Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and breach of probation, as well as his sentence of 30 months in custody less 7 months credit for presentence custody, followed by 18 months' probation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge and dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the circumstances did not warrant a conditional sentence and that the sentence fell within the applicable range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for numerous offences, including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, incest, and child pornography, committed against his biological daughter.

The grounds of appeal included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge, material misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias due to the trial judge's strong language.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible error.

The court affirmed that credibility findings are entitled to significant appellate deference, that any misapprehension of evidence was not material to the outcome, and that while the trial judge's language was strong, it did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed in the context of a thorough and even-handed analysis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years parole ineligibility.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: error in jury instruction on after-the-fact conduct evidence for provocation, error in not compelling the Crown to call a witness, and error in not permitting the defence to call that witness.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge erred by not properly considering the appellant’s immigration status and certainty of deportation in determining parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the jury instructions or the witness ruling, and upholding the sentencing decision as entitled to deference.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal and a stay of proceedings in a multi-accused robbery trial, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar act evidence and granting a stay for lost evidence.

The respondents cross-appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in excluding similar act evidence due to insufficient reasons and in granting a stay without assessing prejudice.

The Crown's appeal was granted, setting aside the acquittals and stay, and ordering a new trial on those counts.

The respondents' cross-appeals against conviction were dismissed as the similar act rulings had benefited them or were consented to, and other grounds lacked merit.

The appellant, Margaret Lee Cole, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder in the death of Richard Humble, who died in a house fire.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's financial motive (forged documents and will), the presence of a sedative (Alprazolam) in the victim's system (prescribed to the appellant), a false alibi, and other suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting extrinsic misconduct evidence (the "Chapman letters") and in the jury's instruction on its use, as well as in the jury's instruction on the fabricated alibi.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the Crown's case was overwhelmingly strong and that the errors did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction upheld.

This appeal arose from convictions for child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, stemming from Project Raphael, an undercover police investigation targeting demand for juvenile sexual services.

The appellant, Temitope Dare, appealed his convictions on two grounds: that the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding the mental element of belief (linking it to reading text messages) and that the trial judge erred in dismissing his entrapment application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the jury instructions, when read holistically, were not misleading regarding the requirement of belief, and rejecting the entrapment argument based on reasons provided in a related case.

The applicant sought review of a detention order made by a Superior Court judge under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant was charged with two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, principle, or palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings regarding the primary and secondary grounds for detention.

The court upheld the detention order, finding the application judge's conclusions about the strength of the Crown's case and the fragility of the proposed release plan to be reasonable.

The appellant was convicted at trial of producing methamphetamine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking following a fire at an industrial complex containing a clandestine drug lab.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's fingerprint on a pop can found in the unit and a cell phone found in the lab that the trial judge concluded belonged to the appellant.

The phone contained incriminating evidence including photographs of equipment used in methamphetamine production.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: improper reliance on certified court documents to link him to the phone, misapprehension of evidence regarding photographs on the phone, and that the conviction on the possession for trafficking count was unreasonable or insufficiently reasoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning and that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported the convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his sentence for large-scale, prolonged marijuana trafficking for profit.

The appellant argued that changed societal attitudes toward marijuana use warranted a reduction in the established sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding the parity principle and police misconduct were reasonable, and that societal perception of marijuana use does not justify reducing sentences for serious trafficking offences.

Parliament has not significantly altered applicable penalties, and large-scale trafficking remains serious criminal misconduct regardless of legislative changes regarding personal possession and use.

The appellant appealed a conviction.

On consent of both parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was directed to appear on December 10, 2018 to set a trial date.

The appellant appealed her conviction for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to provide the necessaries of life, as well as her sentence.

The victim was her 20-month-old child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal on the criminal negligence count but set aside the conviction for failing to provide the necessaries of life and entered a conditional stay of proceedings, finding the offences were duplicitous under the Kienapple principle.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the appellant and her co-accused had comparable culpability despite the co-accused perpetrating the actual assaults.

