ADR/Mediation Services - ONCA

The respondent moved to quash an appeal of a stay order granted under section 9 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, arguing that the stay order was temporary and therefore interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that a stay order under section 9 of the ICAA is generally final in nature for purposes of determining the proper appeal route, as it effectively ends the action before the court.

The court rejected arguments that the stay was temporary merely because the arbitral tribunal might decline jurisdiction, and clarified that statements in cost submissions and the motion judge's characterization of the order do not alter its legal nature for appeal purposes.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal from a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement in the context of a pending arbitration.

The appellants failed to pay the agreed amount by the deadline, triggering a penalty clause.

The court found no error in the application judge’s decision to proceed by application rather than action, in the finding that the respondents had not breached their obligations of good faith, or in the enforcement of the penalty clause.

The appeal was dismissed and costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, Binance Holdings Limited, appealed a motion judge's order dismissing its motion for a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration.

The underlying dispute involved a proposed class action by purchasers of cryptocurrency derivatives against Binance for alleged violations of the Ontario Securities Act.

The motion judge had found the arbitration clause void due to public policy and unconscionability, and that exceptions to the competence-competence principle applied, allowing the court to decide the validity of the arbitration clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the arbitration clause was inaccessible and unconscionable, effectively insulating Binance from meaningful challenge, and that the court properly exercised jurisdiction over the validity of the arbitration agreement.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision enforcing an international arbitral award.

The appellant (LinkGlobal Food Inc.) sought an adjournment in the lower court to obtain evidence regarding alleged failures of natural justice in the arbitration, which was denied.

The application judge enforced the award.

On appeal, LinkGlobal argued the denial of the adjournment was contrary to the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision, noting the appellant's lack of diligence in obtaining evidence and the narrow scope for refusing foreign arbitral awards.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal and dismiss a related motion for leave to appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, applying principles from *Iris Technologies Inc. v. Rogers Communications Canada Inc.*, which held that under s. 17(9) of the *Arbitration Act, 1991*, there is no further right of appeal from a Superior Court judge's decision reviewing an arbitrator's preliminary jurisdictional ruling.

The Superior Court had overturned an arbitrator's decision regarding the validity of a lease and its arbitration clause.

Consequently, both the appeal and the motion for leave to appeal were quashed.

This appeal addressed the interpretation of "fraud" in sections 46(1)9 and 47(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, specifically whether it includes "constructive fraud." The application judge had set aside an arbitral award, finding constructive fraud by the Condominium Corporation for expanding the scope of arbitration beyond costs.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, holding that "fraud" in the Act refers only to actual fraud, requiring dishonesty or moral turpitude, not the broader equitable concept of constructive fraud.

The court emphasized the Act's objectives of efficiency and finality in arbitration, and the narrow grounds for judicial intervention.

The appellant, David E. Wires, appealed a Superior Court judgment that recognized and enforced an arbitration award obtained by the respondent, La Française IC 2.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal due to alleged bias, lack of standing of the respondent, and errors in the arbitrator's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly determined that relitigating the bias issue was an abuse of process, that the respondent had standing, and that the costs award was properly recognized and enforced without double-counting.

This appeal concerns the admissibility of fresh evidence in an application to set aside an arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional decision under the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the Divisional Court's ruling that such applications are hearings de novo, allowing parties to introduce evidence not previously before the arbitral tribunal, and that the "competence-competence" principle does not limit the court's fact-finding ability in this context.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Divisional Court's decision to admit the fresh evidence.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision that denied leave to appeal an arbitration award exceeding $100 million.

The central issue was whether the arbitration agreement precluded appeals on questions of law, specifically interpreting phrases like "finally settled" and "final and binding" in the context of the Arbitration Act, 1991 and ICC Rules.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the arbitration agreement precluded appeals, thereby confirming that leave to appeal was not available.

The court also addressed and dismissed a motion to quash the appeal, clarifying the narrow circumstances under which a denial of leave to appeal by a Superior Court judge can be appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The City of Brockville appealed an application judge's order that set aside three arbitral awards and appointed a new arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by characterizing questions of mixed fact and law as extricable questions of law and by misapplying procedural fairness principles under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court emphasized the narrow basis for setting aside arbitral awards and the caution required in extricating questions of law from contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating the arbitrator's original awards.

SPay Inc. sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision not to stay a receiver's motion for judgment in favour of international arbitration.

The motion judge had ruled that the arbitration provisions were inoperative due to Ontario's "single proceeding model" in insolvency cases, finding SPay was not a "stranger to the bankruptcy" because its proposed set-off against Mundo Media Ltd.'s largest account receivable effectively made it a creditor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, concluding that the proposed appeal lacked prima facie merit and did not raise issues of general importance.

The court affirmed that insolvency courts have broad discretion to centralize proceedings, and that a party asserting a significant set-off is not a stranger to the insolvency, thus falling under the single proceeding model.

The appellant, Zafar Ahmad, appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default order that directed him to pay spousal support, designate the respondent, Maria Zia, as a life insurance beneficiary, and make an equalization payment.

