Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCA

The appellant sought a stay of execution of a possession order pending appeal of a summary judgment decision.

The property was mortgaged to Equitable Bank for $610,000.

The appellant defaulted on payments in September 2023 and failed to comply with a forbearance agreement.

The lower court granted summary judgment for possession and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for stay, finding no serious issue to be tried on appeal, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the stay.

The appellant had admitted default and the mortgage terms clearly permitted the lender to demand full payment and take possession.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order finding that a solicitor-client relationship existed between Paul Kasanda and the respondent law firm (KMH Lawyers and Miriam Vale Peters) for the purposes of an assessment of unpaid legal accounts under the Solicitors Act.

The appellants sought to remove Paul as a party to the assessment, arguing he was not a client and had not agreed to pay for legal services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that sufficient indicia of a solicitor-client relationship existed based on the totality of the circumstances, including retainer agreements, communications, instructions, advice, and payment arrangements.

The Receiver, B. Riley Farber Inc., brought a motion for directions in an appeal proceeding concerning an Approval and Vesting Order (AVO) for the sale of real property.

The appellants, 1000162497 Ontario Inc. and Maplequest Uptown Developments Inc., sought to enjoin the sale, claiming an automatic right of appeal and stay under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The Court of Appeal determined that the appeal was governed by the BIA but found no automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) because the appellants failed to provide credible evidence that the property's value involved in the appeal exceeded $10,000 in loss.

Consequently, no automatic stay under s. 195 of the BIA applied.

The court also stated that even if a stay were applicable, it would be lifted due to lack of merit and the balance of convenience favoring the Receiver.

The appellants, parents whose children were made Crown wards, appealed the dismissal of their action against multiple defendants involved in the child protection proceedings.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious, being an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the lower court's decision that the action constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant lawyer and his firm appealed an order directing the assessment of 14 accounts rendered to the respondent over an 11-year period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the application judge erred in finding 'special circumstances' under s. 4 of the Solicitors Act to justify assessing the older, previously paid accounts.

The assessment was limited to the final three accounts, which were in dispute regarding the allocation of settlement funds, and the respondent's corporation was added as a client on the assessment.

The appellants sought to appeal a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay an action in favour of arbitration.

The respondents raised a jurisdictional objection based on section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, which provides that there is no appeal from the court's decision on a motion to stay.

The Court of Appeal held that section 7(6) precludes any appeal from a decision on a motion to stay, whether granting or refusing the stay, and therefore dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds without reviewing the motion judge's analysis.

The appellant, a teacher at a private school, appealed the dismissal of her constructive dismissal claim by way of summary judgment.

She alleged that the respondent school altered the terms of her employment by failing to protect her from a confrontation with a student's parents over a mark, undermining her authority by having another teacher read and mark assignments, and assigning passing grades to students who had not completed all assignments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal, finding no evidence that the school altered the terms of employment or breached any policy, and that the school's response to the appellant's complaints was measured and reasonable.

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment order dismissing his action against police services and other defendants.

The action arose from two events: an alleged negligent police investigation into a theft complaint and alleged negligent investigations into complaints of child abuse.

The motion judge dismissed the action on two grounds: no duty of care was owed by the police to the appellant, and the action was commenced after the applicable limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the motion judge correctly concluded there was no duty of care owed to the appellant based on established precedent.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee damages for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge found no cause for termination and awarded damages based on a 19-month notice period, a 2015 bonus, aggravated damages of $25,000, and punitive damages of $100,000.

The appellant challenged each component of the award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The court upheld the trial judge's reasoning on the notice period, bonus entitlement, aggravated damages based on the employer's threatening conduct and bad faith, and punitive damages reflecting the employer's strategic use of a counter-claim to intimidate the employee.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to quash an appeal by Fay Brunning, a lawyer representing persons in proceedings under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

The appeal challenged a direction issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge requiring Brunning to appear before an Independent Assessment Process Adjudicator.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the direction was an interlocutory order rather than a final order, and that any appeal from it should go to the Divisional Court with leave.

