Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellant, a former employee, appealed the dismissal of his anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and sought leave to appeal a $50,000 costs award.

The appellant had made threats to communicate damaging information to the respondent's clients and the Ministry of Transportation if unpaid wage claims were not satisfied.

The motion judge found that the appellant's communications were fundamentally about his employment dispute rather than matters of public interest, and that the respondent would easily prove the statements were false and harmful.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis under s. 137.1(3) or s. 137.1(4)(b), and affirmed the costs award.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application to challenge the validity of his deceased mother's will.

The motion judge dismissed the application because the appellant failed to comply with a previous order requiring him to serve a notice of change of solicitor or a notice of intention to act in person within 30 days.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the dismissal was a final order.

The Court found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to dismiss the proceeding under Rule 15.04(9) given the appellant's pattern of delay and non-compliance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a non-profit organization, sought public interest standing to bring nine applications for judicial review challenging decisions made by the Ontario Integrity Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the applications, finding the appellant lacked standing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue as they merely challenged individual exercises of discretion rather than statutory interpretation.

The Court also agreed that the applications were not a reasonable and effective means to bring the issues before the courts, as they would conflict with the statutory scheme and its strict confidentiality provisions.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment finding she breached an agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant was never in a position to close the transaction.

A one-day error by the respondent in setting the closing date was deemed minor and immaterial to the appellant's ability to complete the purchase.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent builder.

The appellants had purchased a newly built home but failed to transfer the closing funds until 9 minutes past the 5:00 p.m. deadline on the extended closing date.

The respondent terminated the agreement relying on a 'time is of the essence' clause, but subsequently offered to revive the agreement for an additional $113,000, which the appellants paid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the 5:00 p.m. deadline was unambiguous, the termination was not unconscionable, the revival fee was part of a new contract rather than an impermissible penalty, and the appellants did not act under economic duress.

The appellant appealed an order striking his fresh as amended statement of claim against the individual respondents without leave to amend.

The claim alleged constructive dismissal, defamation, conspiracy, discrimination, and breach of Law Society rules following his resignation from the respondent law firm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleadings lacked material facts, failed to disclose viable causes of action, and could not be saved by further amendment.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect her appeal from a trial judgment awarding her former legal counsel approximately $481,000 in unpaid legal fees.

The responding party opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the moving party met the criteria for continuing intention to appeal, explanation for delay, and lack of prejudice, the putative appeal had virtually no chance of success as it primarily attacked the trial judge's factual findings without demonstrating palpable and overriding error.

The appellant, representing Ontario grain farmers, applied under Rule 14.05(3)(d) for a declaration interpreting a regulation that restricted the use of neonicotinoid-treated seeds.

The appellant argued the regulation was unworkable and sought an interpretation that would effectively delay its implementation.

The motion judge struck the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation was not ambiguous and the appellant was improperly seeking to rewrite the regulation rather than resolve a genuine interpretive dispute.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim for an accidental death benefit after her son died from a fall from a balcony.

The motion judge used fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04(2.1) to conclude the appellant could not prove the death was accidental rather than suicide.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the insurer, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the evidence.

However, the Court set aside the dismissal against the employer, as the claim against it was based on misrepresentation and it had not participated in the motion.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action alleging that Air Canada improperly collected U.S. transportation taxes on tickets purchased in Canada and between Canada and the U.S., thereby giving extra-territorial effect to U.S. tax laws.

The motion judge found the Ontario court had jurisdiction but stayed the claims of passengers who paid in the U.S. on the basis of forum non conveniens.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while Ontario courts have jurisdiction to determine if a foreign law is being enforced extra-territorially, the entire action should be stayed on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The principle of comity requires that the interpretation of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code be undertaken by U.S. authorities first.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons, noting that the appellants essentially reargued the motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants challenged an order dismissing their claim for delay, arguing that the respondent's consent to a June 2012 order requiring the action to be set down for trial by a specified date implicitly represented trial readiness and engaged Rule 48 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court rejected that submission, holding that the respondent had merely agreed to a scheduling requirement directed at the appellants' longstanding delay and made no representation about its own readiness for trial or the fairness of a future trial.