Ahmad argued the default order was made without jurisdiction due to a prior arbitration or that the arbitration award gave rise to a res judicata defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate these specific claims under Ontario law, and that an arbitration agreement does not preclude court jurisdiction if a stay motion is not brought.

The court also found the res judicata doctrine inapplicable as the arbitration award did not address equalization or support.

The motion judge's discretionary decision, based on Ahmad's failure to promptly respond, provide an adequate explanation, establish an arguable case, provide financial disclosure, and lack of clean hands, was upheld.

Tbaytel, the moving party, sought to strike an affidavit filed by Optiva Inc., the responding party, in connection with Optiva's pending motion for leave to appeal an arbitration award.

The affidavit, from J. Brian Casey, aimed to provide factual information regarding the public importance of issues raised in the leave to appeal motion, specifically concerning the availability of summary judgment in arbitration without consent and the arbitrator's use of case law.

The court partially granted the motion, striking parts of the affidavit that expressed opinions on the legal importance of issues or buttressed attacks on the correctness of prior decisions, while allowing factual descriptions of common arbitration practices to remain.

Consultants retained by multiple landowners to assist in obtaining government approval for urban development entered into a Cost Sharing Agreement providing for hourly fees and a bonus payment upon formal adoption of a Regional Official Plan Amendment.

One landowner purported to terminate the Agreement unilaterally in 2004.

The Regional Official Plan Amendment was adopted in 2009 with all appeals exhausted in 2015.

The consultants commenced an action for the bonus in 2015.

The respondents moved to dismiss on limitation grounds.

The motions judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellants argued the termination was ineffective because only collective termination was permitted and that the limitation period had not expired.

The Court of Appeal held that while individual termination was not permitted, the appellants had accepted the anticipatory repudiation through their conduct and inaction over 11 years, thereby accepting the termination and causing the limitation period to expire.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision setting aside an arbitrator's award of $12.3 million in damages for lost profits.

The arbitrator had found that the respondent unlawfully terminated a purchase and management agreement by delivering a "Defunct Project Notice" in bad faith, thereby depriving the appellant of the value of awarded contracts.

The application judge had set aside the award, finding the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction by awarding damages for lost profits, which were allegedly precluded by the contract's indemnity provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator acted within jurisdiction by interpreting and applying the substantive provisions of the contract, and that section 46(1)3 of the Arbitration Act permits only limited review for jurisdictional error, not review of the merits of the arbitrator's decision.

The appellant brought a proposed class action on behalf of Uber food delivery drivers, claiming they were employees entitled to protections under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The service agreement required arbitration in the Netherlands under ICC Rules.

The motion judge granted a stay in favour of arbitration.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the arbitration clause invalid on two independent grounds: (1) it constituted illegal contracting out of an employment standard (the complaint investigation process under s. 96 of the ESA), contrary to s. 5(1) of the ESA; and (2) it was unconscionable at common law due to prohibitive costs (US$14,500 upfront), significant inequality of bargaining power, and the absence of independent legal advice.

The court held that validity of arbitration agreements is a matter for the court to determine under s. 7(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, not the arbitrator.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment dismissing an appeal of an arbitrator's preliminary award.

The franchisor appealed the arbitrator's determination that the limitation period for arbitration had not expired.

The dispute arose from a franchisee's notice of rescission of a franchise agreement based on alleged non-disclosure by the franchisor.

The central issue was whether a mediation requirement in the franchise agreement constituted a precondition to arbitration that suspended the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The arbitrator severed the requirement that mediation occur in Delaware, finding it contrary to the Arthur Wishart Act, and determined that the limitation period commenced only after mediation was deemed completed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the arbitrator's decision, applying a reasonableness standard of review.

The applicant sought to determine whether an order granting a conditional stay of enforcement of an arbitration award was final or interlocutory, as this determination established jurisdiction.

The arbitration concerned ownership of software, with the arbitrator awarding ownership to the respondent, granting injunctive relief, and ordering costs exceeding $1.5 million.

The applicant commenced an application to set aside parts of the award.

The application judge granted a conditional stay of enforcement pending the disposition of the application, conditioning the stay on monthly payments of $25,000.

The court determined that the stay order was interlocutory because the merits of the underlying application remained to be determined and the matter was pending under the relevant statutory provisions.

The appellant tenant appealed an order quashing its appeal from an arbitration award determining fair market rental under a 99-year ground lease.

The central issue was whether the parties' appeal rights were limited to questions of law with leave, as provided in the Arbitration Act, 1991, or whether broader appeal rights existed under the original Lease provisions referencing the Arbitrations Act, R.S.O. 1970.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the Arbitration Agreement was a stand-alone agreement governing appeal rights and that the parties' appeal rights were limited to questions of law with leave under the 1991 Act.

This appeal concerns whether a partial stay of proceedings should be granted in favour of arbitration in a class action involving both consumer and non-consumer claims against TELUS Mobility for alleged undisclosed billing practices (rounding up calls to the next minute).

The appellants argued that the motions judge erred in refusing to stay the non-consumer claims pursuant to section 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The appellants contended that the Court of Appeal's decision in Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc. had been overtaken by the Supreme Court's decision in Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Griffin remains binding authority in Ontario and has not been overtaken by Seidel, as the two cases were decided in materially different legislative contexts.