Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

This is an appeal from a sentence where the Crown and appellant jointly requested a reduction in the custodial sentence.

Due to an inadvertent error, the negotiated joint submission of 26 months was not presented to the sentencing judge, who imposed a 36-month sentence.

The sentencing judge deemed herself functus officio to correct the error.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and substituted the sentence to reflect the original 26-month joint submission, less pre-trial credit, to rectify the procedural unfairness.

The appellant, Mark Cameron, appealed his conviction for break and enter, firearm offences, and cocaine possession, arguing several Charter violations related to his detention, arrest, and search.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's Charter ruling.

The court upheld the lawfulness of taking keys during investigative detention, the sufficiency of information provided, the reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on cumulative circumstances, the lawfulness of the incidental search, and the justified delay in advising the right to counsel due to officer safety concerns.

The appellant, Daniel Neill, appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing that evidence was obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights due to an unlawful warrantless seizure of his Blackberry and issues with the subsequent search warrant and forensic analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure and that the trial judge correctly applied the doctrine of severance to an outdated search warrant form.

The court also found no s. 8 breach regarding the timing of the forensic analysis, as the warrant did not specify a timeframe for it.

Ultimately, the court concluded that even if additional s. 8 violations were found, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

This appeal concerned convictions for second-degree murder and discharge of a firearm with intent.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's jury charge was unfair and unbalanced due to alleged errors in presenting evidence and failing to adequately relate evidence to the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions.

The court concluded that the charge, read as a whole, was fair and adequately conveyed the defence's position and the relevant legal principles, upholding the convictions.

The appellant, Subeer Bakal, appealed his convictions for firearm offences and breaches, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the principles for assessing evidence, including circumstantial evidence (R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. Villaroman).

The court also denied the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it lacked cogency and was implausible.

Finally, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the trial judge properly considered sentencing principles, including the totality principle, time spent on bail, and the issue of anti-Black racism.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the defence of accident (unintended act).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence of accident did not have an air of reality based on the totality of the evidence, including witness testimony, video surveillance, and coroner's evidence, which contradicted the appellant's equivocal testimony.

The appellant, Adonay Zekarias, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and committing an indignity to a dead body.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence to establish motive, the reliance on inferences for motive, and the use of after-the-fact conduct to prove intent.

The appellant also raised Charter breaches but conceded them given the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning on motive or intent, and adjourned the sentence appeal.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his stepdaughter and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: improper reliance on the absence of exaggeration, improper use of prior consistent statements, and improper reliance on neutral aspects of evidence to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also challenged the s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order as overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's reasoning on credibility or confirmatory evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing the s. 161(1)(c) order, as it was not retroactively applicable to an offence committed prior to its amendment in August 2012.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault with a weapon and possession of a dangerous weapon, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that continued her detention order.

She sought an absolute or conditional discharge, or a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable.

The court noted the appellant's schizophrenic illness requiring medication, her lack of insight into her condition, and the risk of decompensation and danger to the public without supervision, especially given her history of substance abuse contributing to the index offences.

The court emphasized that her progress occurred under direct hospital supervision and that there was no record of success in a controlled community setting.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions arising from two notices of appeal filed by the appellant, Deepan Budlakoti.

The Crown sought to quash a 'Charter Appeal' concerning a pre-trial application dismissal, arguing it was an interlocutory order without a right of appeal.

Mr. Budlakoti sought reconsideration of a decision refusing his application for appointment of counsel for his 'Habeas Appeal' challenging detention conditions.

The court granted the Crown's motion, quashing the Charter Appeal as an interlocutory criminal appeal.

Mr. Budlakoti's motion for counsel was dismissed, as the court agreed there was no arguable ground of appeal for the Habeas Appeal.

The appellant appealed from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued a detention order against him, arguing he should have been granted an absolute discharge.

The Board found that the appellant continued to represent a significant threat to public safety and that a conditional discharge would not allow his medical team sufficient time to intervene if he deteriorated.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no foundation for an absolute discharge and upholding the Board's rationale for rejecting a conditional discharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, appealed a discharge order in an extradition proceeding against the respondent for fraud-related charges.

The extradition judge had discharged the respondent, finding insufficient evidence in the Record of the Case (ROC) to establish his complicity.

The Court of Appeal found that the extradition judge erred by misreading the ROC and by failing to give proper effect to the presumptive reliability of the certified evidence, treating bald assertions as having no evidentiary value without considering the context of the accomplice's deep involvement in the scheme.

The Court concluded that, read as a whole, the ROC provided a sufficient basis for committal.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by a jury on June 17, 2016.

The grounds of appeal raised only questions of fact as found by the jury, with no questions of law raised.

The appellate court found that there was evidence to support the jury's verdict and identified no grounds that would justify appellate intervention.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less one day imprisonment plus two years' probation following his guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the sentencing judge's reasons and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The court noted that the appellant, then 23 years old, had sucker-punched a 55-year-old victim causing significant injury, and that such conduct must be both deterred and denounced.

The appeal was dismissed and the warrant of committal was amended to reflect the lesser but included offence.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was transferred back to medium security prior to the extension of time being granted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the current habeas corpus proceeding was the preferable forum to address the lawfulness of the appellant's present detention.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder by a jury, based primarily on the recognition evidence of the victim.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence and the victim's lack of credibility.

They also argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning, providing an insufficient jury charge on eyewitness identification, and admitting cellular telephone records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the verdicts reasonable, the jury instructions adequate, and the cellphone records properly admitted as voluntary statements.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving, dangerous driving, and flight from police causing bodily harm after his car crashed.

At trial, the sole issue was whether the appellant was driving.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he was asleep in the back seat, partly because defence counsel failed to put this version of events to the other occupants of the car during cross-examination, breaching the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The trial judge also relied on a police officer's observations of the vehicle's erratic driving to confirm the reliability of the other occupants' testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn or his use of confirmatory evidence.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and kidnapping, applied for an extension of time to appeal and for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown consented to the time extension but opposed the appointment of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the applicant lacked the means to retain counsel and could not effectively present his complex appeal, which included arguable grounds regarding after-the-fact conduct, Vetrovec warnings, and prior inconsistent statements.

The court referred the matter to Legal Aid Ontario, ordering that if legal aid is refused, counsel be appointed with fees paid by the Attorney General.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting the preliminary inquiry testimony of a co-accused who refused to testify at trial, failing to properly instruct the jury on the evidence, and improperly answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly exercise his discretion under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, failed to relate the evidence to the issues in his jury charge, and provided a procedurally and substantively flawed response to a jury question.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge or, alternatively, permission to live in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The court rejected the argument that there was a treatment impasse, noting that the diagnosis had been clarified and the treatment team was trying different approaches.