Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to consider the unusually harsh conditions of his pre-sentence detention (lockdowns and triple-bunking) as a mitigating factor, relying on fresh evidence.

The Crown did not oppose the admission of fresh evidence but asserted the original sentence was fit.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and found it warranted a two-month reduction in the appellant's sentence for sexual abuse offences committed against his stepdaughter.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping for ransom and conspiracy to kidnap.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the 33-month delay between his arrest and the completion of his trial violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the application judge made errors in calculating the delay, the recalculated delay still fell within the Morin guidelines and was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstance set out in Jordan.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple counts of domestic violence offences and his dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of two counts of aggravated assault, one count each of sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a death threat, and breach of a probation order, while acquitting him on eight other counts.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's use of cross-count similar fact evidence and the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to the cross-count evidence and confirming that the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were met.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years imposed for a spree of robberies committed over a two-week period.

Duty counsel argued that the sentencing judge erred by relying on an incorrect prior sentence from 2006, claiming the appellant had received six and a half years when he actually received five years and eleven months.

The court found the error immaterial as the sentencing judge had considered numerous factors and reduced a proposed 12-year sentence to 10 years based on rehabilitative efforts.

The sentence was upheld as fit and justified.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder in the death of his girlfriend.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed her in a dispute about his drug abuse and theft of money to acquire drugs.

The appellant claimed he witnessed a drug dealer kill the victim.

The appeal addressed three grounds: (1) admissibility of a police statement taken in hospital; (2) jury direction regarding prior inconsistent statements as evidence of consciousness of guilt; and (3) rulings on third-party suspect evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed a vexatious litigant order issued by the Superior Court that enjoined him from instituting or continuing proceedings in any Superior Court in Ontario for the review of lower court proceedings or Crown action with respect to any private criminal information, except with leave of a Judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

The order also included the Ontario Court of Appeal within its scope.

The appellant sought an adjournment and raised two main issues: that the lower court erred in declaring him a vexatious litigant, and that the court erred in denying his applications for certiorari and mandamus regarding three private prosecutions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the vexatious litigant designation but struck the portion of the order that enjoined the appellant from initiating proceedings before the Court of Appeal without leave, finding that the application judge may have overstepped her jurisdiction in that regard.

The appellant was acquitted of conspiracy to commit human smuggling but convicted of two counts of manslaughter by criminal negligence arising from an incident where he transported three Indian nationals on a Sea-Doo across the St. Lawrence River without life jackets, resulting in the capsizing of the vessel and the deaths of two passengers.

The Federal Crown appealed the acquittal on the conspiracy charge, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's statement and the surviving passenger's hearsay statements.

The accused appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misstated the mens rea test and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced on a charge of cultivation of marijuana under section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after entering a guilty plea.

However, the appellant was not given his election on the indictable offence charge prior to pleading guilty.

The Crown appealed the conviction, seeking that the verdict be set aside and a new trial be ordered.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, set aside the guilty plea and verdict, and ordered a new trial on the charge of cultivation of marijuana.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The conviction arose from a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, particularly the eyewitness testimony regarding the movements of the vehicles immediately before and at the time of the accident.

The court found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the mens rea component of the offence.

On the sentence appeal, the court upheld the 18-month custodial sentence and the 10-year driving prohibition as being within the appropriate range.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sentenced to 36 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on Charter grounds and contested the trial judge's findings regarding his status as a person in authority, the sexual purpose of the conduct, and alleged collusion among complainants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and the custodial sentence.

However, the sentence appeal was partially allowed, with the court setting aside a ten-year weapons prohibition and a victim fine surcharge that were inconsistent with the trial judge's findings.

A lifetime SOIRA order was upheld as appropriate.

The appellant was convicted on 18 counts relating to drug trafficking and firearm possession following an undercover police operation.

He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment (three and one-half years on firearm offences and four years on drug offences, made consecutive and then reduced on a global basis).

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three main grounds: alleging a breach of section 8 Charter rights regarding the search warrant, claiming the trial judge's amended reasons constituted after-the-fact justification, and asserting the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, arguing the consecutive sentences were inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions on 14 counts of fraud arising from his guilty plea.

He asserted that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance as an unrepresented person and deprived him of his right to counsel, contrary to s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing further adjournments for retaining counsel and that the trial judge ensured the appellant understood his guilty plea through a full plea inquiry.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was found passed out in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with the engine on and seatbelt fastened.

He had consumed significant alcohol and provided breath samples showing readings of 210 and 200 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge rejected the respondent's evidence that he had no intention to drive.

The Court of Appeal found that the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge erred in characterizing the trial judge's findings as palpable and overriding errors and restored the original convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions on 11 counts of weapons offences and his sentence of eight years.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of firing a handgun at a third party and then chasing the shooter, ultimately disposing of the weapon in a recycling bin.

The sole issue at trial was whether the pursuer was the appellant or his friend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof and noting that the appellant's blood was found on the recovered handgun, his clothing matched witness descriptions, and he was the only injured party.

The court also upheld the eight-year sentence, noting it was a second firearms offence committed while subject to weapons prohibition orders, and that the mandatory minimum penalty of seven years applied under s. 244(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of William Mason.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the appellant's co-accused, Jason Lusted, who pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact and became the main Crown witness.

The Crown also led circumstantial evidence including phone records, fire marshal testimony, and evidence from Edmund Huard regarding a plot to kill Lusted.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: errors regarding phone records, withdrawal of fire marshal evidence, and admission of Huard's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that Huard's evidence was inadmissible as it lacked probative value and required circular reasoning.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sexual assault conviction from the Summary Convictions Appeal Court.

He raised four issues: (1) admission of fresh expert evidence regarding the complainant's medical condition; (2) admission of the complainant's undisclosed criminal record; (3) admissibility of the complainant's videotaped hearsay statement under the Khelawon framework; and (4) whether a Charter s. 11(b) delay violation occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' decisions and holding that the Jordan framework did not apply retroactively to trials completed before its release.

Crown appeal against sentence imposed on a long-time cocaine distributor for a criminal organization.

The respondent was sentenced to seven years and 69 days imprisonment following guilty pleas to conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking in cocaine, committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, possession of oxycodone, and multiple breaches of recognizance.

The Crown challenged three aspects of the sentencing: the application of pre-sentence custody credit to the criminal organization offence, the concurrent sentencing of breach and possession offences, and the fitness of the five-year sentence for the trafficking offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal while granting leave to appeal.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence and sexual assault.

He appealed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that trial counsel failed to adequately advise him of his right to elect his mode of trial under s. 536 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment on the break and enter charge, which triggered the appellant's right to elect between trial in Superior Court (with preliminary inquiry) or Ontario Court of Justice.

Trial counsel made the election without providing the appellant with adequate advice regarding his options or their respective advantages and disadvantages.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's fundamental right to make an informed election regarding mode of trial had been violated, constituting a miscarriage of justice that undermined the fairness of the trial proceedings.

The appellant appealed convictions for touching a person under the age of 16 years for a sexual purpose and sexual assault.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the credible evidence of two young complainants who testified about being touched inappropriately while sleeping in the appellant's trailer.

The appellant denied the allegations and argued the complainants' evidence contained discrepancies and inconsistencies suggesting collusion or fabrication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, addressed the collusion arguments, and provided adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's denial in light of the complainants' credible testimony.

The appellant, a family doctor, was convicted of sexually assaulting a patient during an examination.

His appeal to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the complainant's 'suspicions evidence' when assessing her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no clear error of law and concluding the trial judge properly considered all evidence in his credibility analysis.