The court also found the appeal moot since the scheduled proceedings had already taken place.

The court noted that while Brunning's concerns about the judge's comments regarding her conduct were understandable, those comments were part of the reasons for judgment, not the order itself, and could be challenged in other pending appeals.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondents.

The motion had been rescheduled from February 1, 2018 to January 31, 2018, but the appellants did not receive notice of the change because they were in an area without internet access.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellants did not receive adequate notice of the hearing date and allowed the appeal, setting aside the summary judgment.

The respondents' motion was to be rescheduled on proper notice to the appellants.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against the estate of their first cousin, Dr. Sherman, and others.

The appellants claimed that Dr. Sherman owed them an ad hoc fiduciary duty to look after their financial interests and that he breached this duty by failing to honour an option agreement that would have allowed them to acquire shares in the family businesses.

The motion judge dismissed the action on two grounds: first, that no genuine issue requiring trial existed regarding the fiduciary duty, and second, that the action constituted an abuse of process as it attempted to re-litigate issues already determined in a prior unsuccessful action against Royal Trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim against an individual respondent on a Rule 21 motion.

The appellant was employed by the corporate respondent and alleged his employment was wrongfully terminated as reprisal for a workplace injury claim.

The motion judge struck the claim against the individual respondent, finding insufficient pleading of grounds to establish personal liability outside the scope of corporate duties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that while tortious conduct allegations may form the basis for personal liability against officers or directors, such claims must be specifically and adequately pleaded with clarity and precision.

Bald or vague assertions of intentional tortious conduct are insufficient to defeat a Rule 21 motion.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 16, 2017.

The appeal was abandoned on consent, and costs were fixed in the amount of $2,500 payable to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal claim on summary judgment.

The appellant was hired by Atomic Energy of Canada but was terminated after providing false information on his security clearance questionnaire and during the hiring process.

He failed to disclose his employment at Ivaco Rolling Mills and misrepresented his whereabouts when contacted about an employment offer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal, finding that the breach of honesty went to the core of the employment relationship, particularly given the national security context and the appellant's access to nuclear facilities and sensitive information.

The respondent stored food processing equipment owned by the appellant and claimed a storage lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The respondent retained the equipment in breach of his obligation to sell it after receiving a letter from the appellant dated May 30, 2012.

The trial judge ordered the respondent to pay damages of $129,500 USD but reduced this by crediting $27,900 for storage fees at $900 per month for 31 months.

On appeal, the appellant challenged whether credit should have been given and the amount thereof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to grant the credit and the calculation of the storage fees.

The appellant employer appealed a wrongful dismissal judgment awarding the respondent damages based on a 17-month notice period.

The employer argued the respondent failed to mitigate by refusing an offer of re-employment at approximately 20% lower salary.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that an employee is not obliged to accept re-employment that risks waiver of the wrongful dismissal claim without clear confirmation that acceptance would be without prejudice to the original claim.

This decision addresses costs of the proceedings below following a partial appeal success.

The appellants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing they were substantially successful on the issues that drove the proceedings.

The respondents sought no costs or costs on a partial indemnity basis, arguing the success was divided.

The court found that while the appeal was allowed only in part, the appellants enjoyed greater success on the key issues and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, reflecting the divided success.

An appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order was dismissed on consent of both parties.

The appellant, 144673 Ontario Limited carrying on business as Whiskey A Gogo, and the respondent, the Estate of Freddie Romanoski, agreed to the dismissal of the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a father in child protection proceedings, appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order varying his access to children from unsupervised to supervised pending trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the Superior Court order was interlocutory in nature, dealing with interim access pending trial, and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court declined to transfer the matter to the Divisional Court, finding that section 19(4) of the Courts of Justice Act precluded such an appeal.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.