Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCA

Ms. Sochnyeva sought a review of a previous order dismissing her motions for a stay of Divisional Court orders, pending her motions for leave to appeal.

She also brought a motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of a previously dismissed leave to appeal motion.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision regarding the stay, noting the matter was moot as her leave to appeal motions had already been dismissed.

The court also dismissed her motion for reconsideration, finding no circumstances to justify reversing the earlier denial of leave to appeal.

This motion concerned an applicant's request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a family law order concerning custody, access, and child support.

The applicant had prepared the notice within the prescribed period but failed to effect service in time.

The respondent opposed the extension, citing lack of merit and prejudice to the child.

The court, applying the well-known factors for extending time to appeal, found that while the applicant had a bona fide intention, the proposed appeal lacked merit, particularly as it sought to overturn factual findings justified by the record, including breaches of prior orders and abusive communications.

Considering the child's best interests, the court dismissed the motion for an extension of time.

Money Gate Corporation (MGC) brought a motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal and a declaration that it had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), or alternatively for leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The underlying matter involved a receivership where a motion judge had dismissed MGC's claim for payment from the proceeds of a property sale, finding no valid assignment of a second mortgage and that MGC was not the registered owner.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding MGC's grounds of appeal not frivolous and no real prejudice to the responding parties.

Crucially, the court declared that MGC had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA, concluding that the motion judge's order finally determined MGC's economic interests in the property proceeds, distinguishing it from a mere priorities dispute.

The appellant (Third Parties) appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the motions judge lacked authority to order the discontinuance of a third-party action, erred in awarding costs to the respondent, and failed to address their cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge had the authority to order discontinuance, with leave being subsumed in the order, and that the costs decision was within the judge's discretion.

The cross-motion issue was rendered moot.

The appellant appealed an order from a motion judge striking his pleadings related to financial matters due to his failure to pay spousal and child support, section 7 expenses, and non-compliance with multiple financial disclosure orders.

The appellant did not appear at the original motion and failed to identify any error by the motion judge on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that striking pleadings was appropriate given the serious and long-standing nature of the appellant's breaches, emphasizing the essential role of financial disclosure in matrimonial proceedings.

The appellant, Narine Loojune, appealed an order that substituted the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as guardian of property for his catastrophically injured nephew, Dataram Loojune.

The substitution was ordered due to the appellant's repeated failure to comply with court-ordered obligations to account for his nephew's property.

The appellant sought to adjourn the appeal to submit fresh evidence alleging fraud by a PGT employee and argued the motion judge applied the wrong legal test and was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment application, finding no credible evidence to support the claims or impact the appeal.

The court affirmed the motion judge's application of the "best interests" test and found no evidence of fraud, harassment, or judicial bias.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to the PGT.

The respondent, NYX Tannery Ltd., brought a motion to quash two appeals filed by the appellant, Julie Daly.

One appeal was from a costs order of $30,000, and the other from an order amending the title of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal quashed both appeals, determining that the order amending the title of proceedings was an interlocutory order requiring leave to appeal to the Divisional Court, and the costs order, being less than $50,000, also required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding a request to vary a trial costs award.

Following a successful appeal and cross-appeal by the Respondents (plaintiffs/defendants by counterclaim), they sought to vary the trial costs award, arguing entitlement to a higher scale due to beating a Rule 49 settlement offer.

The Appellants (defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim) opposed this request.

The Court declined to vary its decision, noting that the Respondents had not appealed or sought leave to appeal the trial costs, nor had they raised the issue in their notices of cross-appeal or in their submissions on costs.

This appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to the appellant's failure to appear for the hearing, despite being notified multiple times.

The court was also informed that the appellant had previously failed to attend his criminal trial, which led to the underlying application for habeas corpus, and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant, AA, was previously awarded reasonable disbursements.

AA filed submissions seeking $1,382.75 in disbursements.

Respondent CC had no issue with the amount, and respondent BB did not file any submissions.

The court awarded AA the full amount of disbursements sought, payable jointly and severally by BB and CC.

