issues were litigated.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the moving party.

The moving party, Lynda Van Delst, sought an order from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to quash Thomas John Hronowsky’s third appeal concerning an equalization payment.

The court granted the motion, finding the appeal to be an abuse of process.

The decision highlighted Mr. Hronowsky's history of protracted litigation, non-compliance with previous court orders, and the mootness of his primary ground of appeal, which collectively prevented Ms. Van Delst from enforcing valid court orders.

The appellant appealed a consent order incorporating terms of a separation agreement, alleging the respondent misrepresented his income and failed to provide full financial disclosure, particularly after purchasing a new house.

The respondent had moved under Rule 14 of the Family Law Rules to grant the consent order, providing additional disclosure.

The motion judge granted the consent order and did not order further disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Rule 13 (requiring updated financial statements) was inapplicable given that full disclosure was made at the time of settlement and the consent order had been implemented.

The court also found the use of a Rule 14B motion appropriate, despite opposition, as the matter was deemed "seemingly uncomplicated" and the motion judge had reviewed the evidence.

The appellant father appealed a protection order concerning his twin sons, which had been dismissed by the Divisional Court.

His appeal to the Court of Appeal repeated allegations against various judges, social workers, and lawyers, and included claims of obstruction of justice.

Following a notice under Rule 2.1.01, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting the appellant's pattern of accusations, litigation of already decided issues, and failure to pay costs.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order transferring primary care of the parties' two children to the respondent father, which included an initial period of no contact for the mother and a staged increase in parenting time.

The trial judge's decision, made after a 39-day trial, found the mother had intentionally undermined parenting schedules and made false allegations of sexual abuse to terminate the children's relationship with the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's exercise of discretion and factual findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in parenting orders, especially when the decision has already been implemented.

The court found no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or her consideration of the Divorce Act regarding family violence, as the mother's allegations were not established.

This is an appeal from an order directing the payment of funds held in court (net proceeds from a home sale) to the respondent in partial satisfaction of a summary judgment against Paige Imola.

The appellant, Luigi Imola, had transferred his interest in the home to his wife, Paige Imola, years prior to avoid creditors.

He argued for a resulting trust over half the funds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's factual findings, including the appellant's intention to gift the property and his subsequent actions, rebutted any presumption of a resulting trust.

The moving party, Sharon Joseph, brought a motion to set aside or vary an order of Benotto J.A. which had dismissed her motion to expedite an appeal of an interlocutory order.

The interlocutory order in question had granted a stay of guardianship proceedings pending the disposition of an appeal regarding the validity of a marriage.

The Court of Appeal found no error in Benotto J.A.'s reasoning that the order was procedural and interlocutory, and therefore no appeal lay to the Court of Appeal.

The court also noted that determining the marriage's validity first was efficient.

The motion to vary was dismissed, and the purported appeal was quashed.

Dale Ottewell, a creditor in the bankruptcy of Christine Ann Davidson, appealed the dismissal of his motions for leave to commence a proceeding under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and to examine individuals under s. 163(2) of the BIA.

The s. 38 motion sought to include a house, beneficially owned by the bankrupt, in the estate, despite a prior family law order where Ottewell consented that the house would not be part of the bankrupt's property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's discretionary refusal to grant leave under s. 38, as Ottewell failed to demonstrate sufficient merit and was attempting to indirectly contravene a prior consent order.

Leave to appeal the s. 163(2) motion was also denied as it concerned a procedural matter without general importance.

This appeal addresses whether a trustee in bankruptcy can initiate an equalization claim under the Family Law Act (FLA).

The Court of Appeal held that while an unexercised equalization entitlement constitutes "property" under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and vests in the trustee, the "personal as between the spouses" provision in s. 7(2) of the FLA prevents anyone other than a spouse from initiating such a claim.

The court found no operational conflict between the FLA and BIA, thus dismissing the trustee's appeal to initiate the claim.

The moving party sought to quash her former spouse's appeal due to his ongoing and wilful breach of court orders requiring him to pay spousal support and arrears.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's non-compliance to be deliberate, relentless, and indefensible.

The court exercised its discretion to quash the appeal, awarded full indemnity costs to the moving party, and ordered that the appellant be precluded from bringing any further proceeding before the court until he complies with all support obligations.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application to remove a writ of seizure and sale filed by a law firm against the matrimonial home.

The law firm had represented the appellant's wife in matrimonial litigation and obtained judgment for outstanding fees.

The appellant argued the writ constituted an encumbrance requiring his consent under section 21 of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the wife did not encumber the matrimonial home; rather, the law firm, as an arm's length creditor, was entitled to file the writ.

The appellant's interest in the home remains subject to the writ.

The appellant father appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his motion to change custody of a 12-year-old child.

The original custody order was made on consent to the mother in 2007.

The father argued that a psychological report ordered under the Children's Law Reform Act established a material change in circumstances affecting the child.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that while the report documented parental conflict and the mother's anger negatively impacting the child, the continuation of parental conflict does not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The court noted that the mother had taken reasonable steps to address the identified issues, including enrolling in parenting programs and increasing the father's time with the child.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's orders awarding the respondent ongoing spousal support of $25,000 per month in a 26-year marriage and costs of $250,000.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred by not explicitly providing for a review of spousal support upon retirement; (2) the trial judge erred in concluding the respondent had no beneficial interest in business shares transferred during the marriage; (3) contingent on ground two, the spousal support award was excessive; and (4) the trial judge's costs award was based on a purely mathematical approach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning or conclusions.

The appellant appealed a change order made by the motion judge on June 10, 2016, which modified access arrangements for a seven-year-old child.

The original access order was made following a two-day trial on February 28, 2014.

The motion judge initially granted enhanced overnight access to the father on Monday and Thursday in alternate weeks to address the child's concerns about evening change-overs, but subsequently revised the order to Thursday overnights only in alternate weeks after the mother objected on child support grounds.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in principle by considering child support implications rather than the best interests of the child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's revised endorsement, which was intended to address the presenting issue of evening change-overs while maintaining the overall joint custody arrangement established at trial.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to change a final custody order that had granted him sole custody of his two sons and required them to attend a reunification program.

The younger son had repeatedly run away and refused to live with the appellant or attend the program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the son's extreme resistance constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was no longer in his best interests to enforce the custody order.

The court also dismissed the son's cross-appeal seeking a declaration that he had withdrawn from parental control, finding the motion judge's order that no person had custody or access rights over him was sufficient.

The appellant transferred two cottage properties to his former common law spouse and later claimed she held them in trust for him.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no written trust declaration, insufficient evidence of an express oral trust, and that the claim was barred by the parties' cohabitation agreement.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the cohabitation agreement and failing to find a trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement was correct and entitled to deference, and that the evidence did not establish a trust.