Family and Matrimonial Law - ONCA

The appellant appealed a trial order concerning parenting time, decision-making authority, and child support arrears, and sought leave to appeal a costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding it repetitive of trial evidence and not meeting the Palmer test.

The Court upheld the trial judge's decisions on equal parenting time (2-2-3 schedule), parallel decision-making (even though parties sought sole authority), and the finding that the appellant waived entitlement to retroactive child support.

Leave to appeal the costs award was denied, as the trial judge's discretion was found to be properly exercised based on the appellant's litigation conduct.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a matrimonial dispute concerning financial advances and child support.

The Estate of T.O. (husband) appealed the trial judge's dismissal of a claim for $341,000 in advances to Ridgeway (a corporation indirectly owned by D.O., the wife), arguing the limitation period was misapplied.

D.O. cross-appealed the finding of her liability for a $40,346 advance made by the husband's corporation and a child support calculation error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Estate's appeal against Ridgeway, finding the 2013 advances were demand loans and thus not statute-barred.

It dismissed the appeal against D.O. and 201.

The cross-appeal was allowed, setting aside D.O.'s liability for the $40,346 advance (as the creditor was a non-party corporation) and correcting the child support calculation.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order that increased the respondent father's parenting time to a 50/50 schedule.

The appeal raised issues including whether a material change in circumstances was required to vary a final order containing a review term, the admission of hearsay evidence, the amendment of pleadings at trial, and the consideration of the children's best interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that a review term in a final parenting order can negate the need for a material change in circumstances if properly justified and delimited.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on evidence, pleading amendments, and the children's best interests, and denied the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence.

The appellant sought to vary a spousal support order and set aside a cost order from a 2018 judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the lower court had no jurisdiction to vary the cost order (as the appellant had abandoned a previous appeal of that order) and that the correctness of the 2018 arrears could not be attacked by a subsequent motion to vary, but only by appeal, which the appellant had also abandoned.

The appellant, a third-party creditor (2401242 Ontario Inc.), appealed an order releasing the wife's share of matrimonial home sale proceeds.

The appellant had obtained a default judgment and filed a writ against the husband, arguing priority over the wife's interest in the jointly held matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a creditor cannot seize the interest of a non-debtor joint tenant.

The court clarified that under Ontario's Execution Act, a writ only binds the debtor's exigible interest in jointly held land, not the entire property, and therefore the wife was entitled to her half-share of the proceeds.

The appellant father sought decision-making authority for the COVID-19 vaccination of his two youngest children.

The motion judge dismissed his application, relying on the mother's internet sources and the children's stated wishes, while dismissing public health information and making inappropriate historical comparisons.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by improperly admitting and weighing the mother's unreliable online evidence as expert testimony, failing to properly assess the father's public health evidence, giving undue weight to the children's influenced views, and incorrectly reversing the onus of proof.

The appeal was allowed, granting the father sole decision-making authority for the children's COVID-19 vaccination.

This appeal addresses whether Canadian law recognizes an Islamic bare talaq divorce, performed in Ontario and subsequently registered with Egyptian governmental agencies.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in recognizing the divorce under s. 22(3) of the Divorce Act.

The Court clarified that administrative registration of a divorce does not equate to the "granting" of a divorce by a competent authority, as required by the Act.

Furthermore, the Court held that the parties lacked a real and substantial connection to Egypt at the time of the divorce, and that recognizing such a divorce would be contrary to Canadian public policy, particularly due to its unilateral nature and the potential for forum shopping.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court's order and allowing the appellant's spousal support claim to proceed.

This appeal concerned the enforcement of letters rogatory issued by a California court in a divorce action, seeking financial disclosure from Canadian corporations and an individual.

The Ontario application judge granted the request, subject to minor refinements.

The appellants, corporate entities associated with the husband, argued procedural errors (lack of service) and substantive errors (wrong test applied, fishing expedition, burden of proof).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the disclosure was relevant to family law obligations and not a fishing expedition, and that the application judge correctly applied the criteria for enforcing letters rogatory, including principles of comity and public policy.

The court also found that the documents were not otherwise obtainable given the husband's history of non-compliance.

Lynne Foulidis appealed a Superior Court order granting a charging order against her Toronto residence to Jodi L. Feldman Professional Corporation for $664,323.38 in legal fees.

The charging order was granted to secure outstanding legal fees from family litigation.

Lynne argued the property was no longer in existence for the purpose of the charging order due to a prior transfer to George Foulidis, that the lawyer's contribution was not substantial, and that there was no risk of non-payment.

Jodi L. Feldman Professional Corporation cross-appealed on costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Lynne's appeal, upholding the charging order, finding that the property was in existence (subject to a triable issue of fraudulent conveyance), the lawyer's contribution was instrumental, and there was a clear refusal to pay fees.

The cross-appeal on costs was also dismissed, but costs of the appeal were awarded to Jodi L. Feldman Professional Corporation.

The appellants, C.O. and N.P., appealed convictions for failure to provide necessaries of life and an order for a new trial on unlawful confinement, stemming from the unsanitary conditions in their apartment and the confinement of their four-year-old daughter, J. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, affirming that risk of harm is an element of the necessaries offence under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code and that the conditions of confinement are relevant to the "lawful authority" defence under s. 279(2).

