Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellant City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it and ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc. (AMD) jointly and severally liable for damages arising from periodic flooding of the respondent National Steel Car Limited's industrial property caused by wastewater discharge into a clogged drainage channel.

The trial judge awarded compensatory damages of approximately $5.3 million (apportioned equally between the defendants), punitive damages of $400,000 against the City and $500,000 against AMD, and granted a mandatory injunction requiring remediation and maintenance of the channel.

The City appealed on four grounds: (1) the equal apportionment of liability; (2) failure to find mitigation by National; (3) the punitive damages award; and (4) the terms of the injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal except for a clarification to the injunction language.

The appellant, a Senior Financial Advisor employed by CIBC, appealed a motion judge's decision striking portions of his Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim alleging defamation, libel, and negligence against CIBC and CIBC Securities.

The motion judge found that the alleged defamatory statements were not contained in the documents referenced, or alternatively, were not published by the respondents.

The Microsoft Teams chat could not constitute publication for defamation purposes.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the analysis of the documents and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants, operators of a long-term care home, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their defamation action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP motion).

The respondent had posted approximately 100 tweets over three years on anonymous accounts alleging elder abuse and serious wrongdoing at the facility.

The motion judge found the tweets related to a matter of public interest and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made reviewable errors in her section 137.1(4) analysis by failing to properly assess whether the defamation claim had merit and whether the appellants had suffered harm, and by assuming the respondent's expression had value without conducting the necessary preliminary analysis.

The appellants, Tyson Rogerson and his adoptive parents, appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against two physicians, Dr. Elyse Savaria and Dr. Nkiruka Nwebube.

The appellants argued that the physicians breached their duty of care by failing to report a suspected risk of harm to Tyson to the Children's Aid Society (CAS) under s. 72 of the Child and Family Services Act, which they contended would have prevented Tyson's catastrophic brain injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the physicians did not breach the standard of care in failing to report, and even if there was a breach, the appellants failed to prove causation, as the CAS would not have intervened in a way that would have prevented the injury.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents general damages of $75,000 and punitive damages of $75,000 for defamation.

The trial judge found that the appellant, a City manager, made defamatory statements about the respondents' business during a meeting with a supplier representative, acted maliciously in response to complaints the respondent had made about him, and abused his position as a public officer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of defamation, malice, and abuse of position, but set aside the punitive damages award, finding that the trial judge failed to analyze whether the compensatory damages were adequate to achieve the objectives of retribution, deterrence, and condemnation.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellants appealed an order from the motion judge dismissing a certification motion for class proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's order was clear and unequivocal in dismissing only the certification motion, not the underlying claims.

Under section 30 of the Class Proceedings Act, an appeal from an order refusing to certify a proceeding lies to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal to the Court of Appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellants proceeding with the appeal in the Divisional Court.

The appellant, a passenger injured in a motor vehicle collision, appealed a trial judgment that resulted in a nil award after the jury verdict of $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages was reduced by a statutory deductible and an advance payment made by the defendants.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's qualification of expert witnesses, aspects of the jury charge, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits and the costs appeal, finding that the trial judge properly admitted non-party expert evidence, provided a balanced jury charge, and correctly applied the costs rules given the nil judgment.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court that struck out certain allegations in his statement of defence and counterclaim as irrelevant, scandalous, and vexatious under Rule 25(11)(b).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting leave to amend the pleadings to include allegations of misconduct relevant to defences against claims for aggravated, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as potential equitable defences and claims regarding duress, undue influence, or unconscionability.

The court emphasized the need for proportionality and case management.

The costs award was set aside with no costs awarded throughout.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision ordering civil forfeiture of a property located at 855 Darby Road, Welland, and associated Hells Angels Motorcycle Club paraphernalia under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The property was owned by members of the HAMC and used as a clubhouse.

The Crown established that mortgage payments were funded in part by dues paid by HAMC members engaged in drug trafficking, and that the property was used as a meeting place where criminal activity was planned.

The Court of Appeal upheld the forfeiture order, finding the property constituted both proceeds and an instrument of unlawful activity, and that the legitimate owner and responsible owner exceptions did not apply.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent plaintiff claimed chronic pain, anxiety, and depression resulting from a relatively minor collision.

The appellants raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on alleged prejudicial evidence regarding the respondent's complaints about defence counsel's conduct, and (2) the trial judge erred in allowing an amendment to the statement of claim following the jury's verdict to reflect the full damages awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions.

This is the third appeal in a class action arising from the acquisition of London Life by Great-West Life.

The class alleged that participating policy account (PAR) transactions violated the Insurance Companies Act.

The trial judge found breaches and awarded class counsel fees of $16.4 million with a first charge over the $56.43 million returned to PAR accounts, awarded $4 million in partial indemnity costs to the class, and imposed a levy in favour of the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The appellants challenged the class counsel fees, costs award, and levy.

