Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant, David Kawal, appealed his convictions for attempt murder, robbery with a restricted or prohibited weapon, and kidnapping with a restricted or prohibited weapon.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the jury verdicts reasonable and the trial judge’s instructions proper.

The court found no merit in arguments regarding the reasonableness of the verdicts, the instructions on circumstantial evidence, eyewitness identification, or the elements of the offences.

The sentence appeal was previously abandoned.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Barrington Grant’s conviction for possession of a loaded firearm.

The appellant had challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained under a warrant, but his application was dismissed at trial.

After his conviction, related proceedings involving the same information to obtain (ITO) resulted in stays due to disclosure issues.

The Crown conceded the appeal in light of these developments and a prior Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Khamo, which quashed a conviction based on the same evidence.

The court set aside the conviction, ordered a new trial, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the sole defense witness.

The sentence appeal sought a conditional sentence instead of the imposed custodial term.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessment, noting the deference owed.

Regarding the sentence, the court upheld the custodial term, emphasizing the serious nature of the offence, which involved the appellant pointing a gun at his son and wife and threatening to kill them.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Andre Appleton, was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated assault following a stabbing incident.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect (Ibrahim Muhia) was irrelevant and in effectively directing that another individual (SHG) was the second man involved in the fight.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly restricting the jury's consideration of evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt about the appellant's guilt, particularly concerning the identity of the stabber and co-participants.

The Court held that no formal third-party suspect application was required as the Crown had already made Muhia's potential involvement a live issue.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Waqar Ali, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 22 months.

The appeal raised issues concerning an alleged s.11(b) Charter delay, the trial judge's decision to grant a similar fact application, the assessment of DNA evidence, and the credibility assessment of the appellant's testimony regarding his vehicle.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding a breach of trust as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding both the conviction and the sentence, finding no errors in principle or demonstrably unfit sentence.

The appellant, Mario Inacio, appealed his convictions for robbery, unlawful confinement, assault, threatening death, and extortion, stemming from a dispute over a $400 rent payment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to adequately assess the reliability of the complainant's evidence, given her admitted drug use and memory problems.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of reliability, noting that the judge was aware of the complainant's issues but nonetheless accepted her evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion to cancel D.L.'s bail pending appeal or, alternatively, for a bail review, after D.L. was charged with new sexual offences while on release.

The court determined the matter was properly a bail review based on a material change in circumstances.

The motion to cancel bail was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction under s. 524 of the Criminal Code, as the undertaking had expired.

However, the court ordered D.L.'s release under more restrictive terms and conditions, including "house arrest" with a surety, to address public safety and public confidence concerns, finding the existing release order inadequate.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 20-year custodial sentence for 18 counts of home invasion sexual assaults and related offences committed between 1985 and 1987.

The appeal argued two errors by the sentencing judge: improper application of the totality principle and failure to adequately consider the passage of time and the appellant's advanced age as mitigating factors.

The majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to totality or the consideration of mitigating factors.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 14 years, arguing that the trial judge erred in her consideration of the "laying low" factor and the appellant's life expectancy, leading to a disproportionate and "crushing" sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter and theft, which was based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the evidence, while suspicious, was equally consistent with the appellant becoming involved with the stolen vehicle after the break-in and thefts had occurred.

The court determined that the inferences necessary to prove possession of the vehicle or participation in the initial crimes could not be reasonably drawn, and therefore, the trier of fact could not reasonably be satisfied that guilt was the only reasonable conclusion.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Crown acknowledged, after review of trial transcripts and an independent interpreter's assessment of audio recordings, that there were numerous and significant errors in the interpretation of the appellant's evidence during trial.

The appeal against conviction was allowed with the Crown's consent.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's December 27, 2018 disposition ordering his detention on a forensic unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with specified privileges.

The appellant contended that the Board departed from a joint submission of the parties by rejecting his request for community privileges accompanied by an approved person, and that he was denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no joint submission was made and that the Board's decision requiring staff accompaniment was amply supported by evidence of the appellant's history of violence, hallucinations, and medication non-compliance, as well as the opinion of his treating psychiatrist.

The appellants were convicted of importing cocaine after returning from vacation in St. Lucia with 1.4 kilograms of cocaine each.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof regarding the defence of duress and erroneously required corroboration of the evidence.