The court found the trial judge erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the health risks posed by the cumulative unsanitary conditions.

The matter was remitted for sentencing on the necessaries charge.

The appellant (father) appealed a trial judge's order that reversed the primary residence of his son, J.K., from him to the respondent (mother), and granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility.

The trial judge had found the father to be abusive and not credible, and the mother credible and a victim of parental alienation created by the father.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the best interests test and in failing to meaningfully consider the recommendations of a court-appointed assessor, Dr. Goldstein, whose reports were largely disregarded due to findings by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on best interests and credibility.

While disagreeing with the trial judge's interpretation that family law proceedings are not "civil proceedings" under s. 36(3) of the RHPA (which prohibits admissibility of certain regulatory records), the Court found that the admissible facts (complaint, investigation, public undertakings) were sufficient to justify giving no weight to Dr. Goldstein's opinions.

The appellant wife appealed a summary judgment dismissing her application for equalization and spousal support, brought over a decade after their divorce.

She alleged the respondent husband misrepresented his financial position during their divorce negotiations, claiming $0 net worth while bank disclosures showed $21 million.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by: 1) allowing the summary judgment motion without the respondent filing a required answer and financial statement, which is crucial for financial disclosure in family law; and 2) misinterpreting the test for extending limitation periods under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act, by requiring "established fraud" instead of the lower threshold of "apparent grounds for relief" and "good faith" delay.

The court emphasized the paramount importance of financial disclosure in family law proceedings.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring her to pay spousal support to the respondent, whom the trial judge found was her common-law spouse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the parties were spouses under the Family Law Act, despite the trial judge's erroneous reference to the Divorce Act criteria for spousal support.

The court found this error not material due to significant overlap in statutory criteria and ample evidence supporting the respondent's economic dependence.

The appeal regarding spousal support and trial costs was dismissed.

The mother appealed an order granting sole custody of the children to the father, which was issued after the trial judge concluded the mother had engaged in parental alienation.

The appeal challenged the finding of parental alienation, the terms of the custody reversal and access restriction, and alleged a lack of fair trial due to ineffective counsel and judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's conclusions on parental alienation, the necessity of the custody order for the children's best interests, and finding no evidence of ineffective counsel or judicial bias.

This case involves three appeals arising from matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal addressed the validity of a stay of execution obtained by a third-party creditor (the husband's father) against the matrimonial home, the striking of the husband's pleadings for non-compliance with court orders, and the interpretation of a domestic contract concerning the wife's interest in the matrimonial home and equalization payments.

The court found that the stay of execution was justified under the Courts of Justice Act, despite not meeting the Family Law Act criteria, as the creditor's objective was to defeat the wife's claims.

The decision to strike the husband's pleadings was upheld due to his wilful non-compliance and history of defaults.

The trial judge's interpretation of the domestic contract, granting the wife a one-half interest in the matrimonial home, and the valuation of the husband's debt to his father at zero for equalization purposes were affirmed.

However, the costs award from the lower court was varied to credit the husband for interim payments already made.

An appeal concerning the appointment of guardians for a 90-year-old mother's property and personal care.

David and Edward Carey, who were originally applicants, withdrew their support for the applicants' position and sought to be appointed as appellants.

The motion judge had previously removed them as applicants without making them respondents.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to appoint guardians in the best interests of the mother.

The court ordered David and Edward Carey to pay costs of $5,000 to the respondents.

The appellant mother appealed the decision of the Ontario Superior Court, which had upheld a motion judge's order making three young children Crown wards (now called extended society care) without access to the mother under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal judge applied the wrong legislation (CFSA instead of CYFSA) and the wrong summary judgment principles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, confirming the extended society care order but granting the mother access to the children.

The court found that the motion judge's factual findings regarding the mother's inability to adequately care for the children were sound, but the denial of access was based on improper judicial notice and unsupported assumptions about adoption prospects.

The nature and extent of access were remanded to the Ontario Court of Justice.

An appeal from a Superior Court order concerning spousal support, child support, and a fraudulent conveyance application.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the motion judge erred in varying spousal support, varying child support, and dismissing the fraudulent conveyance application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part regarding child support, dismissed the appeal regarding spousal support, and dismissed the fraudulent conveyance appeal.

The court allocated costs among the three issues and offset costs between the parties.

The father appealed from the dismissal of his appeal from four family law orders relating to custody and access of three children.

The lower court orders had modified the father's access from unsupervised to supervised, citing concerns about the father's conduct in disparaging the mother to the children and the sporadic nature of his visits.

The father failed to obtain required transcripts for the appeal hearing and insisted on proceeding without them.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal as having no merit.

The father appealed, arguing denial of procedural fairness and inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and confirming that the appeal had no merit based on the materials before the lower court judge.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her action against the York Children's Aid Society arising from child protection proceedings involving her daughter.

The appellant claimed she suffered significant losses and damages and sought to continue the action with witness testimony at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal, finding no error in his analysis that certain claims disclosed no cause of action and that others lacked evidentiary support.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.