The appellant appealed her conviction for aggravated assault of her sometimes girlfriend.

The trial judge found that the appellant caused the complainant's multiple serious wounds, rejecting the appellant's position that the injuries were self-inflicted.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of matters requiring expert evidence, specifically regarding the cause of bruising and blood stain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly drew inferences from the evidence using common sense and human experience, without improperly taking judicial notice of matters requiring expertise.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of morphine and possession of morphine for the purpose of trafficking, as well as an eight-month sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a key defence witness and failed to properly apply Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the trial judge properly rejected the defence evidence and adequately considered the appellant's Aboriginal background and personal circumstances in imposing a fit sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine and ketamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly drew inferences of knowledge and control based on the appellant's possession of a key to the locked bedroom where contraband was found, his attempt to enter the bedroom immediately after police entry, and the discovery of his social insurance card in a drawer adjacent to where drugs were found, along with buy money.

The court found this constellation of evidence created a powerful inference of possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault of a minor victim, as well as his six-year sentence.

The victim alleged that the appellant sexually and physically assaulted her over a two-year period when she was 14-15 years old and he was 44.

The trial judge convicted the appellant on six counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault after finding the victim's evidence credible and rejecting the appellant's denials.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal on conviction: misapplication of the burden of proof, misapprehension of the significance of the victim's diary, and erroneous assessment of the victim's testimony according to standards applicable to young persons.

On sentencing, the appellant argued the trial judge relied on inadmissible evidence and failed to apply the principle of parity.

The appellate court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his conviction for first degree murder in the killing of a victim on June 20, 1981.

The applicant had been tried four times for the offence: the first conviction was set aside on Charter grounds, the second and third trials resulted in hung juries, and the fourth trial resulted in conviction.

The applicant had been on bail for many years during the proceedings and had complied with all bail conditions.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: (1) the appeal is not frivolous; (2) the applicant will surrender into custody; and (3) detention is not necessary in the public interest.

The court found all three criteria satisfied and granted bail pending appeal, increasing the recognizance to $750,000.

The appellant was convicted of two offences: wilfully killing a dog without lawful excuse, and wilfully causing unnecessary pain and suffering to a dog by strangulation and suffocation with tape and a chain.

The dog was found dead in the appellant's yard, tethered to a tree with a choke chain and electrical tape wrapped around its muzzle.

The trial judge found that the dog died by strangulation on the choke chain and that the tape was a contributing cause.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on findings that the appellant knew the dog would struggle and suffer, and was reckless as to whether the dog would die.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the conviction for wilfully killing the dog while upholding the conviction for wilfully causing unnecessary pain and suffering.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a police stop of a van in a residential neighbourhood where break-ins had occurred.

The Court of Appeal found that the initial traffic stop constituted an arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the officer had no reasonable grounds to suspect the occupants were involved in the break-ins and no legitimate highway traffic purpose for the stop.

Although the arrest and search incident to arrest were found to be lawful based on the smell of fresh marijuana, and the post-arrest strip search was found to be unlawful, the Court determined that the arbitrary detention tainted all subsequent police conduct.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the Court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the Charter violations, finding that the seriousness of the police misconduct and its strong negative impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appellant appealed convictions under s. 259(4)(b) of the Criminal Code for driving while disqualified.

The appellant also challenged a forfeiture order that included his pick-up truck, alleged that police seized items outside the scope of the forfeiture order, and sought variation of a probation condition prohibiting possession of housebreaking tools that prevented him from working in construction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and forfeiture order but approved a variation of the probation condition to permit possession of tools required for his livelihood, subject to prior written approval of his probation officer.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting the victim through the heart in a bus shelter in broad daylight.

The appellant claimed self-defence under former s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, asserting that the victim had unlawfully assaulted him.

The jury rejected this claim and found him guilty.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds regarding the jury instructions on self-defence and challenged the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and the appeal from sentence, finding no error in principle or misdirection by the trial judge.