The appellants argued duress was the only defence at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made a misstatement regarding the burden of proof, this was a simple error that did not affect the outcome when the reasons were read as a whole.

The defence failed because the trial judge did not believe the evidence of the testifying appellant and found no reasonable doubt regarding the threats and assaults, and further found that the appellants had a safe avenue of escape once within Canadian jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice for conviction on charges including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, break and enter with intent to steal a firearm, breach of an undertaking, and breach of a probation order.

The original global sentence was 5½ years less credit for 30 months served.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence too harsh, particularly given the appellant's age (19 years old), his substantial rehabilitative efforts while in custody, his genuine remorse, and his motivation to reunite with his young son.

The court reduced the global sentence to four years by reducing the consecutive sentence for break and enter with intent to steal a firearm from 30 months to 12 months.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding sentences imposed following convictions in two cases.

The central issue concerned whether a sentencing judge may impose a small fine as part of a sentence for the purpose of reducing the mandatory victim fine surcharge.

The summary conviction appeal judge had corrected an illegal sentence by removing a fine that violated s. 731 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits combining probation with both custody and a fine.

Leave to appeal was dismissed on two grounds: the issue did not arise squarely on the facts, and a pending Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Tinker regarding the constitutional validity of the victim fine surcharge would likely address the applicant's concerns.

A youth appealed his sentencing on charges of unlawful possession of a loaded handgun, unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon (sawed-off shotgun), and breach of recognizance.

The appellant contended that the youth court judge erred by not respecting the joint sentencing submission on allocation of pre-sentence custody, by failing to allow the appellant to speak before sentencing, by imposing a 15-month probationary sentence (which exceeded the statutory maximum of 12 months for the s. 95 offence), and by imposing a 7-year weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal partially allowed the appeal, modifying the probationary sentence on the s. 95 offence to 12 months while upholding the other aspects of the sentence.

An appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health under a hybrid order requiring detention in the Secure Forensic Unit with discretion to transfer to the General Forensic Unit.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for attacks on strangers in 2007.

The Board found the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety but was considering a treatment plan involving transfer to a more supportive general unit with behavioural programs.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's disposition unreasonable given the identified treatment impasse, the appellant's advancing age and declining health, and the lack of meaningful progress.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted for an independent assessment and rehearing.

The appellant appealed his sentence for criminal harassment, careless use of a firearm, threatening to cause bodily harm, and two breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of two years and six months, reduced by 18 months to reflect 12 months actual pre-sentence custody.

The appellant challenged the sentencing decision on multiple grounds, including the failure to give additional credit for interim release conditions, the characterization of the firearm use, and post-sentence rehabilitative efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault following a violent altercation on a restaurant patio.

He appealed on two grounds, claiming the Crown's closing address was improper and that the trial judge's instruction on self-defence was erroneous.

The Crown's closing address did not misstate the legal test for self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, and any inappropriate comments were adequately corrected by the trial judge.

The trial judge's instruction on self-defence was thorough and proper, correctly identifying the three key elements of the defence without improperly adding proportionality as an additional requirement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day imposed for defrauding three victims.

Duty counsel raised two main grounds: that the trial judge failed to give effect to evidence of remorse, and that the trial judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's position without affording defence counsel an opportunity to make further submissions.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge should have provided the defence an opportunity to address the proposed sentence, the imposed sentence was fit and perhaps even lenient given the serious nature of the frauds, the consequences to the victims, the appellant's guilty plea only after victims testified at the preliminary inquiry, and the appellant's prior probation for previous frauds.

The applicant sought bail pending the Minister's surrender decision in an extradition matter.

The applicant had been convicted in absentia in Illinois in 2004 for drug trafficking and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment.

He fled to Jamaica and subsequently immigrated to Canada in 2006, becoming a Canadian citizen in 2009.

Upon attempting to renew his passport to attend his mother's funeral in 2016, he was arrested under the Extradition Act.

The court granted bail, finding that the applicant met the three-part test under section 679 of the Criminal Code as applied to extradition proceedings: the application was not frivolous, the applicant would surrender when ordered, and detention was not necessary in the public interest.