The court also held that consent to the scheduling order did not waive the respondent's right to later rely on prejudice arising from delay predating the order.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed appeal costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff school board sued the appellant and his son after the son allegedly set fire to a school.

The claim against the appellant was for negligent supervision.

The appellant's homeowner's insurer refused to defend him, relying on an exclusion clause for bodily injury or property damage caused by any intentional or criminal act or failure to act.

The motion judge held the insurer had no duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the exclusion clause only applies to intentional or criminal failures to act, and that the negligence claim against the appellant was not derivative of the son's intentional tort.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of defence and granting default judgment to the respondent bank for failing to pay $3,000 in costs in a $7 million fraud action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge failed to consider the proportionality of striking the defence and the possibility of an adjournment, given the appellant was out of the country.

The orders striking the defence and granting default judgment were set aside.

The appellants' sailboat was seized and stored at the respondent's facility.

A bailiff provided a notice of lien that included amounts unrelated to the respondent's storage charges.

The application judge found the notice valid and awarded the respondent a lien and judgment for $29,920.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the notice was invalid because it overstated the redemption amount by including third-party debts.

Consequently, under s. 4(6) of the Repair and Storage Liens Act, the respondent's lien was limited to 60 days of storage charges ($1,200), and the judgment was set aside.

The appellants requested to re-open the appeal for further argument on the correct Initial Fair Market Value date for a property.

The Court of Appeal denied the request, noting that the interpretation of the agreement regarding the valuation date was not directly addressed at trial or on appeal, but arose indirectly regarding whether an enforceable agreement existed.

The Court held that the issue of the valuation date was not central to the appeal and that the record amply supported the trial judge's finding of a valid oral agreement.

The interpretation of the agreement was left to be resolved by an arbitrator.

The infant plaintiff suffered severe brain injuries during birth following unsuccessful attempts by the defendant obstetrician to perform a forceps delivery in the labour room.

The trial judge found the obstetrician negligent for failing to transfer the mother to a delivery room where a c-section could be performed more quickly if the forceps failed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the obstetrician's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by basing liability on a 'risks management' theory that was not pleaded or argued by the plaintiffs, and by using hindsight to impute knowledge of severe fetal distress to the obstetrician at the critical time.

The appellant registered a construction lien and commenced an action while it was a dissolved corporation.

It was later revived.

The motion judge vacated the lien but allowed the contract claim to continue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the lien appeal and dismissed the contract action.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant could not rely on the corporate revival provisions of the Business Corporations Act to revive its lien action because the strict time limits under the Construction Lien Act had expired during dissolution, vesting 'rights' in the defendant.

However, the Court allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed, as the limitation period had not yet expired, permitting the appellant to amend its pleadings to correct the corporate misnomer.

The plaintiff commenced a negligence action for property damage caused by a fire shortly before the expiry of the limitation period.

During discoveries, it was revealed that the proper plaintiff was the plaintiff's corporation, not the plaintiff personally.

The plaintiff successfully moved to amend the statement of claim to substitute the corporation as the plaintiff.

The defendant appealed, arguing the amendment should not be permitted after the limitation period expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 5.04(2) grants the court discretion to substitute a party after a limitation period expires, provided there is no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant and special circumstances exist.

The moving parties sought to vacate a stay pending appeal after the Divisional Court held that the regulatory definition of "spouse" under social assistance legislation violated s. 15 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Court of Appeal held that the governing test for a stay required the party seeking the stay to establish irreparable harm if relief was refused.

Because the prior motion judge had found, on evidence reasonably supporting that conclusion, that the Crown would not suffer irreparable harm, the Crown was not entitled to a stay pending appeal.

The motion to vary was granted, the stay was set aside, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.