Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant appealed a 9-year global sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that he did not receive adequate credit for presentence custody given the hardship endured.

Although the trial judge accepted the appellant's account of hardship and granted 3:1 credit, duty counsel submitted that the trial judge may have misapprehended the appellant's primary submission for a time-served sentence.

The appellate court found no error warranting interference, noting that the trial judge provided significant credit for hardship and properly rejected the time-served submission based on the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's degree of responsibility.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching entered on November 22, 2023.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury to disregard Crown closing submissions regarding the absence of the complainant's mother's testimony about witnessing the alleged incidents.

The appellant argued that the Crown's submission was improper because the mother had told police she witnessed an incident that was not testified to at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown properly based its submission on evidence actually led at trial and that defence counsel's failure to cross-examine the mother about her police statement was a tactical decision.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that denied his request for an absolute discharge and continued his conditional discharge.

The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence regarding his medication compliance and imposed an unreasonable disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while there was a minor factual error, it was not material to the Board's analysis.

The Court held that the Board's decision was reasonable and justified given the appellant's lack of insight, history of substance abuse, and risk of future harm.

An appeal from a committal order for extradition to the United States.

The appellant challenged the committal judge's dismissal of a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from searches of electronic devices.

The searches were authorized by warrants based on information from an iPhone examined and seized during U.S. Customs preclearance at Pearson Airport.

The Court of Appeal found that the examination of the iPhone violated section 8 of the Charter because it occurred after the appellant was detained.

The court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new extradition hearing to determine whether the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter and whether sufficient evidence remains for committal.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown consented to the admission of fresh evidence and conceded that a new trial should be ordered.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's finding that there was no breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter despite significant delay.

The trial judge had calculated net delay at 50 months, exceeding the Jordan cap by 20 months, but found exceptional circumstances justified the excess delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding exceptional circumstances and the Crown's reasonable management of the complex prosecution.

On the sentence appeal, while the Court of Appeal identified a factual error regarding the timing of professional credentials, it found the error immaterial to the ultimate sentence and upheld the sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000 and conspiracy to commit fraud, as well as the $300,000 restitution order imposed at sentencing.

The appellant was represented by experienced trial counsel and conducted an exhaustive plea inquiry prior to entering his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to set aside either the conviction or the restitution order, which the appellant had agreed to through counsel.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Provincial Offences Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for speeding.

The applicant was charged with speeding on Highway 2 in the Region of Durham, clocked at 107 km/h in a 70 km/h zone.

He was convicted at trial and again at a retrial after his first conviction was overturned due to a misapplication of the rule in R. v. W.(D.).

The motion judge granted leave to appeal on three grounds: (1) misapplication of the W.(D.) rule by the Justice of the Peace; (2) improper restriction of cross-examination regarding prior inconsistent testimony; and (3) failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented accused.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 26 months imprisonment.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The trial judge found that the complainant, a 17-year-old first-year university student, was incapable of consenting to sexual activity due to her level of intoxication and unconsciousness during portions of the assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in understanding the distinction between "blacking out" and unconsciousness, in equating pain with lack of consent, and in drawing inferences about the complainant's intoxication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding the trial judge's findings were supported by evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted after a two-week jury trial of possession of a prohibited firearm without a license, possession of an over-capacity magazine, possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to nine years and three months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in failing to provide limiting instructions to the jury regarding photographs of a firearm found on the appellant's cell phone, and in failing to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the testimony of the appellant's brother.

The Court set aside the convictions on the firearm-related counts and ordered a new trial on those counts, while upholding the drug and proceeds convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant had bitten off the complainant's ear during an altercation at the complainant's residence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the description of the attack and his drinking habits; and second, that the trial judge impermissibly speculated about the cause of the injury without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's credibility, that any inconsistencies were minor and did not undermine the core allegations, and that the trial judge did not speculate but rather accepted the complainant's uncontradicted testimony.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of historical sexual assault against two teenage nieces committed between 1976 and 1986, and received a global sentence of six years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence regarding his 2009 convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis that the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, particularly given the striking similarities in the circumstances of the incidents despite some dissimilarities in the nature of the acts.

Three appellants challenged mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for unauthorized production of marijuana under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The Court of Appeal found that certain mandatory minimum provisions were grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable circumstances, including cases involving minimal involvement, mistaken licensees, and situations lacking culpability regarding statutory aggravating factors.

The court struck down provisions imposing two and three-year mandatory minimums for production of more than 500 plants and the statutory aggravating factor provision.

The court reduced one appellant's sentence and dismissed appeals in the other cases.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on July 6, 2016 by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant pleaded guilty following a ruling dismissing his Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's Charter ruling, which was based on findings of fact.

The appellant raised issues regarding his treatment during arrest and suggested ineffective assistance of counsel, but had not properly pursued such claims.

The court found no basis to conclude the guilty plea was not voluntary and informed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the appellant's testimony that the sexual activity was consensual.

On appeal, the appellant raised six grounds of appeal challenging the conviction.

While the Court of Appeal rejected the first three grounds (misapplication of burden of proof, improper use of silence, and improper use of lack of embellishment), it allowed the appeal on three remaining grounds: the trial judge's failure to inspect the complainant's shirt despite defence counsel's reasonable expectation that he would do so; the trial judge's erroneous admission and use of reply evidence from the appellant's roommate to establish a collusion theory without proper foundation; and most significantly, the trial judge's application of markedly different levels of scrutiny to the credibility of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court found that cumulatively, these errors undermined the fairness of the trial and constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and failing to remain at the scene of an accident arising from a carjacking on May 24, 2016 in Ottawa.

The case turned on identity.

The victim testified that the appellant was not the man who attacked him, providing confused and unconvincing evidence about a prior high school connection and a bar encounter.

The trial judge rejected the victim's testimony as unreliable and hazy, and instead relied on video evidence, testimony from the Brown brothers, and DNA evidence to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's findings and that the verdict was amply supported by the evidentiary record.

The appellant was convicted of possession of oxycodone, Percocet, and clonazepam for the purpose of trafficking.

The central issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of text messages extracted from the appellant's seized cellphone.

The Crown sought to admit incoming text messages requesting drugs as hearsay evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The trial judge admitted the messages and instructed the jury they could be used for the truth of their contents.

The appellant appealed, arguing the messages were improperly admitted and the jury was inadequately instructed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the incoming text messages were properly admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on threshold reliability and necessity, and that the jury charge adequately addressed the dangers of hearsay evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old victim.

The main ground of appeal concerned the admissibility of a partial recording of a telephone call between the appellant and the victim's mother, in which the appellant apologized and appeared to be crying.

The appellant also challenged the admission of incomplete text messages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, finding that the victim's mother's testimony provided sufficient context for the recorded statement and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury regarding the incomplete text messages.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder for the sexual assault and murder of a 70-year-old woman committed when he was 15 years old, appealed his sentence.

The Crown had sought and obtained an adult sentence rather than a youth sentence.

The appellant challenged the sentencing judge's decision on three grounds: failure to consider whether the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted, use of the appellant's testimony and denial of guilt as aggravating factors, and failure to properly weigh rehabilitation and integration principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the sentencing judge erred in using the appellant's testimony as an aggravating factor, the error had no impact on the sentence and an adult sentence remained fit given the heinous nature of the crime.

The appellant appealed his conviction on counts of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on sexual assault.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence of four years on the invitation to sexual touching count.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury verdicts were not inconsistent because the trial judge's instructions created a reasonable basis for the jury to understand that sexual assault required force applied by the appellant to the complainant, whereas sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching required only touching or an invitation to touch.

The court dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.