Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl and appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in jury instructions.

The appellant contended that the judge improperly instructed the jury to assess the complainant's evidence from an adolescent perspective and used value-laden language to characterize her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions, viewed holistically, did not suggest a less stringent standard for the complainant's evidence and that the characterization of her testimony occurred within the summary of the Crown's position, which was clearly delineated for the jury.

The appellant, Harris Nnane, appealed his first-degree murder convictions, seeking to introduce fresh evidence from Alexander Fountain, who identified a third man, Jaiden Jackson (now deceased), as the shooter.

Nnane also argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding identity and planning/deliberation, and that the trial judge erred in jury instructions and by not conducting a post-verdict juror inquiry.

The majority dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it not credible due to collusion, and upheld the convictions, concluding the verdict was reasonable and no errors occurred.

The dissenting judge would have admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial, finding Fountain's evidence reasonably capable of belief.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for serious sexual assault and assault charges, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his detention order.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge, arguing it was the least onerous and restrictive option given his recent progress in managing his mental disorder and substance use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable and supported by evidence, particularly the psychiatrist's view that a detention order was necessary for rapid intervention in case of relapse, given the appellant's history of substance abuse and associated violence.

The court emphasized the Board's obligation to protect public safety and the high standard for overturning Board decisions.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault and a Crown appeal from sentence.

The appellant challenged the conviction based on alleged errors in the trial judge’s reasoning, including the *Browne v. Dunn* rule and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

The Crown appealed the two-year less a day conditional sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court declined to interfere with the sentence, finding it was an exceptional case justified by the offender's remorse, commitment to rehabilitation, insight, and the severe family consequences of incarceration.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, T.C., appealed his convictions for five counts of assault and one count of sexual assault, and his five-year sentence.

The appeal against convictions was based on two alleged errors by the trial judge: allowing the Crown to recall a complainant after closing its case, and failing to sufficiently instruct the jury on prior inconsistent statements.

The sentence appeal argued that the assault sentences should have been concurrent rather than consecutive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to allow the recall of the witness for a limited purpose, no error in the jury instructions regarding inconsistencies, and no error in principle in the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The appellant appealed his convictions for four counts of aggravated assault and five counts of assault with a weapon, alleging unreasonable verdicts, an erroneous similar fact evidence ruling, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the similar fact evidence test and that the verdicts were reasonable given the ample evidence.

The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also rejected.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm, having claimed self-defence at trial.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding the appellant was the aggressor.

The appellant appealed the conviction, alleging legal errors in the application of self-defence provisions under s. 34 of the Criminal Code and a failure to give adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's holistic examination of the self-defence claim, concluding that the appellant armed himself and initiated the confrontation with an aggressive intent, not for self-defence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation involving a 13-year-old complainant.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in applying the "mistaken belief in age" defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, specifically whether the appellant took "all reasonable steps" to ascertain the complainant's age.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to take all reasonable steps, considering various contextual factors such as the age difference, complainant's appearance, living situation, and the appellant's suspicions about her online profile.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of importing methamphetamine, appealed his conviction and 12-year sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged Charter violations (detention, search, voluntariness of statements) due to a particularized drug lookout at the border, and a flawed jury selection process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, affirming that routine border inspections, even with a specific lookout, do not trigger Charter detention until a highly intrusive search or communicated subjective intent to detain occurs.

The court also found the appellant's statements voluntary and the jury selection process valid.

The 12-year sentence for importing 25 kg of methamphetamine was deemed fit and within the appropriate range for large-scale drug couriers.

The appellant, Roger Mercury, appealed his convictions for several drug and firearm related offences and his nine-year sentence.

He argued that the trial judge's findings were unreasonable, misapprehended material facts, and failed to consider other reasonable possibilities inconsistent with guilt, specifically regarding his presence in the apartment and evidence from a car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the trial judge's verdicts were reasonable and based on a careful assessment of formidable evidence, including video surveillance and key fob records, which supported the appellant's control over the car and unit.

The court concluded that the trial judge correctly applied the law on constructive possession and circumstantial evidence and adequately addressed the appellant's submissions.

The appellant, Alexander Rose, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's post-event demeanour and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge was entitled to rely on video surveillance footage of the complainant's distraught emotional state as powerful corroboration of non-consent.

The court affirmed the principles of appellate deference to credibility findings and the functional review of trial judge reasons, dismissing arguments that the verdict was unreasonable or that the evidence was improperly assessed.

The appellant, Michael Trought, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised two grounds: unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 11(b) appeal, finding the transitional exceptional circumstance applied and prejudice was not sufficiently established.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the ground of ineffective assistance, concluding that trial counsel failed to properly advise the appellant on the concept of constructive possession and agreed to a "blended procedure" (where voir dire evidence applied to the trial proper) without the appellant's informed consent.

This failure undermined the appellant's fundamental right to decide whether to testify and rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a street altercation where he stabbed the complainant 13 times with a folding knife.

The trial judge granted a directed verdict of acquittal on a weapons possession charge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing a Scopelliti application to call a witness regarding the complainant's prior violent conduct while intoxicated and in restricting cross-examination on a prior peace bond; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing a Corbett application to exclude evidence of the appellant's prior firearm conviction; and (3) the trial judge failed to inform the jury of the acquittal on the weapons charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed for failure to comply with a probation order and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The breaches involved possessing internet-capable devices in violation of orders prohibiting such possession, which were imposed following the appellant's second conviction for possession of child pornography.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the proper range as it was his first breach and he was not a long-term offender, and that he did not download illegal material.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the offences were flagrant, planned, deliberate, and occurred shortly after release.

The court found no errors in law or principle and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant was convicted at trial of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death, and was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment and whether the operation constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent operator.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in adequate evidentiary foundation and entitled to deference.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the six-year term fell within the appropriate range for similar offences.

The appellant was convicted of assault following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The conduct involved the appellant entering a washroom stall where a three-year-old stranger was standing with his clothing down and pulling the child's sleepers up, making contact with the child's buttocks.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in failing to apply an objective test regarding whether the conduct was within the class of ordinarily acceptable conduct in daily life, and in failing to apply the criminal standard to these issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of assault in section 265(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is exhaustive and does not require proof of socially unacceptable conduct beyond intentional and non-consensual touching.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and breach of probation.

The victim was his teenage daughter, from whom he had been estranged for many years before reconnecting in 2010.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessments and claimed the trial judge applied inconsistent standards of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were entitled to deference and were supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, as was the abandoned sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to his evidence compared to the complainant's, and erred in drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his father as a witness.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh medical evidence explaining his father's absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it was a strategic decision at trial not to call the father.

The Court upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments and found no error in the limited adverse inference drawn regarding the missing witness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, gave insufficient reasons, and erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence were cogent and sufficient.

The Court also held that any Charter breach was minor and admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter or provocation with the jury, that the Crown improperly elicited prior out-of-court statements to rebut recent fabrication, and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding a forged arrest warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support provocation, that the prior statements were admissible, that any prejudice from cross-examination was cured by instructions, and that the fresh evidence was collateral.