Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCA

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing a motion.

The respondent CIBC conceded that the appellant was not provided with the opportunity to make submissions in response to CIBC's Rule 2.1.01 motion.

The Court of Appeal granted the appeal, set aside the order, and remitted the motion to the Superior Court to be heard by another judge.

The Court made no determination as to the merits of the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant, allowing the appellant to renew those arguments before the judge hearing the motion.

No costs were awarded.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order concerning monthly access to children.

The Society argued that the OCJ lacked jurisdiction to entertain an enforcement motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules after a final order had been made, contending that the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 was a complete code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the OCJ retained jurisdiction to enforce its orders, as the definition of "case" in the Family Law Rules explicitly includes "enforcements," and requiring a new proceeding for enforcement would contradict the principle of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the Superior Court judge and addressed procedural fairness concerns.

SIR Corp. appealed the dismissal of its application for insurance coverage for business losses and food spoilage incurred during the COVID-19 pandemic due to government-imposed in-person dining restrictions.

The appellant sought coverage under "Civil or Military Authority" and "Ingress/Egress" clauses of its "all-risk" property insurance policy with Aviva.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the policy required direct physical loss or damage for coverage, which the government orders did not cause.

It also held that "catastrophe" in the policy was limited to events similar to "conflagration" (large-scale physical destruction) and did not include the pandemic.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs award, upholding the application judge's decision.

The appellant, Rolling Meadows Land Development Corporation, appealed judgments dismissing its motion to convert applications to an action, finding a purchase and sale agreement binding, and finding no breach of contract by the respondent, Pine Glen Thorold Inc. The appeal raised arguments concerning the refusal to convert applications, a claim of unilateral mistake in signing the contract, and the quantification of renovation costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decisions.

The court affirmed that the application judge was entitled to adjudicate the issues on the record, that no unilateral mistake was established given the appellant's sophistication and the contract's clarity, and that the renovation quantification was properly determined.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of "involved in the incident" under section 268(2) of the Insurance Act, which dictates liability for statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision that an arbitrator erred in law by introducing a causation requirement into the test for "involvement" in a priority dispute between an insured snowmobile's insurer (Gore Mutual) and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court held that temporal, spatial, and participatory factors were sufficient to establish involvement, without requiring a direct causal link to the injuries.

The appellant sought to review a single judge's order declining an extension of time to perfect his appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned a refusal to extend time to appeal an Ontario Court of Justice order dismissing the appellant's application for adult child support under the Family Law Act, based on his failure to pay a 1995 New Brunswick divorce judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no error in the motion judge's decision regarding the appellant's delay, lack of merit in the appeal, and prejudice to the respondents.

The court affirmed that the motion judge properly considered the relevant factors for extending time to perfect an appeal.

The appellant, David Wong, representing a class of shareholders, appealed the summary dismissal of a secondary market misrepresentation class action against Pretium Resources Inc. and its former CEO.

The claim alleged that Pretium failed to publicly disclose concerns about its Brucejack mining project's resource estimate and feasibility study, which had been conveyed by Strathcona Mineral Services Ltd. The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Strathcona's concerns were not material facts requiring disclosure because they were unsolicited, inexpert, premature, and unreliable opinions, not undisputed facts.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's alternative finding that the respondents had conducted a reasonable investigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a highly contentious family law matter involving child custody and support, the trial judge appointed two amicus curiae—one for the self-represented mother and one for the father after his counsel withdrew due to non-payment of fees.

The Crown appealed the amicus appointments.

Although the appeal became moot when the trial concluded with both amicus participating, the Court of Appeal issued a comprehensive judgment establishing principles governing amicus appointments in private family law cases.

The court held that the trial judge erred in principle by appointing the mother's former counsel as amicus (injecting adversarial elements inconsistent with amicus's impartial role) and by appointing a second amicus (contrary to principle in family law contexts).

The court emphasized that amicus appointments should be rare, essential to adequate discharge of judicial functions, and subject to clear, detailed orders specifying the scope of duties.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their wrongful dismissal action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants were dismissed for cause in November 2009 and commenced their action in July 2015, approximately six years later.

The appellants argued that they did not know whether a civil proceeding was an appropriate means to seek remedy until related criminal proceedings were resolved.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that "appropriate" under section 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act means legally appropriate, not whether the proceeding will succeed.