The majority upheld all trial judge decisions, while the dissent argued that no monetary award was made to the class and therefore no charge could attach to the PAR accounts.

The appellants appealed from a Superior Court order that set aside a Master's decision permitting amendment of the Statement of Claim to substitute the Regional Municipality of York and Brennan Paving and Construction Ltd. for the originally named defendants based on misnomer.

The original claim arose from an accident allegedly caused by a pothole on McCowan Road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master's inference that the substituted defendants would have known they were the intended defendants was not available on any reasonable view of the evidence.

The Notice of Claim and Statement of Claim, even when read together, were not capable of supporting such an inference without further inquiry.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking her statement of claim without leave to amend on two grounds: that the action was commenced beyond the applicable limitation period and that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action for civil fraud.

The appellant sought damages for fraudulent billing submissions to OHIP and alleged inability to obtain travel insurance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's own pleadings admitted discovery of the alleged fraud in 2009, which triggered the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also addressed procedural issues regarding the improper use of rule 21.01(1)(a) to advance a limitations defence and the inappropriate reliance on rule 21.01(1)(b) after the respondents had filed a statement of defence joining issue on the material facts.

The appellants (tenant and its successor) repudiated a commercial lease for an industrial property owned by the respondent.

The respondent was forced to sell the property and sued for damages.

The trial judge awarded $1,277,000 in damages, including lost rental profits and lost capital appreciation.

The appellants appealed, arguing the sale at fair market value fully mitigated damages and that lost capital appreciation was too remote.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that damages for lost capital appreciation were too remote under the Hadley v. Baxendale test, that the property was sold at fair market value, and that damages should be calculated using a discounted cash flow analysis based on the 2013 sale price with appropriate deductions for mitigation.

The appellants, the Better Business Bureau of Ottawa-Hull Incorporated and Better Business Bureau of Ottawa-Hull Inc., appealed a Divisional Court decision that had allowed an appeal by Walsh Energy Inc. in a defamation action.

The trial judge had dismissed the defamation claim, finding that the BBB's D- rating assigned to Walsh was not defamatory and was protected by the defence of fair comment.

The Divisional Court reversed, finding the D- grade was defamatory and ordering a new trial on the issues of fair comment, malice, and damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the BBB's appeal, finding that the Divisional Court erred in ordering a new trial on fair comment, as the record was sufficient to establish the defence.

The court also reduced the trial judge's costs award from $348,135.96 to $175,000 as being excessive and contrary to the fundamental objective of access to justice.

The appellant, injured in 1997 while unloading goods from a truck, brought a civil action against the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal seeking compensatory damages of $1,710,455 and punitive damages of $15 million.

The respondents moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to strike the pleadings as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motion judge granted the motions, holding that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against these bodies and that relief must be sought through judicial review.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction and in striking the pleadings for failing to disclose a cause of action for bad faith or misfeasance in public office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory scheme under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Board and Tribunal, and that circumventing this scheme through a civil action constitutes an abuse of process.

The court also held that bad faith is not independently actionable and that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for misfeasance in public office.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his action against the Toronto Police Services Board and an insurance company on the basis that the claims were barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant was aware of all facts supporting his claims by June 2010 (regarding the insurance company) and January 2011 (regarding the police board), and that he commenced his action more than two years after those dates.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that discoverability for limitation purposes is based on knowledge of the facts necessary to support a claim, not knowledge of the applicable law.

The appellant appealed a damages decision from the Superior Court of Justice.

The motion judge had declined to award damages due to the appellant's non-compliance with a pre-trial conference order regarding the filing of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that although the appellant did not comply with the order, she had filed an affidavit with supporting documentation and a factum detailing her damages claim.

The appellate court held that the motion judge should have afforded the appellant an opportunity to file compliant evidence to support her claim.

The appellant, acquitted of all charges after a jury trial, appealed a summary judgment dismissing his civil claim against the Toronto Police Services Board and police officers for negligent investigation and perjury.

The motion judge found several claims statute-barred and determined the appellant adduced no evidence capable of supporting the remaining claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that while acquittal is a necessary condition for a negligent investigation claim, it is not sufficient; there must also be evidence of a breach of the standard of care of a reasonable police officer.

The appellant failed to adduce such evidence.

On appeal from a trial judgment finding the municipal defendants liable for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident on a rural road during winter conditions.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's interpretation and application of the Municipal Act, 2001 duty to clear roads of snow and ice.

The trial judge found the road in a state of non-repair and held the municipality failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or correct the condition.

The appellants argued the trial judge applied an unreasonably high standard of maintenance for a Class 4 rural road, erred in requiring the application of straight salt rather than sand/salt mixture, and excluded relevant evidence regarding financial costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, set aside the liability findings, and ordered a new trial on liability issues while upholding the damages assessment.