The moving party sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a $40,000 costs award arising from an unsuccessful motion to remove the responding party's counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the underlying order was interlocutory and therefore appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave.

Furthermore, the costs award was under the $50,000 threshold, which also directs the appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court dismissing his preliminary motion to challenge the authenticity of a joint venture agreement through forensic document examination.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge had mischaracterized the nature of the preliminary motion and made material factual errors in his analysis.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside portions of the October order, and reinstated the April order pending the appellant's opportunity to bring a motion in Superior Court regarding the document's authenticity.

The court also preserved the respondent's right to pursue relief if the appellant failed to bring such motion within 30 days.

The respondent retained its costs award from the application judge, and no costs were awarded on the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her negligence action arising from an injury sustained while practicing long-jump techniques at a secondary school.

The trial judge found that the school board and its employees did not breach their duty of care and met the standard of a prudent parent.

The appellant raised eleven grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's credibility assessments, factual findings, and treatment of expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no palpable and overriding error and affirming the trial judge's comprehensive reasons and conclusions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment upholding a mortgage enforcement action.

The appellants admitted the mortgage debt but argued that their financial difficulties preventing payment were caused by improper actions of their former lawyer regarding the placement of the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal found no evidence linking the lawyer dispute to the respondent mortgagees' conduct and noted that the dispute concerned only approximately $40,000 of the mortgage proceeds used to discharge writs.

The appellants offered no reasonable explanation for how resolving the lawyer claim would enable payment of the approximately $830,000 owing under the mortgage.

The court found no equitable basis to prevent mortgage enforcement and dismissed the appeal.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following an appeal from a Superior Court decision.

The appellant sought costs in the court below.

The respondent made no submissions on the costs issue.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs at $12,500, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes, payable to the appellant within 30 days.

The appellants were successful on appeal from a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs following the appeal.

Counsel for the respondent agreed that the appellants' claimed costs of $18,686.25, comprising $17,132.50 in fees on the partial indemnity scale and $1,553.75 in disbursements, were reasonable.

The court ordered that amount in costs, inclusive of HST, be paid by the respondent to the appellants.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement between the appellant and the Ontario respondents arising from the appellant's suspension from the Knights of Columbus.

The appellant argued that only an agreement in principle existed and that it was not finalized by the April 22, 2016 deadline.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a binding settlement agreement had been reached, noting that the essential terms had been agreed upon, settlement funds had been provided, and the release form had been executed by some respondents before the appellant attempted to terminate the agreement.

The proposed intervenor appealed the dismissal of her motion for leave to intervene in an Ontario action seeking recognition of a United States judgment against a foreign state and its security ministry under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.

The Court of Appeal held that she met the intervention criteria under rule 13.01(1) because she had a contingent interest in the proceeding and might be adversely affected if the foreign judgment were recognized and enforced against limited Canadian assets.

The court further held that the motion judge erred by treating the matter as a private commercial dispute and by failing to recognize the public importance of the new statutory regime.

The proposed intervenor had a useful contribution to make, particularly on a limitations argument not raised by other parties.

The appeal was allowed and leave to intervene was effectively granted through directions permitting the filing of a factum.

The appellant surveyors prepared a reference plan that incorrectly portrayed a right of way as a straight line, failing to show a curve that circumvented a rock outcrop.

The reference plan was deposited on title.

A dispute arose between the neighbouring property owners over the use of the road.

The surveyors brought a motion to rectify the reference plan under section 160 of the Land Titles Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, holding that the registered title was indefeasible.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a reference plan does not independently create an interest in land and that the court has jurisdiction to rectify the boundaries of the right of way.

The appellant commenced a fraudulent conveyance action against the respondent, which was stayed when the respondent filed for bankruptcy.

The appellant later obtained an order under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to bring proceedings in its own name.

The motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred, finding that the trustee's discoverability date governed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 12(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the relevant discoverability date is the earlier of the trustee's or the creditor's.

Since the creditor discovered the claim before the new Limitations Act came into force, no limitation period applied.