The court distinguished Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board) on the basis that the civil and criminal matters were not mirror images of each other in this case.

Class members who are not representative plaintiffs have no direct right of appeal from an order approving a settlement in a certified class action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the decision in Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada remains good law and has not been superseded by subsequent decisions.

A settlement approval order is neither a judgment on common issues nor a determination of aggregate damages, and therefore class members cannot seek leave to appeal under section 30(5) of the Class Proceedings Act.

Permitting individual class members to appeal settlement approvals would introduce uncertainty into settlement negotiations, undermine the authority of representative plaintiffs and class counsel, and impede the resolution of class actions.

The appellant purchaser failed to close on an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property in Mississauga.

After receiving multiple extensions, the appellant ultimately did not close due to inability to obtain mortgage financing.

The respondent vendors resold the property for a lower price and sued for damages.

The motion judge awarded damages for the difference in price plus consequential losses, and ordered forfeiture of the $75,000 deposit without crediting it toward the damages.

On appeal, the court upheld the damages award but reversed the deposit forfeiture issue, holding that the deposit must be credited toward the damages when the vendor suffers a loss from the purchaser's breach.

The applicant sought to set aside a decision denying him an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision from 2010, which had substantially denied his appeal from support, equalization payments, and associated costs orders made after a Superior Court trial in 2008.

The applicant also sought additional relief including extensions to file leaves to appeal and notices of appeal relating to interim support orders, as well as orders for production and use of transcripts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the lower court's decision and clarifying that the applicant's proper remedy for changed financial circumstances lies in an application for variation or termination of support obligations.

The appellants, a law firm, appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their defamation action against a lawyer and her firm.

The lawyer, Brunning, practiced "in association" with Williams-Litigation Lawyers, sharing office space and using the firm's letterhead without supervision.

The motion judge found Williams could not be vicariously liable for Brunning's allegedly defamatory correspondence regarding Indian Residential School claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the question of liability was novel and important, involving policy considerations that should be determined at trial rather than on summary judgment.

The court emphasized that Williams had authorized Brunning's use of its letterhead and held her out as associated with the firm, creating potential liability.

The appellant insurer appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding insurance policy interpretation.

The insurer argued that there was no "Claim" against an "Insured Person" for a "Wrongful Act" nor was there a "Loss" within the policy's definitions.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's interpretation of the governing principles or the policy language, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was awarded costs of $16,000.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated March 29, 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had not demonstrated any error in the court below and dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision granting the respondent approximately $311,000 on a mortgage debt and dismissing the appellant's counter-claim for a refund of payments made.

The appellant had participated in a fraudulent transaction by allowing himself to be put forward as the mortgagor when the true owner could not qualify for a mortgage.

The appellant received $5,000 for his participation and made payments on the mortgage for seven years before it went into default.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the motions judge's application of the rules and rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding the unenforceability of the mortgage.

The appellant, a father, appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his mortgage action against his son and daughter-in-law.

The trial judge had found the mortgage unenforceable on three grounds: duress, sham, and failure to prove advances.

The Court of Appeal reversed on the first two grounds, finding no duress and that the mortgage was not a sham.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the father failed to prove that funds advanced through a company were made under the mortgage, as opposed to being income to the son.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Justice dated June 17, 2016.

The parties settled the matter prior to the appeal hearing.

The appeal and application for leave to appeal costs were dismissed by consent, with costs awarded to the respondent in the amount of $25,000, all inclusive.

An appeal concerning the disqualification of counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from a lawyer's transfer between law firms.

The lawyer, who had worked extensively on an insurance coverage dispute for the plaintiff, transferred to the defendant's law firm where he would work closely with opposing counsel.

The court addressed whether an ethical screen could adequately protect the former client's confidential information given the intense working relationship between the two lawyers.

The appeal court upheld the disqualification, finding that while the firm had achieved technical compliance with professional guidelines, the spirit of those guidelines was absent and the presumption of inadvertent disclosure could not be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that partially dismissed his summary judgment motion.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's slander claim but refused to dismiss the respondent's sexual assault claim, finding no settlement had been reached and that the respondent's claim was not statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding no settlement occurred and that the Sexual Violence and Harassment Action Plan Act, 2016 amendments should not apply retroactively.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact and misapplied the law regarding settlement.

However, the court declined to make its own findings on the settlement issue due to significant credibility disputes and directed the matter proceed to trial on all issues.