ADR/Mediation Services - ONCA

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to section 2.8 of an agreement.

The application judge dismissed the application because the appellant had already commenced an arbitration under section 8.18 on all issues, including working capital, and could not change course mid-way.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that jurisdictional issues were properly reserved to the arbitration, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a motions judge's finding that an agreement to mediate suspended the limitation period under s. 11(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants argued that an express written agreement was required and that the alleged agreement lacked mutual intention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge's finding of an agreement to mediate was supported by the evidence and owed deference.

The Court clarified, however, that it did not endorse the motions judge's suggestion that s. 11(1) applies even where there is ambiguity about the existence of an agreement.

The parties appealed and cross-appealed a Superior Court decision that varied an arbitrator's award regarding child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal judge's decision, finding that the arbitrator erred in his application of the D.B.S. factors for retroactive child support, misunderstood the tax implications of retroactive lump sum spousal support, and failed to properly analyze whether post-separation income increases were related to the marriage.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The parties entered into a separation agreement requiring spousal support variations to be dealt with by arbitration.

After the husband stopped paying support, the wife filed the agreement for enforcement under s. 35 of the Family Law Act.

The husband then applied to the Superior Court to vary support and moved under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act to prevent the suspension of his driver's licence.

The motion judge held the court had jurisdiction to vary support because the wife sought enforcement under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the wife's appeal, holding that neither the Family Law Act nor the Enforcement Act supersedes a valid domestic contract's exclusive arbitration provision.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants argued that the limitation period was suspended under s. 52 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, because an arbitration had been commenced via correspondence, or alternatively, that the respondent was estopped from pleading a limitations defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties' correspondence merely proposed an arbitration agreement and did not commence an arbitration under s. 23 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court also found no evidence to support an estoppel claim.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay the respondents' litigation based on an arbitration clause in their shareholder agreements.

The respondents argued the parties never reached an agreement on the contents of a schedule, meaning no arbitration agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and stayed the litigation, noting that the respondents had not sought a declaration that the agreements were void ab initio, the agreements contained severability clauses making the arbitration clauses separate contracts, and under the Arbitration Act, an arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction.

The litigation was stayed except with respect to three companies that were not parties to any shareholder agreement.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside an arbitrator's interlocutory orders, an order striking statements of defence, a final arbitral award, and removed the arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the application judge erred in setting aside the interlocutory orders, as the Arbitration Act does not permit judicial intervention for procedural decisions.

However, the Court upheld the setting aside of the order striking the pleadings and the final award, finding that the respondents were treated unfairly because their bankruptcy made compliance with the interlocutory orders legally impossible.

The removal of the arbitrator was also upheld.

The applicant condominium corporation brought a motion to quash the respondent's amended notice of appeal.

The respondent sought to appeal a judge's decision refusing to grant leave to appeal under s. 45 of the Arbitration Act.

The Court of Appeal held that no appeal lies from such a refusal unless the judge mistakenly declined jurisdiction.

As the leave judge fully considered the application and did not decline jurisdiction, the appeal was quashed.